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Preface
\lost commentators, political analysts, and even scholarly
economic students of development� in the Soviet Uuiun - and
in Eastern Europe g:enerally -have as yet no keen, appreciative
understanding of the strategic position am! world-wide signifi
CUlllT of the nou-Hussian 11.-1.tions he]cl captive within the Soviet
Union itself. Largely as a rC'sult of the educational efforts these
past few years of several institutions in the United States, many
of these ohservers have, of course, comp to know that there are
fundamental cliHt'reuccs between the people and history of
Georgia, Armeuia, Turkcstau, \Vhite Ruthcnia, Azerbaijan, or
Ukraine and those of Hussia. This knowledge is in itself a meas
ure of real progress. HowcYer, it falls far short of a dynamic
uudcn,tamling that with sound perspective can nwaningfnlly re
late. for example, :\Ioscow's economic and political concessions
to these non-Hussian nations with its appeasement policy toward
Tito, or patriotic riots iu .KieY to the Hungariau revolutiou, or
i\Ioscow's persistent propagawla in Asia about the "independ
ence·' of Ukraine and its imperialist drive among the former
colonial nations. In short, mere descriptive knowledge is no
working foundation for that problem-solving capacity which the
suhtlc maneuwrs of the imperi,tlist oligarchy in :Moscow chal
lenge daily in its implacable war against \VestC'rn ci\"ilization.
The natural foe-al point for a problem-solving understanding
of the machinatious and tactics of the Hussian Communist olig
archv is Ukraine. The reason;, for this art' manv, as the Hussiau
o!ig;rchs themselves - beginning with Khrushciiev - well know.
One rests on the elemental fact that Ukrairw is the largest non
Hmsian nation not ouly in the substrate empire known as the
Soviet Uuion hut also behind the European Iron Curtain. Sec
ond, in natural resources-agriculhirc, coal, oil, iron, etc.
Ukraine is one of the richest am\ most diversified regions of
Europe. Third, for a number of objectives, by geographical
position it is strategically located in close relation to Central
Europe. th(' :\1irldle East. the Caucasus. aml the open steppes
of Russia. Fourth. the heroic record of Ukrainiau natimml resist
ance to Hussian dorninaliori, whether Czarist or Communist_ is a
permancut and yery mueh opeu chapter in \Vorkl annals of the
struggle for personal and natio11al freedom. And fifth, as a
manifest derivative of tht' abm·c, without its imperialist po<;ses-

sion of L'krnine. Communist Hu ssia couldn·t possibly maintain
fur long the substrate t'mpire of the Soviet L'nion, no less the
recently r,cqnircd satellite strata of th(' Hnssiau Communist Em
pire, Briefly, in terms of history aml logic, Ukraine is the jewel
in the sickled crown o± the Hussian Communist Empire, and no
where. unfortunately, is this appreciated more than in the
Kremlin.
The lounJation o± Hussian Communist colonialism, as seen at
work in the so-called satellite area, is set in the broad, non
Hnssian periphery of the Soviet Union. This colonialism far
f'xcccds in exploitation and tyrmmv anything that might be
associated with past \Ves\ern colonialirn1. Plainly, the Sovit>t
Union is in reality a totalitarian empire structure. One cannot
mraningfully cast and interpret economic phenomena within
that struclnre other than in a moni.<.tic framework of totalitarian
technique and management in which the production, distribu
tion, and consumption of resources are predicated on totalistic
political ends as determined by a rnling minority within a minor
ity nation of this basic empirP. Hegar<lless of the superficial de
Stalinization program or the economic decentralization meas
ures dcsignrd to enhance productivity as well a.s integrate the
energies· of the mm-Hussian nations in the plan of the enipire,
the substanc.'e of Ambassador Lodge's rebuttal to Vishinsky on
August 27, 19,53 in the United Nations will remain in force:
"Head tlw reports ahout the small minority of so-called 'Great
Russians' who art' crowding the natin' peoples ill thP Soviet
Union out of choice jobs and are tryiug to take ovn evnything
for themselves. Those are real master-race tactics on the Hitler
pattern."
Asidc from tlw magnified effects of modern technology, the
institutional facets of this Moscow-centered structure constitute
a totalitarian offshoot of the autocratic structure of the Czarist
Hussian Empire which scarcely existed for the material and
c11lt11ral betterment of the 11nvestcd Hussian popnla(c, not to
speak of the numerous non-Hussia11 uations it held in bondage,
This is. an indispensable and valuable perspt'ctive for a real
understanding of Rnssiun Communist lOlonialism sinC"e the in
ception of the SoYiet Cnion. The Hmsian HeYolution prodnced
no institutional hiatn, as concerns tlw continuity of Hussian im
perialism ,ind colonialism. It is this vital perspecti\'e that Pro
fessor Kost Kononenko supplies in thb first volume of an histori-

co.economic analysis of the Russian Empire. Concentrating on
th<' period from 1861 to 1917, this incisive work is well Jocu
mcntcd, factual!�· descriptive, and annlytic throughout. \Vith adP
quatc statistical support, it covers all the major spheres in the
economic: relationship behveen Russia and Ukraine, and demon
strates v.:ith telling effect the consistent Russian econorni(' e,p!oi
tation of Ukrainian surpluses. Jn essence, the solid achievem: nt
of Professor Konouenko is seen in his realistic and objective pre
sentation of the PSSt'ntial force of Russian colonialism under the
\Vhite Czars in a period preceding the i11tensificd colltinuation
of the same force under the Hcd Czars.
There can be 1m doubt that this \VOrk is a much needed addi
tion to the economic research now being pursued in this country
with regard to the past aud present Hussian Empire. :\lucl1 of
this research, as, for example, Soviet Economic Gmwth (Joint
Economic Committee Report, 19.'57), consists of abstract, aggre
gative an,1lyses of the economy of USSR that reveal little or
nothing of the ecouomic differentials and inequities which
exist behveen Russia and the non-Russian nations in this Pmpire
complex. As the llnotccl report, the :rest>arch being clone usually
rests 011 politically unrealistic assumptions of a "national cco110my," \Vith a gross national product rather thau a gross empire
product, and consistently employs '.\.foscow-madc monolithic
terms, such as "Soviet people" and the like. Obviously such re
search is of little value when it comes to treating real problems
of colonialism and economic disparities within the Soviet Union.
This work represents a healthy balance to the usual studies: the
promised seconJ volume by ProfessoI Kononcuko should deepeu
American economic scholarship on the Soviet Union imrne·1snr
ablv.
E. DoBnrA;-.;SKY
Georgetown University
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Introduction
A CLosi,; ANALYSIS of Ukraine's history brings
into relief an odd phenomenon. It is difficult to under
stand, how so richly endowed Ukraine could fall behind other
lands of Europe; how it could show signs during its historical
development, contradicting all the possibilities of its natural re
sources. Even a superficial s11r\'ey of the various aspects of thf'
economic position and life of Ukraine gives this astounding im
pression. For example: this land seemingly destined to take a
leading place in workl agriculture, has not done so. Yet, it pos
sesses the hest soil in all Europe. From Southern Volhynia to
North of Mykolalv, clay-laden black soil often reaches a depth
of over three feet, and contaim; up to 10'1 humus material. It
is also rich in the easily soluble flint-add combinations needed
by plant life. The Ukrainian Black Sea littoral also has very
fertile light-brown and chestnut loams. In addition, the soils of
Ukraine contain everything that adds to their fertility: the
Izyum and Podilla regions have rich deposits of apatites
yielding good phosphorous fertilizer, and ammonia manufac
tured in the Donbas provide azotes.
The climate of Ukraine is quite favorable to the development
of agriculture. The land is situated between the 43rd and $3rd
degrees latitude North. True, its isotherms arc lower than cor
responding latitudes of \Vcskrn Europe. Dut> to rnore severe
winters, the average annual temperature fluchrntes hetwC'cn 43
and 49 degre-es Fahrenheit, p_'aching 56 degrees in the Crimea.
B11t it has a far greater numhC'r of days of sunshine in a year
than allalogous regions of \Vestern Europe, and a much warmer
sumnwr. This amount of warmth and the length of the period
favorable to vegetation, makes possible the cultivation of a
great assortrncnt of fann cultures; rye, harley and cotton among
them.
The average annual amount of precipitation in Ukraine is
small, \'arying between 400 millimeters on the shores of the
Black Sea rmd 700 millimeters in Volhyuia. This is in larg(•
measure compensated, howC\'('T. hy two facts. The rains fall
during the optimal periods necessary for agriculture and the
soil has high moisture-retaining q1mlities. Added to this, the
Ukrainians are an industrions people who love farming. The

Ukrainians' ability aml knowledge is by no means lower than
that of many nationah of \Vcstcrn Europe.
Yet Ukrai11e is behind many lands of the Enropcan \Vest
in agricultnral production. \Vh,-.,·?
For the ten-year period before 1917 the comparison of
average harvests of basic grain crops and potatoes is shown in
the following table;
T,\BL�: I
Yicl,ls from 1 liectare in metric hundredweights (of 100 kilograms)'

Lund
Ukraine

Rue
10.()

Wheat

Belgium

24.7
20.2
lUl

'27.7

Russia

CcTIIlHll\"

France

8.7

L:!..O
7.8

23.!J

14.7

Ba�ley
l0.0

\l.7

3().(j

24.0

[."i.'i

Outs

L 1.8

9.0
26 4

::.1.:2

14.5

Potatoes

8.'i.O

80.io
HEOo

l CJ l.ll
D7.0

Other extraordinary facts make the picture clearer. Ukraine oc
cupies at present an area of 576.6 thousand square kilometres,
with a population of 41,250 thousand. n1is gives a density of
population of 71.3 per square kilometre, much lower than \Vcst
crn Europe. At the same time, in tlw past fifty years, ·ukrainc
showed all the signs of agrarian over-population. The most
significant result of this was the mass migration of the rural
population from Eastern Ukraine to lan<ls beyond the Urals and
to Central Asia, and from VVestcm Ukrniue to Canada au<l the
United States. "-\cconling to Professor Vobly, in the eighteen
years before \\'orld \Var I, from Eastern Ukraine alone 1,600,000
people migrated beyond the Urals. They came mainly from
the Poltava region, 2.3% of all migrants, while Padilla accounted
for only 4.5%, although the density of population of Padilla was
wcater ( over 90 per square kilometre) than in Poltava region
(74 per square kilometre). Between 1906 and 1910, the number
migrating from Poltava region was 174,000, 601' of the nahiral
increase of the population,
Consider the following fact: prior to the revolution the agri
rnlhiral production of Ukraine of the five basic grain products
(rye, wheat, oats, barley, and corn) was 560 kilograms per capi
ta, per annum. while that of Romania was 880 kilograms; of
Denmark, CiSS kilograms; a11d of France and Germany, 416 kilo1 L Fcshchenko-Chopi�·sky, Eko11omiclrna heohrafi'}a Ukminy (Ecouomic
Cmgraph y of Ukraine). Ki<.'v, 19�::l. p. 36.

grams. But during this same time, Denmark purchased 272 kilo
grams in addition to a production of 688 kilograms and con
sumed 960 kilograms; Germany and France purchased 80 kilo
grams and consumed 496 kilograms each, while Ukraine, from
its production of 560 kilograms exported 176 kilograms, and
consumed only 384 kilograms, like Russia which produced only
440 kilograms per person.
An analysis of industry produces no less curious a picture.
:\fost striking is the weak development of industry until recent
times, \vhen compared with Ukraine's immense possibilities, and
then its peculiar trend. The nah1ral resources of Ukraine place
it among the most richly endowed in the world. According to
data of 1938, geological deposits of coal in the Donets basin are
estimated at 70.3 billion tons. They are of a high quality, largely
suitable for coking. Coal of the Donbas includes rich deposits
of anthracite, up to 97%. Outside of the Donbas there are
many other coal-producing areas in Ukraine, from Chernihiv
in the Northwest to the Southeastern border, and from Voronizh
district in the ;\;orth to Kuban in the South. Huge deposits of
soft coal have been discovered in the regions of Kryvyi Rih,
Kiev, Kirovohrad, Ternopil, Rivnc, and Stanyslaviv. Large and
rich deposits of peat are located in the regions of Kiev, Cherni
hiv, Zhytomir, and Sumy.
Oil, discovered in the regions of Romny and Lubni in 1936
must be added to the fuel resources of Ukraine. In the Carpath
ian foothills of Western Ukraine, oil has been extracted for a
long time. There are also considerable oil deposits in the regions
of Drohobych, Boryslav, and Stanyslaviv. Ukraine is no less en
dowed with ores, primarily iron and manganese. In the region
of Kryvyi Rib the deposits of iron ore are estimated at 1..5 billion
tons, exceptionally high in quality, and containing 55% to 62%
iron. :\foch of the ore lies close to the surface, and up to recent
times most of it was extracted by strip mining. The Kerch de
posits of iron ore are of a lower quality ( .-35% to 45% pure iron),
but are three times as large as those of Kryvyi Rib.
These two regions do not contain all the iron ore wealth of
Ukraine. Deposits of iron quartzites in Kryvyi Rih and other
regions exceed 21 billion tons. So-called "muddy ore'' is found
in \Vestern Ukraine, containing from 27 to 42% iron. And there
is reason to believe that not all deposits of iron have been dis
covered as yet. J\Jany localities have been found to be magnet-

ically anomalous, indicating the presence of iron ore. Such
anomalies have heen found in n·gions of Kremenchuk, Zaporiz
ha, and in the vicinity of Donbas and Kryvyi Rib. In the region
of Nikopil are located deposits of manganese ore constituting the
largest in Europe and some of the largest in the world. They
contain :3,'5% to 48% pure manganese, essential in metallurgy. De
posits arc estimated at ,'522 million tons in the Nikopil region
alone, and there arc also deposits in the Kryvyi Hih and Odessa
regions.
It must be emphasized that the three basic geological regions
of coal, iron, and manganese which are involved in metallurgy,
are all situated within a triangle whose largest side docs not
measure more than 300 miles."
1-iorcover. in Ukraine there are considerable deposit.� of mer
cury in the Donbas; of lead and zinc in Hahulny Kryah; of
copper at the confluence of the rivers Torcts and Kalmius, in
Volhynia, and South of Kiev. Dcposits of roeksalt in the Artc
movo-Slavyansk region arc estimatt:•d in many billion tuus, to
which must be added salt lakes in Slavyansk ,md salt deposits
by nahITal evaporation on the bars of the Dnipro estuary. High
quality days are also found in Ukraine, including porcelain and
fire-resistant kinds. There is also cement, quartz sand for glass
makiug, etc.
\Vith S(l(;h natural resources, Ukraine should have <lcYelopcd
into a highly· industrialized laud long ago. On the contrary, just
prior to \Vorkl \Var f, the occupation of the population of
Ukraine is characterized by the following data: agriculture,
743[; industry, 9%; commerce, 5.3%; transportation, 6.4%; com
mon labor. 4.8%, and all other, 5%. These percentages so con
trary to in<lw.trial possibilities of Ukraine, appear even more
astounding when considered not in proportion to tlw entire pop
ulation living in Ukraine at that time, as here cited, but in pro
portion to the aboriginal Ukrainian population. Then the oc
cupational apportionment is as follows: agriculh1re, 87.5'.'l; in
dustry 5.1%; commerce, .8%; transportation, .7%; common la
bor, S,,'5%, all other, 2.4%·'. Thus despite the potential, only
� All fi i,.•1..ircs quoted are from: Eko11omich11(1 heohrafiya Vkrainy by Fesh
cheuko-Chopiv,ky, the works of Professor Vohly; "Ekonomiehrm kh>1r
akterystyka Ukrniny'" ( "Economic Charackristics of Ukraine") by P.
Forn1n m .•,:am:lrnrl[la M y.</ (Ed1u·atimw/ ldca.11, 11:harkiv, HJ;'.'.-\. aml
Hnlsh11y11 Sori,•fak(lya Entsiklo.p uliya (Great Sodet E,icyc/opecli<J), VoL

55, HJ47.

"Fcshchcnko-Chopiv8ky, op. cit. p. 47.

5.1% of the Ukrainian population was in industry and .3% in
co1nmerce.
Ukraine is sihiatcd Oil the shores of the Black allll Oziv
Seas, which are ice-free all wiuter. These Seas are \vithiu the
basin of the Mediterranean which has for centuries, been the
center of European and world commerce. This location and
wealth should make Ukraine a seafariug nation, with a dcYcl
oped �ca trnde, good ports, a large commercial fleet, etc. Hut a
cursory ghrncc at a map re\"cals almost HO rail cmrncctious be
tween ports and interior. In geueral, the direction of rail li1tes
of Ukraine are: lines cmmccting the Donbas with the metall
lurgical rcgiou of Kryvyi Hih, \Vith Leningrad ( through Mns
CO\V). and with the Volga vallC'y; lines connectiHg tlw South
west of Ukraine ( basic regioll.S of sugar producti011) with Ceu
tral Hussi,1 aml Lcriiugrad; and finally lines connecting Central
Russia with the Black Sea aml the Caucasus, \Vhich by their
directiou do not link the basic iudustrial regious of Ukraiuc with
the sea. The already built Donbas-Moscow line by the So\"iets,
once more i11tC'11sifies the com1ecti011 with the center of H11ssia,
not with the sea. In fact thf' Oonhas is corn,ected with the
Oziv Sea only through l\fariupil, and Kry\'yi Hih has no direct
rail connection with the sea at all.
When, toward the eu<l of the 19th century the Donets rail
road was opened, Keypen wrote: "Beaching neither the Dnipro,
nor the Volga. enclosed by the ()ziv and Kozlo\'o-\'oronizh line.�.
the Donets railroad is piacC'd iu a po-'>ition o� complete dcpe1td
ence Oil the other lilies, and for this reason, coal mines situated
in its area are unable to develop their producti\'ity in full."•
The problem of \Vater transportation is even worse. In 191�
the commercial fleet of tcu Ukrainian ports consisted of only
310 steamships, averaging 67:5 tons, and of f357 sailing vessels,
averaging 54 tom." As will be seen from these figmes, the com
mercial fleet did not in any way correspond to the position of
Ukraine and the possibilities of p,u·ticipatiou in world commerce.
This fleet was even ina<leqnate to take care of small-scale coast
al trade. It is not surprising tht:rdorc, that dming 191�, the par
ticipation of this entire fleet in commercial opl'ratiolls of ,111
Black ancl Oziv seaports, includiug Caucasian ports, amounted
4 N.oKeypen, Krizis 80-tikh godov, (The CJ'isi� of the '80's), l\lo.,cow,o
HJOJ, p. 29.
"\Ve qw1te pn·-n•volutionary figure;; ,leliberatd;,, becaus(• later, during
the Sovic-t regimL', the very nature of forei�n tie� undcn,ent a changl·.
Trw suhjc-cl will t,,. ,liscuss,:d in detail la!<-r.

to only 11.91 of the number of \'CSscls. and -5.9% of the tonnage
handled. The bulk of ocean freight was handled by forcigu ships,
primarily British, under whose flag sailed 28;!! of all v{"ssels car
rying 47..5'.f of all tonmge.
Equally .striking examples are encountered at every step, no
matter what branch of the economic life of UkrainE' is consid
ered. 11H:• frw examples <1uotcd above rnakc it dear that any
a11alysis of social and economic proce�sc-s of Ukraine cannot be
condncted merely by applying data pertaining to these pro
cesses themselves. The lifo of Ukraine was not only dC'lcrrnined
and directed b�- such laws of development as wonkl flow from
the nah1ral social-economic.· conditions, but by other forces and
factors as well. The economic processes were determined not
only by the interests of Ukraine, bnt by extraneous interests, in
deed. the latter were often of decisive importance.
In its historical development, the social-economic life of
Ukraine can he understood only by umlerstamliug the role im
vosed upon Ukraine b�· the interests of the TTussian Empire as
a whole, he it Tsarist or Soviet. Only then will the anomalies of
this development become umlt:>rslandable and the several phe
nomemt will appear in a proper light.
It is in this light that we wish to present the characteristics
of basic social-economic processes in Ukraine during the last
century. These characteristics should facilitate the understanding
of the social-economic background of the Ukrainian national
idea.

CHAPTER

1

TO\VARD [NDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM

The Social Structmc of 1Jkrairte after the
1648 Revolution
Omi ANALYSIS of social-economic processes in
Ukraine is confined to the period of the last 100 years or, to he
exact from the abolition ol serhlom. ThC" reason for choosing this
<lat.., is that thC' J\Ianifcsto of the Emperor Alcumlcr II, of FcL
rnary 19th 1. old s!ylc) lStll, provid::�d the legal basis for a new so
cial order. From that date the Russian EmpirC' began its period of
modC'rn history, a period of capitalist conditious. ft is under
stood however, that a capitalist eeonom:v lwgan to de\·elop long
before the agrarian reform; thM it conditioued the reform, and
that it had its reflection in it. Thcrl'fore, in order to understand
some components of the reform itself, and prccediHg processes,
\Ve have to sun·ey them in the light of prior developments. It
will he necessary to turn om atteution from time to time to cv011ts
which took place before the reform. This applies primarily to
the agric11lt1tral ecouomy, not only becallSC !he reform created
a C'hange in the agrarian and social conditions i11 the rnral conn
tr�'side, but also because the agricultnral economy was then,
aud in large measure remains to this clay, the hasic branch of
the lfkrainian national economy. It must also be added that the
rdorrn. in its sp('cifie application to Ukraine, and against the
backgro11ml of t\1c preceding agrarian strndurc, in large measnrc
COllditioiic(l tbc sum total of phenomena which characterize the
foll()\Ving period.
When referring to the abolition of serfdom in 1561. one nmst
first of all keep in mind that not 011k was the cxec11tiOll of th:·
rdorm iu many respects different in Vkraine thau in Hussia,
hut that SC'ddorn itself was qmtc different in Ukraine. It did uot
develop in l1krnine as a result o[ social comlitious, as it did in
Russia, but was, to a great extent imposed upon Ukraiuc, in
( outrast to the existing order.

2

Ukraine and Rt1s.'!ia

Serfdom, which existed fn Eastern and \Vcstcrn Enropc iu
feudal times met with mass resistance on the part of the peas
ants in its diffrrcHt stages, assuming various forms, up to am\
including peasant wars (Germany). Similar social processes
developed in Eastern Europe, in Russia and Ukraine, but ,vcre
by their nature. entirely different. Although they took place in
a single historical period, mid-17th century, political and social
conditions in the hvo lands were <liffereJJI. Therefore the pcas
auts' fight for freedom assumed an entirely different nature. In
H.nssia, hy its political coutcnt_, it was purely a social strugglen
of the peasants for a change in th!." structnrc then prevailing. Itn
was a struggle of those social strata which were subject to then
laws of serfJom. It was an exclusively internal process. It as
sumed the nahire of an armed rebellion known as "Hazin's re
bellion," named for its chieftain, Stenka Razin. The process tak
ing p lace in 17th century Ukraine was intrinsically different, be
ing primarily a revolution of na tional liberation and a fight forn
the restoration of the rights of independent statehood. Socialn
moments played an important part, but in contrast to Russia,n
this was not an internal struggle of social forces. It was a strugglen
against a social onler which had heen forcibly imposed by ann
alien power, Poland, and for this reason it went hand in handn
with national stale liberation. Tl is significant in this connectionn
that the oppfessors were m,1inly Polish nobles, emissaries of then
subjugating government. The government of Poland was then
source of their social privile�es, ther('fore that part of the Ukmin
ian nobility which favored Poland was also subject to destruc
tion, because it, too, had become a factor of national op pression.n
On the other hand, that part of the Ukrainian nobility and cler
gy v,:hich joined the common na1 ioHal front iii the struggle forn
natio1Jal liberation, was not ouly not proceeded ,tgainst by then
insmgents, but kept its privileges t'\'t'll after the yietorious eon
clusion of the struggle, nohvithstandiug the foct that it had bee11n
exercishig the rights of the serfchim law. Thus, !he instih1tion ofn
serfdom as such was not denied. but it was eradicated to then
core iu those instances where it came into being from the fiatn
of a conquering natio11.n
This seemingly c.m1tmdictory attitude towards serfdom will
become understandable when we consider the dissimilar atti
tude toward this institution in Ukraine and in Poland. In
Ukraine, personal freedom was not taken away from !he individ
ual, but social obligations were imposed. A person was free to
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choose the manner of discharging them. either armed service in
<lefonsc of the community or allocation of part of one's labor
to the nt>cds of the commnnity. H did not matter how the latter
was made available, either by pnformance of direct labor for
governmental institutions, by delivery of the fruits of one·s
private enterprise to the state or by work done in the employ
ment of another. The dependence of one person upon another.
v,,.hich came into heinµ; at that time, took place as an expression
of the person's own will. Ile would choose this dcpcndeuce out
of economic considerations and even if the choice were made
under economic compulsion, it was still never imposed by law.
Serfdom, thus, ,vas an institution of mutual agrt'crnent. i11 which
both parties carried a legal obligation.
In contra�t to this, Polish serfdom was based upon a legal
incapacitation of the peasants to dispose freely of their eco
nomic activities, and upon a personal allegiance to a master.
llkraine's victory over Poland and th<' restoration of Ukraine's
state independence freed the peasants from St'rvitudc aml rc
stor<'d their individual freedoms. This applied to all peasants,
those who had been subjects of the expelled Polish uobles as
well as those who remained dependent on monasteries and
Ukrainian nobles who had taken part in the fight for liberation.
Unfortunately, legal principles of the new social order cannot
be determined with any degree of certainty. The reason is that
such legal forms could not be formulated withiu a short period
of regained i11depende11ce, because of the peculiar state stmc
tun� of Ukraine ,vhcrc fumlamcntal state po,ver was held by
Zaporozhian Cossack milit ary. Subsequently, J\foscow deliberate
ly thwarted, to serve her own interest, the all-round develop
me11t of lTkrainian statehood. The social conditions of Ukraine
are all the more significant as they developed from practices
be�'ond the scope of legal control. Thus they provide the main
characteristic of the social ideal of the whole nation at that
time. Professor �,Jyakotin, amtlyzing the social structure of the
period, came to the follo,ving conclusion: "Old legal norms
accordillg to which the community was socially stratified had
been preserved, but in reality 'society' and 'the common people'
into which the population wa� now divided constituted a
si11gle social group with free transfer from one to the oth('r."
"\'. )l.fyakolin, Ocherki .w,t,1-ia/1101J i.�tr,riui L'krvin11 v 17-18 c 1•. ( Outline
of the Sncial Jlistnry of Ukraine in the 17-18 Centuries), Pra�11e, 1\)2,f,
r. 1:J:2.
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This classification of the time was not. however, of a permanent
uatnrt'. :\s has been notc<l, it was a social division chosen ac
cording to the different obliµptions to society, the <lccisivc
tac.:tor bl'ing the kind of bnrdcn the imlividnal would he ahl1)
and willing to carry for society. A clear and exhaustive descrip
tion call be toun<l in the 17:2.9 records of oral reports ot old
people of the village of Ilorchaky, Starodnb colonelcy: "When
the pcopll' settled, the more important (wealthier) registered
as Cossach, and the inkrior ( poorn) rcrnainu1 peasants."'
"'Not melltioning the towuspeople," says \1yakotiu, "'even the
peasants were then granted full citizens' rights, inclmling the
complete owucrship of their land holdiugs. The acc111isition of
real property rights by the peasants was complete and general
to such e.x!ent that ii also included those peasants who remaiucd
dependent upo11 the landed gentry a11d upon rno11asteries, those'
that is, \dtosc holdings had been lcfl intact.",·
Hoth the Ukrainian state and the Ukrainian soil had bcc,n
liberated by the effort of tbe entire people. Hence, the people
recognized in themselves the existence of the right to rule them,
selves and their L:md, althongh the property provisions of tlic
"Lithuanian Statute" had not been formally repealed, nor new
laws substituted for lhcm, The common law wa�, iu effect, snp
plemcnted by. creative decisions of the communities which felt
authorized· to pass new mies by virtnc of being responsible for
the regained freedom ..-\!though this caused some discrepancies
in the manner of local soli1tion of similar problems, yet always
aud cver�·wherC' ouc right rcmaiucd imnwhlblc: the pC'ople·;,
right of disposition of the privileges they had gained in their
struggle, primarily of liberty and property. Lazarevskv cites a
vivid example of what the people umlerstood their rights to be
after the liberation from Polish rule. The Cossacks ot the village
of l'okoshyd1 �tatcd in 177:3: "\Vhcn with the hdp of God the
Ukrainians nndC'r Hetman Bohdau Ziuovy Khmclnytsky liber
ated with their blood Ukraifle from the l1olish vokc and from
the ruk of Polish kings .. , at that time . . on both banks of
the Dnipro ,11\ the land belonged to the Ukrainians iu foll ,m<l
in unmnou, rrntil it was fir;,t divide<l among the tolonelcic�.
The trrm "s<Jcidy'' ( tnvarystm) d-enotcd the milit,uy ta�tc of Cossach,
awl tlw \c orm ··l·rnn1non pcopk" (J)/JSfli/stro) 1w,1s.u1l-fa1mc·rs, or in .1
hroi,kr c.:onnot.,Lion, tlw U�p.1ying public.
'A Lawre,·sky, Clpisrmiyc Staray Maloros.iiyi, ( Descri71tion of Old Littlc
ll1rn.�ia [Ukraine]), Kiev, 18b8, I, 381.
� V. \l}akotin, op, ,:if., I, 1:28.
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then thf' captaincies, then the townships. ,·illagc5, and h:1mlcts,
and from the latter amoug the residences, manors, homes, and
homesteads, and therefore all the estates became the property
of Ukrninians by entry into possession. The Ukrainians then
marked the boundaries of their possessions in Yarious ways, some
fenced them, others erected markers and dug canals, and then
built whatCYl'r they pleased withi11 these hounds:··•
Therefore, although the v•.0ave of rebellion, haYing destroyed
the upper layer of manorial landownership did not touch direct
ly upo11 other types and forms of land holding in Ukraine, yet it
did change the rclatiouship betwecu them, placiug them into
nev,, fonns of development. Arnoug such changes the most note
\\:orthy was that evcn the common peasants, "serfs" of monaster
ies ant! Hobks, perceived in the regained freedom their right to
pos�ess laud, and to he able to choost• their future social posi
tion. i\tany such cornmon peasants chose to change their st,1t11s
into Cossacks. Accordi11g to Myakotin, "Fiually tbe monasteril's
had to g<ot reconciled with the fact that during the uprislligs,
and in the firs! years following, no srnall parl of their 'subjects'
went out frorn under th('ir <loilliniou." They \vonld regist('r as
Cossacks, or start farming on their owu, or assume a neighbor's
obligations, i.e., fann the land of another, taking on all the duties
of the former owner. Even later, in 1712, the Archimaudritc
of the Nizhyn Monastery of the Annunciation complained to
llchnan Ivan Skoropadsk�- that the monastery's "subjects" \Vt'rP
selling land, au<l that '·the village of Talalae\·ka is called a mon
astery village, but many others arc in possession of it." It is
notcworthv that the Archimaa<lrite did not request that the
transaltious bl' made void, bnt only for permission to buy the
land back.
lt is obvious that both the munastcrics. and since the latter
part of the 17th ceutury also private landrnvners \vho had had
ten,mt "subjects,'' asserting their rights npon the m1rcpcalcd
pnvilegcs of exercising dominion over their "subjects," hindered
the free transfer of peasants. The llctman Coverrnne11t consid
ncd these claims jnst, and lletman Demyan Mnohohrishny for
hade the common suhjC'cts of monasteries to ehan_ge their status
into Cossacks. Lih\vise the l!cttnans lvHH Samoylovych and
" A. Lazarevsk). "li.talorossi:,-skiye pospolitiy0 kre.,tvane" ( '·Littk-Hussian
[ Ukraini,rn l Common Peasants'"), Znpiski Chi'rn igm;sknc;o st(ltisticl,nkogo
komitctu (Proceedings rif the Chl'rnilliv Statistical Crwm1i.\·si011), Cl1er
,.J>iv, !bbfi, I, 2rj,
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Irnn :\Iazepa frequently attempted to return "newly registered"
Cossacks to "their former commou duties and obedience to rno n
astC'rics." Hut such decisions were, first of all, not in the nature
of a general order, and in the second plac(', they could not al
wavs be carried into eHcct.
'An opportunity for !\foscow to interfere in the area of land
owuership came right after lhe conclusion of the Treaty of
Pereyaslav in 1654. Hctmau Bohdan Khmclnytsky's envoys to
:\:foscow, the Jud!,?;e-Gencral S. Bohdanovych-Zarudny and the
Colonel of Pcreyaslav Teterya requested the Tsar of 1\-luscovy to
g;ra11t tlwn1 estates and "subjects,'' and received them. True,
these acquisitions were, for quite a long time kept S('Cret because
at that time nobody would dare take a\vay the newly gained
freedom from the peasants. This same Tcterya requested of the
Tsar that '·that with whic.:h anyone has beeu emlowed. by his
majesty, should not be ordered made public, ... because if
the Army would find out that he and his comrades had been
granted by his majesty such great estates, they would imme
diately suffer ... hecaust' the members of the Zaporozhian
Army may 11ot h.'n-e any possessions."'"
Soon therc'.1-ftcr the Ukrainian gm·ernment was compelled
to start endowing the Cossack officer class with "subjects," i.e.,
with tht-' right to dcrnantl of the common pvasants ccrtai11
obligations. Giving Jarid and ·'subjects" became a mpans of com
pensating thcise who served the gowrnment. A significant char
acteristic of such endowments was the fact that they did not
pass into the absolute ownership of the person n•cf'i,·ing them.
Thl"y w,cre so-c,1lk<l "cstalcs of rank" hcnditil1g officers or state
employees according to their rank and only for the duration of
their office. lu this manner the common peasants did not be
come serfs of any individual. hut rather under duty to thC' statt',
which ceded such rights to pf'rsons performing certain state
fuJ1ctions. Along with "estates of rank," there ('Xistcd otlwr forms
of land tenure, i. c.: 1) peaceful aud unimpeded enjoymeHt, or
forever; 2) ..at the plcasurP of the military," that is until such
time when the go,·ernmcnt would effrct a change in possessions,
and 3) "in support of the home," as temporary relief given for
ally good reason. llut even in the first instance, when land \Vas
granted "forever," it was still J10t the same thing as the Hnssian
votdiina (father to son inheritance). First of all. although a
10 \".

l\ly.,kotin, op, cit., I, 63, 136.
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father could give the land he had received to his heirs, the heirs
as a rule had to request from the Hetman Government a confir.
mation of their right ( of temire), a11d iu tlie sel:ond place, the
goyernment itself never alienated its right to dispose of such
lands otherwise.

Reinstatement of Serfdom
The c011tra(·tual nature of all forms of land tenure made
them similar to "estates of rank." Moscow wanted all the endow
ments with land and "subjects," which were being carried out
on its orders, to assume characteristics peculiar to :tvluscovite
votchina, absolute ownership without the right of the Ukrainian
government to interfere. In the '"Kolomatsky articles"11 of 1687,
on the occasion of !he election of Ivan :vlazepa to the Hetman
ate, it wa� stated: "Whosocvn receives from the Tsar a writ of
endowment, he shall have the right of dominion over the mills
and the peasants, and the Hetman may not take such writs away,
nor violate the Tsar's gracious ukase in any manner."'"
Such violations of the rights of the Ukrainian people were
met with decided oppositiou on the part of the masses. Wheu
Hetman Samoylovych was deposed in 1687, !here was a whole
series of uprisings. In 1692 a military scribe, Petro lv,menko
Petryk, \vho first escaped to Zaporozha, and then to the Crimean
Khan, proclaimed himself Hetmun and called upon the people
to rise against .\lm,co\v and against fletman i\fazep,1. The Za
porozhian ()laman of Kosh ( Corps) Husak, wrote: " ... the
commou council had carried a resolution that there should he
no injustices in Ukraine, and today we see that the poor people
in the colonelcies are suffering great oppression .. , Then we had
thought that for all time the Christian people would never he
in servitude. and now we see that the poor people are worse
off than under the Lakhs (Poles), because even those who have
no right to have serfs, have them, to haul wood and hay for
them, and to stoke their oYens .. ," Dominion hv rank did not
evoke opposition, as in the minds of the people thi� was justified:
"such men may hold subjects, it does not grieve anyone." Rut
as to others, "just as their fathers ate their bread from labor.
so should they eat.""' It must he stated that until the Po\Lava
'' "Artid,·�" were a Ukr,1ini,-m-r.luscnvite treaty cunclmle<l at every dection
ot a new Iktman.
12 \', '.llyakotin, op, cit .. II, 79.
1" A. Lazarcvsk , ".'.llalornll>&iyskiye pospnlitiye krestyane " p. 29.
,
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catastrophe of 1709, \foscow's aims could not he \vidcly re
alized in Ukraine, because Moscow had to deal through the in
termediary of the l1 krainian authoritie;....d10 were decidedly op•
posed to letting Mosco\v lay its heavy hand on Ukraine. The
situation underwent a radical change after the Poltava defeat.
Tsar Peter I issued an order as early as June 18, 1709: "All es
tates of snch traitors like \fa.-.cpa. and of others who do not bc
lo11g to the office of Hetrnan, are to he listed and reported,
am! cue uot to he given to anyo!le without a nkasf' of the great
ruler, and also in the future the Hetmau may uot give anymie·s
\H�alth nor f'states without an explanatiou as to who rt'ceivcs
what, and for what merit, 11cithcr is anything to be lakcn away
for fault without explanatiuu; and whenever he, the Hetma11,
shall see somebody's service which he, even with the consent
of the general officers would reward, he must write of it to
the great rnlt'r. and whosoever shall he at fault for which he
should be deprived of wealth and estates, when the guilty must
be pruhibitl'Ll from excn:isi11g power and it must be takell away,
then also it must he written of to the great ruler."" hi this man
llcr. from then on the Tsar of Muscovy considered himself the
solt' owner of the la1Jd of VkraiuP, empowered to dispose of the
l'kn1i11ian pcop!C', and tht' Hctman Government became merely
a delegate of the Tsar. Although the on.lcrs were not always
strictly adhered to, especially in matters concerning holdings of
land and "subjects" of Hussian magnates, nevertheless from thut
time, the ;\fuscovite system of land tenure and the abolitiou of
liberties acquirC'd by the peasallts came quickly.
Until the time of Hetman Ivan Skoropadsky the Russians
di<l uot have the right lo rcceiw estates in Ukraiuc..\n exceptior1
was ma<le in the case of the Tsar's resideuts attached to the
Hetmall, who received ia1Jd 011 the rights of "estates of rank."
;\ow Hussiall mag1mtcs and lesser officials hnrric<l to get rich
with Ckrainian lamls. likrainc heiug uo longer cmisidere-d a
separate state, hut a conquered la11d. Skoropadsky was powerless
to resist the grcC'd of prC'tC'mkrs to Vkrai11ian lan(l a1Jd "was
forced to embark upon the road towards which he w:ts heing
proddetl h_v the r€(1ucsts of the Tsarist ministers. the road of
grantin� estates in Ukraine to private iudividuals who were in
no way rnunected with Ukraine, who had no prcvion� relations
with l'krainc.'·i,,
"\. :\lyaknliu. loc. t:iL

10 \'.

\fyakotin, op. cit., p. 81.
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A letter of Count Sh(•remdiev to I fchnan Skoropmlsky is
significaut in this respect: ··Not long ago, tha11ks to th{' high
grace of !he Tsar's majesty, in reward for their merits, and
thanks to your favorable goodness, his Highness Prince �fr11Shi
kov, the c�inent gentlemen Count Golovkin, Prince Dolgorukov,
and Squire Shafirov received estates for thcmsch·es in UkrainP;
this example has prodded me to make this request" ... ''fleceiv
ing cstait's formally from the llctman, these magnates wen:' in
reality outside of his power, and the lktman could not only not
have any cha!lce of taking away a given estate, but he did not
have ,rny influence in this respect." Thns such estates, and
peasants inhabiting them, became extra-territorial, not under the
jmisclictiou ot the Ukrainian authoritif>s. A typical colonial situ
ation arose; citizeus of the ml'tropolis, not subject to any laws
of the colony, established their plantations culthivated by the
local population, transformed i11to serfs. The Russians' appetite
for lands ancJ "subjects" in Ukraitie was insatiable. Prince Men
shikov provides a notable e:rnmp1e. No matter how much land
he received or grabbed, it was still not enough. The extent of
his acquisitions can be atksted to hy the tact that he forced
the entire Pochepsky region to be granted to him, with 6,250
settlements. Later, after the death of Peter I, he receivecJ, with
others. the city of Raturyn with all tlw surrounding villages and
hamlets. Others were not for behind �knshikov, Similar condi
tions pre\'ailcd, particularly in the South of Ukraine after the
lirtnidation of the Zaporozhian I lost in 1775.
Along with the distribution of land those peasants who lived
upon it came into servitude. The natural conscqnence of this
was that the number of free peasants diminished at a catastro
phic pace. Following: the amn1dments of !Ietman Danylo Apos
tol the n11mber of estates. according to c:1tegories, in seven
colonelcies out of ten, was: free military, 20,031; city hall. 4.'39;
of rank, 6,173; monastery, 9,644; pri\"ale 19,776; total,
56,063. In all ten colonelcies, the number of common free es
tates was only 29,321. Thus, 75 years after liberation, the fret'
common peasants in seven colonelcies constituted only one-third
of all holdings, city halls k•ss than 1%, estates of rank about
10%, whereas the monasteries and private penons held over .'50'.1
of the estates. During the period from 17;30 to 17,'52 the number
11;

'"Ibid., II, 179.
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of free common holdings in nine colonelcies ( exduding Hadi
ach) decreased at the rate shown in Table II. 17

After amcndmen/8
"' 17:29-30
2i,55Ll estates

TABLE II

,\fter um('mfmcnts After anwndmenls Status as of
of 1743
1752
of 1751
2,S,59
11,774
ti,9:)2
and 5,'1G9
and 2,G82
without a
without a
landlord
landlord

The problem, however, was not confined to the servitude of
the common peasants. l11 1710 !\Ienshikov demanded of Het
man Skoropa<lsky that the Cossacks residing in the Pochepsky
district which he received also be given him as serfs. Nor was
this an isolated case. During the Hehnancy of Skoropadsky,
some of the Ukrainian Cossacks became the serfs of Hussian
magnates. Only much later did some of thern succeed in regain
ing their freedom. Many of those also suffered who had previ
ously registered as Cossacks: a number were deprived of their
Cossack privileges and returned to the status of common peas
ants. The Cossacks were subject to oppression pn the part of
new landowners, HusSians who had received Ukrainian lands
from the Imperial Government, and who, leaning on Muscovite
authorities, flouted Ukrainian laws and customs. Receiving
lands settled by common peasants and Cossacks, they would
often assume property rights over inalienable Cossack lands.
�foscoi,v would leave most complaints unanswered, and the
I letman Government was powerless to right such wrongs. For
example, the Cossacks of the Chernihiv regiment wrote that:
·'Before, they could easily bear arms for the state, because theyn
had sufficient lan<l and other goods, and now they are undern
all manner of oppression from the lan<lowners."1"
The Empress Anna issued a ukase on August 8, 1734, pro
viding that if a Cossack sells hi:s laud and continues to live on
it, he must henceforth carry the obligations of a common peas
ant. This produced the practical result of making land owner
ship a social category. The fiual consequeuce of this was that
',- Figures eitf'd arc from V. �[yakutin, op. cif., II, 18,5-189.
10 !\f.
Filimonov, Mafi;ria/i po voprmi, ob ewlutsiyi ;:;emlcdmliniya
U,latcrU1fa on the Problem of Ecolufion of Land Ownership ), Penn,
lo!J5 (2d ed.J, p. 14.

Tou;ard Industrial Capitalism

11

in 1783 all Cossack regiments were transformed into regular
army unit.�, and although the Cossacb did not lose their person
al liberty and right of land ownership, they were deprived of
their old privilege of self-rule. r-..latters were also complicated
with the new Ukrainian nobility which came into being under
conditions of breaking up of old po\iti('al and social forms.
The pre-revolutionary nobility ceased to exist as a separate
social class iu the middle 17th ceutury. Some iudividtrnls of
the former nobility .rnrvived as landO\vners, hut without any
special class privileges. Ultimately the introduction of the Rus
sian order, and the servitude of Ukrainian peasants promulgated
hy i-.loscow, hro11ght to the forefront the problem of rights of
Ukrainian lamlowllers, bccaust' according to Hussian laws, only
nohles had the right to exercise rule over svrfs. Therefore, the
Ukrainian landowners who possessed "subjects" wishing to
make their class position certain had to take some definite
steps. They had already requested on many occasions, that the
Imperial Government make them equal in social privileges with
the H.ussfrm nohility. In a plea of the Hlukhiv nohility to the
Imperial Commission charged with the project of a new s!ah1te,
it v,·as requested: "Permit us, on the same principles as the H.us
si,m nobility, to serve where we choose, and to enjoy all our do
nated and acquired possessions, and such powers of the Hussian
nobility to he confirmed by high imperial privilege to us and
our heirs."i<• The privileges of Hussian nobility were extended
to Ukrainian nobles in 17S5. 1lany controversies arose from this,
the Hussian Government frequently refusing to recognize as
nobles not only those who had ac(1uire<l estates in civil service
of the Ukrainian state apparatus, but also military elders. These
matters dragged on into the 19th century. The Se11atc created a
special commission in 1828 for the ratification of privileges of
nobility iu Ukraine. As to the Left Hank of Ukraine, the ukase
of !-.larch 20, 1835 made a final determination, admitting to
privileges of nobility descendants ot high Cossack officers ( in
clusive of the nmk of "comrades-in-arms"). The problem was
more acute on the Hight Bank where, following the revision of
18:"IB. orily 587 persons of the former nobility were recognized
as uobles, 22,000 were classified as doubtful cases, and 87,121
were deprived of privileges. In l'odilla, 83 were recognized, and
L', \'.
<
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•iS,545 refuse<l, and the corresp onding number for Yolhynia wasa
7;3 and ,'31,411."''a
As is well known, the Russian Government abolished the
autonomous Hetman Covernmeut of Ukraine in li64, and in
1781-1782 "'agulwrnial ordinance" was extended to Ukraine,
with the enforcement of Hussian laws, and by Empress' Cather
ine 11 ukase of May 3, 1783 even those common peasants who
had not theretofore been "subjects.. of landowners were de
clare<l serfs. They became ·'state peasants" (goswlarstvenniye
krestyanc), serfs on stale lands, such lan<ls being the acquisition
of the Hussian Government of both free lands, ami of those
belonging to free peasants, Only those Cossacks who remained
professional soldiers retained personal freedom and the rights
of land ownership .
.Freedom gained in hard struggle was taken away, and serf
dom imposed on the peasants whose system of land ownership
was wrecked. The land itself became in large measure the
property of Russian magnates and nobles, the Ukrainian peas
ants becoming sprfs on their plantations. h1 p lace of the Ukrain
ia11 State, which concededly had as yet beeu unahle to perfect
its governmental structure, came an artificial division into ad
ministrative-police units, the gubernias, under .an autocratic or
der. Ukraine ceased to exist as a state-political body.

Conditions of Serfdom
lt cannot be stated that conditions of serfdom were
more oppressive in Ukraine th,m in Russia. The treatment
of scrfa was perhaps even more gentle and more huma11e
than in Hussia. The reason was th:lt alon�.�ide the serfs there
existt>cl the free class of Cossack-pl'asants, who held on tpna
ciously to the tradition of defenders of the people's rights. It
was also of decisive im portam:c that th<:· entire prnple had pre
served the spirit of freedom, of struggle for it. and that memor
ies of a free life were quite fresh. Serfdom itself was considered
as a trampling of people's rights by an alien power. It is not
surprising therefore, that the peasants frequently rose in rebellion
against the oppression of the landlords. According to computa
tions of �:f. Drahomauov, behveeu 1836 and 1848 there were
sixty-eight peasants' uprisin gs in Slobidska UkrainP. with twenty
'° U. Slabchenko, Materialy d1J ek1Jn()mir/mr,-sotsialnoyi istori!Ji Ukrain!J
Hl-oJw Star. ( Materials on the Economic-Sr,cial History uf Nineteentha
C1'nfury Ukraine), Kh.uk,v, Hl2J. I, ,J\-1.

13

Tmrnrd Indus/rial Capitalism

lamlowners killed. In the Hight Hank Ukraine there were twenty
six uprisings between 1845 and 18-19. Escape was another form
of reaction agai11st the landlord.< oppression, the flights frequent
ly assuming ma.<,s proportion;,. Most of the escaping peasants
went to Southern Ukraine, to the Don and Kuban regions where
the descendants of Cossacks, whose Zaporozhian Host was
ruined by the Hussian Government in 177-5 had found refuge.
There were so 111.:rn�- of these serfs-escapees that the Tsarist
Govcrnnwnt \\·as powerless to restore them to tht"ir masters, and
i11 1832 permission was granted "for the succes�ful settlement of
the Northeastern niast of the Blal'k Sea. to let ·tramps· settle
there who had come without proper documents (passports).""
This thirst for freedom and for throwing off the yoke of serfdom
imposed by Hussia lle\'er died among the peasants, and it kept
all life at a point of high tension, decidedly innuencing relations
between masters and sC'rfs. On the eve ot the abolition of serf
dom, Ukrainian peasants embarked upon a mass migration to
the Crimea, just following the Crirnean \Var. From two counties
only, Verkhncdniprovsk and Kater�'noslav, 9,000 peasants es
caped, and :3.000 from Khcrson. Great masses also came from
the guhi:mias of Poltava, Kharkiv, and Cheruihiv. The govern"
ment was compelled to set up a military guard across the Pcrek
op Peninsula: the escaping peasants staging pitched battles
agailist the regular army. Some part, albeit a wry insignificant
one, was plan�d in this cautious treatment of the serfs hy the
faet that 110! all the old rules of law had been abrogated. The
Emperor Alexander I decided to effect a codification of laws, in
tending initially to conduct the work in two directions: for the
whole empire, and for those preserving a differeut language and
bws. Ukraine was s11pposed to constitute such a separate part.
The project dragf?;ed rni, and a code of locnl laws was not com•
piled until 1h29, hut "on the pmt of local administrators ( Hussian
officials). the compiled code was rnet with an unfavorable at
titmle. The Governor-General of Kiev. Bihikov, was particular\�·
hostile, because he gave precc<lcnce to Hussian law and would
not agree to the continuance of separate courts 011 the Hight
Rink, adliPring to a strictly Tlussifying policy.' ""2 County mar
shals (adrni11istrative officials) mc·cting in Poltava in 1�4() ('\>
pressed themselves in a similar vein. demanding the abolition
of �fagdeburg Laws and of the Lithuanian Statute, alleging
21 11. Slabchenko, np. cit., l, 138.

n I!Jid., I, Ill.
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that "differentiating features have been erased, and one can ob
serve au identity of laws" with those of Hussia. As a result of
this, lhe Lithuanian Statute was repealed in 1842:,"" and general
laws of the Empire substitnted for it. The Magdeburg autono
mous laws of the cities of Ukraine \Vere abrogated even earlier,
between 1831 and 183.'5.
In the light of what has been said above, it is clear why
the state administratiou of Ukraine freqtHcntly interfered in
the relations between lan<llon\s a11d peasants with the object of
regulating them, and of curtailing the nobles' license which con
tributed to the already existing tensions. Serfdom in Russia was
based on the principle of almnst complete denial of any rights
to the serf. The serf was deprived of human honor and dignity,
a!ll! therefore had no right to appeal to a court for slander. Ile
could not testify under oath, although an oath of allegiance was
required of him iu military service. He was a res of the owner,
an instrumc11t11m vocale in the full meaning of the term. M.
Slabchenko quotes the words of Tsvetayev which vividly char
acterize the Russian understanding of serfdom: "' ... servitude
is one of the most important political rights, according to which
one belongs as a thing, as far as his property is concerned, there
fore the right to possess serfs should be the privilege of the first
estate in the nation, which consists of persons prominent, either
by their own merits or by ancestry.""'
Jn relation to bis serfs the landlord was not only the master
of their land and labor, hut also their administrative and judicial
authority. :\ccording to Hussian law. the lamllonl could, for
transgressions against others and against himself, impose peual
ties upon serfs up to 40 lashes, imprisonment up to two months,
prescribe forced labor up to three months or transport to arrest
detachments up to six months. By act of 1846 the landlords were
permitted to maintain thcir o,vn jails and to put prisoners in
chains. The only prohibition \-.:as inflicting bodily injury upon
serfs. Serfs could be exiled to Siberia after 1822. According to an
act of 18.57, corporal punishment was a mandatory addition to
every penalty imposed upon a serf.
The landlord also bad a right to sell his serfs. The law of
180S prohibited the sale of serfs without land. and the law
Only soll\e provisions uf the Lithuanian Statute R'Jll.Jined in force ( par
lic11larly i.n domestic rehti,",s and laws ol inlwritaneci . .ind were the law
of the Left Bank of l1kraine n11til Hll7.
H !If. Slabchenko, 011. cit., p. llfl,
2·'
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of 1883 without the serf's family, bnt it became permissible alt
er 18--11 to purchase serfs for resettlement on othC'r lan<l. The e11s
torn \vas for a serf to work for three <la\·s i11 a wce1. for his
master, and the rest of the tim(-, for himsdt, bnt th(' ukase of
April 5, 1797 provided that such a division was only advisory,
a11d not mandatory. In fact. the landlord himself would deter
mine the nurnber of days of weekly servitude, sometimes the
entire week.
Complete enforcement of all these rnlC's of servitude throu�h
out lTkraine was impos�ible <lue to hi�torieal circumstauces. This
is not to say there wa� no crnel comlud agaillst serfs in Ukraine.
ThcrC' was, not i11frcq11ently. But despite e\"C'rythiu�. the Ukraiu
ian peasants 1wvcr lost tlwir fccli11g of human dignity. and never
acr1uiesccd to tlw condition of scrYitudc. 1:lence thP ncc<l for
colltrnlle<l relation� between lamllonls and serh, to prevent or
weaken emptions of opposition. Indicative of this were the so
called "Inventory Hules" introduced Ly the Governor-General of
Kie\', Bibikov in the 18-!U's. According to these rules, every es
tate had to bf' descrihed in detail, with au estimate of the labor
of serfs i11 all categories. The serf's dut�· to render ]ahor was
based on the amount of th(' lamllnrd's land he was using; his
labor therefore was like payment of rent for using land. Accord
ing to the amount of lahor to he rendercll, the serfs Wt're divided
into: 1) draught-serfs (a draught nwaut J to 4 tcmns of o;,.en or
hor!.es). 2) semi-draught, 3) gardeners, and 4) bohyly (landless
\VOrkcrs). The serfs ir1 the first category had to \vork for the
master thrl"c days a week, in tlw scco1td two day.�. In addilinn
the�· had to fulfill 12 "gathering·' ,la�'S per yC'ar (<lurinp; the
period of greatest activit�· when all the ahle-bodil•d were ··gath
.
ered . for work), and 24 days of guard duty. If a landlord was int
1wed of mPre labor, he was to pay for it a("eording to schedule.
The gardeners had to give 12 more da�·s of labor per year in
addition to the 12 gathering days :md 24 guard days, ,md to
pay for the lam! they were using for themsclws according to
S('hC'dule. \Vork in the manor. i. e. everyday labor 011 the cst::i.k
of the landlord could only lw performed \,y bobyl.y (landless
peasants) and orphaus, and for wages. An accounting of lahor
prrformed had to he entncd into a hook of everv serf. Serfs
obligated to perform labor wcr(' men frorn 17 to 55. aml women
from 16 to 50. Labor for the lamllonl had to he done during
the first days of the week. holidavs cxdnded, also davs of sick
ness if no �11hstih1te was available. Working off dd;ts for any
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goods received from the landlord was not permitted during
periods of fit>]d \vork, and uo more than one day in a week
conld he given for tliis purpose.
After taking a detailed inventory of the cst.1te, with an exact
description of the duties of each serf, one copy of it was kept
hy the landlord, another was announced by the minister in
church and h·pt by him. It is obvious that the landlords made
a determined stand against this control of obligations, and
wherever possihle circumveuted the rules and avoided making
inventories. Landlords would often substitute so-called urok y
( annual days) for obligatory lahor Llays, which was permitted
by law. But tasks to he performed on riroky were often of such
maguitude that it took an entire family a ,veck to Lornplde them.
The milt!cr and more restraiuc<l forms of scrvitu<le i11
Ukraine, as compared to Russia, cauuot he presumed to furnish
proof that there was no oppression in Ukraine. Such a false con
clusion could be reached by assuming that Ukraine was an or
dinary colony, in all respects behind its metropolis, sonwthing
on the order of Asian or African colonial buds. Hnssia, how
ever. came to Ukraine possessing a much more bachvanl sys
tem of SO('ial order, a system of deep social cleavages and <lark
slavery. Ukraine, following the revolution of national and social
liheratiou of 1641,, stood in the ranks of the- leading nations of
Europe of the da:·-�-'
Thus, the lesser degree of trampling of human rights was not
the result of any privileged position of Ukraine. It furnishes
only one more proof that the conquest of Ukraine by Russia
constituted an act of extreme retrogr<'ssion for tlw former. Of
equal importance is the fact that the serf's position was charac
terized not outy by the curtailment of his human rights. In eval
uating his positiou, the economic status of the serf was of prlme
importance. In this respect the Ukrainian peasant was ahvays
below the comparable Hussian. This was due nut so much to
conditions of agricultural productivity as to the general econ
omic conditions to which Ukraine was subjected.
The Ukrainian peasantry was by no me,ms homop;eneous in
the social and legal sense. It \\aS more varied than the Hussian.
Besides the Cossacks who had not lost their personal freedom
and right to own land, and tl1e iusignificant 11umher of free
2 '•

An '1JLdlogous �itnation could be observed in Finland ,ifter its <.:onqucst
bv Hussia. Finbm\'s social onkr W,lS without eurnpMison more libt·rnl
a�d demoerntic th,m Russia's.
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peasants, there were also many alien colonists in Ukraine, who
were free and their own masters. \Ve do not mean the Hussian
peasp.nts-serfs who were imported into Ukraine by tens of thous
ands to provide labor to the Hussian landlords on their Ukrain
ian plantations, but colonists from varions lands of Europe. They
flocked to the rich lands of Ukraine. Indeed, the Hussian Gov
ernment took pains to settle and assist such <:olonists. 'The Com
mittee for the settlement of aliens admitted in 1870 that one
family of colonists cost the treasmy .5,000 rubles, whik sub
ject peasants who were migrating from overpopulated gubernias
to sparsely settled areas, aud created the most profitable settle
ments from a state viewpoint, were hardly ever granted any
loans.""" One of the motives behind attracting alien colonists
was a desire lo establish military settlements which would pro
vide the governmc11t with better support in tnrbulent Ukraine.
This was one of the primary reasons for settling a large number
of Serbs in Ukraine, who established the so-called New Serbia,
receiving a grant of 1,421,000 dcsiatynas of land. Tims, thanks to
eomlitions created by Hussia, there was this curious phenome
JJOII in Ukraiue that Hussiaus and emigrants from various lands
were colonizing Ukraine, while Ukrainians were leaving en
masse for Kuban, the Crimea, etc.
The basic element and largest part of the rnral populatiou
was the serfs. They were in turn divided into serfs of t he state;
crown and landowners. State �crfs were those who occupied
state lands and tilled them. Crown serfs were those on land
belonging to the reigning dynasty. These classes of serfs were
created by the Imperial Government's confiscation of lands
which were either the property of the Ukrainian nation or the
private property of the peasants. We have previously stat(;"d what
('Onditions prevailed in Ukrain(' after the liberation from Polish
mle. The Hussian Government, in di�tributing the land, along
wit h its peasants, among Russian landowners, and keeping the
remainder, thns assumed property rights to the land. The peas
ants, by acquiring rights to till the land became obligated to
the larnllords or the govemment. Thus the duties imposed 11pon
the serfs for the right to till the land flowed from the 11surpa
tion of the righb of these very same peasants by the Hussian
Government. \Ve are emphasizing the nature of agrarian condi
tions of this period because we shall encounter analogous con'" J\l. Slal,chcnko, up. cit., I. 2.'.'..
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ditions again, iu discussing agrarian policy of the Bolshevik
regime.
Troynitsk_v's work "O chislc krcpnstnikh i; Rossiyi" ( On //ir
m1mlwr of serfs i11 Russia), (p1otes the tigiires, in Tahle Ill, 011
the number of landowners' peasants (in thousamls)."
TAHU; 111
Region:

Volhrni,t
Katerrcmsbv
Kiev
l'odil!,i
Poltava
.Kharki\"

Klwr�on
l.herniJ,;v.
·roTALS:.

JS();)

3·!5,3
117,B
lSR-1

-l!'i-1, I

(iJo,1
1\:JUi
\JQ,, j

( inclwkd in
l'oll,w.,j

2,.'H0,2

I f/,l7-a,�
,15 l.,5
t.J.5,8
!'i0-1.6
162.7
337J)
226,1
l ,':il,1.
290.,1
2,. ':i79•.';

lfl-57-S8
..J40.3

1. 38.8
.�21.:!
IH3,9

;32.J ,:l

22T-3

!.'>J,l
277, 1

2,.>63,,1

The aho\'c figures deserve sorne study. As we can see, tbe
total numher of serfs is almost stationary. Fur tlic 35-ycar period
betwceu the first and second census the increase is only 10.5'.T;
for the 20-�·ear period between the second and third census, the
nurnher is alrnost stabilized, Such odd censu5 results rPquirc
some cxplauation. l1y naturaJ iucrcasc alone, the number of
serfs should have doubled in 5,5 years, and in addition thew
were other factors contributing to the increase of the number
of landlords' serfs. Firs! of all, at the beginning of the 19th cen
tury !he process of distributing land among Hussia11 magnates
still continued. Secondly, during the first half of that century
mass settlement of Hussian serfs continued on Ukrainian es
tates of Hussian laudlords.
The ca11sc of these cew,us results is in a small rlegrce the
liberation of some serfs by purchase, but the real and main
cause is their mass flight to the Don and Kuban regions. Dur
ing those times. Kuba11 became almost exclusively settled by
Ukrainiaus. and thus by its national compositiou became a
Uhainian land.
Not the lack of land, nor its poor quality were then tht.·
cause of a mass flight of Ukrainians �rom their homeland, but
conditions created by Hnssia in Ukraine.
"' N. Troynihkv , 0 ch isle kre pnstnikh v Rnssiyi ( 011 the Number nf Ser fs.
w Ri,.�s:11,I. l'olt.1va, HJ(l';'. p. :20.
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TafJlc IV shows the number of slate serfs ( in thousands).
TABLE IV
Region:

1$.58

1851

1')7
,t;W

24

\'(1lhvnia
Katc�y11nsl:1v
Kie"

42..'j

211:i

:J.(16

146

Pod ilia

Pol ta"·'

Kharli,Klwrs,m
Chernihi'"

86(:;
6:)8
97
628

TOTALS.

3,(J:30

1(;7
94'.l

687

m

6fi6
�s

J,:l\H

For clarity the number of landlords who owned serfs, with
a division into gronp� ac<:ortling to the nurnber of serfs ownC'd,
should he shown (in Table V): thi;, will be uecessarv to shed
sornC' light on comliticms at thC' time of the reform of 1861.

"' \ " of
'" ocrfs '"

Classific,ttiun
Regio11:
Yolhynia
K«teryuosht\"
Kiev

Padilla

Pollava . .
Klmrkiv
Khns,m

to 20
serfs
.Jll

8Sl
188

310
5,HJ:5
2,2:36

Chernihiv

1, l 7t)
3,3--l-2

TOT.\LS:

11,838

TAllJ.t.;;

Landlords
100
500
708
1,06:l
3-'l,1
376
l..'504
l,l08
LO.',!J

\.132

7,10-5

serfs
/Fil

,(]()

."i63
570
,'578"
1-

·-

:333

3.":i()

4,127

1837
to 1,00()

.\er/,

112
3::1

138
H'l

,5:3

14

:08

over 1,000

�-,;r/,1-

63
1 ,3
78

10-5
39
.1::1

,,;

67

46

623

384

zo

Significantly. over 80% of all serfs bC'longc<l to estate;, which
held 50 au<l mor<· serfs, aml over 37'.'f to estates \vhich held 1,000
ai1d mort> serfs each. This show� that the dorninaling fraturc of
landlord possessiou was the lmgc estate, typical of an agriculhn
al economy ot sfaye h1bor in a colony.
Accordinp; to the ukase of December 12, 1801, a serf desiring
to purchase his liberty had 11ot rm!y to pay for his pcrso11al liber
ty. h11t also purchase his laud. which had prcYiously been taken
as Ibid., p, 30.

�� Ibid., p. 36.
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away from him. After 1826, personal liberty could be pur
chased without land.
The obligations of a serf to the landlord consisted ot two
main forms; panshchytw, labor for the master, and obrik, rent,
or the product of his labor in the form of produce or money.
The master's demand of labor can be considered the more op
pressive fonn, inasmuch as the master could Uemand the highest
degree of efficiency during the perfod the serf \Vas working
for him. TI1e obligation of paying rent could be accomplished
with a more leisurely pace of work. It would be complied \Vith
by simply surrendering to the masfer a certain percentage of
the crop. But them were also instances where the rent would be
computed in an absolute figure of produce or money without
regard to the serf's income. In such cases the tenant could apply
more intensive methods and all the surplusage would accrue to
him. Ile could also engage in a trade or in commerce.
In Ukraine, labor for the master was the dominant form of
serfdom, tenancy with payment of rent being infrequent. As
we shall see later, this circumstance was of prime importance in
determining the development of the nation's economy and its
agrarian conditions.
According to compilations of Maslov, the number of tenants
paying rent reached 16.7% iu the Left Ilank and Slobidska
Ukraine, 6.5% in the steppe region, \vhile it was only 1% in the
Right Bank region."0 The number of serfs who gave labor was
(regions); Poltava, 98.86%, Chernihiv, 97.44%, Katerynoslav,
99.8%. There were 524 villages of rent-paying State serfs in 1851,
whose population \Vas 182 thousand, about 6% of all serfs in
this category.'11
The amount of rent in prodnce averaged in the Kharkiv re
gion one-third of the gross crop, and in Volhynia from two
thirds to three-fourths of the crop. In addition there ·was a cash
rent of J to 4 rubles per household, and in the region of Poltava,
5 rnbles. On a cash computation the average annual rent per l
dc:siutyna of ploughing soil was (regions): Katerynoslav, 27
rubles, 91:> kopecks; Kherson, .CID rubles. and Kiev, 2 rubles, 92
kopecks.
Before making conclusions as to all peasant obligations. cx
d11sive of taxes, the so-called military settlements mnst be con'" P. Maslov, ,\grarniy v0pros t'. Ro�siyi (The Agruri<m l'rol,/em in HuMia),
St. Petersburg, ICJ08, ll. 141.

'" !.f. Slahchenko, op. cir., p. l2S.
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sidercd. The idea of military sdtlements occurcd in Russia
iu IGS.5, at first tor the organization of Cossack military service,
but after the Poltava catastrophe the Hussian Government
sought a foumlation for its rule in Ukraine in the establishment
of a lauded militia system. The :\Tapolconic War of 1812 acccler
,1ted the plan lor military settlements in Ukraine.-'" The compo
�itiou of rnilitary settlements \\..as quite varied. Cossacks and
State serfs, it also inclmled Hussia11 peasants purchased from
their masters by the government at the followiug rates: a child
to 11 years, 390 rubles; a youth. 7.50 rubles: an adult, 1,000
rubles. These settlers lived in separate settlements, including all
who belonged to that category. Tu lTkraine military settlements
were lornted iu the g11hemias of Kharkiv, Kater�·noslav, Kher
son, Kiev, and l'odilla, totaling 3(-l battalions of infautry aud 249
scp1adrons of cuxalry. The basic form nf obligation of the�e set
tlers was military ser\'icc, aud also so-called "bivouacs," i. e.
maintenance of armed detachments i1J temporary quarters, :'.vlil
itarv settlt'rs were divided into a first and second rank. The first
included men who haLl no less than four oxen or horses and re
Cl'ived 1.S df'siatyntls· of ploughing soil, the seccmJ with 2 oxen
or horst·s woul<l get half as much land. There were also such
settlers who tilled only truck gar<leus, and received one-fifth
as 1nuch Iaml as the first rank. They \VCre free to do their work
whenen·r necessary. but for the purpose of safeguarding some
of their time for military Juty, thcrl' was a certain amount of
r<'g11lation.

Pre-capitalist Trade and Commerce
In order to recognize the economic conditions of the
Ukrainian peasants, aml the degree to which they differed
from Hussia, WP TIIUSt go hcyond an analysis of the agricnlh1ral
economv. It would be futile to mernly mention considerahle
differences in the conditions of production. Quality of soil. di
mate, arnilahility of space in the Southern �teppes all nwde the
position of the Ukrainian peasants superior to that of many Rus
sian regions. The <liffieult situation of !he Ukrainian peasants,
and of all other workers, was comlitionc<l by those social au<l
economic circumstances which encompassed the entire ceononiy
and life of the population. The natural environment did not have
the decisive influence in this case.
'" Ibid., p. 76.
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As early as the 18th cf'ntnry the Ukrainian agricnlhual econ
omy bt·gan to enter a rnotwy economy. It showed signs of de
vdoping industries, ancl in general far 011t-distanced Hmsia, llwu
still remaining in tlw stage oI an agricultnre strictly for <:onsump
tion. In methods of agriculture Vkrainc was not infrrior to thC'
leading lands of \Vestcrn Europe. Even in antiquity tools were
used in Ukraiue which Russia adopted only scn·ral cr•utnries
later. Aristov wrote in 1S66: ''Tools used fnr tilling the soil in
Ukraine, were the same which we now scee in our agricultmc."
Tlie iron plough was used more in that antiquity than l'Dklia.
( The wooden .wiklw was the most widely used tool in Hnssia as
late as the 17th centnrl_lv). Hid..:a Prarda of the 11 to JSth centur
ies contains reference., to iron harrows and scvthPs. In the 1267
chronicle of tlw Tartar Khan Tcmir there is mention of water
mills. The chronicle of 907 llescribcs spring and wi11tPr sowing,
and such cult11res as wheat. rye, oats, harley, peas, lentils, hemp
and flax.
Dnring those ancient times. VkraiHe-Hus also engaged ill
{ommercial ac!ivity on the markds ot Europe, trading nMinly
with lauds of the Danube a11d with Greeks. Accordinµ; to the
chronicle,. the Great Prince Svyatoslav said: "J do not like to
stay in Kiev. I would rather be in Pereyaslavets on the Dannhc
as that is the ccr_ttcr of m;-· land, all goods _arc gathered th(�re:
from the Greeks, gold, textiles, wines, all kinds of fruit from thf'
Czechs and 1.fagyars, silver am] horses; from Hus, furs, wax, hori
ey and servants.'''' It is therefore not s11rprising that, coming
under the sovereignty of Hnssia, Ukrairn' was already at a hi14h
stage of commercial devP\opment Among the man!· artic\Ps of
commerce, grain oce11pied a place of prime importance because
of nahlfal circumstances and transportation facilities. Den·l
oping grain export.� gradually, by the middle H:lth er·11tury
lTkrninC assumed a leading position ()ll the grain markets of
Europe. 11 exct·cckd Hussian foreign grain trade sixty-fold.
Duri11g the period .1846 to 1S52. l:krairic cxportPd thc following
qua11tities of grnin in units of clwtrerf:·" to France, 4,41.'3,616; to
Italy. 4,149.587; to Austri,1, 2,070,997: to Turkcy, •1,117,163; to
Fugland, 4,071,3,'30; to Greece, 172,308, l'k.. ,
:1·, N. Aristov, Promishlt'nno�t drn.nny R1,si (fodus!l'y nf A11ci!'11t R11s',i, St.
l'dt'rsbtll!;, 180(J. Jl, 17,
'"'Clwt1:('rf is a nlf�asure of \'olurne ('qualing about 210 pounds for oats,
to 350 ponntls for wlwat.
·'0 \1. Sbhclienko, op. cit .. p. S1.'3.
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Ukrainian imlustry also developed rapidly. Various trades
and home industries had already existed during the I (etm:malc
pniod, and factor; industries lud made a �tart. Tu the l,'3:}()'�
when factories began to crowd out individual tradesmen, tlw
region of Poltava had --t 216 artisa11s; KharkiY, 3.08:3; and Kiev
lU,0S0, of whom about cl,000 were in the City:'u Some home
industries, in the nature of peasant ha.ndk:rafts, produced _goods
having a wide market: rugs of Kh:nkiY county, earthenware of
Voclolahy and \"alky; silk shawls of Okhtyrka; lace and linen ot
Iz; um; H.eshctyliv ribbons in the Poltava region; tablecloths
and towels from Krolc\·cts 11ear Chernihiv; fishing nets tor the
Oziv Se,1 of Ostri; sails of NovoLyhkiv; furs of Ostri; fur
garments in the tern of thonsands from Bcrcznia11y region,
and 111a11y others. Industrial production alw reaelw<l wide
proportions. \Vr;wing of wooltms was an old aud highly de
yeJopcd industry of Ukraine. Looms (for wcaYing cloth)
were standard equipment in most households.a" The flow
ering of the woolen industry reaches the early 18th century,
whell Ukrai1w already had huge shet'p ranches of a high tc..:dmi
cal stan<l:ud, with a rich and Yaried assortrneut of produdiou.
The regions of ChernihiY and \"olhy11ia produced mosl of tht•
heayy cloth. Kiev, Padilla and l'olhn'a produced fine doth.
Similarly, the manufachITe of linen.<, developed at a fast p,1ce
after the 18th century. The main ce11ters wen• in the regions
ot Chernihiv ( Pochcp, Shcptaky, Topril), Volhyuia ( Hinw) and
Kiev ( Shpola). ()thcr devt>lopi11� hranchl'S of iud11stry were
glass, porcelain, metalware ( mainly tools fm agricnltme) and
others.
\VC' are not now att(•mpting to giw a detailed description
of the level and condition of Uha.inian industry of the 18th
cent11ry. The data briefly furnished merely r'inphasizes 1ha1 as
Par\y as the period rdcrrc<l to, ln1 krainc was already wdl on the
\\·ay towards a broad developing industry based on natural a11J
economic conditions, and had achieved a position of prominence
in international commercl'. The retreat tram this path of histori
cal development occurred under pressure of alien forces, in {'011scqul'nce of Hussia's colonial policy in Ukraine.
"'' Ihirl., p. 201.

"'0. Ohlohlyn, Ochcrki istoriyi Ukminskor1 fabn;ki. Manufaktura v.
Ilrtmanshc/1yni (Outline of History of [:kminUm Factories. Manufactur
ill!! /11 tfw Ifchmm P,·,·ied,. ;,:icv. lc):!3. p. S7.
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Ohloblyn gives an accurate estimate of the situation which
came ahout a;, a result of an a<lva1H.:c<l and strong(•r ec0110m11.:
sy;,tem being corn1tien:d by a weaker and u!ldN-developc-d sr
tem: "Th<' foun<lation of the l'krainian and Hussian economy
of th(' J8th century was the sam(': rural agriculture. But at a
time wheu tlie products of the Ukraiuian economy were al
ready, for a tew cenh1riee>, known abroad, having trave\le(l a
beaten path there, the Huc,sian agricultnrnl economy had only
j11st started on that path. Hussian corrnnercial capital. taking a
freer look at Europe through a window just openeJ, ;,houl<l
have taken pains to close some door�, primarily to iHdependent
Ukraini'im trade, in on\('r to keep out draft;, d('trimcntal to it
self. Hussian industry, young and weak, could not alonf' com
pete with the old an<l strong \Vestcrn European industry tor
the Ukrainian markf't. The interests o[ Hussian husiness un
er,tuivocally dictated the liquidation of Ukrainian commerce. The
problem was to divert Ukrainian commerce to m:w aml 1rn
known paths.38
"In thC" struggle against the economic independence of
Gkraine, Moscow attt-mpted not only lo takt' tliis forcigu trade
into its own hands ( apparent in tht' first stages from the desire
to curtail lllack Sea tr.ulc), but also to crowd Ukr.1inian goods
out of the Hussian market and to transform Pkrniuc into a mar
ket for Hussian products. These attempts became evident even
in Khmelnytsky's time. whl'n duties were imposed on Ukrainian
goods ..." Hussia madl' ·wide application of its customs duties
policy in the strugglf' against Ukrainian industr�· and conm1C'rce.
"The Hussian hourgt'oisic ot the 17th and 18th centuriC's did not
feel comfortable when Ukrainian factories grew and ,voulcl send
their goods to \Vt'stern lands and to Hussia, wher{' Ukrainian
products competed with the Hussian easily. The reasons cikd
brought harriers to industry and Lommcrcc, wilh whose aid the
Imperial Governnwnt could regulate LTkrninian exports and im
ports. The fiscal interests ol the Empire were hcing simultan
eously s,1feguarded:t3�
Customs duties was not the only weapon of Hussian policy
against Ukrainian industry and commerce. tfany oiher mi'ans.
including outright wrt'cking of industrial plants "·ere employed.
At the election of fktrnans. it became almost a rule to introduce
"Ibid.. p. 3".l.

·'" \1 Sl<1.hchf'nko Orhanizr.tshJ(< khozuatll"lt:a Vkrainy ( Organi;:ation of
ih� Economy of {.?krai,w}, Klurkiv, 1925, II, !J2.
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"a series of articles prodding for the curtailment of Ukraiuian
trade within the- borders of th"' Hussian State.";,, In 1718, the
erection of nt'\\' potassium plants was prohibited. Then came
the prohibition of free Pxports of potassium, tars, and saltpeter,
which ultimately resulted in complete decline of these previously
highly developed i11d11stries.
A simibr fate befell the Ukrainian glass industry, which had
reached a high stage ot development awl was Hussia's chief
supplier of glass and glass products. Legal restrictions pnt this
indnstry into a difficnl! position. "Ukraine could not only no
longer sell her glass on the Hussian market. but her own mar
ket begau to feel insufficient production of this article.""
A stage was read1"'d where some branches of Ukrainian in
dustry encountered artificial barrif'rs erected by Hussian com
petitors. Thus, for example, in place of ready made products
of the porcelain \Vorks of the \'illage of l'oloshky, Illukhiv
COlmt:', clay was exported to :\foscow and l)dersburg, to plants
of Russian manufacturers. Hussia did not hesitate to wreck
Ukrainian cntC'rprises outright. The fate of the large linen fac
tory of l'ochcp \vas sealed by an ordi1iance stating: "this sum
mer the factor�· is to be transported to Great Hussian cities," am\
it \VHS dismantled am\ re-erected in Russia. In general, the
woole11 and linen imlustrics ,vere the object of the most acute
oppressiou 011 the part of Russia. This cau be readily understood,
since their wide]:· usl'd products offered the most tempting op
portu11ities in Ukrah1e for Hussian ma1111facturers. The Ukrain
ian tf'xtile industry was brought to a decline by a .\eries of onli
nances, especially of a customs tiscal nature. Thus, for example
the \VOO]en industry of Kiev region declined 44,1% between 1842
and 1847, from 668.5 thousand rubles to 3i3..'3 thousand. Other
lol.liitie� had a similar dt'clirw.
All this had repercussion.� 011 sheep ranching. The demand
of wool mt the part of the Ukrainian mills, as well as Hussian
manufacturiug and the markets of Western Europe. caused thC'
development in Ukraine of fine-fleece sheep. From the ver�'
be�inniug, the ranching \Vas of a colonial nature. :\ferino sheep
made their first appearance in Ukraine i11 the late 18th l.:entury.
In l "lO·-t the Hnssian GovemmeJtt, through •t German named
11ill('r, brought a large flock of merino sheep to the Odessa re
gion. Thi, kiud of sheep ranchillg took great strides with the
'" Ibid., III, 146. "�I. Slabchcnko, op. cit., 11. 150,
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establishment of huge ranches, main!? in Southern Ukraiuc,
and thus Ukraine became a ,...-ool center both for Hussia and
Europe. In 1848 thf'rc ,verc 3,700,000 meriuo sheep in the s011th
of Ukraine, with some ranches raising tens of thousauds Exports
of ,vool through Black Sea p orts reached the follo\ving figures:
l/:J:31, 3,140,000 pounds; 1840, 6,418,000 pounds; 1860, 20,577,000 po1mfk and in HUS, the Hussian mills purchased 3,200,000
poumb on the Troi!sky market in Kharkiv. '"
Af!n closing the borders of Ukraine to \Vestnn European
tf',;tiks and \vrccking the Ukminiar1 woolf'n and linen im.lus
trics, Hussia, ill onkr to procnrc for herself a monopoly of lhe
Ukrainian market and its tolonial exploitation, undertook meas
\lfCS to p revent even Polish textiles from reaching Ukraine. "An
increase of imports of Polish manufac.tnres, mainly cloth, an<l
primarily into Ukraine, was the cause of initiating special tariff
measures in 1832 to curtail Polish imports into the borders of
Hnssia and Ukraiuc."•·1
In this ,-onnection Slabchcnko wrote: "'l\ussiau merclHrnts
\W"n� p artic11larly i11tercstcd in Ukrai11ian markets, lwcause there
the�· 1101 only got raw material, bul .1lso disp(N'cl of goods of
infnior quality .. goods <ldivcrc<l fro11J Hussia were of much
lower qualit_hy then those distribute(! iu Russia itself, and prit'CSh
obtained in Ukraine \\TIC 15'.: to 20:,; highvr. The tariff of 1822
secured particular p rivileges to ;\:[oseow merchants, and in this
urnncction a lot of"so-callcd 'fancy goods' ( te:..-tilcs ) were pushed
into Ukraine. The Krcshdwnskv au<l rllinskv fairs alone handled
almost 22 million ruble:> \\Orth of Hussian m,mufachtrcs, which
was about one-third of the total production. Hussian textik,
goods crowdcd 011t the Ukrainian altogether."''
Ohloblyn gives this exact analysis of the Ukrainian market
of the p1:rind: "In tht: middle l850's the proc('SS ot capturing
the Ukrainian market by Hussian capital was almost cornplctc.
Hussian ind11:>try sold on the markets of th(• Left Hauk and
Southern Ukraine 20 million rubles worth of textiles aloue. (Al
most one-third of the gf'1wral textile production of the Empirc).
In 1854 this was 86.9'.; of the total sales of textiles, and ucarly
a <jUartcr (28.8'.;') of the gross sales at Ukrainian fairs. The parti
cipation of foreign capital in the textile trade of the llkrainian
;\I. SlalK·h(·nko, .Hlltcriuly . "p ..31.
<1 i\l. Volohuyl'\", "Do Prnhlemy Ukrajuskuyi F.konorm\..} ., ("Ou th" Prohh·rn
of th,· UkrniuiJn F.(�momy"), Bol.1he1:']k C'krainy. Khnrkiv, 1928, (''From
.\l.>nu�cript'').
H \I. Sl.,lwh,·nko, "I'· l'it., p. 228.
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market in the middle of the century amounted to onl\' l million
rnblcs, constituting 4.3¼ of the total sale of textiles."'"
The graiu trndc was mor<" complicated. Hussla could not do
the sanll' thing as in industrial products, S(lueezt, the Ukrain
ian agrk:ultural economy and put Hussian production in its
place. Ilut the large grain trade volume opened wide possibilities
of increasing national commercial capital. Exports of Ukrain
ian grain in great ,pianhties facilitated, because of the influx of
foreign exchangt\ exp orts to Ukraine of \Ve�tern European in
dustrial products, with ,vhich Hussia could not hope to compete.
\loreover, the inclnsion of foreign importers in the actiYities of
tlie Ukrainian market in connection with grain trade was fraught
with dangers. particularly i11 the graiu price policy. Thus, the
grain trade of Ukraine became the main problem to be solved
before Hnssi,1 could C'onquer the Ukrainian economy complete
ly.t'"t
\Yhat made the sihmtion even more complex was the fact
that Ukraille, situated on the seaboard, was naturally drifting in
to participation in world ocean trade and was thus becoming
an organic part of the European ec<momy. Under such circmn
stanccs the develop ment of Ukrainian grain tra<le based on
Black Sea routes was self-evident. As early as 1802 Napokon
wrote to Tsar Alexander T: "Your Highness' State and Franct!
would benefit much if direct trade were opened bchveen our
ports through the Black Sea. \Vt' could bring from �Iarscille to
Black Sea ports products of our colonies and of onr manufacture,
am.l in E'xcha1Jge would take grain, lumber, and other �oo<ls
which are easy to carry down the great riYers flowing to the
Black St'a,"4•
The attractive power of the I3lack Sea was being frlt to such
a degree that not only Ukraine, but also Russian gulwrnitLS bor
dering on Ukraine directed their gonds to this arterial highway
o1 commerC'e. Durin g the 182U's, 90% of all goods from the
gubernias of Orlov, Smolensk and Kaluga went down th<" Desna
and Dnip ro rivers to the Black Sea.
These nah1ral factors of the Ukrainian econom,· were so
strong that in spik of all obstacles, Black Stea trade kept
increasing considcrnhly. Shipbuilding increased, hoth of seagoing
"" 0. Ohloblyn, Peredkapita/istyclm11- fabryk.a (Pre-Capitalist Factmics),
Kfr·v, HJ2.7. pp . 4-1-1-5.
-rn M, Sbhchcnko, op. cit., p. '11.t
-1; K.t Skalko.-sky, Rt.ssky torgu-i:iy flot (Russian :'llerchant Marine), St,t
Petersburg, HJ09, p. 17.
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and river vessels, and seaport impron,mcnt was begun. Follow
ing a plan of Count \'orontzoff, a guild of so-called "'free sailors'
unions" was established to guarantee erews for ships.
An important stage in the development of seagoing trade,
suhscriucntly playing an important part iu its further growth.
was the granting to Odessa, in 1817 of free customs zone privi
leges, finally effcchiatcd in 1819. This made Odt>ssa a ware
housing point for foreign goods and guaranteed dut�·-frec cx
cha11gc of goods within the prcscrihed zone. The C'Xtcnt of the
BL.ck Sea foreign trade is shown h) tlw fad tlmt hdwccn 18,51
an<l 18.):1 the nnmhcr of vessels entering Black Sea ports was
:3,!::116 and sailing for foreign pmts, 11,074.
This situation created for the Hussian industrialists and mer
chants a dual problem. First, they had to remove from the
Ukrainian markets the foreign exporters dangerous to them and
replace them with their own capital, and then they had to impair
the significance of the Black Sea and turn Ukrainian grain north
ward to their ports on the Baltic. The Crimean \Var of 1854 to
1856 helped rl'alize the firsl task, "removing the foreigner and
putting in his place the Hussian exporter aided hy tariffs." The
war also helped in lessening the importance of the Blad. Sea not
only by halti�g all traffic for the duration, hut also h_v destroying
the mcrcbant fleet. The restoration of this fleet proceeded under
the new form, completely in the hands of Russian capital of the
"Hussian Company for Steam Navigation and Commerce."
The channeling of Ukrainian grain northward required
more complicated steps. One of them was the price policy of
grain. In Ukraine, local prices were kept at a mnch lower levd
thau in regions which gravitated to Baltil· ports. Freight rates
and duties were much lower in the Haltie than in tllf' Black
Sea ports in spite of a greater distance of grain producing areas
J:rom the former.
Table Vl gives comparative pri('l'S of grain in Bailie and
Black Sea ports (per unit of I chct1wrt (approximately 360
pounds in rubles). On the other h,md freight and duty per cliet
u'rt were 1.67 ruhles in the Baltic ports and 2.99 rubles in Black
Sea ports. "'The growth of the Ukrainian grain trndc could not
he looked upon with comfort by Russian hlack�soil landlords,
therefore they ma<le demands that duties he imposed on Ukrain
ian grain in tbe i11\erests of Hussian black-soil ,1grie11lturc."·"
•� M. Sblichenko, op. cit., p. 41.
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1627-Jt
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l/-J.37-41
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.':i.bll
.':i.S()
l:U.5
7.80

Bia, k Si'u
4.20
.J..�."i
:-;_10
'5.40
.5.10

This (lifference in freights a11d tariffs was f1,lt even more acutely
wl1cn Hussia started building railroads, and baited them iu
Ukraine. In the correspolldence of a Ukrainian landlord, .-\mlry
Storozhenko, with his son. we read: "But they did not hurry with
Ukraine, although Ukrainian merchants and landowners were al
ready vociferous about this matter ( wnstruc:tion of railroads).
Conversations started in connection with the fact that AmC'rican
grain began to take the place of Ukraini,t'l on foreign
markets. Our wheat was locally cheaper: in Odessa in 1840, 6.10
agaiIJst American i.92; in 1841, 5.60 agaiHst 7.85; in 1842, 5..'55
against 7.39, in 184:3, -1.85 against 7.00. But both freight and iH
surance were higher in Ukraine (insuranec from Odessa to Lon
don was 2..'W aud from New York to London LS:.:. lt took almost
twice as long to ship grain from Ukraine as it did from .-\merica.,,,�
Ukrainian lamlo\vners were very busy in the matter of build
i11g railroads, but "the Government made such severe demands
on corporations that they could not be complied with,"''''
The results of this policy soon became apparC'nt. "'ln the
1850's Englaud was lost as a purchaser, now being able to buy
the same Ukrninian grain in Baltk ports, the Scandina\'iun
nations also, although the Black Sea still offered stiff resistance
to encroachments of Baltic ports and Hussiau exporters, even
during periods of lowest depression.".-,,
The Black Sea grain track itself finally canH� under Hussian
control, being unable to avoid the general process of colonial
exploitation. Table VII shows ethnic division of industrialists
an<l mcn-hants of Uhaint' for 1S3Z.
"Hussian merchants and owners of factories often lived in
Russia, and admi.nistned their Ukrainian cnterprist'S from
thcrc."5"
,, . Ibid .. p. 24i::i.
oo P. .Fomin, "F,konomio;hna khaqktery,tyku Ukrainy" ("Economic Charno;
teri,tic1 of Ckrainc"). p. 51
5" 0. Ol1Joblyn, 01;. cit., p. 47.
51 /I.I. Slabchenko, op. cit., p. 146.
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Even tht-' sugar refining imlu�try, where Ukraine was dearly
oubide of any compditiou hy reason of havillg the greatest yield
per area and the lowest produ('ti(m costs, was snhjcct to attempts
to haw its development thwarted by a system of tariffs. There
were 4-5 sugar retiuiug plants in Ukrai11c in 1840, and 229 iu
185:2, but uotwithstanding the prime position of Ukraine. con•
sidcrablc quantities of unrefined sugar were shippc<l to nussia
for refining (e.g. the Koenig plant in Petersburg).
The position of Ukraine as a result of this policy was aptly
characterized in 1S1:3 by V. Karaz;·n. the fonnder of the first
Ukrainian 1111iversit\' in Kharkiv: "\Ve arr forc('d to sell Ollf
product.� iri that form in which uature has giYe11 them to us,
and bcin;:i; rich iu all material for rnannfacturillg, almost all our
needs have _to be satisfit'd by imports from afar, paying for
freight tO inside Russia and bad., and paying with our poor
money the net gains of middk,meu through whose hands pa;,s
first of all rnw materials extracted \\ it.b our hands. and then
when thev (;Ome back to us in the shape of manufactured
goods."-"
\Ve refer again to the basis of the Ukrainian population, the
peasants. In the light of what was said aboYe, it is dear why
their position was much worse than that oJ the Hussian pt>asants.
The pro<lul'tivc nature of Ukraiuian agric11ltnre induced the
landowners to increase its cxtt'nt imposing �('rf labor upon the
peasants. 1 lcm:c tlw practical absence of a rent c.ystern in
l1kraiuc, the complete depell(lencc of the peasants on the man
ors and the .�erdtude, :\<lded to this arc the extremeh· limited
opportunities of wage labor, hecause of an artificial s1:ifli11g of
Ukraiuian indnstry. The Ukrninian peasant simply had no place
to earn wages en•n if he only had to pay land rent. Tht' policy
of low grain prices in comparison with Hussia, diminished even·
further the income from tliat part of the peasants' productio11
o:, Qu<.>ll'd ill l\l. SLtbdw11ko, op. cil., p. 10.
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that ,wnt to market. At the same time, the fiscal policy of thP
Imperial GovcrnnwJJt based on the prim:iph- of privileges for
the bndowners and favoring young Hussian industry, trans
ferred the gwater part of the t.ax load 01i1o 1he shouldt•rs
of 1he peasants. The landowners' peasants paid a head tax
ol 95 kopecks, 49 ..5 kopecks of land dues, and a whole
�,,ries of local assessments, such as qnartering soldiers, fnrnish
illg labor tor road COJ!Strnction. am.I traction power for hauling.
D.l Zhurnvsly in his Statislicheskoye Op i.rnniye Kierskoy G11ber11iyi, computed the easli cxpcmlihtn·s of a peasant family in thel
1S30"s in Kiev reg;ion at 29 rnblcs, 25 kopccls, of \Yhich 15 rublesl
went for taxes, 3 rnbles for eommunal dues. and 1 ruble tor re
ligious elm's. The balance ,vent primarily for tools, scythes,l
whct'ls, a:>..lq�rcase, etc. Only tiny amounts were available forl
consumption and clothing, the rn,lin item being the cost ofl
�alt . .-,il
Thus, the purchasing power of the main part of the popnla
tion, a decisive factor in any nation's ccouomy, was c:-.tn·mcly
low. But cvcll these modest financial ll('ecls could not be met
by fanning. Comparing the cash income and cash outlay of a
medium sized houschokl. we find an average annual cash defi
cit per family of 7 rnbles, 25 koped,s. This caused a continu.11
accruing of huge tax deficiencies owrn.l by the peasants, which
the government was frequently compclletl to write oft as not
collectible, only to have them pile up again, in even larger
arnouuts. In 1817 the landowuers' peasants owed 879,000 rubles
in deficiencies, which \Vere written off. lk 1839 there was a
new (kfidPncv of 5.5 million rubles. ,\ ma11iksto of 1H26 wrote
off similar defieiencies ot state serfs. !mt in 18,58 the latter again
mwd 797,000 rublt:s in rents all(! 7�7.000 ruhl<'.\ in taxes. :\n ex
tremely tight money situation was then charackristic of the
Ukrainian farm economy; caused on the one halld by agranan
conditions existing iI1 Ukraine, ,mcl on the other by the colonial
position of the Ukrainian economy, particularly of in<lu;,try and
commerce. This crisis, as we shall see, played a decisive role
in the ;,ubst'l}llt'nt history of Ukrainian agriculture, and of the
economy as a wholt'. Ukraine entered the period called tlw �era
of industri:"tl capitalism" undPr these handicaps. The beginning
of the period is the abolition of serfdom, in February, 1S61.
' .\/. Sbhrlic11ko, op. cit., p. 1-18.
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Earlier, Empress Catherine TI wrote to Prince Vyazcinsky:
"\V(' must eradicate the indecent idea [of the Ukrainians], ac
cording to which they consider themsl'lvcs to Le au entirely dif
fer('nt Hation from this [Hussian]. Little Russia, Livonia,
and Finland arc provinces governed by privileges confirmed to
them; it \\'onkl not <lo to viola((' them all at one<·, but neverthe
less calling them forPign (nations) and treating them on such
a basis is more thau a mistake, it can b(• called sheer stupidit:'•
These proviHccs, also thr) Smolensk, must be brought by c,1sy
s!'agcs to sud1 cornlition that 1hcy become Russianizcd, and stop
lookiug to the woods like wolve�."c,·,
Tile policy of Hussiauization was, as is we.II known, the
hackhone of Hussia's attitude toward Ukraine over the centuries.
Tt would, however, be a grave mistake to believe that tltP aim
of this policy was complete unification of Ukraine with Hussia.
i.oc. tl1e transformation of Ukraine into an eqrn1l Hussian terri
tory. On the co11trary, Hussian economic policy alwav� aimed ato
�!iffercntiating l:krainc fnnn Hussia, and of keeping L:kraine ino
the status of a colonr.o

:;:; Serhiy Yelre,nov, Islorit1 Ukraimkul.o T"/Mmi,1.1·/1:11 (History of Ukrt.1ir1i1m
LitPratrm')_. Kiev. 1924, I, 272.

CHAPTER

2

POST-REFORM AGRARIAN CONDITIONS
IN UKRAINE

Pre-conditions to the Reform of 1861
THE :\..fAKIFESTO of February 19, 1861, abolish
ing serfdom and introd11cing a change in agrarian conditions,
instead of solving the diffic11lties of the Ukranian peasants re
sulting from the economic subjection made them even more
complicated. The causes of this were both the nature of the re
form itself, as well as the peculiar situation in which the Fkrain
ian peasants were placed in relation to Russia, again in the
interests of the latter.
The abolition of serfdom had at that time become an his
torical necessity, moral motives never being decisive in the poli
cy of the Russian Government. The main compelling reason
was the comse of Russia's economic development. A further
growth of industry, already occupying in Russia an important
position was meeting with two insurmountable obstacles. First of
all, iudustry needed a mass consumption market for its pro
duction. because at that time, light industry was the domimmt
mass production manufacturer. Serfdom excluded the possi
bility of creating such a market. The labor of the peasant on
the landlord's estate was in the nature of work dues (a certain
number of days in the week), having no reflection in the peas
ant's cash budget. His own enterprise was also of a natural
consumpti011 character, and his connection with the cash-com
modity market went no farther than the purchase of salt, axle
grease, scythes, etc. Ylost satisfied their needs with their own
farm and handicrafts products, or by bartering food products
for products of other artisans. This characterized not only the
level of the needs of the peasants, but also the style of, their
living, reflected in the commercial relations of the period. The
produce of the peasants' farms (bread, vegetables, milk, meat)
had no local market, and the masses of the local population
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had to be their sole consumers. If a person nccdccJ such prod
ucts, he would lmy them not for cash, but for repayment in
kind. Consumer goods produced hy the peasants then could
only get a market value upon reaching a city market. Bnt the
distances from such markets with almost no cstablislwcJ roads,
and the small amount of production, were an ohstack to the
participation of the pr)a\ants in market activities. Cash was bad
ly needed for the payment of taxes, and thi� determined the
l'xtcnt to which the serf farmers took part in market activities.
Accordi11g to hudgetary research, in 1858 in the: Kiev rt'gion the
payment of taxes and local assessments reached two-thirds of all
cash expenditures of the ;n'r'ragc household. Jt is quite dear
I hen, that under s11ch internal market co11ditions, any large-scale
UPvelopment of capital industry was ont of the question. Life
Uemanded a breaking down of the natnrnl fomis of the econ
omy. It demanded the incln.�ion on a much larger scale than
before of the pcasanh as thP basis of the population ( coustit11t
ing over 7,5% of Empire's entire pop11lation) in the system of
monetary circulation. For this purpose it wa\ rit'ccssary, on the
one barn!, to endow the labor of the peasants on lamllords' es
tates with the fom1s of hired labor, paid in wages, and on the
other, to increase the peasauts' nct"ds for cash, mai:ily by increas
ing their taxes am] other obligations.
The Imperial Trqasur�· had a direct interest- here. The econ
omic condition of the Hussian Empire, backward in relation
to \Vestem Enrope, was becoming hard pressed and threatening.
The aureole of glory and the lcadiug rok in Europe secured
by Russia as a result of the war against Napoleon vanished
quickly, and Hussia faced the danger of ,1 decline of her impor
tance in Europem1 politics. The Crimean \Var of 1834-56 gave
the situation a vivid emphasis. It was becoming clear that it was
no longer possihle to base the powl'r of the state exclusively
npon the human masses, \Vith th<' gigantic itlllnstrial develop
ment of \Vestem E11rope d11riug the 19th century, if Hns�ia wert'
to remain industriall�· stagnant, she wnnld invariabl�· lose all
her positions gaiucd in almost uninterrupted wars of aggression.
( According to the Hmsian General Kurop,1tkin, dnring the 200year period of the 17th and 18th cn1turics Hussia had 72 years
of peace and 12S ;·ears of \var, out of which 101 years, :2.2 wars,
were for the conquest of alien territories.) 1
1 "l\"atsionalrw pytannya n,i skhodi Fvropy" ( '"llw l\·uti0nulity Prubkm in
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The necessary tempo of development could not be provided
by Ru;,;,ian industry's own resources, because up to this time
it had been existing under favorable r.:onditions of the natural
ecouomy of serfdom and did not possess sufficient capital.
Therefore, in order to achieve its goal, the government had to
embark upon the development of a state industry, and furnish
aid to industry in the form of grants, credits, and a favorable
customs policy. This required a considerable increas{' in the state
budget, impossible to realize under conditions of serfdom. In
a natural economy, the peasants could not become the basic
tax-beariug category. On the other hand, the class nature of
the Tsarist Empire, the privileged position of the Pobility, and
the political weight of the latter, stood in the way of increasing
the tax load of the landowners. 111us, this facet also demon
strated the need for abo lishing serfdom, so as to change the
peasants into a basic source of the state's income. The main
emphasis was that only by liberating the peasants, would Rus
sia, as the metroepolis, get rich at the expense of her colonies.
This was, in fact, realized in full measure, as we shall sec later.
Colonial exploitation had, in the case of Russia, the same de
cisive meaning in the development of industry, as it did in the
case of \Vestcrn European empires.
The interests of industry also demanded the abolition of
serfdom, because the problem of availability of labor hinged
upon this. Binding the peasants to the soil caused a lack of labor
for industry, and snpplementing the cadres of labor from the
ranks of rent-paying peasants (relea;,ed for wage-earning by the
landowners) created on the other hand a condition of Huiditv
which precluded establishing a permanent class of qualified
labor, a prerequisite for the ever-increasing technical level of
the industrial process.
The government had earlier songht a solntion to the problem
of industrial labor by submitting state-serfs to serfdom in in
dustrial plants. The metallurgical industry of the Urals was
based upon such serf labor, and the Luhansky State 1.fetallur
gical Plant in Ukraine was also based on this plan. But this
proved to be so unproductive that it was impossible to even
think of organizing any normal production schednles with it. Tn
dustry needed a free market of hir-cd labor; it needed the aboli
tion of serftlorn.
Eastern Europe"), Uaterualu i Dokumeuty (Matcrfrds and Documents),
Prague, l\J2,5, p. 31.
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Finally, the landowuers themeselves were, in a large majori
ty, inte-rested in such reform, not because serf ownership was
onerous to them, hut because it \\'ould provitle a means of rl:'m
edying their hopeless financial position. The crnx of the matter
is that the monetary �ptem of the economy was unable to in
clll(le in its orbit even the landlords, whose economy, as has
bC('ll mentioucd above, was hase<l upon a natural system. The
11ew stde of life created an acute need for rnoucy which the sys
tt·rn of the time was unable to satisfy. lfeuee the gre:o.t indebted
ness of the landow11ers, the mortgaging of properties, etc. Re
demption paymnils, due the landowners according to the 1861
reform, the land becoming the property of the pecL�ants who had
been tilling it just as before the reform, thus became a consider
able financial aid to the landowners. In reality endowing the
peasants with land along with their liberation was nothing but
compulsory purchase, and at pricE's much in excess of the real
market valne of the land. This was the reason behind the interest
of the landowners iu the reform. It is true that they hecame ap
prehensiw, lrst after the liberation a lack of labor for their es
tates might ensue, and that cash payments for laLor may become
a great load upon their ecouomy, and for that reason they de
manded certaciu guarantees to be given along with the reform
which would safeguard. them against such dangers, and this, as
we shall see later, they were successful in getting.

Abolition of Serfdom and Endowment
with Land
The abolition of serfdom was then an historical necessity
of the period. It was not ouly in the interests of the commer
cial and industrial classes, but also of the whole state, and
even ol a large part of the gentry. Serfdom was abolished
on February 19, 1861, after lengthy preparations by the gm·
ermnent. The Tsar's Manifesto granted the peas:.u;ts personal
freedom and abolished their subjection to the landowners.
bnt the peasants were still a class of limited rights. They
had no right of absolute freedom of mo\"ement, they were sub
ject to the jurisdiction of special courts, corporal punishmeut
could be inflicted upon them at the hands of so-called Zemsky
nanhalnykty (Landchiefs) an office created in 1889 of a purdy
administrative 11al11re, though also endowed with certain judi
cial functions. These conditions wen\ however, uuiform for the
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whole Empire, and in this respect Ukraine did not differ from
Hussla. Rut in applkation of n1les the Hussian lmn•aucrats in
Ukraiuc displayed much more nf a ''fightiu� spirit," mentiornxl
by the Hnssi:m jo urnalist DaniloY in his work Ohshdwya poli
tika prat:itelstrn i gorndarstDCnniy Stroy. He wrote: " ... this
(policy) was didate<l by a desire to bolster among the organs
of the authorities that 'fighting spirit' which is created h_v a mili
tary command i,1 borderlands; it was dictalC'tl by the ti<lP of a
mnltipliecl hnreacracy which was directly augmente(l from the
milieu of the Jarid-poor gentry, clergy and officialdom, running
after jobs and rewards .. Finally, this 'fighting' policy was,
in relation to borderlands, peopk of other race and other faith,
the means suited best for diredi11g their feeling nf anger and
dissatisfadion on a false path, a frding 11wt was embracing
more and more of the ,ihorigi,w.l Hussimi population which was
heing fon·ed to take it out against other nationalities by oppress
ing them. for their own miserable and poor existence,""
Tn Ukraine, this "fighting spirit" became more acute hy
special efforts of the government directed at eradicating every
thing that had any relation to national separatelless. ln 1S6:3
the Ukrainian language was prohibited iu rt'ligious, popular and
scientific printing and textbooks. Later, in 1876, a circular letter
extended the prohibition to all forms of works in thP- Ukrainian
language. A11ything that contained traces of nationalism in any
form was placed outside the Lnv.
But the Hussian Government did not slop at national op
pression or cruel administrative policy. lu Ukraine, the reform
itself wa;. surrounded hy a whole series of legal norms, differing
from those for Russia, such that they not only preserved the
colonial position of the Ukrainian agricultural economy, bnt
umd.itioned its increase.
The ernlowment of the peasants with land, hy way of pur
chase from the landowners, was it;,clf very unjust, as far as
Ukraine was concerned. \Ve ha\'e already mentionccl in the pre
vious chapter how serf<lom originated in Ukraine. lt was noth
in g hut an usurpation of the p easants' property rights to land.
lln\ike Hussia, the intro<lnction of serfdom in Ukraine mnsistcd
not only in depriving; the peasants of their personal freedom,
� F. Danilo,, "Obshchaya pn\ityka prnvitelstva i gnsn(lar�tvcnni\· �troy"
c·c.,nernl Policy of the Governme-nt and State Stnwture"), Ohslidie.�t
t:ennuye dd:d,cniye t: Rossiyi (The Social Mm:emenl in Ru.�sia), St
Petersh11rg, 1910, I, 2l l
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and impming labor obligatiom on them in rdation to landown
er,, llllt also in robbillg them of their own land properties.
The l'krainian peasantry has always remembered this viola
tio11 of ib prop(Tty rights to laml. 1t loJJg contimie<l, co11trary
to alien legal rules, to exercise property rights in land by alien
ation, lea�c, etc. And these acts of the peasants were recognized
even by the landowuers as part of the commou law augmented
by traditioJJ. Thus, the very dccisioJJ com:cmiJJg purchase of
laJJ<l from the lamlowJJcrs hit hard on the consciousness of the
Ckrainian peasants. To them it was nothing, but this: the pur
chase of their own property from those who had stolen it from
them.
The average price of one dcsiatyna of land at the time of the
abolition ot serfdom was 12,3 rubles in Ckraine, and 187 rubles in
Enropean Russia. This differential was caused by the low
price of land in the steppes where, at that time, little \Vas under
cultivatiou, The differeutial of the price of land is given varying
analyses by differeJJt authors. Some stress the privileged position
ot the Hussian lamlowners as compared to that of the lamlowu
ers of Ckraine; others, contrariwise, mentioJJ the better position
of the Ukraine peasants than those of Hussia. \Ve hdieve that
a correct estimate of the situation would he to look at it from
the aspect of- its future influence upon the Ckrainian peasants.
First of all, the figures cannot he taken in their absolute dimen
sions. \Ve have menti011ed before that the cash budget of the
-Ukrainian peasants was because of the suppression and deliber
ate wrecking of Ukraillian indushy, relatively lower tha11 of thee
Hussiai1 peasants, \vho had opporhmities f-or extra wage incomee
in industry. \Ve shall sec later what a large Humber of Hussiane
peasants had \Vinter home-wage opportlrnities in, for example,e
textile industry, preparing thread for weaving. Hence the pay
ment o!- 123 rubles was llO less onerous to the Ckraillia11 peasante
than 187 rubles to the Hnssian. :1\""either can we overlook thee
fact that 123 rnhles \vas an excessive price for the period, ine
rnmparison with the real value of the land. Professor Slabchen
ko cites computations of Professor Khodsky, according to whiche
the pnrchase price exceeded average bank valnations ( aml these,e
as we shall see were higher than average market prices) in thee
Chernihiv region by .3,9%; in Khcrson, 11.27; iu Katerynoslav,e
18:l'; in Kharkiv, 2:3.2%; in Poltava, 3'5;;; in Volhynia, 81%; ine
Kiev, 96.'5\/'; and in Padilla 10O,9'.l'., In localities of the greateste
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density of population, arnl the least land availability, thcv were
lloublc of the current real values.'··
Even thi.� cxt·t::ssively high price of land in Ukraine did not
a!ld to the landlords' desire to transfer larger areas of land to
the peasants thau \\"8.S done in Russia. The naturctl aml economic
comlitious in Ukraine at the time determined a capitalisti(' na
tun; of large agriculh1ral enterprise.�. This was the can"c of the
landowners (ksire to hold on to as nrnch laud as possible, be
cause land pbyed the role of capital. This process of capitali£a
tion of the a�ricultmal economy clid not reach the same degn°e
in Hussfa, aml mon·owr, the higher price of 187 rubles fa\"ored
a larger distribution of land among the peasants.
A dccre,,se in the amount of pC'asaut holdings in Ukraine
was also in the interests of the Imperial Gm·ernmcnt. In it was
pc-rcr:in'd the best guarantee against tlw <langn of a lack of
human labor on the large estates, in whose conseryation it was
i.utereshcd, hecau:,e they provid<"d the main sourcC" of exports of
goods, the profits of which, as we shall indicate later, benefited
the Imperial Treasury. The nine-year C1blig;ation of former ,-crfs
to work 011 lands of their form-er masters authorized by the
Polo;:J1c11i!f(' and the so-called "obedience'" provided a lcrnporary
sol11tion of the problem. The "peasant i..nh)rmetliarie�," author
ized to conduct the land refonn put into effect in that spirit the
matter of emlO\dng the peasants with land.
The rcs11lt.� \\"Cfe these: thC" peasants nf the- C'entrally located
and more imlmtrialized regions of the Empire lost only !J.9T
of their former land uses. \\·hile in Ukraine, where the land \\·as
the sole so11rce of income for the mass of the population. the
arc•a of land used by the peasants decreased by 30.8%. The re
form t·ost the peasants almost one-third of that land, off which
they livetl heforc 18(·il. Hu! of itself this large awragc loss of
peasant bnds does 11nt provide a cn1Hplt>!e picture of t!w dl'
erease of peasant land uses, nor of its economic con:.equcnces.
ht>l'n11sc that average was in large measure determined by the
land-rich steppe, where the amonnt of such losses wns much
smalln, arnl where the peasants' purdia�t's wvn' much larger.
The real um! eatastrophic si;.;nific.am:e of these land losses \\'('H'
felt in regions where '·Jand \\'JS tight,'· and wlwre lhe population
was dense, on the Right Bank and iu Slobozlmnska regio1,, where
1

"\I. Shbdwnko, ,\fotcriu/y .... II. 3G.
• N. Olczhko, Agrarna politr;ka Balsh,:.0T ykit (/igmri,m l'oliq1 of tin· Rol
shniks). Mm,ic-11, 1041, p. 8.
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the losses were greater, and the area of land coming to the
peasants did not warrant the normal development of the econo
my. To compute the •·hca<l-tax," a periodic census of the popula
tion was taken following the revision. Between the two revisions
the real number of the population exceeded hy for the number
uf "taxahk souls." Thus, pC'r "taxable soul" there were 3.5 dcs
ialynas of land before 1861, and only Vi after. Less than 3
desiatynas per "taxable soul" were given to peasants in the Kiev
guhcmia to 72¼; in Podilla to 77.,'5:C; in \'oll1yHia to 3:).7'.f.; in
1':harkiv !o 3,'3.5'.f; in Poltava to 70.5%. and in Chernihiv to
4(14:.' Un the occasion of the rcfom, the peasants of thf' Poltava
guhcmia lost 449,76.5 dcsiatynas; of Katerynoslav., 198,838 des
iatyrws; of Kharkiv, 187,128 desiatynas;_ of Chernihiv, 59,015
desiatynas, etc:: It must he added that the extent of the losses
varied. depending on the area of the estates..\s a rule, the larger
the estate, the larger the loss(•s to the pcasauts of la11d which they
had been using. Tll('se loss<·s amou1ited to 50;; and more. P. i\Ias
lov. in the work riuoted gives collected data on the guhemia of
\'olhv11ja. According to him, the peasants suffcrt'd the losses
showu in Table VIII on the occasion ot tlwir liberation in 1861.
T.-\BLE \'JJI
On Pslalr'S of /c,1.1· than 100 d,-,siatynas.
On e8tates /mm 100 to .'500 ,ksi,itvn.is.
·nOn estates fmm ,=;oo to 1,000 desiatynas..n
On esh1lcs from 1,000 to .'5,000 desiatynas,n
On estates from .'5,000 to 10,()00 desiatyn.as.n
Ori l's/a/es ol"Cr 10,000 tlt·siutyuasn

% of their former
/rind usr
8,2'.:.
2)Ul'.i
J0.4'i
43.4¼
,"ifl..'5%
74.fl;l:n

There were theu �erfs who received ouh one-fourth of the
amount of land which they ha<l been using before the reform.
\Ve must hear in mind tlMt land-rich owners holding 1,000
desiatynas and more, \\:ho had taken the most land from the
peasants, held on the Left Bank 7Ll% of the total area of land
owned by the landlords, on the Hight Bank 86.9:.l and in Sonth
ern t:kraine also 86.9%.n8
5 P.n !1.faslov Ra witiye zemledeleniya c Rossi yi ( Dccelol)mv11t of Landn
, :
/Jfatribution in Rr,�sia), :\loseow, H!L2, p. 12:J.n
,. �I. SLdwlw11ko, loc, cit.
'I' !\b,!r»· ov. !'it., p. J :'.9.
8 M.nOgonovslc , Individtwlno!/e ::emlc.-.ladcniyc (fodiridual Land O!L'ner
y
.,hip), �1oscow, l'Jl2. p. 7\J.n
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Monetary Restrictions
Thus the Ukrainian peasants had been robbed twice: when
serfdom began their land property was taken away; when
serfdom ended they were robbed by means of payments and
decrease of the land area used by them. Land-tight conditions
thus created, became as \Ve shall see later, a decisive factor
in the entire development of the Ukrainian economy, and
in the stTTJcturc of economic conditions. It determined a stand
still, and in some fields even a retrogression of agricultnral pro
duction. It caused an aw ful breaking up and differentiation of
farm units. It created an exceptional increase in differential
rent and land value, as capital. Tt finally created that crisis of
the means of production and costs in the agrarian economy
which characterized the entire system of agrarian conditions,
and in large rncasme predetermined the position of the peasant
ry in the social processes of following periods, including the
Bolshevik period. All this, in turn, brought about the fiscal forms
of colonial exploitation of Ukraine; a decline of large-scale agri
cultural production; diffinilties in the accumulation of national
capital which is a basis of the development of a national econo
my; a sui gcneris capitalization, and its capture of foreign capi
tal. It is difficult to find any branch of the Ukrainian economy
during the last century, whereiu in gr eater or lesser degree,
conditions of the agrarian economy did not have repercussions.
It is quite understandable when we connsider how important the
agricultural economy was to the basic mass of the population of
Ukraine. \V(' noted in the introductory remarks to this work
that as late as the eve of World War I, 87.5% of all the Ukrainian
population. or 74.5% of all the population of Ukraine were en
gaged in agricultnre. These are tl1e reasons which compelled
us to consider all the foregoing, for without it one c0uld not un
derstand the nature of many social and economic processes in
Ukraine. And one could not uncover. in full measure, the colon
ial position of Ukraine.
The oblig.i.tion to pay off thfc' "purchase price·· of land nnoer
conditions of a natural-consumption eharacter of the agricultural
economy, and in absenee of opportunities for gainful employ
ment outside the home farm, coupled with a decreased land area
used by them. descended as a great weight upon the baeks of
the peasants, it immediately created a deep internal economic
and financial crisis, which influenced tlH' economy for a long
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pcriOll of time. It was uot within the pt=>asunt's own powers to
rnpe with the obligation. Ile was therefore cornpcl\('<l to apply
for a stale loan. authorized bv the reform of 1S61. This trnus
formed the "purchase price·' into a form of obligation to the
state, turning the go\'ernment into a wllcction agcm:y. lu the
minds of the peasants the borderline het\veE:n the current pay
menh of these obligations and onlinary taxes \Vas thus often ob
literatt'd.
Nobody was able to pay the purchase price of land i11 the
uhernias
of Podilla and Yolhoynia, in Kiey gubemias only 0.1%;
g,
Poltava, 2J-l%; Chcrnihiv, 3.0%, Kharkiv, 5.41, and only in the
lan<l-ricb regions of the steppe the percentag e was higher.
re-aching 13.8% in Khersun, 32.3% in Kateryno�laY. and 35% in
Tavria. Almost all peasants signed up to buy land. (Sec Tahle
IX).
TAHLEJ\

In the rqj,m nf
Kharkiv ..
Kl,nsnn
Katerynoslav
Cl,eruiluv
Poltava

Tntol mmilwr
!uwl,/c s,m/-1o
179,2..18o
117.0\):J
130,596
23C'dl6
284,078

X11mbcr
, s·imJiH/;!l/J

164,211- 97.8%
'.J 1..')RO - !J4�'
82,467 - 63.8%
ISJ!)..385- B8.'J'.
21U.T56 - 76.S'f.

In other regions almost all peasants signed up. But still, hy
1874. when tlw aforcmelltionell nint'-year term of "ohedieucc"
·ofinally expired there remained, in different regions, a certaino
number of peasants obligated to the landowners, and unable to
perform them partially. The number of peasmits so obligatedo
rt>adwd 26.7% of all peas,mts in the l'olbwa region. Ami in allo
regions without exception, from the Ycry first year of account
ing for endowed land there were deficjt'n<"ics, peasant indcbt
eduess for vurreut payments whid1 often, increasing frorn Je
fidendes of prior years, readied the dimensions of the peasants'o
total cash expenditures dnring an entire year. The pktnre be�o
comes morP dear when \Ve consider the Pxtent of·th('sc obliga
tions. Tn thr Klwrson region. for each "soul endowment'· theo
following paymeuts had to be made ammally: 7 rubles, 20 ko
pecks for the purchase price amount, l ruble, 80 kopecks to theo
hndlord for the same account. 2 rubles head tax under theo
"ta,able soul" revision asses�rnent, and 80 kopcvks for localo
net>ds. All this excluded assessments in kind. The totttl arnouutedo
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to 2 rnhks_ 12 kopecks pC'r dr:siotyna. Assessments were C\'l'Tl
higher i1t otlwr regi011s. According to data of !he Klmrkiv Conn
ty Administration for the year 1Sfl9, ttw assC'ssnwnts for ever:,,'
dcsiatyna of land were: Kharkiv, 3 rnbk-'s, 79.5 kopecks; Poltwa,
.3 rubles, 70 kopecks; Kiev, 4 rubh's, 27 kopecks; Po<lilla, J rubles,
Si kopecks; \'olhyuia, 4 rnhles, 27 kopct.:ks, ck.,i
Professor Slahche11ko savs that "conditioTJs became such th,1t
in some localities payments l'xceC'de<l laud im:ornc." This m,iy
sound im:redihlc, hut we nmst consider that the tax amount of
4 rubles from oHc dcsiaty1w, under the..: then prevailing agricul
tnral svstcm of rotation which ldt one-third of tlw lan<l fallow.
really rne,mt 6 rubles in relation to the crnp-yieldillg area, equal
to 25�' of the gross crop (less see(\). Au cndkss mnnbcr of other
taxes i11creascd the bunlen. Beside the purchase price, the:,,· had
to pay state and local property taxes, city tax<"s, the ht'ad-tax,
military le\·�·, assessments iu killd aud many others. A large part
of the taxes ( especially those imposed locally) changed fre
quently, usnally increasing, making accounting of the peasants
out of pwvions payrnPnts morl.' difficult. ln some ;::;£'ms/ros1 •1
tlwsC' taxt's equalled, am! sometimes cxCl'(•ded, the totals of ;11\
othC'r assessrnellts. Thus. e. g. in the Vovchansky county of Kh,tr
kiv gubcrnia, the taxe.� reached almost 5 rubles per dcsiatyiw.
In addition to cash taxes the pC'asants had to beM a whole
series ol asscs.�meuts in kind: "ro•tcl dnt�·," labor mt road co11stnictio11 aud maintenance; hauling duty, tntnsportiug gomls
and people; desiatske, police aid work with local authorities, de.
Such taxation of the pe,tsa11ts was without comparisou higher
than that of the landlords. Prof. Bogolepo\' compiled the follow
ing table of land ta,es ( e-.:dmin· of redemption price paymentst,
militar) Jen', as;,ess111cnts i11 kimL etc. of which the laudlonh
were c·utirely free). Ile compared, see Table X, the taxes pail\ by
peasants and lanrllords dming the periods of 1:-,91 and !S99
( in rubles aud kopecks per dc.siatyna, per a1111u111,)
ln some counties. loc,11 assc.'ssrnents narrowed the gap, hut
the difference was still great. Iu the PoJtaya regiou, the peasant�t
"Id. Slal,dH·nko. np. cit., pp. 267-26\J.
"' Zcrn1tu, \\as an org:m r,f l,w.LI ,;clf-gov,·mnwnt m "hid, rqJresentall-t',
of tit,· nohilit_v "",-,' in a dorniJJ:\llt rn;ijorit} llel,•g·,lo's nf ti,,· 1wa,11,t�
numbered no more than one-third of the voting land d<cputie:;. l'artieipa
tion of thC' pc:is"nb in the e�c<:utive organ of the ::t'11�itco. Upra1:a, was
in,ignifio,;a11t. Among the <cornpetem:rs of zcmst1:os were; rum! 11rim.iry
edt« :ltion , health_ n,.,_intenan,·c of rn.«lc;_ vihl �L1tistic>, :1!.'n.morni<: andt
,·ctuinarhn ,iid, and otlwr similir 11u·,1�11r<� in nid nf the pt•nsants.t
Finan"ial!y tlw ::cm;"h:us relied on the powr,r of ta,ing the peasants.
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TABLE X

Rq;i,m

Left Bank
Right Bank
Steppe ..

Pe11srmt1·

1.60
l.U3
1.1i

1891
L<1ndou.m1·rs

0.40
0.3-5
0.26

Peasants

1.80
2.(16
1.70

1889

Lmdo1L"t1crs

0.70
0.18
0.2H

"

paid from 10%- to 150% mon" than the landowners and in Cheroni
hiv, 8%:, to 71%. This difference became greater when, following
requests by the landowners, their land taxes were twice reduced.
True, some taxes of the peasants were also reduced. Thus,
the head or soul tax was abolished in 1883, and the passport
fee in 1892. But in general the taxes increased by means of new
forms, mainly local colledions. For the three-year period, 18751877, zcmstvo averaged 6.2 to 6.5 kopecks per desiatyna per an
num for landowners lands. Those of the peasants were 13.9 to 14.8
kopecks. Along with a decrease in direct taxes, there was, as a
rule an increase in indirect taxes. Between 1881 and 1892, direct
taxes in the whole Empire came down from 1:39.9 million rubles
to 91.3 million rubles ( not including local taxes, whose sum total
did not decrease, but increased). But <luring the same period
indirect taxation increased from 327.7 million rubles to 46fi.9
million rubles. Per capita indirect taxes amounted to about ,'3
1
ruhles iu 1871, and to'5 mhles, 20 kopecks in 1901.o
'
�loreoveL there was an unequal distribution of laxes within
the peasant class itself. Former stale serfs were better positioned
than former serfs of private owners, and they also, as we shall
show, received more land. In the Poltava region. as has been
noted, former landowner serfs paid an average of 3 rubles, 70
kopecks per dcsiatyna, while former statr- serfs paid only 1 ruble,
63 kopecks. Corresponding figures for the Kherson region
were: 2 rubles, 12 kopecks and 1 ruble, 19 kopecks. lt may seem
unnecessary to devote so much attention to the matter of taxes,
since neither the sole fact of taxation nor its amount, if figure�
are taken in the abstract, reveal an unusual situation, However,
when one comi<lers the total position of tbe peasauts these pav
mcnts and all other money burdens which descended upon the
peasantry of Ukraine as a result of specific measures applied to
them on the occasion of the reform. the picture differs.
11

P. Bogolepov, Cusuda,-stt>enniyc i micstniye nalogl ( Stotc ,md l,ocal
'" lhiJ., p. 53.
Tli:Us), Kharkiv , 1H02, p. 3\J.
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?\Ioreover, tax itself is not of basic importance, but 1he ex
penditure of tax money, lu this respect Ukraiue was again i11
a ditferent position than Hussia: thP bulk of taxes was not ap
plied to the servicing aml development of the Ukrainian popula
tion ·s economy. All taxes went into the Imperial Tn·asury and
came hack to Ukraine only in insignificaut amounts, mostly
for the upkl't'P of the Imperial govcrnmeutal apparatus which
was by its composition, mainly Hussian. Thus on the Hight Dank
for example, out of the eutirc Ukrainian populatioll there were
employed, on government jobs in the army, administration.
courts and police, as well as in the free professions, only 5,,3'f.
The nnmbcr of Russians was 47S:; Je,vs, 17.57; Germans,
8.8'.f; and Poles 29'.i."'
:\lost of the taxes paid hy Ukrainian peasant's went toward
the ecouomic development of Russia and toward increased
armed forces. necessary for the realization of her policy of ag
gression, particularly in Central Asia and in the Far East.
\Ve have already indicated that the Hussian CovC'rnment
organized state industrial enterprises, and developed a network
of statl' railroads in Hussia proper, excluding non-Hussiau terri
tories, lTkraine among them. In 1876, when Hussia already pos
sessed 17,652. i:ersts" of constructed railroads, Ukraine had only
5S7. Later, wheu railroad construction assumed a much faster
pace in Ukraine, its financing was carried out not by the state,
hut by private capital, mostly foreign.
All these expenditures were labelled i11 thP budget as "ex
traordinary.'" Ukraine's position in the Imperial hudget will be
an,ilyze<l in detail later, we now mcntiou these "t•xtrnordinary"
expeudihucs only to stress the fact that taxes both exploited
the rural ecmwmy, and failed to invigora!e the national ccon
omv.
The best in<licatioH of burdensome h!x loads are tax deficien
cies. From year to year these deficiencies invariably character
ized the ability of the peasantry to pay. Tax indehtness grew
constautly, notwithstanding the fact that taxes were collected
very ruthlessly, and their coll('ction was facilitated by the exist
ence of the so-called Kmhorn poruka (liability), which will be
described latl:'r. There were many instauces of the auctioning of
the peasants· household effects and livestock for these tax de" 1{. Porsh, "fa sl.alystyky Ukrainy" ( '·From Ukrninim1 Statistks"i, Ukrnirw.
Kiev, 1907. m. .1--1.
"' l i;erst "-" 1.066 km., or roughly two-third� of a mile.
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ficiencies. But tht>se mcasmt's \\·e1-e incapable of solYing t!w
prohlem, awl the govcrnmeul was frequently compelled to ,vrlk
off, or rcJuce the ddicil'ncies . .-\ml nevertheless they grew
anew. For the five-year Jk'riod, 1891 to 1895, tax ddicie11cies of
the Ukrninfan pcasauts reached 85.2'.'; of the aumial tax ,tssess
ment. "·
.\ vivid illustra!imt ot the fad that taxes ,vcre an unhearnhlc
load is the rcmarh1bly l'XkJJsiH! practicl' of usury which fed
on the peasauts' miser;:. Professor Slahchellko cites the follow
ing: "in the villages of the Right Bank, Jews, who paid the taxes
for the peasants chargcJ 3 kopecks per ,veck interest per nibl<'
(155:f a year), or if Ilic peasant borrowed ::i rubles from the laml
lord for that purpose, he had t<J work for tlic landlord for two
months of 30 full days under peualty of ,) rnhles.'·,.,
Of cours<' the govcrnmellt. in spite of its attenipts to collect
from tlw pop11latio11 as much as possibl<', could not be blind
to tlw great economic degradiug of tlw peasants not only in
noH-Hnssiau territories, hut also in Russia. ThC' famine of 189192 ill the Volga rq.!;ions was partic1ilarly hanl-felt. Struck by
it, the Secretary of the Trca,my \Vitk wrote: "The village is
impov<'risbcd under the tax load ... It would be better to halt
the comtrnction ot railroads temporarily. or to build them ,vith
borrmved funds, tht\ll to continue this financial policy, ruinous
to the population 111lder which money is collected not fro111 in
conw, \mt from capital.''"
l11 a confidential note Strain rm the l'aying i\l:iilit11 of tlw
Population ( 1903) ·witte wrote: " . . we canuot dose om eyes
to the indubitable- bet that the df'velopment of the people's
prosperity is going at an 1rneve11 and rn11d1 too slow p:l<'C, arid
in places tlie level of the c-umo111y is even dec-li11ing.'"l1' \\'ith
cites in support of his stah'rncnt tlw ,vonls of the Chief of the
Council of Ministers of 1591 Bunge, that "under l·xisting condi
tions of life in the villages. the people will not come ont of the
hopeless .<.ituation. 1t is imperative to think ahout rcmoYing the
evil. If we <lo nothillg to get the rural popula! ion out of tlw posi
tion in which it remains_ then famines whic\1 OlTnr almost an10 F. D:milov, op. cit., J, 187.
''' !-.!. SLihdwnko, "I'· I.it .. p. 27 ,1.
tr Ihfr/.
1'"�. I. \Vitt<:, 0 1Wf]1r1Jllzlumiyi plulezlmik/1 sil r1a.wln,iy11 ( The Strain Oil
!he Ptl!/ing _\hi/ilrJ of lire l'op11/o/i1ml, Stuttl(,ut, Hi(\.'), p. 21.').
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nnally, will become more frcqnent, and will encompass ever
larger territories."''"
In seconding this idea, \Vitte was also worried about reper
cussions on the state treasury: "The total amonnt of postpone
ments and cancellations of deficiencies equals this year the sum
of 41.5 million rubles. In addition, for 1894 there remains 1,074,000 rubles dderred, and not paid Oil time, and we can expect
a further increase of this debt; in 1898 taxes in kind for 189192 were forgiven in the amount of 170 million rubles; a quite
sizable rednction of state land taxes was put into effect; the pass
port tax was repealed, etc."20 But all these worries apply to
"tensions of the paying ability of the population of the central
Russian gubnnias." This character:istic of the peasant situa
tion did not consider those in borderlands, nor in non-Russian
territories. On the contrary, unable to foresee an improvement
at the expense of alleviating the tax load of the central regions
(because this would be a bnrden on the state treasury), Witte
openly proposed transferring this load onto non�Russian terri
tories. "All states," said VVitte, "'profit by their colonies as a
source of income and a means of increasing their prosperity;
we, however, apply quite contrary principles, ... we place the
burden of taxes upon Hussia proper."21 He claimed that in 1896
expenditures in the Caucasus exceeded collections by 6.5 million
rnbles, and in Central Asia by 6.6 million rubles, although basic
ally these expendih1res were related to the maintenance of the
imperial apparatus in the l'Olonies, and to the army maintenance.
He was indignant that "the above mentioned regions do not par
ticipate in general expenditures for the central government, in
payment of interest and retirement of state loans," although the
loans were taken for the construction of railroads in Russia
proper and for fiuancing her wars of aggression, and the retire
mf'11t of these loans, as ,ve shall see later, fell almost exclusive
ly upon Ukraine, to the detriment of Ukraine's favorable foreign
trade balance.
In the opinion of Witte the colonies should reimburse Rus
�ia for the military expense of their enslavement. He said: "
the great expenses which Rnssia bore for the annexation of these
borderlands and for their cultural development [ which in reali
ty consisted of the introduction of a Russian administration and
10 Ibid., p. 218.
�, JbUl., p, 218.

20 Witte, op. cit., pp. 220. 221.
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a destruction of native culture-( Author)] have fallen upon, and
continue to bear upon European Russia with all their weight.""�
\Vittc resorted to unusual calculations in order to prove the al
legedly insufficient taxation of the colonies and to justify a
transfer to them of a greatn measure of obligations. Ile ignored
problems as: reutability of the ec011omy, nature of market rela
tions, cxteut of production of goods, place of accumulation of
differeJJtial re11t and the e11tirc system of economic relations, of
all that, in other words, vvhich determines the amouut of pay
ments a given population is capable of beariug. Iustead he took
the total of all tax payments per capita of population, including
not ouly land, and other taxes, but also income from realty, in
come from industry and commerce aud redemption payments. It
is obvious that such taxes, as those from commerce aud iudustry
which were more developed in Russia, increased the total sum
of taxes. The same applies to income from realty, naturally much
higher in the industrialized regions of Russia. But he did not feel
restrained to Compare the per capita tax load of Russia ill the
amount of 1 ruble, 84 kopecks with that of 92 kopecks of Central
Asia, nor to deem this an "obvious illustration of the burden
carried by.central gubernias in favor of borderlands." Ile stated
that a correction of this, the transfer of a great part of the tax
load to the colonies, will be "the subject of <\etailed studies and
measures of the Ministry of the Treasury.""a
Even this dubious method of computation showed that the
tax bmden of black-earth regions, including Ukraine, of l rnble,
97 kopecks per capita was in excess of the tax burden of thf'
central industrial region of Petersburg, where the per capita tax
load reached 1 ruble, 3 kopecks. 24
Subsequently, when we shall analyze state budgets of these
times, we shall indicate what huge amounts were annually drawn
from Ukraine in favor of Russia.

The Granary of Europe
Such an approach to the probl('m of taxing the population
of the borderlands, wherein the amount of taxes was not deter
mined by the total economic conditions of the land, but a colon
ial obligation to serve the development of the prO!ip('rity of the
metropolis, and its policy of military aggression, brought about
2f Ibid .• p. 228.

2"

IbUJ,, p. 221.

2

•

Jbid., p. 221.
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a situation under whidl the excessive taxation of the Lkrainian
peasants was one of the prime caus-es of thC' impoverishment of
large masses of them. An acute shoTtage of tools of production,
au<l to a certain extent a deterioration of the (icouomy re
sulted. ExcessiYe taxes and curtailment of the area of laud use
were hvin dilemmas for the Ukrainian peasants. Their very life
was suhjcct to an attempt to �olve tl1e problem: how to feed tbc
family, and ·where to get the money for taxes. l:u<lcr existing
conditions both problems were, to a majority of the peasantry,
incapable of solution. \Vhat is more, the natural increase of the
population, whoS(' surplus could find no outlet in industry even
during the period when industry began to grow quite notice
ably, made the problem more ,rnd more acute. ff we compare
the area of land use<l by the peasants in 1860 with the area in
1890, considering the increase in population, and losses suffered
as a result of the reform, we get the figures in Table XI!·'
TABLE XI
Land art'a pt'r
JH60
JH90
% of dcf'rease
1 /JOO pn))iilatfon
50.5
69/5 desiatynas
Rigl1t Bank
1,404 desiatym1s
Left Bank
1,562 Jesiatynns
898 desiaty nas
42.6
Southern Uhainc ...... 3,017 dcsi�tynas 1,243 dcsiatynas
58.8

This decrease in land holdings was a continuous process, and
by 1900 the average holdings per household, as compared with
lb6.3 ( the year of separating the holdings of the peasants) are
shown in Table Xll. 26
TABLE XII
Region

Kharkiv
l'oltava
Chcrnihiv
Kiev
\'olhynia
Pudilb . . .
Khcrson
Katerynosbv

2.-'

1863

·1.S desiatynast
2.S dcsiatynast
3.4 dcsiatynast
2.9 dcsiah-·nast
4.2 desiat}·nast
2.6 t!<'siatynast
0.1 (l,.siatynast
6.0 <lcsi;1tynast

l9()(J

1.9 dcsiatyna�
1..5 <lcsiatyna�
2.0 d ..stutynas
1.2 desiatrn,ts
1.7 dcsiatynas
1.2 dcsiatyn'-ls
2.2 desiatynas
2.3 desiatrnas

% of decrease
!57-6
40.0
41.2
58.5
51..'5
53.8
63.9
61.!i

V. Kosinskr, K .·\gramomu u>prosu (The Agraria11 Problem), Moscow,
1911, I, 47!:l.
"' M. l'orsh, loc. cit.
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Under pressure of such C'Urtailmcnt of cultivated land, the
peasants utiliz<"<l every bit of suitable land for ploughing. Ev('TI
considering this, the decrease of land under cultivation 1wr 1,000
people was: on the Right Bank, 29.9%; on the Left Bank, 42.3%;
and iu Southern Ukraine, 26.7%. The utilization of land for
ploughing reached such an extent in Ukraine, far in excess of
analogm1s imlices for other European couutrics, including Hus
s1a. (Sec Table XIII).

County
Ukraine
Englund
Italy . . .
Frnncc
Germany

Russia

l'loug/1cd
land and

....

gardens
70.3
12.9
42.6
,5().1

48.7

28.2

TABLE XIII
Grasslands
12.3

Forests

25.0

6- ':i.8

10.,5

16.2

16.4

10.6

Total area

Un.witable of cult/ration
82.6

15.7

6.8
17 1
13.l

2-5.k

H.3

64.9

3.n

1.5.8

.3\J.2

14.3

Hi.2

78.7
67.6
69.!:l

4'1,(j

At the beginning of the 20th century there were, per 100
dcsiaty1ws of arable land, the f-ollowing rural dwellers: England,
79; France, S4; Germany, 107; and in Ukraine's regions: Kiev,
178; Padilla: 160; Chernihiv, 157; Volhynia, 147; Kharkiv, 137;
Polta\·a, 124, an<l only in the regions of Katerynoslav and Kher
son were the figmes equal to those of Gcnnaqy and FrancC', re
spectively,�•
It is evident that such a density of the rural population per
arahlc unit of !aJJd, coupled with a lower fertility than that of
\Vestem European countries, did not provide sufficient food for
the population. This is a seeming contradiction of the general
estimate of pre-revolutionary Ukraine as the "Granary of Eu
opc" which exported its grain produc!s in gr('a! q_uantitics to
foreig11 countries. Judgi11g by grain ex:port figures, it would be
erroneous to explain these e;-,;ports solely by tlw cxiste!lce of
grain surpluses. Exports were in large measure the result of
economic difficulties of the peasants, and the tax policy illus
trated above contribute,1 in no small degree to the existence of
these difficulties. Tahlc XIV Is a ('ornparison of an.·rngc annual
yiPlds of tht' chief cultun'S for the ten-year period of the end of
the 19th an<l beginning of the 20th C(>ntury ( in pounds per 1
desUttyna) _n
"' Feshcbenko-Chopivsky, Ekonomichna hf.'Olirafiya UkraimJ, p. 36.
,,; Ibid., p. 41. Tlw original quotes fignr<•s in ;ioorfs whi<;h the translator has
cakulatl:d in pounds at 36.113 pound� per poud.
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(,\,w1/rlj

Hu�,i.,

Ckr,1iw,

Bdgium
G�rmany

Frnncc

/)!JC

U,78

2,l."3C

.J.34➔
4.J6J
2.-+04

TABLE XI\"
HarlqJ
\\"/war
l,W17
2,0<�4
2,1:i(JO
:'..172
6.608
.5,\-J�J4
S,164
4,!lWl
3.3,38
3.l7S

Oat.1

Corn

Potato,w

:'.,.-128

2,464
.S,70,'5
4,.',36
3.142

3.3'51-l

17,n8
IS.--117
41,-5:J()
,32,7.'5,!
20.940

1,fJ"iO

2,1)89

\Ve have already indicated that the "Granary of Europe"
consumed kss grain per person than any other \:\/estern Euro
pe-an country. (Sec Table XV).�r,
TABLE:,,.\'
Uenmark
Cerrn,rny

Fran,·,-.

Ilungary
Bulgaria
Ukr,iine
Russm

Crain production
per capifo
J/i52 !bs.
9.39
939
1,--180
l,:J00

l-2.G4
1.011

Crain
imports
614

180
144
210 ("<pt.
,125 expt.

3\-)7 c,;pf.
1-H npt.

Per cap/la
consumption
2.16/i
l, l Hl
1,083

1,264
H7.'5
8(J7
867

One must not lose sight of the fact that the extent of grain
consumption stands in reverse ratio to the consumption of other
products. Therefore Ukraine, where hrmd is the basic food, has
more need of grain than for example, Denmark or Germany.
Thus, the amount of bread alone per person is, during this
p eriod. not nearly enough to satisfy the population's grain needs.
llencc, the annual export figure of almost 14.4 billion pounds
of grain is no indication of a sated internal market. The surplus
is comparable not with the need, only with the purchasing pow
er of the population, especially of the rural population, a major
ity of whom appeared on the markets as bread consumers when,
a short time before, thev had been yendors.
The rcsnlt was that Ukraine, producing 25% per person more
than TTussia, exported :397 ponnds ot �rain per capita, as against
Hu.,sia-s per c.1pita export figure of 144 pounds. Thus Ukraine
brought her consumption down lo the same level as Hllssia's, 867
pounds per capita. These figure� become mul'h more convinci11g
if we appl�- thew not to the average data of Ukraine as a whole,
but to the peasants" comtmiption. If we consider 7'20 pounds
"'' Fc•slwhc11ko-Chopivsky, ,>JI. cit., p. 30.
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per capita as the norm of peasant co11sumptio11 ( induding fod
der), an absolutely inadeqnate qnautity, then we see that en'n
under this norm, the Hight llank has a deficiency of 216 pmmds,
or 31.5%, the Left l3ank a deficiency of 2:34 pounds, or 32.5'.i:" and
only the steppe region has a surplus of 644 pounds, or 89%.
Kminsky condudes that "people and cattle were equally under
nourished.""('
As has alrcadv bee11 noted. the taxes were assessed 011 the
laud area without regard to the fact whether this unit yielded
au income, or ouly miuirnum livelihood. Iu addition, the statis
tics refer to total cultivated land areas, iucluding leased laud,
the rent for which. as we shall see later, was extremely high. In
order to satisfy the need for cash, the weakest ecmmmic groups
had to be vendors of grain in the fall, Ollly to become purchasers
soon after Christmas, or else cousumers of substitutes for bread,
most often potatoes. This explains why the price of rye, which
constituted the basic ingredieut of bread in the peasants' con
surnptiort, went up much faster than the price of the most valu
able grain, wheat. Even during the first decade followillg the
abolition of serfdom, the price of rye went up more than 70%,
while wheat.rose only 38%. In order to uuderstand the exteut of
the nuaJ· economy production in relation to its population, and
in order to be able to realize the real naturt; of the so-called
"relative agrariau overpopulation" iu Ukrai11e, which is always
referred to as the most characteristic feature of the Ukrainiall
rural ecouomy, it is necessary to consider in more detail the mat
ter of peasants' land holdings.

Land Shortage
\Vhen the peasants were endowed with land, they lost a
considerable part of the laud which they had been using before
the reform. In 1877, after the [and allotments were almost com
pletely finished, the entire agricultural area of 37,460,633 des
iatynas was divided i11to the following categories: private prop
erty, 17,952,886 desiatynas, or 47.9%; endm.ved property, 16,762,066 desiatynas, or 44.6%; state, church, etc., 2,745,681 or 7.51."'
Dming the next 10 years the geueral arable land area was iu
creased by 1.4 milliou desiatynas by putting hitherto unused
·"' V. Kosinsky, op. cit., I, 482.
31 :\I. l'orsh, "Statystyka zemlevolodinnya i mobilizatsiya zemelnoyi vlas
nosty v Ukrainy" ("Statistics of Land Ownership and :'.\fobilizatim, of
Land Property in Ukr;,ine''), Ukraina, .ll-12, p. f,J6.
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land under cultiYahon, incr('asing the total of 38.8 million dcs
iatynas. During the same period, the area of peasant endow
ments was increased by 1.5 million desiatyrws so that peasant
endowments increased to a total of 18,169.922 desialynas. Since
that time, there were no changes of any significance."
The endowed lall(_I was divided, on an average per house
hold. as shown in Tublc XVI,

Region
Right Dank
Left Bank ...

Southern Ukraine ..

TABLE XVI
Endou:£'d land
6,l.'59,829
7,187,809
4,822,284

Ii ouselwlds Per lwuselw/d
1,134,6,54
5.4
1,178,345
6.8
56.5,121
8.5

Thus that average land endowment per household in Ukraine
was 6.3 dcsiatynas. But this figure does not sufficiently charac
terize the problem of land use. Besides regional variations, we
must bear in miml that fonner state serfs were in a much better
position on land endowment and tax assessment ( See Table
XVll).
The matter will hecome even more clear when we consider
in Table XVIII the groups of households among which the en
dowed lan<l was divided.
Thus, from the very beginning there existed a deep discrep
ancy in peasant land holdings, where 32.3% peasants' farms had
only 13.3% of the land with an average holding of less than 4
desiatyrws per household, or under the minimum required for a
bare living. But outsi<le of that there were also landless peas
ants, constituting 19% of all peasant households, 3,595,500 peo
ple. If we take all peasant households who conlrl not he provided
with a livelihood from the land, their numher rises to 44.7%. In
other words almost half of the Ukrainian peasants were land
hungry immediately following the land reform.
A question naturally arises whether such lan<l hol<ling was
peculiar only to Ukraine, or whether the same picture is pre
sented hy all European Russia in the post-reform period? Un
fortunately we have no data pt>rtaining to the last quarter of the
19th century, because not all zem.stvos kept statistics of land
holdings. There are some data pertaining to the first years of
the 20th century, but these, to some extent, indicate a better
nlbid.

"3

Ibid., p. 164.

......... 8,616
State serfs rC'ccivcd . . . . . . . .
... 8,167
Landowners serfs received . . .
- - - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2'l
Fn·emen received
110
L,,.os.,holding sprfs received
.......... \,2-15
Colonist� received . . .

---

TABLE XVII
thousand
thousand
thous,m<l
thousand
thousand

de�iJtynas
dcsiatynas
desi,1tynas
<lesi,!tynas
d('siatyna�

for 1,137
fo, 1,617
fo,
5
for
II
for
78

thousand
thousand
thollsan<l
thousarnl
thous,md

housC'holds,
households,
lmuscho!<ls,
housdiol<ls,
houschOlcls,

°'

7.,5

'" average 5.0 each
each
"' avernge •Hi <'ach
"' ,iverage 2.6 <,adi
"' avt;"rage 1.5.9 ("ach"'
Un'rnge

TABLE XVIII
Group
Under 1 dcs!utynu
1-2 <lisiatynas1
2-3 <lesiatymrn1
3--t desi.itynas1
•'±--"i <lesiatynas1
!5- 10 desi:ityn"s1
10-.C,O dtisiatynas1
.')().l(J(I dcsiatyrrns ..1
Over 10() dcsiatynas1
'" Ibid.. p. 163.

so Ibid., p. 166.1

Farms
(households)
number
8-1,6911
132,1041
.'326,0871
376,6071
38.:3,6671
1,155,667
,'3!J7.174
1,378

ws·

"

3.0
4.6

11..5

13.2
13.4
40.,)
13.9
0.0
().()

Land
area in
desil1tynas
3�1,074
208,387
841,617
1,318,8,'52
1,731.603
8,269,232
5,592,86--1
82,373
30,128

'

0.2

1.1

4.7

7.3

'.J..5
4-5.71
30.!J1
0.41

.,

0.2
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position of Ukraine because, as we shall see later, the Ukrainian
peasallts were buyi11g up the landowners' estates on a large
scale. There are grounds to helicvf' that immediately after
the reform, conditions were evc11 worse. But under any conrli
tions, the different situatio11 of Ukraine bcrnmes imme<liatdy
apparent.
If we divide all peasants into three groups, those ,vith in
significant land holdings, medium holdings., and large holdings
( including in the latter gronp all farms of ten desiatynas, and
over), then Table XIX gives proportionate figures for differeut
regions of the Empire (in percentages),'�

Region;

Central Chornuzem
t-.!iddk-Volga

Ukraine
South
Rigl,t Bank

..

Slobozhan�b

Industrial region
ByPlorussia
Litliuarna
Lake region
Sallie region
lJr:il region
'\Jorthnn region
Lower \'olga

TABLE XIX
Smail holdir,g.,
21.7
17.9

,U,·,liwn

36.0

ilO.O

Lar{!.F

20.3

32.l

33.4
57.6
4-1.1'
16.8

36.fi
33.0

28.0
g.4

58.7
63.6

2-1.5

4.0
5.1
1.5

19.0
43.5

0.7

87.8
78.4
5�4
3,5.4

7.9

10.0
19.9

5.4

43.0

11.6

24.7
9.2

12.2

28.5

77.0
51.4

As can be seen, Ukrniuc differs greatly from the other ter
ritories of 1he Empire by the large prt>pondcrance of small peas
ant holdings and by an insignificant percentage of large hold
ings. Only northern Ukraine has .a number of large holdings
equal to that of other regions, but the number of small hold
ings here is also much greater than elsewhere.
This single comparison suffices to prove that Ukraine, as a
result of Russia's colonial policy, was under entirely different
conditions. An additional factor must be noted which was of
great importance in the matter of land holdings. It is of servi
tudes, or easements. Ukraine is poor in pastures and foresls: only
12.3'7 of lhe usable land area is pasture lam.l, and 10.6% forests
'·" I'. \hslov, A,;ramiu u;µros t: Rossir1i, L
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( comparL·<l to the respective figures for Russia of 16.4;;: and
;39.2%.). For this reaso11, tlte accumulation of hay aml fodder for
cattle was always an acute problem. During the land reform
a large part of such lands ( pastures and forests) were excluded
from peasaut allohncn!s and reserved as servitudes, or lands of
tommou nse. For example in Volhynia in 1885 there were 1,926
thousand desiatynaR of servitude lands; in Kiev, 6,f/ thousand
dcsiatynas; in Podilla, 991 thousand desiatynas, etc. But in 1886
the sena1c passed a ukase which gave the landlords the right
"to decidP 1he matt('r in the interest.� of farming." From that
time the landlord had a right to "'place his sown field according
to his convenience, without considering the servitudes.""'
In reality this was an abolition ot' the right of easement which
deprived the peasants of the opportunity to use pastures and
meadows, and transformed these lands into the private property
of laudm.vllers. :\lass litigation ir1 this matter hrought 110 changes.
Thi:, causet1 a la11d shortage, th(' amount of land in possession
of the peasaJJts conld not absorb all available labor of the peas
ants. A surplus rural population came into being and contiuucd
increasing. thus causing all '"agrarimi overpopulation" which is
justly •·relative,'' because at its basis by not an absolute lack
of land, 011ly its artificial apportionment. This land shortage, in
relation to ecouomic conditions, of which it was "th(' main cause,
became the chief obstacle on the road toward an intensification
of thC' rural economy, and prevented the increased use of labor
per area of surface.
As early as the 1870's the land with which a peasallt liou�chokl
had to work. under t'Omlitious of t!w period iu the PoJtaya re
gion, snfficed for only onc worker. "·The seco11d am\ following:
workers in households of no !rind and small lam! holdings were
supcrfluou�, unless the farmer leased other land.""�
S.t Korolenko estimated the surplus rural population for thet
1S80"s to be 5 million, with only about half able to fiud work
locally, or in the immediate neighborhood; tht' remainder leaY
ing for work in distant places. Thns, the entire naturnl imTe'.1se
of the rnral population, with the very small exl'eptions pertaining
to larger farm holdings, became "surplus" and had no opportun•
ity to earn a living. Ukraine had neither sufficient iudustry to
s, M. Slabclicnko, or,. cit .. p. 169.
·" S. Va<,y],.,,ko, Kw,tarni pmm11�·/ y ( lloml' lnd11\'fr1u; l. Kiev, 1913, p. �3.
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absorb this surplrn nor oH-sca,011 liomc-wagc ean1ing opportun
ities \d1ich woulJ cmnpemate for the inarkquatc i11come rkrivcd
horn agricnlture, and \vould emplo�· people bc�·oll(l the period of
sea,m1,ll Lum "vork.
Tlie peas.mt; of i11drntrially developer! Hussia \Vere, in this
respect, in an ci1tirely different position. In addition, they liaci
much better farm la11J. The peasants ot Hu<;<;ia no! only founJ
ample employment opportm1itic, i11 i11d11strial pla11b, but also
haJ good cliances of additio11al wages by worki11g for tlw same
i11Jlls-tries at home dllring the \Vinter ,ea,on. "Over and almve
factory industries, i11 the guhcrnias adjacent to \fosco\v, home
cotto11 man11fachJri11g i11d11strics were widesprcaJ. They em
ployed 350 thousand people." Tlmse pca,a11b, employer! at home,
tllrned out semi-finisher! products for tlw factories. "In arldition,
outside of the factories. the line,1 industry employed 3 million
spinners and half a million weavers, and in the preparation of
flax another half millio,1 peasants follnd work. This worki11g
population lielongerl to the northcn1 and ce11tral gu/;ernia.1."·''
The Ckrainia11 pca,ai1!s did not have such opportu11itics nor
any real chance of full-time employment in indmtry. Their home
i11dustry of preparing flax and hemp, \vhich also existed, had an
entirely different ch,1racter. For the most part it \Vas merely to
satisfy tlicir own familv needs.
A situatio11 thereby aro,c in which the peasants found them
selves chained to tlie soil. Outside of agriculture they did not,
in fact, have any chance to work. It is the11 natural that the in
crease of the population contrihuterl to the splitting of peasant
holdings arnl to the increase of the nmnlier of landless peasants.
Professor M. 1. Tuhan-Tiaranovsky cites changes which occurred
in the division of pcasai1! lanJ holdi11gs i11 ni11c cotm!ics of the
l'oltava guhcrnia Juri11g the ten-year pcrioJ from 1S89 to 1900.
( See Tuhlc XX.)'"
\\'e have here a very diaracteristic pichue. The general in
crease iu the numher of farms \Vas 11%, at a time wh(m changes
among the groups are far in e"<cess of this increase. \\'c sec then,
110! OTily a distriliution of the increase of the pop11latio11, but
also !ranslocatim1s withi11 tl1e groups. The most stable appear
"" l'\ Ya1,nnpnl,ky, •-�:knnumidicska ya buduehmic;t yuga Ro,siyi i sov
n,m,,mrnya yqm ot,talost" ("The Econom,c Fulllre of South Rusc;ia
and Its Pn,1,"llt llaekwardn,,s," ), Otechco-tm:rmiyc Za piski' (Ilome Soles ),
�t. Pder,bm;(. lh71. p. '2cl.2.
'" Q1Joted from Fornill'1, "Fkunomic.,lma kl,araktcrystyka
.," p. 59.
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TABLE XX
llou.w,holt.i (farm�} in thm1Jtmds
Land- Un<lcr 1-2 2-3 :J-(:; 6-9. U-15

1889
li:JOO

less
56.7

2-).2

a�. des. Jes. des. des.
6.8 19.4 25.5 61.1 33.5 19.0

1 des.

2.!;J
1::1.2
1.5.2 30.6

-18.2.
18.3.
5.8
Approximate
perccntagt'S
plus and mlnu�
chan ges -15 ! 124

10.8
32.0
11.6 E!.l

�6.0
7L7
::?.7.1

1,!.2
30.6
11.6

+60 +20

+8

-H

8.1
18.5

-··-'

13-50 ov. 50
des. des.

6.�J

2.9
8.9
3.4

Total

235.2
2.7 100
13.6 269.3
2.H 100.
6.3

-3 +29 +117

+l•I.

to be the three mi<l<lle groups, from 9 to 15 desiatynas, The ex•
treme groups uuderwent significant changes, such changes being
more prouonnced in those groups ,vhich are farthest from the
center. This rneaus that there was a process of land splitting; the
weaker units of the middlc groups joined the lower groups. and
tht? latter went down ev("n further. On the other hand, the more
wealthy farms of the middle groups, went higher.
Regarding the decrease in the mimbcr of lamlless house
holds, we have not an acquisition by them of land, but, nudoubt
cdly, a complete abandonment by them of farmiug. This finds
support first .of all in the insignificant percentage increase of
the total nnmber of fanns in relation to the natural innease of
population, and in the second place in the fact that by 1900 the
Donbas indnstry had already grown considerably, and was able
to accommodate a large number of workers from the neighbor
ing Poltava region. Such a large percentage of landless peasants
and a constant increase of the number of small holdings was
prevalent not only in the Poltava region which cxpo;ricnced the
worst '1and shortage," but also in the land-rich regions of South
ern Ukraine. Peasants who could not cultivate laud ( a certain
percentage of the landless took land on lease) numbered; in
Bcrdyansky county, 6.7'.i'; of the total number of households, in
Melitopil county, 7.51; Olebandrivsky, 16.81, Ananievsky,
13.11. Bakhmutsky, 15.4%. Slavyanoserbsky, 22%, etc.
The data regarding \fariupil county. shown in Tahle XXI are
entirely analogous to those of Poltava. only in a different numer
ical expression, and in reference to farming not only the peas
ants' own land, but also leased land. 11
·" A. Knipo\"ich, K Voprosu. o dikrentsiyutsiyi krestyunsk"g" k/w;:IJUfjstw.
(On the Problem of Diffen'nliatirm o f th e Peasants' Economy), Katerynu
slJxskoyc Gubcrn. Zcmstvo, 1903, p. 78.
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A statistical study , conducted in Bakhmutsky count y in 1886,
gave tbc results shown in Table XXIU'
We sec then that even farms of medium land holrling joined
the landless class.
'n1is loss of land in certain counties and within certain cam
gories of peasants reached extraordinary pro portions. In 1882,
Table XXlll shows numhers of landless peasants in Poltava re
g ion.
In 1917, in general, the peasants of Ukraine were divided, as
Table XXIV shows, into categ ories according to land holding:'l
TABLE XXI
1886
4.6%
19,:W
2S.7%
3,5.1%
J l.61
0.7%

Nnt culti,)(lting ..
Under , e; desiatyna�
"JO
10-2020-,"i(l
Over 50-

1901
6.8%
\.5.7%
2/i.0%
29 ..'l'l:
17.6%
2.1%

Xumber Receiving Land
inl861·
4581
6Hl3
6402
8075

TABLE X...'\:ll
Qr,�ntity 11cr
household
11p to 4 desiatyn:1s
over 4 desiatyrus
up to 8 desiatynas
over 8 desiatynas

Recamr
landless
9i7 -21.4%
444-7.2i990 - 15.4'.-i'.846 - 10,8%-

Among Cossacks
Among l'msants

TABLE XXIII
M'}rhorod
cowitr1
16.ci'�,;l(j_:y;-

Zilikiv
county
lH.8%
53.8%

TABLE XXIV
Amount owned
Landless, or with only ,i house and vard ..
I to 3 desia!ynas...
3 to ,5 desiatynas ................ .
,5 to 8 desiatrrn1s.
8 to 10 dcsiatynas ..
10 to 20 dcsi<ltynas.
Over 20 dcsiatynas.
Total
'" :\I. Slabchenko, op. l'it., p. 17\:l.
•·1 F,·shchenko-Chopivsky, op. dt., p. G3.-

Polt1wa
cmml'}
29.8'.li
36.0't

Families in thousands
700 - 15%
800- 20%1,000 - 22ll'.
950 - 21%
600 - 13%
300 - 7%
80- 2%4,430-100%
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It should be noted that this last listing of land holding shonld
be considered in relation to the time, 1917; the process of mobil
izing laml by the peasants had been going on for several years
by means of purchases of land by the peasants. This will be
discussed in more detail later.

Lease of Land
The land situation of the Ukrainian peasants here described
brought about quite naturally a situation, under which all the
peasants' attention was concentrated on the problem of getting
more land, because they had no place to earn a living outside of
agriculture. The peasants had only hvo ways open to them: pur
chase or lease. The third way, one of fighting for their rights, at
first assumed the form of mass lawsuits for lands held by prescrip
tion, for rights to servitude (easement), and btet, of rebel
lion and open revolutionary warfare for land. This did not, how
ever, bring about any changes in peasant land holdings up to
1917.
Speaking of leasing land, we must first of all note its peculiar
nature which has given rise to the apt designation, "lease in kind."
For most peasants, the taking of land under lease was not in
contemplation of increasing production in order to take in an
increased profit, but merely a means of getting additional pro
duce in order to fee<! the family. A lease was "a continuation of
the farmer's work on his own land, the former and the latter
constituted a single economic activity." The large number of
people who took land on lease can be explained by the fact
that the area of land per household was two to three times
smaller than necessary.e44
To determine the essence of the "lease in kind" we must
understand first the objective the peasant had in mind when he
decided to take land under a lease, and secondly the price he
had to pay. The decisive factor was that the grain from his own
farm would not suffice the family for a year, and a certain
number of pou nds must supplement it. He could not buy the
grain for money earned elsewhere, because he could not find
work during the off season in agriculture. What remained was
to lease some land, not for reward, but on the risk that the ad
ditional amount of grain, after payment of rent, would suffice
·0

V. V. Oclwrki krestyanskngo k/w;:;yaystu, (Outline of the PN1:,ant Enm
omy), ]\foscow, 1903, pp. 83-100.
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to rnver his deficit in kind. The essential attributes of a lease
were its compulsory nahire and tlH· attempt of the peasants to
solve their subsistence budget with its aid. not stopping to
consider its economic fallacy iu the sense of a mm:h lower re
,nucl lor labor wll{'n compared with the prfr:e of labor. Profes
sor Slahchc-nko wrote in this conrn'diou: '"The peasant (lid not
stop to consider tlw obvious in(onvcnience ot a lease. in the
Poltav,1 rcgiou, e. g. the gross income from 1 dcsiatyna of lam!
was 19 rubles, 26 kopecks, and the cost of tilling 11 rubles, 76
kopecks, while the rent was 9 rubles, 6 kopecks. This meant there
was no profit, only a loss of 1 ruble, 51 koped..s.''·1'·
Thus rf'nt for land was not determined hv the intl'rest on
]arid as a capital investment. ( not by the level of an ahsolute
land r<·nt). Instead, secondary considerations fixed it, consid<'r
aticms which had no (lirect relation to the amount ot industrial
iucomc from thf' agricultural e11\t'rprisc. cost of labor, and
pric('S of agricultural products. The r('nt \Vas created hy condi
tions resulting from post-reform laud relations. It became. of it
self. a factor which determiucd the value of land as capital.
In Table XXV, Professor Kosinskv, in his K :\gramumu vop
ros11 shows a balance. quotC'd in foll, of economic results of till
ing leased laud in five counties of the steppe. They dt'arly
show the ecouomic nature of this kind of land area exploitation,
when the problem is approached from the criterion of normal
industrial entC'rprise interests:'"
TABLE XX\'
( In Ruh/es)

Nd ineome from
l dr:oi,tlyna

nz,,ks.

andriu
3.98

R,,nt (Jr, ]png-tcrm lc,1,,,
fl.28
Rt·nt 00 l year lease . . , . . . \:l.\IB
i.e. loss (-) or profit l+I
l.'ndcr long-tenn kdS('
-2,30
l.'ndcr l year leas(, . . . . . . -5.98

E[11savcthrad

AnanOdessa
in:

Khcrson

..>.91
.'i.,56
9.60

1.01
5.00
7.,58

4.81

7.97

-'5.52
8.7"6

-1.62
-.5.Gl

-0.9V
-3.57

+I.43
-l.70

+1.96
-L28

fi.27

7A8

The nature of the phenomenon becomes even more apparent,
when we consider gross income as seen in Table X.'\TI."
,-, J\f. SJ;,bd,enko , op. cit., p. 268.
"Il>i,l., p. 2H2.

,,, \'. K(,oin.,ky, op. cil., p. 2Dl.
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'lABLE XX\"l
Olcks-

To!,tl gross ioclu<led
from 1 dcsiatyna
I .ong-trrm lease
I yc,,r lcci�,_.
llin·<l Labor per
l. dcsiatyna ....
Hc·ncP, the rc�u\t uf
long-term l,·a�c
1 year kasc.

El11save-

fl.rum-

OdeSM Khcr,wm

am!rit

thrad

12.30
f 6.98
I 2.3-1

12..10
+6.74.
+2.70.

11.3()
+6.30.
+4.72.

+8.56.
+5.-B.

+ll.38.
+o .oo

8.32

8.3ti.

7.2ll.

7.1:l.

7.3�.

- 1,36

-0.1-:l'J

+l.4J.
-1.70.

+HJfi

-1.:H

-5.W;

-."i.fitl

in

-2..'57.

13.-fO

1-i.SO

-1.32.

As we can see, the economic nahue of a peasallt'S work 011
leased land was such that it was rewarded at a much lower
rate than the hired labor market offrrf'd. On a 011c-ycar lease,
the peasant of Oleksa11driv coullty received only 28$ of what
he would earn working as hired labor. The remai11iug 72% of
hi� labor accrued to the landowner, creating a differential land
rent. To the peasant there was significance not in the reward
for his labor Itself, lml in additional sum total of natural prod
ucts. To that end, he increased the leased area ( calliug 011 C'Xi�t
iug manpower in the family) to sueh a degree that as a result, lw
would eithe� get the amount of produce needed, or else he
would have to curtail his needs either by reducing the number
of cattk, or simply by undcrnourishi11g the cattle ... aml his
own family. Obviously the existe,1cc of such high reutal rah$
for land determined by its "yield in kind" uature is, from the
economic viewpoi11t, an anomaly. The explanation has to be
sought both iu the diYision of land on occasion of the reform,
and iu the cco11omic s11bjectiou of Ukraine to Russia. The former
created au artificial surplus of thf' rnral population with its
"relative agrarian overpopulatiou,'' the latter tied this popula
tiou to the soil.
Thus, a constant and e\·er growing demand for land on
terms of lease was created. A coutinual increase in land rent
resulted.
In the J.'ollava region. rents illcreascd at the following rate
(in rnbles): lS(H, 0.i5; 1Si2, LS0; 1S9:2, 10.14; 1900, 11.92;
1901, 13.00, aud 1902, 13.85.e48
In 1916 average rents in Ukraine were on the following level
for spriug sowing ( double for wiI1ter sowing): Volhynia, 12.00
s M. SLibchenko, up. cit., p. 312.
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rllhk,, Kiev, 12.50; Podilla, 16.00; Kher,on, 12.00; l'oltarn, 18.50;
Kharkiv, LZ.00; Katerynoslav, 12.00; Tauria, JS.00. The average
for all of Ukraine was U.00 rnblcs. "Tliis gave tl1c bm.lowncrs
110 less than 17.) million rubles. Before, the entire servitude gave
the landlord, le,, than only tlie land rent now . .-\nd at that, as
thev ,av. withollt aJff tnmblc."·"
·a
·,\nll ,o it wa,. in the 18q()'s, in the same l'oltava regiona
tilling ot l dr:siatyna hy the landlorrh cm! 27 rnble,, arnl the
income was :H ruble�. But C\-Cn at that time. rents were liigher
than tliat difference of 7 rnblc, a11d the landlord could
a
higher iuconw from rent without tlie trouble of: cOT1dllding an
ci1terprise.
Althougli �i,1lC that time yields became higlier, and the
prices of grain i11crcased also, neither the former nor the latter
went hand in hand \\·itli the increase of rent. The increase
in rent wa, in no rkgree dctcnni11cd b)' the market for grain
or tor labor, only liy tlie hopclc,, po,ition of: the pca,anb, for
wlio1n the lease was for tlie most part the only meam of: pre
serving life, This, in tmn, cal!serl a rlemand for lam!. If the
l'oltava peasant in 19.16 had, from .1 dc,1iutyna of leased land
2,27.S pound, of barlc;,,; ( or corresponding amollnts of other
grain. the lmn·e,t tl1at ;,,;car being about a\-crage); then, after
deducting the ,eccl, lie had a marketable product ( grain a11d
�traw) \·alued at 2.q to 32 rnhle,, out of wliicl1 he paid a rent
of .IS.,30 rubles or SSZ to G,1'.f of the total. .-\fter rlerlucting all
otlicr expenses, Sllch as traction, tools, threshing, etc. onlv a
miserlv amount \\·as ldt on�r for his O\n1 lahor. But the deci
sive factor was tlmt otlicrwisc he would liave had notlii11g, and
lie had tlii, arhlitional amount witl1out leavi11g his farm.
It must he noted that these average rental '1Jms contain
large hidden difference,, depending on the term of the lease
and 1he area of the lanrl leased. \Ve harl the opportunity to
observe, on s!11dying fin� co1111ties of Sollthern Ukraine, that a
one-year lease \\·as 60�! to 65% more cxpcnsiyc tha,1 a long-term
lease. J)iffrrcllcCs arc even greater \\·lien the area i� con,iUcrcd.
Thus, in llcrd;mn�ke county, for example, a lease of up to 5
desiatynus of lam! cost 11 rnhlcs while larger lea,e, of over
50 desiatyuus called for a rent of onlv cl.20 ruble,. The corres
ponding figures for Dniprnv,kc county were JS.2,:i nihles and

g·e1

"' S. O,t,p,,nkn, "'Kapilalizm. na Ukrnini" ("Cap1lnl1.1m in Ckrnmo"),
Cherrnny Shlakh (fled Pn1h), Kharl,iv, lfl24, p. 2(i.
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3.!'i.5 ruhles. It was like this all over. This naturally gan,• ris('
to speculation in leases. ··rn the l'oltaYa regiou, a speculator
would take land at 8 rubks and sublease it at l.'5 to 35 ruhh's
and eveu at .50 rubles. depending on the culture for which the
land was used." ( Truck garden rents \\·ere as high as 60
rubles.)"', Extra high rents ,n're also charged for grazing. On the
Left B;mk, they Wf'IC 7 to 10 rubles per dcsiatyna, between one
quartf'r and one-third of the value of the cow itsel!-.
J:hcre are no <lata availahk showiug t·lw C'.xact amount of
land leased hy the peas,mts. Professor Slahchcnko dtes estimates
of Vasylchykov pertaining to the 1870's, according to these esti
mates the peasants lea;,ed. ( See Tuhll' XXVII). l'roft'ssor OgonTABLE \.\.\ lJ
lfrgi,m:

Kharkiv
Clwn,ihiv
Poltav.1
Kiev
Podilia
\'olhyrna

(In d1wiatr;1ws)
Former land/orJs'
Formrr slat,:
limds
lmuls
S9.7,":i(I
1,Jhfi.'.'.J.J
,"i,1:'.0
1,(H:'..,377
10,mn
l,\J4:'.,i:l7
H1,77(i
1,808.·124
l,GOJ ..":i'lO
,12,4.')fi
1:J,5,HJ!)
2.2.5f>..33S

,,,

ovsky reports for appm:-;:imatcly th(' 5amc' p('rioll that in SoutJwm
lJkraine the peasants took on ]C'ase :2,761,,500 di:siatynas of
land.''"
fo total, this gives a s11111 which ('fjllals 7:1',- of all private
larnl holdings, at that lime 17 million rlcsiatynns. \Ve are in
c lined to believe that these figures rtre excessi\'1:. They might
indu<lc st'rvitude lamb \,·hich still ('xisted at that time, arnl com
prised scver,tl million dcsiatynas. The estimates of }', Maslov
may lw eonsfdered as the more accurate, also those of Posnikov.
Both state that at the h('glnning of the 20th centmy, the land
lords culti,·atcd only S(i'T of the land they owned. If we' take
this figure, and if this percentage is not umlcrcstimatcd, it
woul<l appear that at that time about 4..5 milliou drsiatynas
were taken in lease by the peasants annually ( the awa owned
hy landowners had hy then declined to 10 million desiatynas).
''" r..t. Slahehcnko, op. cit., p. 37�. . ,- , Ibid.
'" �I. Ogonov;;ky, op. cit., p. 161.
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The average rent then as has been stated above wa�, in Ukrame,
4 rnLlc� per desiatyna. Thi� means that cvcrv year 68 rnillion
mbks were taken from the peasants in the form of payment for
temporary use of land. \Vhere this money went, anJ what the
rcpcn.:11ssions were upon the entire Ukrainian economy, we
,hall ,how later.
Kuipovich gives a vivid picture, reprodl!ced in Tahle XXVIII,
of the meaning of land leases among the various groups of
peasants in his work K 1:oprosu o differcntsyalsiyi krestyanskogo
kho;:,yaystu1. '''
.\lthough the data apply to the relatively laud-rich Katery
noslav region where, a� we see, the percentage of lanJless peas
ant,, and of those who only haJ a cottage, cquallcJ only 8.1'.t
as against 36'1'. in the l'oltava region, and although the data
are cited for the period when the Kateryno�lav region had an
alreaJy noticeahle imlmtry which, to ,omc extent, freeJ the
peasants from the lanJ. :\"everthclcss, even under such cor1Jitior1s
we can sec what a decisive role lcasillg of lar1J played in the
lives of the pcasaJ1ts of that region. Only in the last group of
those having over 25 de.1"iaty11a.1· does the lea�e occupy an auxil
iary place in the general land holding, and at that, at the cx
pcmc of land acfp1isition. Bllt even in this group the percentage
of farms which took lanJ in lease was not lower than in other
groups. In general, more than half of all the farm� re�orted to
leasing. It is a striking fact that along with a general land lmn
ger and mass resorting to leasing, all groups include a certain
part which gave out laud under lease. This is particularly noticc
ahle in the groups holrling fom 5 to 10, and from 10 to 15 des
iatyrw.l" per farm, precisely in the miJJle groups, where the
ef111ilibrillm bchn�cn labor available in the family and the
amount of lalld is at au optimum. This phenomenon resulted
from many cames. :\mong them, the rnore significant, though
llOt decisive, was au insufficient supply of fann tools. But the
main cause was that the region of Katcrp1oslav, unlike many
other parts of Ckraine, was a guhcmia governed by the Hus�ian
imposed system of community land holding, a sihiation to which
we shall rdurn later. This form of land holding causcJ a great
spli!lir1g of lanJ into strips, where one farrner would have to
11se many small pieces of land each in a different location. lu the
-,, A. Knipnvid,, "P· cit., p. 1.37.

of farms

L111dlcss
Crn!n I d,.s.
1-:1
:1-.5
,"i-10
10-J.5
1"-20
2()-25
Owr 25

GrotJf)~

of farms
•lO.
2.6.
9..3.
15.7.
35.U.
18.8.
7.2.
2..4.
5.0.

'f.

of pnpulatioii

.33,::0.
1!5.3
5.1
l.J.
4.1.

rn.:5

4.9
3.2
11.2

~

unit (in dc.~iatynas)

0.3
2.0
,1.6
7.1
11.7
16.5
2.1.\)
5\l,5

Amble la,id per farm

�

5.1
5.2
5.1
,.5.0
6.S.
7.6.
8.8.
9.6.
7.6.

'l of fc.mits tdiich
bought lar~d

12.3
10.9
H..5
12.9.
]8-8.
2.2.6.
.36.3
55.\)

Land bnught per

% nf farms taking

1.6
l(j_()
21.2
27.I.
26.0.
24.5.
1,5.5.
12.6.

~; of farms gitiing ·
fond h1 lease

6.0
24..5
4-'.dl
62.6
61.8
,56.3
48.9
39.6

Er1rlorr-cd

II
2.3
2.S.
5.0.
8.1.
f).7.
16.J.
H.H.

JOO
92.!l
7::\.2
cil.3
::12.1
:w.1
:J4.0
:rm
1.5,.5

�

C

% of Land in Group

,---- ----.)2,:{
·1:3.0.
, 5•1.:).
4•1./l.
37..5.
-H.O.
-18.:l.
fi4. l.
53.7.

h·<lsccl land

-�
:.E

--

"'
26.l.
2.\l.
.1.1.
2.S.
3.2.
3.8.
7.8.
14.0.
59.tl.

"t_g

arms

~{; nf farms 1.dth

.33.7
27.0
-1f).4.
29.7.
28.8.
29.8.
23.7.
23,0.
7.3

home industries

TABLE X.XVIII

fnrm unit

0.4
1.5
2.2
4.1
7.2
10.7
1 Ul
57.4

(1~·(•d

farm unit

BougTtt

;:'

::, -1=

"
.?":::,
_,
-�
"�

43.0
59.4
39.fi.
:io.2.
'.'.0.7.
11.1.
f;_:j.
2.4.
l.fi.
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steppe area these distances sometimes reached eight an<l more
miles. The cultivation of a small piece of land at a distant loca
tion was naturally a losing proposition; hence the owner would
let it out iu lease, in ordl'r to lease for his own usP more closely
located land. This was the canse of mutual leases in tht' groups
of farmers. 1n the higher groups, however, leasing of land as
sumed proportions of normal industry. As far as the group hold
ing 1 to 3 desialynas is concerned, the fact Iha! 167 of them gave
land in lea�e cannot un<ler any cin:umslanccs mean that they
had a surplus of land. This is a group which abandone<l farming,
and appears to he artifidally tied to the laud by norms of the
so-called Stolypin law of community property, obshcllina.
Likewise the huge percentage, 26.1%, of labor hired by the
landless cannot be considered proof of a lack of labor in com
parison with the land area. This is nothing but hiring to till the
land of thost' who possessed the needed tools. by those who did
not. In genernl, wc can see that the utilization of hired labor
by all groups, with the exception of the last, was so insignificant
that even on farms with sufficient land ii could not be taken as
proof of the lack of an a<lequate labor �upply in relation to the
land. \Ve should also not overlook the significant percentage of
farms in all groups that engaged in home industries. The nature
of the home industries and their dlffncnet's from those of Hussia
have already hecn commented upon. This was not factory work
which would bring in extra income. It merely satisfied their
own net'lb. primarily in textiles. This fact proves that the econo
my wa� of a consumer nature, and that tllt're was a lack of rncm
ey which prt'veuted the peasa11ts from joining in the market turn
over.
The "lease in kind" nature of leasing land in Ukraine ( the
most appropriate name for it would probably be "lease in order
to live") was, according to the number of leases, the most wide
spread. Its chief mark was that it was dictated by the hopeless
situation of the peasants. Ncvertlwlt'ss, there were forms of
leases which peasants undcriook not by compnlsion. but out of
consideration of a more rational and more profihble comluct
of their farm enterprise; tlwre were also hnsiness leases dt"
signed to effectuate a large production of cereal goods. In
his Opys l'oltacskoyi hulNmiyi, 1 mshenetsky divides leases
into thrt'c groups: 1) lease out of nt'cessity. in which he
includes all leases under 10 clcsiatynas; 2) economic leases of 10
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to 30 desiatynas, and 3) industrial leases of 30 desiaty11as and
over. A division into the above groups gives the picture shown
in Table XXIX.'"
T.\BLE XXIX
Land given in lea,e

Group I

Leases ........... .

13.9%
.'51.7%

Group II

3-5.7,;
37.2%

Group Ill

.J0.4%
11.1%

Mobilization of Land
It is quite evident that the Ukrainian peasants were seeking
a solution of the artificially created land shortage by means oth
er than taking land in lease. Strenuous efforts were directed by
them toward acquisition of land outright. Here again, as in the
analysis of leases, we shall encounter a series of phenomena,
basically different from their analogies in Russia. They came
into being as a result of specific economic conditions to which
the entire economic life of Ukraine was subject in the interests
of the metropolis.
The process of diminishing landlord land ownership is
characteristie of the entire European part of the former Hussian
Empire. Its causes were many. First of all, the huge area of land
acquired by the landowners during the reform; by far exceeded
present adequate production capital in the shape of tools, mate
rial, cash, etc. necessary for the exploitation of such great areas.
Prior to the reform, the majority of labor was performed with
agricultural tools of the serfs. In the second place, the diversion
of the economic attention of the peasants towards their own
land created, particularly during the seasonal peak of activity,
a lack of labor available from local reserves. Thirdly, capital
invested in agricultoure brought much lower rehirns than in other
forms of production because of the poverty of the internal market
caused by the agrarian nature of the country, underdevelop
ment of transportation, etc.
In Ukraine, however, in addition to the general causes, there
existed others, created by peculiar conditions. It is obvious
that the demand for land, prompted by the "land shortage" con
tributed to a greater increase of prices for land than iu Russia.
"''.\. Im�hf"nf"tsky, Opy.� Poltnnkoiy huherniyi (TJcscription nf Poltava
Gni;ernor.l'hip), Poltava, Hl07, p. 43.
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Bnt i11 a rn11ch greater degree leasing wa, a coantrihnting fat:tor.
l::1.trcmcly higl1 rental vallle, of land given in lease determined
the capitali1:cd valllc of the land. Similarly. as the market value
of stock risc, according to higher dividends declared llpon it,
aiming toward an an;ragc yield on i11ve,ted capital, so also prices
of land ch:rnge(l continually, cktcrminccl hy lease rcnb a, land
rent.
lf we adopt the figurc 100 as the price of laml arnl tlw rent
Yalne for thc period HJ()4 to lfJDS, s11hseq11cnt changes an: in
tl ic fol\mving rdation slmwn in Tahir: XXX_.-,.-,
TAilLE X\:X

11J04-08
l\J09-181J
l81J

Runt
100
138
1(-i, "i

l'l'ic,, of fond
](l()

1:m
Hi.'}

,b we cai1 sec, there is a complete concurrence, and it is
also clt:ar tliat the decisive role is played by the rent, i.e. the
price paid for using land.
This is where \Ye liave to look first for an cxplanation of
\vhy there occmrcd c.'1.ln:mc variations in prices of laml whicl1,
during tlie reform, were more or less on an even level and rlnring
the determination of reform acqlli,ition payments \H�re higlwr
in Hnssia than in Ukraine. Land i11 Ukraine in f-act l.wcame sev
eral times more valnahlc than in H11ssia.
1n Tahlc XXXI \Yt: gin: a comparison of and prices in vario11s
regiorn of- the former i-:mpin: dnring the period of 1SS4 to 18. '5'�
and lS\-JS to Hl02 from '"hirh one t'an also set: to wlut e:-:.:tcnt
T.-\Hl.E '\:\\.I
l'ri,-,, /Jl?r 1 dl'sial!Jntl of land in outri ght purdrnsc (ruhlcs).
18%-1')(!2
Satinn
]8.S1 J,\58
C"nl"Li industrial n,p;iou
M.82.
.�(i.25
·12,76.
15.(i:i.
\Ve,tern hml
:12.0:,.
l<a1tern land
-�.82.
Ukrai1w:
17 78
118.80
l.dt B.1nk.
HJ1sl1t Bank
12.7',
99.12
11..14
l:'.J.'l7
Srn,rJ,,,rn
·.' S. O,t.qwnl.o, op. cit., Jl. 120.

'" l'. \lasluv, "P· cit , 11, 211..
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the prices fixed at 187 and 123 rnhles at the time of the reform
exceeded the rc,11 value of land at that time.
Snbsequently the price differences became even grf'atcr. At
five-year intervals the purchase value of lanc..l iu Ukraine, per I
desiatyna increased at the following rate; 1868 to 1872, 28.1%;
1873 to 1877, 21.9%; 1878 to 1882, I4.9'I; 1883 to l8S7,
38.2'{; 1888 to 18U8, 16.8'.?; 18\.J.3 to 1897, 17.3'.f; 1898 to 1902,
'.Xi.l'.�.--\Vliercver the rental valne reached its highest peak, the pace
of price increases of land was also the fastPsl. Thus, in the Pol
tava region the price of l desiatyna in 1897 was 103 rubles; in
1902 it was 207 rublc5; in 190,'5, 2-36 rubles; in 1908, 281 rubles;
1909 to 1912, 236 rubles, and in 1913, 451 rubles.'' Within six
teen years the price more than quadrupled. It is understood
that neither the profit income from land, nor price profit from
land could, or r.lir.l grmv in the same proportion. It was nothing
else but robbing the peasants under specifically created concli
tions.
:\ similar process went on in all other parts of Ukraine, al
though not in the same degrc-t' as in the l'oltava region. In
Southern Ukraine, the increase of prices of land for the eight
year period ·from 1892 to 1900 went on at the pace charted
in Table XXXII.
TABLE XXXII
Cmmty of

Olehandriv

97.5

1892
1893
181)4

11396

1B\-J7

1898

189':l
190()

88.3

126.7
1,113.3

100.l
96.0
9:J.:l

1-17.l
1.}t-;_:l

101.7

113.2
1:2.0.5

]H(),5

Ananiei:

174.2
:2.01.5

97.7

IJ0.5
J3:lq

139.V

Kherson
94.9

llD.6

117..'i
12213

J.10.6
132.8
14f:Ui
174.fi
188.6

And people still continued to buy land. During the period
1893 to 1896, the peasants bought land for the followirig amouut
( in thonsands of rubles): Left Bank, 10,188; Hight Bank. 10,208,
Southern Ukraine, 15,8.'32.'°
" ll,id., p. 21-3.

,, a Tbid., .1lso S. Ostupenko, op. cit., p. 128.

,, �{. Slflbehenko, op. cit., p. 378.
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\Vhen we emphasize the mass and increasing demand for
laud on the part of the peasants, we may no! lose sight of oue
factor which proves conclusively that it was not the demand
which created such an unbelleveable increase in the price of
laud, because offers of land always exceeded the demaud.
During the first decade following the refonn collections of
rcdemptioll paymenls by the laudlords contributed in large
measure to the betterment of the finaucial position of the land
lords who, as has been stated above, felt a lack of capital for
conducting their enterprises under new couditions. The capital
rent on their own grain production was immeasurably lower
than the average capital gains of the period, thanks to general
economic conditions aud, primarily, to grain prices, tariffs, cus
toms policies. the details of which will be discussed later.
Land purchase ( under lhe reform) payment allevinated the
sihiation to a certain degree. Rut already iu the second decade
they collected ouly 25% of the previous decade's amount, aud
during !he five-year period of 1893 to 1898 only 1% of the iuitial
amount. Against this background there appeared, on the part
of the landlords, a continuing demaud for credit.
In 188-5 the "Gentry's Land Bank" was established, for the
purpose of iss11ing land mortgage loallS at 5.25% iJ.Jterest rate,
as against the lowest prevnailing rate of 6%. In 1889, a lottery
premium loan was floated by the bank which increased its
capital by 90 million rubles. and reduced the interest rate by ..5%,
�fortgage loaIJS extendiug from 60% to 75'.f of the bank's valuation
of the land were given.
Already in the 1890's, 41,788 landlords' estates in Ukraimo
or 42.1% of the total 11t1mber were pledged with banks. They
\vere valued at 1,129 million rubles, and were pledgnl agai11st
loans of 714 million rubles, 63.5% of their valuation.""
The extent of indebtedness was re-ached by reason of the
over-evaluation, conducted in 1888. To the old indebtedness
was added a new oue, in the followiug amounts per dcsiaty11a:
in Volhynia, from 26.25 rubles, to 32.61; in the regious of: Ka
tervnoslav, from 21.05 to 27.85; Kiev. from 27.97 to 35.08; Pol
ta\:a, from 39.96. to .53.20, etc. During the same period the land�
owners possessed in tools per 1 desiatyna in Volhynia, l.92;
Poltava, 6.0.'3; Padilla, 2.70; Kiev, 4.07; Chernihiv, -1.77, etc."'so .M. Porsh, op. cit., p. 46.

"' M. Slahchcnko, op. di., p. 361.
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From the reports of the "Land Banks.. of Kiev, Poltava,t
Tauria, Khersou and Kharkiv one can get an approximate 1Jea
of the indebtedness of the gentry's lands in Ukraine. As of
January 1, 191.'3, these banks reported loans issued in the amount
of 596,800 thousand rubles, and unpaid loans in the amount of
54.'J,800 thousand r ubles, or a total of 1,140,600 thousand of
rubles. This was far in excess of the indebtt:'(lness in Hussia. For
e:1.arnples, for ] desiutyna of land, there were loans in the regions
of: Kiev, fi2 rnbles; Poltava, 69 rubles; Kherson, 70 rubles;
Kharkiv, 7,3 rubles; Tanria, 77 mbles; while al the same time the
figures for the Petersburg and Tula gubcmias were 32 rubles;
!\loscow, 43 rubles; Nizhegorod, and Samara, 14 rubles.°'
By government decree of .!\lay 18, 1882, the Peasants Land
Bank was established for the purpose of facilitating the purchase
of land by peasants from landlords, or, to be more pret:ise, to
facilitate the landlords' sale of land. A source of capital of this
bank was au annual issue of 5.5% government bonds in the
amount of ,'5 million rubles, which wne subsequently quoted
on foreign exchanges. Already in 1884 this issue proved insuf
ficienL It was increased from year to year. In 1894, the interest
rate on bonds was reduced, and in the following year the hank
was autho_rized not only to give loans for the purchase of land,
but also to give mortgage loans against previously purchased
land. In addition, it-wuld purchase land itself for the purpose
of resale.
The bank's favorable attitude towards the landowners was
manifest from the very outset, when prices for land sold to
peasants were fixed at a higher rate than their existing market
value at the time. Thus, the Kharkiv Peasants Uank valuated
1 dcsiat!)llO in 1893 at 102 rubles, as against the current value
of 8-'3 rubles; in 1895 at 102 rubles against 88 rubles. Similarly
the Podilla Bank sold estate lands in 1894 for 127 rubles against
the current value of 116 rnbles."·1
Banks paid these high prices for the landowners' land in
spite of the fact that the demand never equalled the supply. Int
1905 to 1906, filled with hopes resulting from the revolution, the
peasants sharply curtailed their purchases of land; but this did
not prevent the banks from making further purchases. At
the same time, as we have had occasion to observe in the Poltava
region, the prices went up at an even faster rate. As of May 1,
az S. Ostapeuko, op. cit., p. J:30.

"l M. Slahchenko, op. cit., p. 381 ff.
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1907 the bank owned already 2,()95,:365 desiatynas of land val
ued at 205,401 thousan<l rubles, and the hank sold, from Novem
ber to :\fay. only 170,00() desiatynas. ThC' remainder owned by
the bank, yielded only .15% interest.,;,
The above cluoted facts are quite ;,nfficient to prove that
the mobilization of the lan<llorcls' Janel by the peasants and the
prices paid for land were in no way the result of a hc•althy com
petition between two fonns of an agricultural economy: the
large and the small, :\'eitlwr did they indicate healthy market
conditions. At the basis of all this lay, on the one hand, the
"land shortage," and on the other special measures taken by
the Russian Government which was interested in the exploita
tion of the Ukrainian economy. Russia made ?;OOd use of the
consequences of anomalous land conditions ereated by it at
the time of the reform. The operations of the land banks per
mitted the govnnment to place the bonds of the banks on
foreign Pxchanges, and thus to draw into Russia the capital ne
cessary for the development of Ru;,sian iuJustry. Just as in the
matter of leases, the "land shortage" compelled all groups of
peasants to participate, similarly in the purchase of land all
peasants took part, the poorest included, though of course,
in unequal degree.
Land purchased through banks, amounted to the quantities
per person of a peasant household shown in Table XXXIII. Out
TABLE XXXIII
Landless
Those owning
Those owning
Tho�c owning
Those owning
•

r

I

•

•

•

•

r

•

•

•

I

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

~

•

,

~

less than 1..5 dc�iatvnas.
from 1.5 to 3 de.�intynas
from 3 to 6 dcsiillynas
over 6 dcsiatynas

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

1 .4 dcsiatyna�
0.8 desiatyna�
0.8 desiatyn,is
2.6 dcsiatyuas
5.6 desiatynas

of the land purchased by the peasants personally between 1875
and 1895, small purchases ( under 25 desiatynas) acconnted for
16% to 20% of all land alienation, and the greater part
(800: to 84i) were larger transaction ( over 25 desiatynm,) ,tsh
During the refonn the Ukrainian peasants possessed, as pri
vate property, much less land by far than the Russian peasants:
only ·132 thousand desiatynas oul of a total of 5,745 thousand
�, P. �faslov, 011. cit., II, 227.

60 P. M:i�\o.,·, loc. cit.
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desiatynas of peasants owned land, i.e. 7.5% in proportion to 23%
of the population. By 1877 this private property increased to 776
thousand desiatynas and continued to increase very rapidly,
leaving a similar Hussian land mobilization far behind. 66.
As has been noted, in that vear there were 17,95:3 thousanJ
dusiaty11as of privately owned '1am} in Ukraine. This land was
distributed among the categories of owners shown in Table
XXXIV.
TABLE XXXLV

L,md()wners (gentry) , .................. .
�lunast€ric's and churches ..........•......
r-.frrc:hants .........•..•...•...•.•.•.••.•
Tuwnspt•ople ................ , ......... .
Pca,,rnts ...............................
Aliens •.................................
Others ..•..............................
U nc lassificd .............................
TOTAL ....... . ............ .......

1-5,17-1 thousand dcsiatynas
Jlf:i tlumsand tksiatynas
1,172 thousand dcsi.ttynas
:Hf:i thousand dt•siatynas
776 thous,tnd dcsi,ttym1s
l."il thousand dcsiatynas
76 thousand dcsiatynas
162 thousand clesiatynas
17,953 thousandclesi.atynas

Subsequently the redistribution of real property among the
categories of owners took place almost exclusively at the expense
of the landowners (gentry). As early as the latter part of the
19th century, the landowners' property declined_ in some regions
to its former ha.If, and at the beginning of the 20th century the
process quickened noticeably. If we assume the extent of the
gentry's holdings to he represented by the figure 100 as of 1862,
the year of the reform, the decline of these holdjngs _is repre
sented by the figmes in Table XXXV. 0�
TABLE XXXV

. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .
Ri).(ht Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Snuth(•rn Ukrnine .. . . . . . . . .
Ldt Bank

'

'

.1 862

1867

1877

100

101

97
84

100

100

98

9-1.

9(1

1887
79
93
66

1897
68

87

,5 6

By 1905 the area of landowner holdings decreased ( frcm
l:'5,174 thousand desiatynas to 9,985 thousand desiatynas) by
5,189 thousand desiatynas. Those 5 million des·iatynas were dis�� Stnti:;tika po ddzlrnniyu wmlt!t:ladeni11n v Rnssi11i, 1911 ed., p. 17,
67 1\.1. Pnrsh, op. cit., p. 148. os P. �-faslnv, lnc. cit,
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trilmte<l among all groups, the greatest area being taken over
by pcasa1Jts.0''
J )ming the same period, Talilc xxx,:1 shows changes which
took place in the peasants' 1and holdings.'n0
T.\BLE X"'\X\'I

Y!!,;rs
1877
J\J0-5
lncn.•Jse

Enduu:rd
16,672.066
18,16!Ul22
1,487,856

Purchased Total (in desiatynas)
17,,H7/l74
775_fl08
.i,.536,.52,',
22.7<:6.4..J7
3,760JH7
-'i,2)'i8,473

\\"e have data for the same period referring not ouly to
peasant homchul<ls, but all farms, induding those of colonists,
townspeople settled in villages, and others. VVe quote them in
Table XXXVII because they provide a more complete picture
of the structure of productive peasant landholding:n71
Land from the landowning gentry was purchased not only
by the peasants, hut also by other categories of land holders.
;\Jerchants increased their holdings during this period by 160
thousand dcsiutynas, townspeople by 524 thousand dcsiatynas
and others by 451 thonsand dcsiatyna.s.'n2
.-\ftcr 1905, when by ukase of Nowmhcr 1905 the operations
of the Land Bank were considerably broadened, the mobiliza
tion of landowners' land by the pcasan1s, which had subsided
during the years of the re\'olution, increased again very quickly.
In 1906 the Land Bank in Ukraine had been offered 1,453
thousand dcsiatyrws of land for sale, of which 1,289 thousand
desiaty,ws were offers of the gentry landowners."
During the fo\lowiug five years, up to 1910, the peasants of
Yolhynia, Kiev and Podilla regions acquired an additional ,'HO
thousand dcsiatynas; of Poltava, Kharkiv and Chernihiv regions,
4:25 thousand dcsiatynas; of Katcrynoslav, Tauria and Kherson
regions. 711 thousand desiaty1ws, or a total of 1,476 thousand
dcsiatyrws.''
Professor Peshckhonov wrote in 19:22: "Dnring the years fol
lowing. the transfer of absentee o,vners' lands into the hands
'" //,'·'
"" !vi. Pun!,, op. cit .. p . HA
""Sils'ke ho,;podarstvu Ckrainy" (Ukrainian A>!riculturc"). Narkomzcm
(
., Ukrainy! l'co p! es' Commiss.a_.: nf A.gr/culture ), Khnr� iv, JY:23, p. JO..
·· \I. Por, 1. nn. c,t., p , 14B. • \I. Por,h, op. cit., p. 1,:,3.
l; P. Fo:11in, "F.konnmiclrna khamktcrystyka Ukrainy," p. \-)7.

TABLE

xx.xnr
'J of

...i

3'

8.1

'

pim·lioscd
in rdatirm 9
to m1J,11,1,•ed {i

'

l'er lwuselw/d

s
<

"E'
•

1i'

IA77

Emlou:c,I

6 gubrrnias of tlw Left Bank and the Right Bank

391,006
761,973

12)5,'i2,·1S4,
7,323,212

0.2

:3 gt1hl'r11iu.s of tl1e Skpp�

12,161.448
6,561,239

10,l

15.l

1.8

8.3
16.9

Tot.i] L,r Ckraine

18,722,687

1,152,979

19,875,666

6.1

9.7

0.6

10.3

6 guhernias of Left Bank and Right Bank ....
3 gubcrnias of the Steppe ...

13,347.638
6,779,816

2..'568,901
3,044,708

1.5,916,539
9,824,524

19.2
44.9

5.8

1.1

Total for Ukr:iine

20,127,454

3,613,609

25,741,063

27.9

6.7

1'1,rr:luised

Total

1905

9.7

6.9

4.4

14.1

1.9

8.9
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of the peasants went on at an even faster pace, and holdings
of the peasants increased annually by 200 to 22:0 thousand des
iatynus. Hy 1917 the peasants of these nine gubernias possessed
as we can assume, over 28 million desiatynas, or 64% of the total
area. ,,,o
It appears, therefore, that the Ukrainian peasants acquired,
between the time of the reform and the 1917 revolution, over
8 million desiatynas of land.
Average prices of land increased from 72 rubles in 1888 to
1896 to 196 rubles in 1906 to 1914.o7� Inasmuch as the bulk of
the land was purchased by the peasants at the end of the 19th
century and the beginning of the 20th, it would not be too risky
to assume that the average price for the entire period was be
tween 160 and 170 rubles. It follows therefore, that the Ukrain
ian peasants, besides paying an ammal round fi�ure of 60 mil
lion rubles for rent, also spent another 1,360 million rubles in
purchasing land.
If we take to consideration that during this period the
Ukrainian peasants paid over 3 billion mhles in rent, then the
sum total is very close to 5 billion rubles, This sum i.� to be ac
cepted at its value then, when it was much higher than the sum
total of all capital invested in the entire Ukrainian industry on
the eve of the revolution.
Thus, over a period of more than half a century, the huge
aggrc_!!:ate of the labor energy of the multi-million Ukrainian
peasantry, instead of being spent on the acquisition of products
of human enterprise went merely for the right to use the land,
i.e. to use the natural property of the people. What neocessitatedo
the shifting of the right of the use of laud was at first Moscow'so
wanton disregard of existing land conditions in Ukraine, ando
later an even further deterioration of these conditions during theo
reform of 1861.o
Such an accumulation of the national income, effected at the
cost of pitiful living conditions of the great masses of peasants
and the halting of the development of their economy could be,
if not excused, at least understood, if these accumulated values
had gone toward the development of the national economy,
toward the development of national industry, or at least toward
n A.

l'<'shekhonov, "Zcmlevladeniye" ("Lanrl Ownership"), Narodne
Klwzyaystvo Ukrainy (Natinnal Economy of Ukraine), Kharkiv, 1922.

"

ti

"Sil�"ke hospodarstvo Ukrainy."

78

Ukraine and Russia

a rational organization of production of the large agricultural
enterprises themselves.
Nothing like this ever happened. The overwhelming part
of those huge material contributious of the Ukrainian people
was completely excluded from the Ukraiuiau economy. Those
huge amouuts flowed from Ukraine in a wide river to Pctcrs
Uurg, Moscow and abroad.
This statement is not too difficult to prove. If we divide all
the landowners according to the extent of their holdings, we get
the figures shown in Table XX.XVIII for the year 1877.
In the Kiev region, owners of over 10,000 dcsiatynas held
17% of all private land holdings, and in Volhynia, 24.2%.
Discarding the group of landholders under 100 desiatynas,
the ove rwhelming majority of whom were peasants, we have
the right to come to the conclusion that Ukraine was a land of
large estates. Three thousand owners of large estates who con
stituted only 1.5% of all landowuers held more than 50'.i: of all
privately owned land. Tho.�e billions of purchase price money,
rents and other payments went into their pockets.
For the most part the owners of the large estates did not
administer them directly. They did not even live on them, visit
ing them orlly once in a while, They constituted the close circle
of the Tsar's court, the upper echelon of the government hierar
chy, the higher aristocracy. In short, they were the haut-monde
of the hvo capitals of the Empire who also filled the fashionable
places of France, Switzerland and Gennany. It was into the
pockets of the Koenigs, Kleinmichels, Sheremetevs, Bobrinskis,
Sangus,.kos, Branickis, Potockis that the Ukrainian peasants,
money flowed. :.\:loncy in payment for the right to till their own
Ukrainian land. The peasants' concentration on extending their
land holdings absorbed all their economic resources and became
the main obstacle to the development of agricultural production
commensurate with its natural potential, a potential which
would have guaranteed Ukraine a foremost place among the
countries of Europe. This is what prevented the intensification
of agriculture and increase of the amount of lahor per unit of
area, and which gave rise to that so-called "relative agrarian
overpopulation."
As is well known, the basis of a rational organization of agri
cultural production is a harmony between its three basic factors:
land, labor and tools. The land conditions created in Ukraine

She of ho/,ilings
L'n<ler 10 <lesiatynas
11 to 50 desiatyna.,
51 to 100 desiatynas
Total under 100 tfrsiatynns
10 I to fi00 dcsiatrnas ..... .
501 to 1000 desiatrnas .. .
Total under 1000 de$iatynas
1001 to 5000 dc�iatynas ..
5001 to 10,000 <lesiat ynas ..
Over l 0,000 dcsi.ttym1s .. .
Total ov"r 1,000 ............ .
.-, :\I. Porsh, "/!- cit., p. L58.

TAlll.E xxxvm
Number of holdings
Amount nf /mid
m 1/1nt1.1a,ufo
in t/1ou.wnd d,wiatu1ws
12:rn
412.4
\)33.2
41.:1
8.7
626.4

!foldings.
in%
60
21.5
·1.5

I.,md in
%

"·'

O"

6.2
,1.1

1,972.0

90.J

1:1.0

12.1
;q

2.834.0
2,421.6

n.,1
1.8

18.6

15.5

5,2.'55.6

8.1

34..''i

2.8
0.1
0.0
2.0

.'),2.'5,1.,'5
1,183.4
L.555,l.
7,992.0

1.5
0.0

31..'i
7.8
Jll.:?.
52.,"i

173.0

o_o
1.5

1,7. \)

"
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pro<luce<l a surplus of lahor in relation to the hmd: finaucial
burdens came into existence as a result of land conditions, a
deficiency of tools, even i11 relation to the insufficient amount
of land. What is more, already toward the end of the 1880's,
when rents began to rise much faster, the payment of rent was
in large measure accomplished at the expense of a reduction in
the basic tools of produdiou. This was a Jirect sign of a decline
of the economv. It was felt most acutely in the supply of working
and production animals. Censuses of horses, TufJle XXXIX, for
military purposes comlncted between 1888 aml 1901. show the
changes in the supply of horses (the vear 1888=100).'"
TABLE XX.\:JX
Far!llS
Farms
F.irnis
Fam,s

witl1011l horse,
122
with l horse .. , . . . . . 125
96
with 2 horses
65
with 3 horses . .

Farms with 4 liorsc>s.
Farms with 5 horses_
Fanns with 6 horses.

57
45
•II

This indicates that the number of households with one horse
and without any increased at the expense of a sharp decline
in the number of multi-horse farms.
As ear1y as 1882 the number of farms without a horse was,
in relation to the total number of farms: in Chernihiv, 31.4%;
Volhynia, .39.87; Katerynoslav, 40.9%; Kharkiv, 41.7%; Kherson,
44.7%; Podilla, 51 .41; Kiev, .'58.2%, and Poltava, 58.6%. rt is not
surprising therefore that even in such a relatively wealthy county
as that of 11ariupil "teaming up" by several neighbors for com
mon tilling of land reached 5.3.57 of all field work: hiring of
horses, 21.4% and only 20.7% of the area was cultivated by the
farmer's O\VIJ animal power.'"
A similar process of impoveri.�hment could also be observed in
relatior1 to food animals. The number of animals in the wealth
iest food produciug Kherson area is shown in Table XL!''
Maslov noted the relationship behveen this phenomenon and
anomalous land couditions in these words: ''The process of the
impoverishment of the peasants permitted a continuation of lease
of lan<l, a� kmg as there wa� au opportunity to supplement the
budget of the household by mcaus of curtailing the tools of pro
duction."''
7a P. Maslov, o p. cit., II, 63. 7� �I. Slabclienko, op. cit., p. 111.
"o Ibid., p. 112. -' 1 P. i\-laslov, op. cit., II, 69.
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TABLE XL
I'er 100 popiJlation
Cattle
Sheep
64.4
206.0
70.2
1:ll.2
76,5
46.4
65.7
44.2

1882
1887
18%
HJ()()

Per 100 dcsiatyuas of Ulna
Cattle
Sheep
34.8

60.5

24.5

·10.7

22.9

32.0

An even more vivid illustration of the impoverishment of
the peasants is provided by Tahlc LXI, a closer analysis of the
supply of production tools and d\vcllings.p82
TABLE XLI
Aecragc per orw f(Jrm (mlue in rubles):

I d"siatyua and less

1-2 dt'siatynas
2-3 c\c;iaty1rns
3-4 ,lesialynas
4-,) desiatyna;

5-6 dc;i<1tyn,1s
6-0 dc;i<1tyn,1s
fl-1.'i clcsiatynas
15-2.') dcsiatynas

25 to 30 clc�iatymis . . .

Building.�
236
266
207
256
27-1

Fann
tooL�

8

()()

44<')

104
160
167
212
312

361

807

3SU

, 598

2,080

·102
B81

All

Production capital
im:cstc,l
tools
per one per onr
Animals desiatu1w dcsiatuna
14
22
238
35
fJ.1
260
i3S
140
,57
1-106
74
67
70
111
,)3
104
<'58
126
1()6
46
1:3 1,.
136
45
05
40
195
58
400
.54
J�lO

Noteworthy is not only the 10\v amount of invested capital,
but also the fact that its absolute increase in the higher groups
of land holding is so insignificant that it conclusively indicates
rather an increase in tools of prime necessity, such as ploughs,
harrows, etc., rather than any application of improved machin
ery. \'ery significant also is the fact that the value of buildings
in all groups except the last is almost unchanging: all peasants
live in primitive <.:ottages an<l have primitive quarters for their
animals. 11ost indicative is the extTemely low value amount of
animals, which even in the groups of (l to 9, and 9 to 15 des
iatynas does not exceed in value 2 lo 3 hcml, horses included.
Even in the ISSO's only the pcrccutage of peasant land hold
ings �hown in Table XLll v...ere tilled with the aid of machines.
o; S. Ost.tprnko, op. cit., p. 119.
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TABLE XLII

Right B□nk
Steppe

Sou:ing

Reaping

5 .7
20.7

1.3

20.3

Threshing

29A
36.3

,viimou.:ing
,'32.1

no data

ss

Ac1.:ording to the census of 1917, when the peasants were in
fad cultivaling nearly 27 million desi;,itynas of area, they had:
2 million metal ploughs: 1.5 million tillers; 4 million harrows;
2.6 million carts; only 7,000 steam threshers; 55,000 seeders;
4-'3,000 reapers; 156,000 winnowf'rs, etc."'
From the mere fact that there was one seeder for every 500
ilesiatynas and one winnower for 175 desiatynas, we can judge
t he straightened financial circumstances in which the peasants re
mained as far as equipment is concerned. This situation was
caused primarily by the burden of payments for land.
It must be stated here that in the enterprises of a capitalisteic
nature. of the landowners au<l of other owners, the sum total ot
capital investment in buildings, tools and animals equalled only
1,145 million rubles. It was far smaller then, than these enter
prises received for land and in the way of annual income from
productioQ. This is convincing proof that a great part of such
imome· was kept from use in the national economy and con•
sumed beyond its_ borders.
In the light of the data quoted above, we must now come
back to a matter discussed before, the problem of the so-called
"relative agrarian overpopulation." This very term contains
within it the source of many misunderstandings, On the one
hand, nobody dare deny the existence of a '1and shortage" which
hy itself indicated a surplus of farm labor in relation to available
!and; and on the other hand, the fact that a certain number ofe
peasants from Russian gubernias migrated for seasonal work toe
the steppes of Kherson and Tauria gave an opportunity, to thosee
who wished to avail themselves of it, to generalize this phenom
enon and to maintain that Ukraine represented a market of un
filled farm labor and high wages where, as the saying went,e
"the more unfortunate Russian peasants" sought relief from theire
ill fortune. Those who so argue wish to see facts which allegedlye
contradict the statements about the colonial position of Ukraine.e
�.1 Trudi Kharkovskogo obshchestva sel�kogo klwzyayslm ( Proceedings of
K/wrkiv Agricr,ltural Society), Kliarkiv, ·1889, I, 19.
o-, S. Ost.ipenko, op. cit., p. 12.1.
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Even if we were not disputing that sud1 were the facts, the�·
still coHld not preclude the existence of a colonial slatus, be
cause, for example, when America was an English colon�·, its
status was in no way altered by the fact that emigrants from
tht' metropolis came seeking a better living. However, the very
inkrprt'tation of migration of Hussi.:rn peasants seeking work in
the Ukrainian steppe is entirely incorrect. \Ve do not pretend
to idealize the' position of the Russian peasants, and arc far
from denying that their fate was hard when compared with that
of the peasants of economically <len:>loped countries of \Vestem
Europe. Here, in the Russian Empire, the formula was even
more true than elsewhere that "whoever oppresses other people
inevitably oppresses also his own." Particnlarly since in Hussia,
subjected nations were included within contirmous borders of
the state compelling, in large measnre, the making of identical
legal norms of conduct. \Ve do not pretend that the Ukrainian
peasants were badly off, am! the H.ussians well off. \Vhat is of
essence is that the entire economic development of Russia,
whose complexion also included agriculture, differed from that of
Ukraine, and the difference was determined by the colonial po
sition of Ukraine.

Agrarian Overpopulation
\Vc have already brought together such basic factors as de
termine agrarian conditions: land holdings; rent; mobilization of
land; density of the mral population; outside income, and local
intirm of the national economy. \Ve have been able to sec thf'
much worse conditions under whid1 the Ukrainian peasants
came after the reform in comp,trison with the Hussian peasants,
bemuse of specially directed measures of the economic policies
of the Imperial Government. Further we shall sec an economic
policy even more flagrantly in the interests of Russia in indus
try, tariffs, finances, foreign trade, etc.
But let us return to agrarian overpopulation, and see if in this
respect Ukraine was also in a position different than Russia. Let
us see if at its base we can again see a specifically directed
policy.
lllumination on this point is of importance for yet another
rf'ason: there is an unconcealed Russian tendencv to treat the
"relative agrarian overpopulation" as absolute, and to base on
this the thesis of the inevitability of a connection between
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Ukraine and Russia. Only in this situation, it is alleged, does
Ukraine preserve an opporhmity to have the necessary leben.�·
raum on the peripheries of lhe Russian tcrritorities for placing
the surplus of the Ukrainian population.
First of all we must define the tenn, "overpopulation." Do
we mean the inability of the given territory to feed its own pop
ulation, or to employ it? Neither the one, nor the other is, as we
well know, something that can be measured in absolute figures.
As far as the second factor is concerned, the scope of employ
ment of a population is determined b? the general tone of the
economic development, natural resources of the territory, and, in
much lesser degree, its extent. Concerning the first, the ability
of Ukraine to feed its population, no one can have any serious
doubts about it. The quality of Ukrainian soil, climatic condi
tions, density of population, an<l a comparison of all those factors
with Western Europe indicate the immense possibilities Ukraine
has to increase consumer products and to satisfy the needs, not
only of the existing population, but also of the natural increase
for a long time to come. In addition, the food balance of a popu
lation is determined not merely by the consumer products of that
share of the production of a given country in the world division
of labor. Hence, an�· analysis of the overpopulation of Ukraine
in this aspect would be superfluous.
The matter is then reduced to the problerri of employing the
population. nut even in this respect we must distinguish be
tween two situations: paucity of natural circumstances which
make the development of productive activities of the population
difficult, and artificially created social-economic conditions
which prevent such development. Only in the first instance, and
relatively at that, could we speak of an absolute overpopulation.
The second must, in all justice, be analy,,:cd as relative.
It is the latter that \Ve encounter in Ukraine, and in relation
to the peasants we consider it to be a relative overpopulation.
\Ve must include in this tenn the absence of a surplus of means of
production in relation to agricultural productivity. This came
about as a result of: 1) insufficient land holdings of the peasants
coinciding with the availability of the necessary land area, 2)
compulsive necessity of increasing the holdings of the peasants
at the expense of narrowing their production possibilities, 3)
preventing the peasants from reorganizing their economy in the
direction of absorbing more labor, 4) a one-sided development
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of the national economy or, more precisely, the absence of a
total national economy which ,vould waITant a normal
social division of labor and provide a certain part of the natural
increase of the population with ,m opportunity of employment
in other branches of socially useful work. \Ve have already in
dic'ated the existence of such factors in Ukraine, and only they
can explain the existence of a surplus population among Ukrain
ian peasants. In this, and not in a comparison to the existing
life conditions, or of a standard of living, lies the difference be
tween the Ukrainian peasants' life and that of the Russian. This
cause of the surplus population was not felt as acutely by Russia,
and in a majority of Russian localities was entirely unknown.
The difference between Ukraine and Russia cannot therefore
be reduced to the fact that Ukraine had an average density of
population of 64 people per square kilometre, and Russia only
22, and that in Ukraine 79% of the people were engaged in agri
culture compared to 68% in Russia. The gist of the matter is not to
what extent the Ukrainian peasant had a harder life than the
Rus.�ian, but in the fact that the former was unable to utilize
the opportunity to live better, and in the fact that conditioens
made their appearance under which a part of the peasant popu
lation could not make a livelihood at all.
It is unnecessary to repeat many illustrations previously
given in this chapter, but we wish to provide some additional
proof that during the period under discussion the agricultural
economy offered opporhmities for a considerable increase in
employment. Few people know, for example that the geograph
ical boundary of sltgar-beet culture extends far into the South
east. but the spreading of this culture was stymied by an absence
of refining establishments. At the same lime, rotation of sugar
beets with grain crops triples the amount of labor needed in
comparison with grain cultures. The same can he said of vinicul
ture which did not nearly reach its northern boundaries. \Vide
possibilities existed in Ukraine for such culhires as tobacco,
hops, flax and many others providing raw materials for industry,
and requiring much more labor per unit of area. \Ve could list
many more products for which Ukraine's nah1ral conditions are
favorable, cotton for example, widely planted at present.
Tims, it was not a lack of nah1ral opportunities which pre
n•nted the increase of the number of employed people, but the
level of deveelopment of industry bast'd on agriculh1re, and the

86

Ukraine and Russia

peasants· lack of capital indispensable for snch a reorganization
of production.
This also explains the fact that Ukraine, utilizi..1tg the high
est percentage of arable land of all territories of the Empire,
nevertheless had 24% of it lying fallow, either under pary, or tolo
ka.�0 Under multi-field rotation and proper eradication of weeds
the unexploited area wul<l ha\·e been considerably reduced.
We could cite imrnmerable examples of increasing labor per
unit of area known to agriculture and to the peasants themselves,
but this is superfluous. \Ve m11st stress again that the "surplus"
of the rural population cannot, under any circumstances, he
regarded as an absolute overpopulation. It is only the result
of conditions created for the Ukrainian economy.
It is impossible to give accurate figures for this "surplus."
Different authors take a different approach to make their esti
mates. \Ve have already noted that S. Korolenko estimated this
surplus for the 1890's at 5 million, of whom 2.5 million could
find work only beyond the bordPrS of their own territory. J'ro
fcssor Ostapfcnko wrote in this wnnedion: "On the eve of the
revolution, the Ukrainian peasant:/ agricultural economy had a
'surplus' of_ 7,778,866 workers."86 It is not important whether the
surplus ·was 7 or .5 million, or even less, but the very fact that
richly endowed Ukraine had millions of peas�nts who, by virtue
of created conditiOns, could not make a living.
This also caused the mass migration which marks so vividly
the differing positions of Ukraine and Russia, the latter not ex
periencing such phenomenon.
The numbers of peasants who left Ukraine, and migratell in
the main beyond the Urals, to the so-called Zeleny Klyn (Green
Wedge) in the Far East are shown in Table XUll.
TABLE XLHI
1886 to 1890
1891 to 1895
1896 to 1900

!),880
106,993
243, 52.1

"

\Ve must note that this migration was spontaneous, and
against government orders. In 1894, the number of spontaneous
"' Para is fallow grournl lying plowed, while to/oka is fallow ground under
sh,hble left on it.
s-0 S. Ostapenko, op. cit., p. 119.
"' M. Slabchcnko , op cit., p. 174.
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migrants constituted 78'1, of the total. But in 190.S. the govern
ment set up the so-ealle<l Central Commission for Hesettlemellt
which subdivided land in lomlities of uew settlement, provided
aid for transportation, etc. After that, mi1,;ration assumed great
er proportions. Taufe XLIV show;, tlie numbers of peasants rc
scttle<l dnring the period between 1906 and 1912.

From the Region uf:
Poltant
Ch,·mihiv
Kit.•v
Kh:irkiv
Katcryn%bv
Khl·rson
Volh.-ni,i
Poclilla
TOTAL:

T.\BLE XLIV

Number
198,4i'i9
l,'57,622
148,1.'57
127,538
69,979
85,7.)!J
43,287
42,3:-;5
873,136
ss

Professor Vobly estimates the number of emigrants going be
yond the Urals during the period between 1896 and and 1914 at
1,600,000. The Poltava region always occupied first place, 2'3%,
of all emigrants; then Chernihiv, 17%, and in last phtce Podilla,
4.51."' These proportions are very telling, because Podilla, as has
been stated, had the smallest extent of average land holdings,
thongh sugar-beet culhue and a well developed refining indus
try provided mi entirely different utilization of labor per area
unit. From the Poltava region on the other hand, during the same
period 60% of the natural increase of the popnlation cmigrate<l.
(See Table XLV).
T,\BLE XL\'
Landless

ThosP
Those
Those
Thos<"
Those

.....

owning up
owning up
owning up
owning up

to
to
to
to

owning over

1 d ..siatyna
3 desintynas ..
6 dC'siatynas
IO desiatynas .
HJ desiatynas ..

Among the emigrants were:
16.6%
12.Wn
27.7%n
32.!Yfn
7.8%n
3.0:!n

o-'I i.:P�hchenko-Chopivsky, op. cit.,. p. 47.n
'" K.- \'o"fJly, 1-:konomichna lieolirafiya Ukrniny (Economic Geography of
t kminel, Kiev, 1927, p. 73.
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This proves conclusively that migration from Ukraine was not
in the nature of a colonization of new and unpopulated regio ns,
so well known in world hbtory, and which was the nature of the
Russian colonization of Siberia during the 17th and 18th cen
turies. Here we have neither the hazards of enterprise, nor seek
ing of wider opporhmities for utilizing capital and energy which
were peculiar to this colonization. Ukrainian migration was
simpl�· an escape of the hunbtry from famine and in search of
bread.
1n this respect this phenomenon of migration is analogous to
those mass movements of peasanh. within Uhainc in search of
,vagcs. involving hundreds of thousands each year. Not an ab
solute insufficiency of labor in an annual balance, but an accu
mulation of seasonal work during harvest time, created a lack
of labor in the Southern steppes which was filled by migrants
from Poltava, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, the Right Bank, and partially
from central Russian guhernias. In the 1880's an average of
63,205 migrant workers left the Poltava region annually, and
later the number grew to 125-150 thousand. In 1884, from Chcr
nihiv region, 43,957 migrants went out; in 1893, 110,334, and in
1896, 148,1�7.n00 In all of Ukraine the number of migratory work
ers, not counting local unskilled labor and industrial \vorkers
reache<l the figure of 600 to 700 thousand every year, among
whom the Russians constih1tctl an insignificant percentage,
smaller than the number of Uk.-rainian migratory workers in the
Russian gubernias of Kmsk, Orlov, Voronizh, Samara, etc. and,
in particular, in Don Military Region.
The statement that Russian migratory workers were attracted
to Ukraine by higher wages compared with what they could
make locally, is incorrect. If this were true, it would contradict
the large surplus of rural population in Ukraine. In reality, a
comparison of wages at sowing and haymaking time (meals in
cluded) for the years 1902-1906 gives the picture shown in
Table XLVI 91 (in kopecks per day).
1foch more important than migratory workers in the balanc
ing of labor surpluses was local unskilled labor offering itself
for hire. This applies both to the number employed, as well as
to steadiness of ,vork and locale of work in the peasants' budget.
Hiring of unskilled day laborers by landowners and wealthier
farmers was conducted in the immediate vicinity. In Bakhmut
�o :'IL Slabchenko, op. cit., -p. 263.

91 P. 1fablov, op_ cit .• II, 181.
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TABLE XL\'I
/legion.
Kherson

Ta,Hia

!902-04
Smc- IIa11ir,g
/48
(:i:l

:J,)
Podilla
\'olhynia
:rn
40
Poltava
Kharkiv
4 ,)
and c.,mi1pare \\•ith the above:
. 08
\"olodimirska gubemia
]\,fo;cow gubernia
.. 03

1905

Sotc- Ilayrrwkir,g ir,g mukir,g
4,)
70
7:i
lO l

7:i

40

(:iS
:i,'i
:iS

70

30

75

105

70
70

100

45
O:l

85

45

1.,

00
70

110

190()

Sow- Ila11fr,g

making

8,)

1:m

.'is

45
45

so

]()f,

OS

00

85

GS

80

80
80

1.30
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county, in 188?), among 3,819 annual clay laborers, there were
only 244 people from other localities; among 2,022 seasonal
workers, 60; among 177 monthly workers, l; and among 3,713
day workers, 86. This is tniical. Hence, unskilled day labor be
came the steady occupation of a certain part of the local popu
lation, bestowing on them the badge of a rural proletariat. A
system of ecouomic intcrdcpeudcnce came into being behveeu
this proletariat aud the employers. A large number of peasants
with little or no land turned to unskilled day lahor as a hasis
of their economy. Hence, their conditions dctcrmiucd the eutire
economic interest. This explaius the appearance of peculiar phe
nomena, known only in Ukraine during the revolution of 1904
to 1906. Herc along with a mass struggle for land, there was a
dctcrmiucd struggle of the village proletariat for a change in
the legal and economic couditious of work. As early as 1863, at
the time of the abolition of serfdom, temporary regulations re
garding rural workers were issued. The employer had a right to
punish a worker with up to 2 days wages for leaving work with
out permission, laziness, carelessness, etc. IJe could discharge
for sullenness or insolence. Ou his part, a worker had the right
to leave work if he was beaten, insulted or not paid for hi�
time. In addition, by decree of July 12, 1886 an employer had the
right to punish without recourse to a court of justice. It com
pelled the workers to deposit their passports with the employer,
depriving them of the right of free movement. It raised violations
of labor coutracts by workers to the classification of crime�,
punishable under the criminal, and not civil law. 92
9, F. Daoilov, op. rit., I, 179.
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From this we ean sec that the present Bolshevik dassifica
tiou of labor contrad violations to the category of criminal trans
gressions had a precedent in the former Russian Tsarist legisla
tion.
In differentiation from agrarian revolts which for the most
part consisted of seizing lands of the estates, wrecking of es
tates, etc., the struggle of the village proletariat for a cbange of
legal conditions and wage.� assumed the proportions of organized
strikes with well-defined demands. In the village of Dyakovo,
o! Haysin county, during a period of five years, the day laborers
condnde<l a hoycott of t·states. In the town of Sorochyntsi, near
Poltava, striking laborers demanded an increase ot wages: fnr
inen from i,5 kopecks to 3 rubles, for women, 50 kopecks to 1.50
rubles; monthly \Vagcs from ,S or 6 rubles to 30 rubles, etc. Dur
inµ; this period, .\imilar demands assumed mass proportious.
Professor Ostap('nko estimates the total number of agricultural
workers as of 1916 at 964,000. This is 7% of the number of \Vork
ers among the rural population between thP ages of 20 and 59,
whose total at that time \vas 13,740,000 (6,768,000 men and
6,972,000 women). According to his data, during the same pe
riod there \�·ere in Ukraine, of the total number of day laborers,
4S.s;z were employed by small farms, 46.9% by medium sized
farrns, and 4.6% hy large farms.""
\Vages of day lrihorers were lower than t!ie average reward
for work on the peasants' own farms which Professor Ostapenko
estimates at 203 rubles per annum for an able bodied man. A
day labo rer mack 110 rnhlcs and meals ( meals cost the employer
20 kopecks per day, or 73 rubles per year), therefore the total
\Y:l.S 183 rubles per year. Rut if we compare these wages with
the income of a poor farmer on his own holding, then they ap
pear twice as large. The total sum of the pea,�ants' incomt: in
the year 1916 reached 2,235 million rubles, of which 449 million
rubles were made by poor farms, 1.341 million rubles by medi
um farms, and 44-5 million rubles by tht' wealthy. This giws a
total for each work�r in the corresp11nding dass of 91 rubles, 2S3
rubles an<l 812 rubles per year.
Thus, the "relative agrarian overpopulation" was character
ized not only by the fact that part of the Ukrainian peasants
could find no work on their own land and had to leave it. nor
only that certain masses of peasants had to mo\·e over Ukraine
n, S. Ostap enko , o p. cit., p . l 18.
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each year in scan h of work, lmt also bv the fact that some oi:
thmc: peasants had a lower illcome than the average wages on
the lalior market.

Common Iloldinf!,s
;\s a final illustration of agrarian conditions which came into
lieing in Ukraine follO\\·ing the reform of 1801, we mllst consider
one more factor which played a very important role in the lite
of the peasauts. It was likewise not peculiar to Ukraine, and was
imposed on Ckraine liy Hl!ssia in the interests of the treasury.
\\'e have in mind the so�called obshch y na or common holding.
Jn H11s,ia it has a history. of manv
. centuries. The essence of 1t
is that the land is the property of the commllni!y, and it is rli
vided among J11emliers of the community no! on the basis of
outright property, bu! of temporary individual la11d use. The
basis for the division is the number of people in the family,
i.e. a 11orm in kirnl. Changes in the composition of families liringo
about either periodical redistribution, or an equali:--ation of normso
by means of sulitraeting from some and adding to others. Thus,o
the Hussian peasants did 11ot feel tied to a particular piece ofo
land as being their O\Vll property and they dirl not feel that theyo
were acquiring property grarlually along with payment, for laudo
endowed accorUing to the reform. Their at!i!llde was one of con
sidering la11d as something to which to apply their labor. Thiso
form of land holUiug vvas favoreU by the interests of the gov
ernment_ to �ome extent abo lw the interests of th e Hussiano
peasants themselves, and was much idealizeU liy the politicalo
trc11d \\·hich was mos! acceptable by the peasa11ts, the narodnikso
or populi�ho
[t gave the government an opportunity to apply the princi
ple of the so-callerl "comm1mity liability"' in the interests of the
trea,ury, i.e. the respomiliility of the e11tire commu11it;--· tor the
pa;--•J11e11! of taxes b;--· all its members. lnUividually unpaid taxes
were as�c��eU am(mg the remainder and paid by them.
The peasaub wished to see the obshchy na as guaran!eei11g
an equitalile di,trilmtion of land, and a safeguard givi11g them
additional di,tributio11 when there were more mouths to feerl
i11 the familv.
Finally, the so-called narorlnitski (populist) !rend in the
Socialist political movement perceived, in the principle of oh
slicho! flW or conimunito;--· propert ;--· of laud, the pattern of a future
socialist society.
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Ukraine had never known obshcltyna. In old times, even
before serfdom, there was community property in Ukraine, but
only to a very small extent, and exclusively applicable to lands
of common use: pa<;tures, forests, etc. Community enterprises
were encountered even before the reform of 1861, but this was
an obshchyna sui generis, on a contract basis, and not connected
with results of labor. It was simply a cooperative enterprise of
labor and capital. This was not an obshchyna of the Rnssian
type, although in some places immigrants from Russia made at
tempts "to get organized according to the Russian pattern."�•
Nevertheless, at the time of the abolition of serfdom, obshchy
na was widely imposed upon Ukraine. "\Vhen peasants received
endowments, 9,056 thousand desiatyrw.s, or 53% of usable land
was given to 1,945,000 people ( 42.7%) as community property,
and the remaining 7,913 thousand dcsiatynas or 46.7% was given
to 2,605,000 people (57.3%) as household property."%
Or, if we take into consideration not individuals, but house
holds, then 1,191,643 households ( 41.5%) were on rights of
obshchyna and 1,683,477 households on household property
rights.�6.
In some gubernias, obshchyna then Qecame the dominant
form of.lurid holding. (See Table XLVII.)e97 The imposition of
TABLE XLVII

Region:
Chernihiv

Poltava . . . . . .
Kharkiv . . . . .
Khf'rson . . . . . . .
KakrysnosLv ...

..........
Volhynia . . . . .

Kiev

Podilla . . . .

Obs-hchyna
land
969,238:
239,107
2,450.925
1,915,368
2,535,770
326.864
480,331
90,606

• ,1

Ilouselwl.d

Total

913,799
1,839,692
121,23(:i
241.678

1,883,037
1,878,799
2,572J61
2,157,046
2,628,101
1,946,831
2,171.l98
1,666,66�

land

,i2,:n1

1,619,967
1,6!JO,867
1,576,0,58

land in
household
property

48,3
84.1

4.7

11.2

3.5

83.3
77.9
94.6

such form of land holding upon Ukraine according to the Rus
sian pattern, although "the obshchyna was not applicable to the
very nature of the economy, as accepted long before the reform"
( Slabchenko) was exclusively for fiscal purposes; to lTansfor the
1H M. Slabchenko, op. cit., p. 1--t �s M. Parsh, op. cit., p. 44.
�o Ibid., p. 166. u, M. Slabchenko, op. cit., p. 20.
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guarantee of collecting taxes, even from those households which
were unable to pay, to the backs of others as an additional bur
den, even if they were already overburdened, and applying for
the purpose a "community liability," Ukraine did not, as a mat
ter of fact, accept this obshchyna imposed on her. "Among the
obshchynas, a total of 80.2% did not comply with the re-allot
ment requirements of obshchyna."98
But the Russian authorities did not take this into consider
ation, as Professor Slabchenko appropriately says: "One of the
most interesting scholars of agrarian conditions in Ukraine,
Shymansky, is right when he says that individual enterprise
dominated in Ukraine, while the Russian authorities were certain
that obshchyna existed in Ukraine and erected their financial
policy on this. Thus obshchyna itself was a fiction, imagined by
the central Petersburg authorities; in Ukraine they knew only an
individual, albeit a three-field economy."99
Nevertheless, although the Ukrainian peasants violated the
rules of obshchyna and used the lam! on the basis of household
holding, its detrimental results, as of the formally existing form
of land holding, laid heavily upon the economy. Even disregard
ing "community liability" noted above, it presented an insur
mountable obstacle to the general effectiveness of land distribu
tion by massing all the land of one farmer \Vithi:n one boundary.
Splitting, which had its source in it, augmented by family divi
sions, became one of the decisive factors which excluded a ra
tional organization of the productive process. The distance sep
arating pieces of land from each other, and from the farmer's
abode even reached several kilomeb:es, A large part of the land
was thus wast ed on boundaries and field roads.
In a<l<lition, obshchyna forms of land holding frequently
compelled the peasants to apply involuntarily forms of crop
rotation. For the most part the three-field system was revived
( winter planting, spring planting, and then fallov,· land, toloka
fiel<l covered with the previous year's stubble and grown with
wee<ls which were used for animal pasture). The need for pas
hues preserved this system, preventing the more developed
farms to change over to a many-field system, with grass sowing
etc., not to mention the fact that a fallow field with stubble con
tributed to deterioration of the soiL
98 Jbid.
00 M. Shl,d1rnko, Orhanizatsiya khnzym1.1frl/ l'kr11in11 (Orgmiization of the
f:cmwmy of Ukr11i11e), Kharkiv, 192.5, I, 64.
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Another important factor was that ob�hchyna land holding
made documentary proof of any household's rights to land im•
possible. The application of Russian practice, where obshchy na
encompassed more than 80� of all households, brought about
in Ukraine a situation where the peasants were deprived of a
legal formulation of their prop<.'rty rights to endO\w<l land. "It
is a terrible thought," wrote later Minister With:, "that farmers,
both under household, as well as obshchyna land holding, do
not have in their hands any documents which would prove their
rights.",,),)
AU this was written, however, in face of the fact 0£ the agrar
ian revolution, when community liability was being repealed
(190J), when endowed land had been paid for, and whm the
order of the day was the Stolypin reform. But 40 years earlier
this obslu:hyna was imposed on Ukraine by force, contrary to
the existiug sitnation in Ukraine, and caused the rural economy
great harm. Such were the agrarian conditions created in
Ukraine following the reform of 1861, and such were its conse
quenc<>s.
It is understood that the colonial policy of Hussia iu relation
to Ukraine was not only mirrored in the area of agrarian policy.
Of such nature was the agrarian-economic policy in general.
\..Ye shall show this in subsequent chapters of this work, where
w e sball illustrate this policy in connection ·with otlwr social
economic processes of similar kind.
We here are deliberately not taking into account the rea<>
tions of a national and political content which the agrarian con
ditions produced in the Ukrainian peasants, as did all Russian
policy in relation to Ukraine. The social-political processes in
Ukraine are complicated, to such an extent, peculiarly revealing
in tlwir prnsentation of a national entity, that they cannot be
considered superficially. They demand a separate and independ
ent illustration.
Precisely within the Ukrainian peasantry these processes
showed themsekes most clearly, often assnming very acute
forms. Beginning with the 18/0"s signs of mass opposition ap
pear, sometimes taking form of fairly well organized peasant
movements. The opposition reached its culminating point in 1902
when the peasants of the regions of l'oltava and Kharkiv started
an agrarian revolution. The revolution spread all over the EmIOU

\Vitte, np. cit., p. 221.
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pire in 1905 to 1906. No repressions were in a position to break
this spirih1al opposition, hecanse rca\it�.- left no alternative, but
to fight. The hopelessrtcs� of the situation fouud the most vivid
expression in the words of peasant participants of revolts.
during the punishment by the whip: .._ . althougli we shall per
ish." sho11h•<l the peasant Khoma P-r·yadko, a participan t of the
Chyhyryu revolt, "at least our children will get better land." And
Trokhym Shay<la, a Poltava insurgent of 1902 yelled: "Slaughter
us, beat us, just the same we shall have to die without !awl"
The thirst for Land and Freedom is not onlv a revolutionarv
banner-word aroun<l which all the peasantry gathers in struggle,
it is not merely a formula of economic and political demands.
Land and Freedom is the ideological basis of the entire outlook,
of the understanding of the natural right which penetrates
deeply into the comciousness of the peasantry, having its roots
in religion;; faith and feeling.

The Stolypin Reform
Th(� revolution of 1902 to 1906, as is well known, ended in
failure, although under its pressure the Government agr<"e<l to a
series of concessions. These included. a declaration of the free
dom of religious beliefs; repeal of "community liability"; aboli
tion of corporal punishment by judgment of village courts; aid
for resettlement; etc., as well as greater civil rights and introduc
tion of population representation in the State Duma. But the
most important problem of agrarian conditions, the mainspring
of all the peasant movements, the problem of bnd, remaine<l
unsolved. It was not solved bv the State Duma in all of its four
sessions, although a new land reform bill was the center of all
of its legislative programs. The first Duma was dissolved pre
cisely because of its radical attempt to solve the laud problem.
and it called upon the people to continue their fight.
Of the 458 legislative demands that were served upon mem
bers of the second Duma. 2ITT demanded a solution of the land
problem, and even the rightist, monarchist circles saw the dan
ger of any further procrastination in this matter, and the threat
to the preservation of the Tsarist Empire itself, The electors of
the Stavropil county demanded: "l) Antocratic government with
participation of representatives of the people; 2) Preservation of
the entirety and unity of the Hussian State on coudition of equal
izing all the rights of nations constituting it, hut in no event
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should any land or nation be permitted to separate in an inde
pendent political government; 3) All the lanrl should be pro
claimed common state property, etc."io,
The idea of "nationalization of land" had wide support
among a majority of the deputies from the central Russian re
gions, but it "created sui gcneris separatist trends among the
representatives of the borderlands, because to those who had ex
perienced the decrees of the central government in the matter
of 'unifying the nationalities' the danger of nationalizing the
land was dear." 102
As far as the demands of peasants are concerned, and these
came from all nine gubemi-as of Ukraine, their content can be
reduced to the invariable demand of the free transfer of all
Ukrainian lands to the Ukrainian peasants, a reduction of the
tax burden and a guarantee that the people would have a right
to determine their form of life.
Having conquered the revolution which threatened not only
Tsarist autocracy, the gentry's landownership, the integrity of
the Empire, and still preventing the State Duma from a legal
solution of the agrarian problem, at least to the extent of blunt
ing its acuteness, the Governmetnt nevertheless understood that
some changes were inevitable, and that it was imperative to take
the initiative in this matter away from the stormy peasants. This
is where Stolypin's law came in.
Credit for this law should properly go not to Stol yp in, but
to his predecessor, Count Witte. In 1904, in his Zapiski po kres
tyanskomu delu which was based on resolutions of 11,000 meet
ings held in this matter, Witte posed the problem of abolishing
the compulsory form of community land holding under obshchy
na, Even the <leer<'e of 1861 foresaw the possibility of quitting
an obshchyna, and the compulsion to remain within it was tied
only to the final payment of installments for land, Article 165 of
the Payment law stated: "If a peasant, who desires to separate
will pay to the county treasury the entire amount due for land
from him, then the community is obliged to separate for this
peasant the appropriate part of land, if possible in one location."
This article was repealed in 1893, however, because by that time
the fiscal interests, and not land payments, demanded the pres
ervation of obshchyna. One cannot say therefore that the nega
tive properties of obshchyna, from the viewpoint of agricultural
101

P. Maslov, up. cit., II, 379. ioe P. Maslov, loc. cit.
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production, were not clear even at the time of the abolition of
serfdom. In dfoteryali Redaktsfonnoy Kommissiyi (materials of
the editors· committee) of the law of 1861, we read the following:
"In the further economic development, the commnnity structure
will change into a burden on the peasants themselves. A change
of commnnity land holding will, most probably, be inevitahle."m
Thus, Count \Vitte's proposal, expn�ssed in the above cited
Zapiske po krcstyanskomu dclu, of facilitating an exit from obsh
chyna was foreseen long before. He argued for his proposal in
the following manner: "Such an order of land holding kills the
main stimulus of any economic culture, the consciousness and
certainty that the fruits of his labor will be enjoyed by the
worker or people close to him by blood relationship; a member
of a commuuity cannot have such certainty by virtue of a tem
porary use. Economic expectations, the initiative and e1JPrgy of
individuals are futile, and in many instances cannot be realized.
Such mai.11 carriers of any material culture encounter insurmoun
table obstacles under conditions of community structure.''e10 4
The law of Stolypin (Nov. 9, 1906) gave nothing above the
opportunity to acquire private property over endowed laud.
Article 9 of this law stated: "Every head of a household, who
holds land according to comnumity right, may demand any
time that it should be determined as his individual property, or
property in common with other members of his family." Article
32; "Every head of household whose land holding is detcrmiued
has a right to demand that the community give to him, in place
of separate pieces of land, an appropriate piece of land, if pos
sible in one location." This land will become outright private
property without any restrictions (Article 47).1°5
Stolypin's law did not, therefore, completely abolish obshchy
na. It only facilitated avoiding it, and made possible the estab•
lishmcnt of farm enterprises, either so-called otruby ( all the
land iu one piece, but the home of the farmer is in the village)
and khutirs ( the land and home all in one location, much like an
American farm), \Vith this law, as has alreadv
, been noted, the
operations of the Land Bank were authorized to facilitate the
sale of Jami to peasants.
ioa Materyali Redaktsionnoy Kommissiy! ( Materials of the Editing Com
mission), St. Petersburg, 1876, IV, 45.
Il>4 S. I. \Vittc, Zapiske po krestyanskomu dclu (Notes on Peasant Affairs),
Stultg�rt, 1903, p. H7.
105 Y. \'ozncscnsky, Deytt'uyushche zakony o krestyariakh (Binding Laws
Pertuiriing to Peasants), Moscow, HHO.
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This law was dictated hy far-reaching political aims. and by
no less important economic rcason.s. The year 1903 proved that
the government had very weak support in society. Even the
industrial bourgeoisie, including that of noble origin, joined in
the opposition to the government. And the landed gentrY, weak
ened by its parasitic existence, ,vas unable to create any strong
political force. This created the idea of favoring the establish
ment of snch a social force, whid1 hy its nature would he con
sPrvativc, and on which the throne could rely. The law was con
structed in such manner as to favor such a d.iss, with its credits
for land, khutirs and otruby, in other words, a landed middle
class. In addition, for the Russian peasants, where 80% of tlwm
were within obshchyna, facilitating their quitting vhshchyna
and becoming an industrial proletariat. Obslich1pia land holding
and in this rcspi.ct Stolypin's law provided a certain relief to
the tension resulting from the agrarian revolution. Under the
conditions of a well developed industry in Tiussia, the peasants
with small land holdings had long since heen leaving tht• land
and becoming an industrial proletariat. Obshd11;na fo.nd holding,
prohibitit1g the alienation of his land as his own property, hound
the peasant to the land artificially and tied him a� a proletarian
to the land. The new law made it possible to become an outright
owner of the land and to sell it, thus improving his financial po
sition without changing the basis of his livelihood, i.e. hiring out
as labor. Such a sale of land by the proletariat, the former small
holding peasants, was at that time ver�· widespread in Russia.
ln this respect the Stolypin law gave the Ukrainian peasa!lts
no benefit at all. The liquidation of obshchy na forms of land
holding hardly introduced anything new into the lives of peas
ants with small holdings. As has been noted, the instih1tion of
ohshchyna w,1s in general alien to the Ukrainian peasantry. In
that degree in which it had been imposed on Ukraine by Hnssia
it did not take deep root, remained a fiction, therefore its re
moval was nothing very significant. The main thing is that, with
an undeveloped industry which could not provide for the em
ployment of peasants with small land holdings, these pr-asants,
as before, remained affectionately tied to their piece of land as
their 50\e means ol subsistcncf'.
The Stolypin law had, hmvever, a devp significance for
Ukraine in a different aspect, which \Vas, undoubtedly, one of
its most important political aims. The revolution disclosed in
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Ukraine more than the wiH of the Ukrainian peasants for a
change of the existing or<ler. 111 no less a degree it indicated a
unity of the peasant mass('s i11 the strugglt• am! a weldi11g of all
its social strata. This gave the revolution the character ot a lla
tional deed. In the slogan "Land aud Free<lom" the term Frel'
dom spread to include an introductiou of "our own order in our
own land." This contai11c<l the grnvPst danger to Hussia that the
peasant revolution in Ukraine offered.
lt was dear that suppression by arms did not halt the proeess
of the revolution. And it was not the inteution of the govern
ment to solve it by mc>ans of a change of agrarian conditions.
Hence there arose the uecd to change the uaturc of this process.
to deprive it of the hallmark of a natioual movement, to break
the unity of the riational community by way of planting and
sprea<litig within the peasantry social controversies, thus crea
ting a cleavage between the wealthy and the poorer peasants.
As we shall sec, suhsequently, the Bolsheviks mac.le use ot this
device to the fullest extent.
It must he adrnitte<l that in and of itself, the form of farn1
enterprise is in the highest de�ree comml'nsurate with the spirit
of the Ukrainian peasantry. it is therefore not surprising that in
this respect the Stolypin law found favorable acl:cptance amoug
the better off peasants. i\'owhere else were khutirs and otrul)y
as widespread as iu Ukraine. The wealthier peasants began to
consolidate their lall<ls into siugle units iu a mass mo\'ement, de
tcnnining thereby in large measure a more rational farm ecou
omy. Likewise all !and purchased through the bank assumed
the form of khutirs aud vidruhy. During the period from 1906 to
191-'3 this land w,ts divided accor<lir,g to the form of: use as sh0\•.'11
in Table XLVIII. '"�
T.',BLE XLVJll
Gubemia

% uf kh utir l,md

Chernihiv

48.9
25.1

l'odilla
Kkv

."iD.l

Pr.!h\"d

JG.O
21.9
2UJ
28.2
18.1

Volhynia
Kh,trki,·

Khersrm
Kateryno�bv

21.2

Tan,in

,., '"'Sils'h· hnopodcir�tvo .

.," p. 24.

� of vidrnbr, la11d
!51. l
74.9
40.9
64.0

78.0
78.D
71.l
81.!:I

78.8
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Such a transformation of the wealthy group of peasants in
Ukraine constituted the economic object of the law. The decline
of the Ukrainian agrarian economy, nnder pressure of land con
ditions and of general economic circumstances faced Russia
with great difficulties. Grain crops of Ukraine constituted 23% of
the entire Russian crops,107 and in exports of grain Ukraine
participated to the extent of almost 80%. This grain of Ukraine
was a basic export product, at the cost of which Russia covered
in large measure her payments of foreign loans. Therefore the
maintenance of a production level of grain in Ukraine and of its
export goods part was an absolute necessity to Russia.
'Without a change of agrarian conditions, with a general im
poverishment of the peasant masses, and under a general decline
of agricultural productivity, Russia sought a solution of the prob
lem at the expense of the wealthier peasants.
The material condition of the Ukrainian peasants was, includ
ing also land taken under lease, as is shown in Table XLIX. But
TABl.E XLIX
Poor peasants ( 0 to 3 dcsi,1tynas of land) .. .
�lid<lk pP.asauts ( 3 to 9 desiatynas nf fand) .. .
\\.'calthy Peasants (9 to .'50 dcsiatynsais of land) ...

61.7%

33.4%
4.9%

the top echelon of those in the middle and of the 4.9% of the
wealthy held over 60%'. of all peasant land and were the chief
producers of commercial grain.
Favoring this part of the Ukrainian peasantry, the Stolypin
law had as its objective the preservation of a source of income
for Russia. Hence, the new Stolyp in refo1m did not change
agrarian conditions in Ukraine created by Russia.
The acuteness of the agrarian problem, as well as of the gen
eral economic conditions, not only did not subside by 1917, but
grew even worse as a result of the war.

'"' B. Dz.inkevych, Prod11ktsiya khli/m tc Ukraini (Grain Production in
[.'krniuci. Kl,ark1v, 192-3. I, 19.
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UKRAINIAN INDUSTRY, CONDITIONS OF
ITS EXISTENCE AND DEVELOPMENT

Explanation of Colonial Dependence
Two SHARPLY DIFFERE!>."T periods must be distin
guished in Ukrainian industry following the land reform: the
period of decline to the 1880's, and the rapid growth since the
1880's and in particular since the 1890's. We can accordingly
discuss two stages of Russian economic policy in relation to
Ukrainian industry.
At this point, we take the liberty of making a slight digres
sion from the main subject in order to concentrate on the idea
of colonial dependence. The concept of colonies, as we know,
is given various meanings, especially with reference to conditions
in industry. \Ve make this digression, however, not to refute
various extreme concepts, nor to lecture on the subject. This
work is an analysis of Russian-Ukrainian relations, in the eco
nomic sphere, during the time of Tsarism. The subsequent, second
part of this work is devoted to Ukraine's position under Com
munist Moscow. The latter professes to be continuously fight
ing against colonialism. The main emphasis of Moscow's for
eign policy is upon this point, particularly in the recent, post-war
period. Much space in Soviet works on politics and economics is
devoted to coloniali!';m. Thev all refer to countries of Asia and
Africa which, until recently, had been colonies of western em
pires, or remain eve11 now in some relation of dependence.
There was a time, however, prior to the seizure of power by
the Communists in Russia, when they similarly eYaluated the
position of nations conquered by Hussia: Ukraine, Turkestan,
Georgia. etc., defining the position as colonial. In support of
this, they cited in the literature of that and of the subsequent
period, definitions of the very concept of colonialism and of
those manifestations which determine the position of one or an
other country as being in the category of a colony. These <lcfi-
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nitions provide in general a fairly accurate definition of the
concept of a colony. Therefore, our object being to shed further
light on the colonial nature of Ukraine's economy of that perio<l,
we believe it would be proper, before corning to the analysis of
the posit;on in the branch of iudustry, to state how a colonial
natur(' of an economv is to he understood when confronted with
it as understood by the Communists themselves. Theu, in an
analysL'> of the present position of Ukraine, we shall only have
to rnutinue to stay with those definitions which the Cornmuuists
themseln·s applied earlier to Ukraine as a colony of the Hussian
Empire.
We have done this advisedly in the chapter devoted to in
dustry because de\·elopment of industry in a country is most
frequently the cause of a confusion of the real nature of tlw
economv inasmuch as the center of attraction then becomes
dC've!Op,ment as such, and its nature is ignored.
There arc many authors who treat the rapid industrial devel
opment in Ukraine as proof of equality between Ukraine and
Hussia. The location of different forms of industrv O\'er the ter
ritory is, these say, the Empire, a result of a social division of la
bor \\"ithin a single ecoonomic hod�-- The high level of industry
in Ukraine· reached at the beginning of the 20th century
is. in their opinion, higher than in many regions of Hussia prop
er, and would of itself disprove the condition of colonial depen
dence of one economy upon the other. They \\,'Ould inject into
the term "colony" a content applicable to that term in old times:
of an industrially and culturally backward land whose economy
is an annex to the ccouomy of the metropolis, and the latter
drawing products of consumption aud raw material for its in
dustry from the colony, and supplying it in tum with its manu
factured goods.
Such an understanding of the tC'nn colony is correct when
applied to relations between old Western European empires
,md their tl\'erseas possessions. But these relations changed as
time went by, and the subsequent process of imperialist conquest
of new terrains also assumed different forms. It is not surprising
therefore, that hvo terms made their appearance in literature
for the designatiou of colonies, i.e. colonies of the so-called
"Asian type and of the "European" type. The respective adjec
tives denoted not their geographic location, bnt a different form
of economic <lepemlcnce.
h
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The direction of industrial development, not its level, is the
determining characteristic of a colony of the modern type. In
other words, whether the development of industry, its extent
and form, is dictated by the h1terests of the metropolis, rather
than the demands of the total complexion of a national economy.
The main characteristic of a colonial condition is the enforced
accumulation of a major part of the national income beyond
the borders of the national economy.
The product of society is the result of the labor effort of the
community, and ought to be used for the satisfaction of the
needs of the particular society. There is the realization, however,
that among such needs there is atso the necessity of providing
work for coming generations, and a drive to broaden the satis
faction of the needs of the present community. All parents have
a natural desire to provide by their own labor an existence for
their children, either in the form of giving them professional
il1tel!igence or skill, or in the form of creating new enterprises
for them. These desires of each generation of parents accumn
\ate in society and contribute toward the exclusion of a certain
part of production from consumption, a<l<ling to the amount of
accumulated capital goods.
Likewise in the satisfaction of their O\'v·n needs, both of those
that exist already, of those which are created by invention and
the production of new articles of use, and to shield themselves
from complications of all sorts, people try to restrict their every
day consumption. thus nearing these goals. In this case, also part
of society's production is saved.
Therefore, the presence of a national reserve ( production cre
ated in the process of society's labor, bnt excluded from direct
consumption within the given productive drcle, either for the
purpose of increasing the tools of production, or increasing the
satisfaction of personal needs) is a phenomenon common to every
society. We have gone into these common tenets to recall mat
ters logically connected with our study of Ukrainian economics.
We wish to emphasize, that by the term "nationaol reserve"
we mean part of the national product but do not identify it
with the Marxist "surplus production." \Ve reject the Marxist
theorv of "value of labor," already discarded bv life, and the
theoyY of "surplus value" emcrgi�g therefrom,· as well as its
understandillg of surplus product.
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In the process of creating values the market is, to a large
extent, au independently acting factor, as is also the so-called
"law of widening renovation of capital" of Marx, which is far
from encompassing the entire process of industrial capital ac
cumulation. In this, an essential part is played by that part of
the national product which is created by excluding from cur
rent consumption of a part falling due to men as the equivalent
of their labor. This is a conscious act on the part of man which
is effected by means of personal savings, social undertakings
(insurance, union funds, etc.), stock participation in enterprises
and so forth. The sii:,'llificance of these kinds of sources for cre
ation of capital can be observed from the fact that, in the United
States, out of 240 billions of bank deposits, nearly one-half con
stitutes personal savings and communal funds.
Hence, in the given instance, we should not speak of the ac
cumulations which are created within the process of production,
but of that part of the entire national income which is excluded
from consumption in the form of savings, profits or compulsory
curtailment of consumption, and is not used up in the national
economy.
This accumulation of a part of personal income takes p lace,
during the very process of creating the given goods as a manu
facturing profit, in the process of exchange '.1-s a commercial
profit, in the form of savings of the community, and in the form
of taxing the people to a greater extent than the eApenditure
budget requirements.
The diseposition of these resources, and directing its location
is the most distinct indication of the muhial relationship of two
complexions of a national economy. \.Yhenever these resources
leave one national economy to join another, he it in greater or
lesser de&rree, we have sufficient evidence to make a statement
that there exists a colonial dependenee of the former upon the
latter, regardless of the degree of their industrial development.
In this instance there is a violation of the very root of human
action which stimulates this exclusion of part of the national
product from consumption in the interest of further develop
ment of the naliollal community. All, or a major part of accumu
lation of this kind, then goes beyond the circle of this commun
ity's living organism, and this automatically creates a cleavage
bchveen the causal purpose of the phenomenon and its effect.
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Thi� acts with equal force upon all countries regardless of
their degree of c:olqnial dependence, be it, "Asian" or "Euro
pean."
"All the confusior> arises from the fact that it is considered
the mle for a colony to be more backward than the metropolis,
and that colo!lial policy is confined only to the 'exploitation of
the colony's backward economy.' "1
"The shapf' of relations behveen a metropolis and colonies of
a 'European type' is undoubtedly different from its relations
with 'Asian type' colonies. Colonies of the 'Asian' and 'European'
type are not separated by any insurmoountable barrier. There
are many tr.msitional forms behveen the one and the other, and
a ·European type' colony is merely a glimpse into the future of
its 'Asian' counterpart, provided its economic development will
continue to proceed on the basis of colonial dependence ... The
exportation of capitaL being the most important form of ex
ploitation of an economic terrain during periods of imperialism,
by means of decomposition of pre-capitalist forms of the econ
omy and favoring the development of the productive forces of
a colony in capitalistic form, transforms such an 'Asian' colony
into a 'European.' "2
Thus, any characteristic of the economy of Ukrainian industry
cannot, by any means, be confined to a finding of its "stormy
development" toward the end of the last, and the beginning of
the present century, as is frequently done by those economist;;
who deliberately refuse to consider the true nature of such de
velopment, They fail to consider the basic element: the drain
ing of the n:ci.tionnl h1come which comprises the most essential
feature in describing the position of Ukrainian in dustry, "because
in relation to Ukraine, no other but a colonial policy was con
ducted. as a rcwlt of which sllfplns values were siphoned to i:;n
beyond the borders of the colony, and this started a general
impon-rishm<'-nt of all classes_''.J
Let us take one facet which we shall consider in more de
tail: "The value of Ukraine's annual exports was 1,022,780
thousand gold ruhles, and imports \Vere Yalued at G.-17,900 thous
and gold rnblcs. It is clear from these figures that th e dragon
1 M. Vololmycv, "Do probk-my Ukraiuskoyi ekonomiky" ("On the Prob
lem of the Ukrainian Economy"), lfo/iihetJyk Ukrainy ( The Vkrair1ian
Holshct"ik), Kharkiv, 1928. Quoted from a rcpTint.
2
ibid.
3M . .Slabchenko, Uateri,ilu do ckonomfr:hno-.snt.1·ialnoyi ...• p. 37.'3.
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of c'.lpital, wb.ich •p�ntured into Ukraine, drained away into its
centers, for the purpose of capitalist "acc�mnting," an annual
s11m of ,'17,1,&20 gold rubles. or the equivalent of the annual labor
of 1,874,000 Ukrainian workers."'
"The matter becomes more clear when we compare the ex
change of goods beh,.,een Ukraine and all the lands of the
former Empire. Ukraine delivered to different lands of the
former Empire goods of the \'.alue of 551,760 thousand rubles
which comtitutc<l 54% of Uk raine's total exports ... All the
lands of the former Empire exported to Ukraine-a total of
2.91,320 thousand rubles, or 45% of all imports of Ukraine ...
\Ve have here therefore, a difference beh•;een exports and im
ports amounting to 2.60,4,10 thousand rubles, or 70% of the entire
difference ... In general, this difference can either he canse<l
by the fact that 'foreign' capital dominated Ukraine, with the
aid of which the Ukrainian worker was exploited, or by the
fact that Ukraine was simply being robbed, as they say by
'highway robbery'; to pay for wars, or for b0rrowings for
such w ars, or for both. But one may state at the outset that
in thh case bdli foreign capital and highway robbery are of
equal force."·'
"This co:i:idition cannot under any circumstances be dimmed
by the fact that the development of Ukrainian industry, as we
later shall see, took place at th€ expense of \Vestern European,
and not Hussian, capital. This did not change the nature of
Ukrainian economic dependence upon Hnssia . . . There were
wide discussions among us, as to whether Russia was a colonial
land, or 11ot, whether we had a colonial type of development, or
not. They took into consideration that Russia was itself a colony
for \Vesteru European capital. But they did not pay any atten
tion to the other side of the question, that Russia it�elf is one of
the greatest colonial states in the world ....Regarding the area
of Russia's colonies, Russia held first place... , But if we understand the term 'colony' to mean what it means to all literate
people. i.e....such a land which serves the latter (metropolis)
as a so•ircc v£ raw material, and in modern times as a place
from which capital is exporlcd ...then all these lands ( Siberia,
Central A.,;ia) appear as the most typical colonies."s
4 S. Ostapenko, "Kapitalizm na Ukraini," p. 114.
Ibid., p. 207.
6 M. Pokro�·sky, Marksizm i osobe:nnosti istoricheskogo razvitya Rossiyi
(Marxism and Peculiarities of Rllllria's Historical Development), Moscow,
HJ23, p. 47.
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The development of industry in Ukraine and the growth
within Ukr"ine of riroductive forces, not only did not weaken
her cC'lonia! (�cpen<lcnce, but on the contrary. brought about
an even <lcepf'r entrenchment of that dependence and a great
er accentuation of differences existing hetween Ukraine and
Hussia, It could not be otherwise, as both the nature of this in
dustrial <l0•,rekpmn1t, its direction and its economic results, all
this on the �Le hand, defined more clearly in the minds of the
Ukrai11ian community the meaning of the national economy. On
the other ll'm<l, it ma<le that community feel the dependence on
a will and in�-crf'sts alien to them. "The gigantic development
of industry '.lffnted only the mining and smelting branch, which
conceutrat0d ii.s enterprises in the Southern Left Bank region.
Other hranche� of industry. first of all light and artisan industry,
were far behind heavy industry, and were also far behind Rus
sian industry of the same categories. TI1c reason for this back
wardness of Ukraine in this line of economic development was
that Russi?n competition diligently guarded its colonial privi
leges in Ukra!r.e from the mass consumer."•
This is the only criterioa applicable to an analysis of the
condition of Ukrainian industry, if we are to understand the
natur<.. of the telling <..'Ontradictions which appeared in its de
velopment throughout the post-reform period. M. Volobuyev is
right when he says: "The essence of the results of colonial de
pendence h1 the case of colonies of the Europeau type lies pri
marily in a divergence of the development of productive forces
in favor of the economy of the metropolis. For an aualysis of
the degr�e of colonial dependence of such a colony, the follow
ing elements are of importance: the level of development of
rnam:facturing industry which indicates the extent to which the
colony has left its p0sition of raw material market for the in
dustry of the metropolis, further ( and this ties in directly with
the ufores:,i!l) such changes in the economic structure which
imported en.pita! brought with it ( of special importance is the
problem of what kind of capital was imported, in loan, or in
dustrial inveshnent form); of no less importance are data which
indic1.te the <11rect, pi eying exploitation of the colony ( even if
it is only the equalization of imported and e:\.J)Orted goods.)"�
'M. Y:worsky, Ukrni11a v epokhu kopitalismu ( Ukraine in the Era of
Cu1,it,,/ism), Odessa, 1924, 111, 17-18.
';\-1. \"olobuyev, luc. cit.
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Volob11yf"v is <ilso right in his statement that the particular
o
f rm of coloufr,l dependence which is understood under the
connotation "European type" does not occur as a mutation fol~
lowing the prim "Asian" form, but is only its supplement or fur
ther ttage. 4..s a rule the old form keeps its place, and they both
exist together. Ukraine is a prime example of this. Precisely all
that is connertul with the modern system of colonial relation
ships, i.e. investment of capital in the colony and the develop
ment 0£ industry on the colony's territory, are characteri:.tics of
the economic position of Ukraine during the period of about
twenty years before World War I. They related in the main
to the mining -:i.ml smelting industry. ln all oteher respects that
system of conditions was maintainerl and spread which combined
to make for the political dependence of Ukraine on Russia dur
ing the entire period of such dependence and which basic
ally had their origin in such political dependence.

Ukrainian Industry Within the System of
Russian Industrial Capitalism
It has b�en slated in the introrluctory part of this work that
from the time.of the Treaty of Pereyaslav of 1654, Ukrainian in
dustry, which at that time was far ahead of the Russian, was
subjected to 2 ruthlc_ss political and economic .oppression, not
only hy means of granting Russian industry and commerce a
st'rie, C1f privilt>;�cs, and imposing legal restrictions upon tho
Ukrainian, but also by means of direct destruction of Ukrainian
industrial enterprises ( e.g. the Pochep textile plant and others).
The aim of Russian economic policy was not merely to shield
their imlnstry and commerce from dangerous Ukrainian compe
tition, but also the transformation of Ukraine into a source of
supply of raw m:1terial and a market absorbing their production.
Simultnaeom:ly Ukraine was being turned into a market com
pletely isobte:1 from economic relatiom with the rest of the
world, with which it heretofore had had ties by rea�on of its
geograplu<' pos'tion, natural resources, and historical economic
deve'.opm0nt. Tlw dirnatic moment of this is olation was the
above• menti011L'd tariff law of 1822 which virtually stopped the
flow of any goods to Ukraine except Russian. Hussian goods were
not ba�r<-<l by any customs border, because with the loss of
statehcod in the form of the Hetrnanate, and even earlier,
Ukraiflc lmd bf't11 deprived of any tariff rights.
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Up to the time of the land reform, which, as has been stated,
signified thf' t,-an.<:ition to modern forms of capitalist develop
ment, Ukraine did not, as a matter of fact possess any large in
dusU)-· ot her O\Vll, Only in sugar-refining, distilling, milling and
coal-mining were there enterprises of more or less considerable
size. But we must r.:'mcmbcr that the process of centralized
production, even in these enterprises, occurred at a later period.
In addition we must note that a greater part of these enterprises
were not owned by Ukrainians.
The basic form of industrial enterprise of that period was
the t:aic.'-!inna factory, a factory owned by the landowner as part
of his inherited estate. The "t:atchinna factory was based on its
own raw material, it ,vas many-sided, and used local serf labor."
But e,-en then "the city factory appeared as its competitor, hav
ing been established by an alien Russian or Jewish merchant-en
trepreneur."0
During 1857 the average number of workers employed by
an enterprise was: (regions of) Kiev, 107; Poltava, 93; Kharkiv,
148; Khers-:m. 70, and Chemihiv, 62. Considering the very low
level of mc.•eh·mization of that period, manual labor predomi
nating, snch numbers are indicative of a semi-artisan nature
of thc�e industrial enterprises. The value of goods p roduced
attests to the same facts. In Volhynia the value was measured
in the cl.mount of 984 thousand mbles, which gave an average
of 2.2 tl1011�'.1ml rubles per enterprise, and corresponding figures
for other regioi.s are: Katervnoslav, 813 thousand and 10 thous
a'ld; Kiev, -4,107 thousanl and 21.3 thousand; Podilla, 1,078
thom?ud and fi.3 thousand; Poltava, 671 thousand and 7.5 thous
and Khcrson, 806 thousand and 8.8 thousand; Kharkiv, 868
thousand and 6 thonsand, and Chcrnihiv, 1,688 thousand and
8.5 th,nmm,1 mbks.1�
At tbat time the production of the factory industry of the
entire Russian Em pire reached 224,332 thousand rubles. Of that
figure lHl,769 thousand mbles or more than half. were con
tributed by four gubemias, Moscow, Petersburg, Volodimir and
Perm.''
By the time of the land reform the value of this production
grew umsidcrably, but its coi>eentration in the same regions
n \1. Sla!Jd,.mko, op. cit., p. 205.
Ihid .. p 200.
11 Statistich,:wkiye tablitsi
Ros8iyskoy imperlyi zo 1856 g. ( Statistical
T"h/n of the H11s�ia" Fmpire far the Year, I85t;), St. PetP1sburg, p. 2.75.
10
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did not change. According to data £or 1865 and 1866, for ex
ample, out of the total value of the cotton industry's output of
72,10-l thousand rnbles, 70,80/) thousand rubles, or more thau
98'.i, came from the gubcrnias uf: Hyazan, :\1oscow, Petersburg,
Volodimir, Kaluga, Kostrom, Tversk, Yaroslavl, and onlv an insignificant percentage from Livorda and Estonia."
In addition, in the guhernias around \foscow, a puttiug-out
cotton industry was very widespread. It t>mployed :350,000 work
ers while the factories themselves employed only 80,000. A
similar concentration of industry in the Hussian gubP.ruias can
be also observed in other branches, particularly those of a mass
consumption nature. "Olli: of a total of 28,.517 thousand rubles
value of products of cotton goods, the gubeT11it1S of Volodirnir,
Moscow, Ryazan, Petersburg and Tversk contributed 28,0;36
thousand rubles, or more than 98X. Out of 46.1-'37 rubles worth
of woolen goods, 39,700 thonsand rnb\es, or 88'.i came from the
gulicrnias of Moscow, Grodno, Symbirsk. Kaluga, Petersburg,
Penza, Tambovsk and Livon;'.l., while \1oscow g11hcmia alone
accounted for 53%. Out of 13,8]5 thousand rubles worth of flax
awl hemp products, 11,9.)6 thousand rubles or 86.5�. ag.1."n came
from th� gubernia ol Tversk. Volodimir, Yaroslavl, Kostrom,
Vologda and Petersburg. Moreover, in the processin?; of flax
there were, at that time, engaged in the same. guhemias. in put
ting-out industries, ;J million -�pinners alld 500.00'.J weavers.
Out of a total of 3,736 thousand rnbles' worth of silk goods,
.
3.645 thousand rnbles, or 97 .5%,
fell to the \loscow and Peters
.bnrg gubernius; in gold-weaving goods of 2,090 thousand mbles
worth, Moscow gulwrnia alone produced 2,0:19 thousand mbles
\Vorth, or H?.57. Out of 3,267 thousand rubles worth of chemicals
and dyestuffs, Petersburg '.lnd \fosrnw guhcrnias produced
1,957 thousand ruhles or 00%. The machine building industry
produced J6,57l thousand mhles worth of prodncts and Peters
burg alone participated to the extent of 13.292 thousand rubles,
or 800:.o13 The same is noticeable in other branches of industry.
Copper manufacturing plants were also centered in the North�
em part of the Russian Empire. on Russian territories. More
than half of the copper products came from the guhernia� of
Moscow, Petersburg, Tula and Volo<limir."
1� Sbomik Svedeuiy I Materyalov Minister�tva Finansot: za 1867 f!,Od.
Yun' (Coll,xtlon of Reports and Materk1l.1· vf the Ministry of Finance for
the Ymr, ]1.ne, 1867), St. Petersburg, pp. 3l:H-348.
'·' N. Yasnopolsky, "Ekonomicheskaya b11d11chnost .," p. 242.
14 V1,reslnik Evrop11 (European News), St. Pe-tcrsburg, Nov. 1870, p. I3a
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Even such activities as pro,·t-ssing tobacco and distilling spir
its were better developed in the North than in the South. Out
of 14.5 million rubles' worth of processed tobacco, 9 million
rubles worth. or 62%, came from the guhemias of Moscow, Pe
tersburg an<l Livonia. Similarlv, out of a total of 6,771,394 bar
rels of spirits produced in tj1e Empire in 1862-6.1, 4,045,000
barrels, or nearly 60% came from the guhernias of Petersburg,
i\Ioscow, Vilna, Grodno and Kaunas. (Some non-Russian guber
nias are included here, such :.ls Livonia, Vilna. etc, but the ex
tent of their production, compared to that of the Moscow and
Petersburg guhemias, was qnite insignificant.)"
Such disproportion in the industrial development and in
dustrial concentration, mainly in the central Hussian regions,
was by no means the result of natural conditions prevailin� in
these regions, of abundance of raw materials nor of sources of
energy. It was all the result 0f a deliberately directed economic
policy of the Imperial Government, according to which the "bor
derland" was destined to be the source of suppl�- of raw mate
rial for Hussian industr�·- and markets for Tiussian goods. This
policy had its most vh·id illti.�tmtion in tariffs. details of which
will he discussed later.
Ukraine playt'd the role of one of the most important sup
pliers of raw material. As has already been stated, 88% of the
woolen i11dustry was located in central Hussian gubernias. At
the same fonc "out of a total of Spanish ( fine wool) wool pro
duced in the Ernpirt>, 21,667',S00 pounds (deaned), the South
produced 14,986,88<'5 pounds. This total amount of wool was
allocated in the following manner: exports abroad. 36,11,'3,000
pounds ;to Petersburg and :\fo�cow, .HL'300 )5-14 pounds; to Bialy
stok, ;1,791,86.'5 pounds; to Higa, 1,986,21!5 pounds; to 1-Iinsk,
650,.544 pounds; tc> Chemihiv. 1.986,215 pounds; to Kiev. 6:50,
J,'34 pounds: to Podilla, 722..'260 pounds; to Volhvnia, 252,791
pounds. (The -figures are for 1867.)'" Thus only 2,'5% of the wool
produced in Ukraine remained in Ukraine, while Moscow and
Pctcrsbmg received 70� of it." During that year a total of 16.106.:.19S 110m1ds of all kind� of wool ( Spanish and rnmmon I was
exportf'd from Black Sea and Azov Sea p orts. Baltic ports sent
''' \l.1t<-ri"l t.1k('n from Ye:lwgndnik ministcntrn finanrn!" ( Am11wl Hnmrl
of tlw ,\finistrr; of Financr), St. Pcter.1hmg-. 1869 (1st Pd.), 3rd. ,lep t.
,,; \I. Yasnopo\�ky. or. cit., pp. 281, 282. The weight nnit ll.l('d i11 tJ,,.
origi11,1l i� Jl!JOds. tr.1n�late,l into pounds at the ratf' of 36.113 P"""d�
17 Ibid .. pp. 281, 28:!..
pn pnnd.
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4,947,481 pounds. "It must be noted that a major portion of the
wool. hides, lard, and other goods \vhic:h went abroad through
Baltic ports, originated in the South of Russia." ( The author
quoted here means Ukraine for South Russia.) "Similarly, hides,
over and above the quantity exported ahroad, were directed to
leather manufacturing plant� of 1foscow and of the central
gubemias, and came back from there in the shape of a variety
of manufachued leather goods ... Also 1,805,650 pounds of high
quality porcelain clay from Hlukhiv county went hither, out
of which 90% of all porcelain goods of the Russian Empire were
manufactured."''
A large portion of cotton arrived in the Black Sea ports of
Ukraine, but not for the purpose of assuring a place for Ukrain
ian industry. 'With tremendous outlay for transportation, this
cotton went to Russia, to rch1rn again to Ukraine in the form of
expensive manufactured goods.
"To wll'lt extPnt this land (Ukraine) is poor in plants and
factories, can be seen from the fact that in the Katerynoslav re
gion in 186(! the total of locally produced goods amounted to
2 ruhles, 71 kop(·cks per inhabitant," while the corresponding
figure "for Petersburg gubernia was 51 rubles; for Moscow gu
bernia, 4i rubles, 47 kopecks, for Vladimir gubernia, 25 mbles,
2.5 kopecks." 10
"It is evident that such a preponderance· of the Russian light
manufactm+1g ir.dustry over the Ukraine . . . delivered the
Ukrainian m,,rker- into the absolute power of Russian industrial
capital. which could peacefully continue its colonial policy in
Ukraine, a polky already existing since the 18th century, and
introd•.1ced bv Russian commercial capital ... this proves un
equivocally that Ukraine was as yet unable to satisfy her needs
out or her e,vn manufacturing industry, and was compelled to
import mam,fac':-ured goods from Russia."
This was the position of Ukrainian industry after the aboli
tion of scrfd,m. on the threshold of the era of industrial capital
ism in the llussk>.r, Empire. Such disproportion could not go un
noticed. both in rt'lation to the number of population ( at that
time the population of Ukraine was 22.6% of the Empire's en
tire poptulation), and, what is even more important, in relation
to he� natur'.ll resonr,:;es. 1t was a fact that even then, Ukraine
2,)

, s lliid., p. 28.J.
"' J\·. y,,,nupo\sk y, v p. cit., p . 2tkl.
io M. Yavorsky, op. cit., p. 118.
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had very goori prospects of developing her coal-mining industry,
being alrcaJ:v an important supplier of coal.
",\n abu,,dancc of cheap hard coal as fuel has, at all times
and in all phce�. hcen of the highest importance to manufac
turing. Therefore, m.turally, a question arises: why should not
the South now utilize this mineral ,vealth, and would it not be
more profitable to process raw materials on the spot, which have
hercl.0fore been disp'.ltchcd to a <listancp of thousands of miles.""
The op::!11ing c,f the Suez Canal in 1869 added to the econom
ic importance of the Black Sea considerably, and made possible
a wide scale development of Ukrainian industry, in accordance
with the existing natural wealth. It is therefore not surprising
that even people, ,vhose ideas were entirely free from any
thoup;ht of a partition of a single Hussia, as for ex:ample, Profes
sor 1-1ykola Yasnopolsky, could not ignore the fact of the im
poverishment of Ukraine which \Vas the result of a deliberately
directed eccno:rr.ic policy of the Government. Guided by the
thought of :l rat!rnal organization of the state economy, and far
from any admission of the colonial nature of the existing phen
omPca, Yasnnpolsky began his work on the economic backward
ness of the South with a paragraph which is worth quoting here
in it'; entirnt•,:; 'Tntil this time, the South of Russia constituted
a lam! extraordir.urily endowed by nature, but it lacks any im
provements 0f civili.mtion. Thus far the economic progress is
disproportionMely more marked in Northern H.11ssia. There, since
tlw time of Peter the Great, much energy has been spent to aid
its development: canals ,�·ere built. roads improvt'Cl, credit insti•
t ution, estaHish<'d, private ente1prise was favored and helped,
and finally in 1 �22, an uninterrupted <levelopment of factories
was guanrn�':'ed Ir, brief. much \Vas done of rnch nature as
woulci mflucncP lhe fortune of the North. A lam! without natur
al wealth, covered for the most part by forests. marshes and
sand, with poor ;.oil ' it wonlil be more appropriate to say: a
land which neglected to develop its own wealth because of a
more profitable exploitation of annexel.l lands-Aut1wr). It has
become at �he rrc�ent time a factory for thf' far-flung Russian
Empire, and for th,1t reason, under a favorable tariff, capital
from almost '."Ill parts of Hussia began to flow there in the form
of overpayment for products of the factories which could be
brought fn,m abwad for much less. Now au SQ.million person
21

;>,;_ YHsnopolsky, n11. cit., p. 2.70.
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mar1,et is �urroumled by a tariff wall in the interests of the
manufacturing r<'gion, and the latter, it might be stated, devel
oped at the ,-,xper,se of other regions of Russia. Our two capitals,
are located in •his region which, as capitals of a centralized
state, draw unto themselves the wealth of the most widely ex
tended stak in the world ... But even for these successes our
industrial regions with both our capitals are to a great extent
indebted to other parts of widespread Russia. The a1-,rricultural
half of our state served, and (.ontinues to serve, as a provider
for the indu,;tri?.l region for both our capitals, and pap for it
by its backwardness in respect of its economy.""� Even M. V.
Wolf, who entire,y Jejected the thought of the existence of any
colonial conditions in Ukraine, was compelled to admit: "It
would be a Jreat mistake to look for the causes of the develop
ment of t!1e Central-industrial region ( Moscow and adjacent
gubcmias-Author) to its natural resources, i.e. to a wealth of
raw tralerhl and foe!. Local fuel and local raw material is used
by only an insignificant part of the industry. of the land; the
most important manufacturing is dependent on imported fuel
aud raw material. On first glance the metal divetrgence of the>
industry of the Northwestern region (Petersburg) may appear
to be_ somewhat incomprehensible. Having neither iron, nor fuel
suitable for a metallurgical industry . . the region was com
pelled to import both the metal, and the f uel, either from
abroad, or from the South and the Urals. Therefore, the dcwl
opment of a strong metallurgical industry in such a region may
appear to b0 irrational."2'
\Vol£ wishes tG find in �loscow's cetntral location a justifica
tion of the firr-t re,l;ion's development and in the second instance,
Peter�b,,rg, in the abundance of qualified labor. There were
also attempts to explain this phenomenon by the fact of the de
velopmed 0f comrnunicatious iu these central regions. Hegarding
the Me>s�o'.v reton, whose basic branch of industry is the tex
tile, the statement with respect to its alleged ceritral location
bean nn relatio'l to the truth either with regard to fuel or raw
material. A', ha� ulready been stated, a large amount of cotton
went to �loseo,v {rum Black Sea ports, in transit through
Ukraine, a land of abundant fuel. Even in relation to Turkestan
�� Ibid., p. 269.
s3 M. \". Wolf, Gcngruficheskoye rinmycskcheniye Russko11 proriiio ·lilen
nosti (Geographic Distribution of Ru;;siau Iudustry), �loscow, 1925,
[l. 2i.
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cotton, :\Ioscow ca1111ot under any circumstances be called "cen
trally locatF'd."
C0nctmtration and development of communications is not a
factor of spontac,eous appearance, only a consciously directed
effort for the :calization of a certain goal. Therefore, in this
case, the b1<;ically important question is: why did the develop
ment of tr.:insportation take a direction safeguarding the interests
of Moscow? The resulting influence of transportation upon in
dustry can be moulded by adopting a certain course of policy.
The same goes for an abundance of industrial labor. This
factor piar� a rn!e in the development of industry, but it does
not appear as a gift of nature. It is only the result of the exist
ence of inrlustrial plants which teach the appropriate skills.
Petersburg did not become an industrial center because it pos
sessed caJn's of qualified labor, but it had cadres of qualified
labor hecause i� was an industrial center. Therefore !vi. Volo
buyev is right when he says: "The basis of the errors of those
economists, as well as of many others, lies in a misunderstand
ing of thr importance of the role which the colonial policy of
Tsardom played in the geographical location of industry with
in the oord�rs of Hussia.""
An explanation of the causes of industrial development, like
that of any other economic phenomenon, requires calculation
and a11:1lysis of the whole gamut o f factors which determined,
favored, or hindncd certain processes. A correct illustration of
our theme, the r.atn:re of economic conditions in Ukraine and
in Russia, requi1es an insight into the official course of the
economic policy, '.nto those norms of a legal nature which de
termined the clin:cction of the economic process. Such economic
policy reaches far beyond mere enforcement. It should embrace
an appropriate direction of policies of tariffs, customs, money
credit, market conditions, etc., which give rise to immutable
economic impulses rind create a certain economic climate, and
most important. causes the absorption of the surplus production
of the na �ional income
We shall be more detailed later. Here we shall only analyze
the Ccvernment's tariff policy in relation to the textile industry
in order to illw:trate the catastrophic backwardness of Ukraine
in industry during the period of the first decades following the
land refm -.- ,. WP are considering this branch of industry not only
a M. Volobuyev, op. cit.
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bemuse I Jkrai:ne was the most backward in this branch, but also
becanse the textile industry provides a product of mass con
rnmption 0ffering great opportunities for a colonial exploitation
of the population.
''Th8 customs tar!ff of 1822, proposed by Minister Kankrin
in, introduced a system of protectionism. Very high import du
ties v1e::-e imposed on foreign goods and many goods were pro
hibit('d entirely. Exports of products of the Empire were facili
tated ... The tariff of 1822 was very detrimental to the Ukrain
ian economy. Its first repercussions were upon Ukraine's foreign
trarle."�1
UkraiT';:m protests were of no avail, because the precise ob
ject of the tariff act was to free Muscovite industry from foreign
competition, to give it monopolistic privileges on the internal
market a;d to fac.ilitate the securing of excessive profits. The
intert'St of that industry were looked upon as the interests of
··the whole" which h,1d to have a priority over local interests."o
The Ko,.,wrr:heskaya Gazeta editorialized in 1826: "Southerno
Russia c0mplain., ahout th(' prohibition of importing goods ando
about high tariffs. They say that nothing can be sold becauseo
we do not want to buy anything from foreigners, and that every
thing i:, either prohihited, or burdened with a customs duty ino
excess Of :r.!1y measure ... Stwh complaints are of a local nature,o
which show a lack of understanding of the interests of theo
whole . , . Even the official organ of the Ministl'y of Financeo
had to �dr.--it that if the tariff of 1819 were restored ... theo
ports of t\,e Bhck Sea would certainly gain a great deal. A hugeo
amount of goods would come here, commercial profits and theo
income of the population would be generally excellent in thiso
case.''•••o
Bur the Govt->rnmont was not concerned with the interests of
Ukraine· cr0rtai•�ly m,t at the expense of a loss of income from
cust,ims duties that were creating artificial conditions for the
develcpmer,t of industry in ceutral Hussia. "The prohibitive
system, introduced in Russia in 1822, awoke the national euergy
in almost all branches of factory, plant and trade industries and
contnhulerl to tht' establishment of many· factories and plants;
but tl·e ar:complishrnent was made at huge expense, on the one
ea 0. Ohlohlyn, "Prohlcma Ukrains'koyi ('konomik;. v naukoviy i hromadskiy dumtsi" ( '''nw Problem of \},., Ukrainian Economy on SdPnlific
and Comrnumty Thouglit"), C/wn:nny Shlakli (lkd Path), Kharkiv,
10:31-1, '.'<o. '.J-HJ, p. 107.
eo Ibid.
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hand of The G,_:vernrnent, on the other, of thr� consumers; the
whole state became, for a period of several decades, vassal of a
certain number of industrialists. As a result of this, common and
widel_v used goods were sold to the people at prices 60% to lOO�f
in excc>ss ,-,f nornal for the benefit for the manufacturers.''"'
In and of itself, a protective tariff .system is nothing unusual.
It was aprlied by Jther states wishing to shield their undevel
oped industry fro1i1 ruthless competition. Henee we \Vish here
to ur:derlirc:' no,_ the mere fact of a protective tariff, but of the
peculiarify of its application, In the first place it strengthened
an artificiall�· eTcated industrial center at the expense of an in
dustrial lkvelopmcnt of other terrains which were more suitable,
Under such Conditions these non-Russian terrains \vere trans
fonned into markets for compulsory consumption of the prod
ucts of Hn:;siau industry, and the above mentioned 60% lo 100%
overcharge� for these goods became nothing else but colonial
expl(Jitafrm. In the second place, the application of customs
dutie� as a protective measure �vas of a un il atera l nature. \.Vhile
prohibiting or hinderin g the importation of machines essential to
the Ukrainian economy ( e.g., fann machinery), the importation
of weaving machines was entirely free of customs duties. \Vhat is
more, not onlv iri the act of 1822, but in its subsequent changes
of 1847, 1�50, 1857, 1868 and later, one principle was constantly
adhered to, disproportionately high duties on ready textile goods
( e.g. fine woolen cloth, 60%; mediuhm, 100%, and coarse
200% ud calorem) and very low duties on raw material ancl semi
mam1facture d goods. \i\Thenever the interests of two fonns of in
dustry cla,·hed, spinning and weaving, of which the fonner was
intercstP1_1 i•.1 high duties on yarn, and the latter, just the oppo
site in l0w dutie!:, the Govemrnent would step in to protect both,
DuriPg dlscussion� on the tariff of 1850, the weaving industry
demamlPd a lowering of the duty on yarn from 6,50 rubles per
36,11 p-''nnds (1 pond) to 5.75 rubles, because. it was alleged,
this duty, together with additional expenses, amounts to 8,50
rubles, equal to 50% of the value of the yarn, They wrote that
"a co11tinu·1tiou of this duty will benefit only a small number
of spinners, be..:::tusc the Moscow spinners, who do not feel the
comretiticm 0£ English yaru, will be able to raise the price of
yarn as much as Lhey please.""' In their tum, the spinners wrote
\1. Soholcv, Tamozhmwaya politika R().1·siyi (Rusoiti'� Customs Policy),
Tomsk, H.111, p. 22.
"" !hid., p. 39.
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that they :ire not in a position to compete with England, where
yarn was halt as cheap as in Russia. The Stale Council complied
with the r<"quest vf the former, lowering the duty to 5 rubles
per pood, but compensated the latter by leaving unchanged the
duty on cotton at 25 kopecks per pood, against the wishes of the
Treasury which wanted it increased to 1 ruble, for the follow
ing reason: "As for as cotton is concerned, the Tari££ Committee
thought it desir<1ble to leave it untaxed by any duty; but due
to the fad that the duties on cotton constitute a considerable
item of the Treasury's income, it has agreed to leave the present
duty at 25 kopecks per pood, calling, however, the Govern
ment's atte..:.tion tu the desirability of, if not a complete aboli
tion, then at least a reduction of the duty to 5 kopecks. 29 After
1,'36.'3 cotto1 was, for a considerable time, entirely free of duty.
But such meticulously attentive attitude to industrial benefits
in the sami<> tt>xtile industry is quite absent when it comes to
matters concernir.g Ukraine, because the objective was to de•
prive Ukraine of any influence upon the monopolistic rule of
Moscmv over the textile market'. As has been noted, at the be•
ginning: of the ]9th century Ukraine was well advanced in fine•
wool sheep rancl:.ing, and ,vas a large supplier of wool to Russia.
Wool, like cotton was taxed very lightly, and by the tariff of
1850 the dnty on wool was reduced from 1.90 rubles to 20 ko
pcch vvhir-h W'lS a heavy blow to Ukrainian sheep ranching,
uneable to cumpe:te with British exports of wool, mainly because
of the lack of communications. Nevertheless frequent endeavors
of Ukraine to l:ave the duty on wool increased produced no
resul�. Duri'lg Ci3cussions on the 1877 tariff act "representativeS
of the Klnrkiv corporations trading in wool indicated that the
fine•'-'·ool sheep ranching industry of Poltava, Kharkiv and Kater
ynoslav regions is at a standstill because of the considerable and
almost duty-free importation of foreign wool.''" They requested
that the duty 1:ie increased to 3 rubles per pood and that the
importation of" noi substih1tes should be prohibited. The same
requFst was mf\ck b�, the Rural Economic Congress in Kharkiv
in 1874 and in Odessa in 1878. At a Congress held in Kharkiv in
1386, the regior,s of Poltava, Kharkiv, Katcrynoslav, Tauria and
Kherson again requested that the duty be raised to 2.50 rubles
or even to 4 rn'!:iles, but Moscow was always against it. The
duty was r'lised only in the late lSSO's hut not out of considera·
20 Ibid., pp. 38 and 44i.
➔

ao Ibid.
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tion for the Ukrainian economy, only in the interests of the Treas
ury \'.'hich was :·nmpelled to find a way out of the unfavorable
trade bahmce. IJu-L by this time the Ukrainian fine-wool sheep
ranching industry was already completely ruined.
Thus, the de-velopment of industry, in this case of the tex
tile i11d11stry in the central Moscow region, was, from the very
beginning, dictated by the interests of Russia as the metropolis,
and based rn thf' solid supporl of the Government, with a delib
erate disregard and rejection of the interests of the so-called
'1)orderlands." And in spite of the fact that this monopolistic
situalion on th{:' internal market and the high prices of textiles
causl>d loss�s to all consumers, the Russian consumers included,
this was compensated for by the extension of the labor market,
and Ly the fact that the accumulation of industrial and commer
cial profits went lmvard strengthening the Hussian economy. On
the other hand, Ukraine became from all this a real "vassal of
Russiau industry," giving up a large part of its national income
for tle ben'!fit oI its development.
Notewo,-thv :lrf'. the motives expressed by the industrialists
on the desirability of high duties on ready textiles during discus
sions on th,.. tariff act of 1850. It was alleged that not only in
d11strialL'>ts were interested in the development of this industry,
but a!so the peasant.'., because they make wages on it. Therefore
the protec +ive policy is justified, because it is directed "in the
interests of the textile industry, mainly the weaving industry,
vd1ich emp!oys hundreds of thousands of the peasant population
without taking them av.,ay from their family life. Therefore it
deserves a mon' fowirable attitude on the part of the state than
does the �pinning industry."�1
Conceming regions which had no textile industries, such as
Ukraine, it was maintained that "the peasants of agricultural re
gions will not suffe.r from high prices on the internal market
became they have no money, don't buy and wear home-spun
clothes.""'
Tl-c impoverishm(·nt and primitive life which came in the
wake of c0lonial exploitation were treated as conditions which
justified a further exploitation!
From the motives mentioned above we have been consider
ing th£' textile i1:Justry in more detail, as a leading industry of
the timf, and as most clearly illustrative of the colonial condi31 Ibid., p. 111.
30 Ibid .. p. 150.
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tions. But the same thing existed in other branches of industry.
Until th� end of the 19th century even at a time when foreign
capital bcgim to flm,v into Ukrainian industry freely, it was iu
comparably \.ve'lker than the Hussian. And as of old, the Ukrain
ian market wa� under the complete domination of Russian indus
try.
"In the Ukrainian economy of the period following the re
form, we \'.'ere rble to note a continued growth and strength
cr1ing of t-hc• domin:mt positinn of the Russian manufacturing
indm,try. In Table L arc telling data. illustrating this dominant
position (the figures refer to the year 1904).
(The total of consumption goods is mbsing from the column
referring to Hussia. We have <:!Omputed it as the result of the
difference behveen the sum total and the addition of single items
in the table.)
TJ;e first thing that strikes us upon closer analysis of the
.ibove table is the conspicuously unilateral development of in
dustry. Processing of consumption goods constitutes 66.1% of
Ukraine's total indmtrial production, and together \\-'ith metal
lurgy, rninhg and processing of minerals, 88%. All other branches
of industry add up to only 12% of the total, and some, like tex
tiles, chemicals, processing of animal products are virtua1iy lack
ing. Every nati0nal economy is characterized by a comprehen
sive industrial deVelo!_]ment. One or another' branch of industry
may be lacking, because its development \vou!d, due to natur
al condition�, be unpwfitable, but \Ve never encounter a normal
sihmtion where Ollly two or three branches of industry would
prosper, and in all other respects a national economy would
make itself dependent upon an outside economic body. Such a
situation gravely contradicts the economic interests of a nation
al community and can only exist under circumstances wherein
these intere�ts are subject to some other interests, whenever in
other words, an eronomic system is merely an adjunct of another,
dominant system. It is the most convincing sign of a colonial po
sition.
For a better illuslrntion of this disproport[onate development
of industry, we give in Table Ll, another variation of the previ
ous table, i.e. a compilation of the relative importance of each
branch of indus�rv in Ukraine and in Hussia.
It must be noted, for a proper evaluation of the above table,
that although in the manufacture of cotton goods both Ukraine

TABLE L
Number of cnterprfai-s

Branch nf Indust11J
llfn,mfacturing of cotton
/1.!anufacturing of wool
l\la,mfacturing of silk
i\hmufacturing of li11,·11-liemp
\lanufacturing of othn textiles
Paper mmmfact11ri11g ...
Mec.:hankal womlworkin.g ....
Mdal working shops arnl machine builUing.
Ri\p1dr shops
Other metal m.1nufactnring
Railroad sho11s
Shiplmildin::i: yards
/1.lanufactnring of minerals
\lannfactming industry of mining products .... .
Processing of auimJl produrts .................
.Proccs�ing of ,·onsurnption goo<ls
nndcr internal tax ....
Clwmical industry
TOTALS:
"·' 1\-f. Vo\ohuycv, /,-,c. cit.

Ukraine
J.1

48

•!O

28

232
290
197
59

86

36
6
278
13
91
l,!:.l68

80

3,465

Rus.1·/a

886
1,037
277
175
384
1,3:n
1,900
916
:323
712
176

% [.:kraitw
1..1
4.6
(1,(1

1,521
186
l,l."i3

J2.8
7.3
17.4
15.3
21.5
18.2
12.l.
20.4
35.2
18.3
7.0
7.9

7,S.18
801
19,845

24.8
10.0
17.4

17

Production total in thm,.�und rnl,lcs
Ukrnine
R1rn;-i11
% Ckraine
475.0
928,486.6
0.5
9,461 .3
225,3..Jfl.7
4.2
,14,f;,,W.4
()_()
6,:567.7
9-1,491.4.
7.0
73,1.6
15
49,632.5.
12H,88!:l.3.
l l,.'389.4.
9.0
J0,604.3
1rn,5J0.8.
8.8
60,442.6
347,371.3.
17.4
1,388 .."i
13-644.3.
HU
5,010.8
67.315.8.
7.3
22,543A
31.6
7U66.4
4.51.f!
43.800..1
]0.3
15,600.6
16.0
97,726.0
84,483.7
2I4,R4U'i
39.4
11,0:lJ.6
J."i!J,211.,"i
G.!)
503,482.2
18..)1-l.6
762,184.9

1,51-5.513.3
387,812.6
4,498,679.8

33.3
4.8
16.9

.n
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TABLE LI

RelatiVi! Importance of Bn.mchcs of Imlustry

Branch of irulustTy

Manufaduring of cotton g oods ..............

Manufaduring uf wookn go<Jds.,
Manufacturing of silk g0ods
Manufacturin.g of linen-he1np

Uannfacturing of other textiles.

Paper manufacturing ..
Me('hanical woodworking
Metal working and machine building,.
Re p,air slH>ps ..
Other metal mannfacturin g
Railroad sh,1ps ........... .
Shipbuilding

Processing of minerals ...
Processmg of mining products .. .
Prottssing of animal pro duel, .. .

Processing of t>0nsn111 ption good�.
Ch,,mi<:al ind11stry .....

'{ Ukmiru:

0.05
1.2
0.0
O.\J
0.J.
J.5.
14.
7.9.
0.2.
0.7.
3.0.
0.05
2.0.
11.l.
1.4

66.l

2.4
100.0

'f l/us.,ia
20.6

.s.o
0.8
2.1

u

2.8
2.9
7.7
0.3
L5
1.6
LO
2,0
4.8
3.5
3.1.7
8.6
100.0

and Russi., lacked their own raw material yet in relation to
sources of supply (Egypt, India) Ukraine was situated closer
and in di,rl:'ct ccntact by sea. We must not look therefore to
natural c( uditions to find an answer to the query why Ukraine's
cotton indmtrv was 412 times smaller than Russia's. The same
appl;es to the· foitr times smaller wool mariufach1ring industry
which is absolutely unjustified when we consider that Ukraine
was a large supplier of wool both to Russia, and to foreign
lands. Even the et,u:a.l figures in such an industry as metal work
ing are not normal, hecause, at that time Ukraine was supply
ing 57.2% r,f all the ore extracted in the Empire, and the Urals
only 20.8'.i'. In tl,e production of pig iron Ukraine stood at 52%,
in ready imn ard ,ted, 44.7% against the Urals' 22.4%. Comin g
back to the indices of the totals of production we must not over
look the far-t th:, l the total production of Ukraine amounted to
only 16.9% of the Russian Empire (see table on p. 189), at a time
when the popuhtion d Ukraine was 22.6% of the Empire·s total,
and 40% of the prpulation of Russia. The figure of 16.9% is only
due to the large extent to which Ukraine participated in the
proc,�ssing of foorl. pwducts. Without that item the participation
of UJ.raine would fall to a mere 8.7%.
Lr-� lb consider the food processing industry of Ukraine.
Out of the wide variety possible in this line, Ukraine had only
three comeparatively strong industries: sugar refining, milling,
1
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and Cistilling. All other industries, even those like tobacco pro
cessir.g and wine making for which Ukraine possessed ample
uw rnakri:ll, were very insignificant. Out of the three territorial
parts into which the Ministry of Commerce and Industry divided
Ukraine-Southern agricultural, agricultural industrial, and min
ing industrial ( a division which did not exactly correspond to
the border5 of Ukraine), only two were reall y producers of
food products. In the third, food accounted for only 9.1% of its
total indust ry. The other two above mentioned parts produced
87% of all processed food and 68% of the sugar.l3�
Tim�, thP abcve mentioned figure of 503 million rubles for
the food processing industry in Ukraine creates an imagiuary
conception of a high stage of development of that industry when
ht fact ovn tw0--!"hirds of that figu re applies to the sugar refin
ing industry. On the contrary, on closer analysis, the low level
of th{' de"Ploprr:ent of the food processing industry becomes
obvious, aml in qny event is nowhere near the natural possibili
ties. If we consider only the agricultural-industrial part which
takes in thP rei{ons of Kharkiv, Chemihiv, Kiev, Padilla and
Poltava, regions with the highest level of that industry ( 329
million rubles out of a total of 401 million of all industrial prod
uds of the regions, or 82%), then the division according to
branC'hes Clf production is characterized by the figures of values
and percentrges in Table Lll.
TABLE LII

Brmichcs of industry
Sugar rcfinnies ... , ....
Milling
Distilling .......... , ........ .
Tobacco
Oil pressing ..... , .
Coofodinnerie� . , ,
Grits and cereals ..
Bakin g .....
SauS<1ge-making

Distilling-cordials
Slaughterhouses
Starches-molasses
Cooling drinks

Others, not specified
TOTAL ....

Thimsamh of rubles
%
237,121
72.0
47,679
14.4
18,441
5.5
11,729
3.6
2,944
0.9
2,514
OS
1,991
0.6
l,7.'54
0.5
732
0.23
247
0.07
196
0.06
156
0.05
125
0.04
4.250
1.25
329,405
100.0

·" Mhiister Torgovli i Promyshlcnnosti ( Minister of Comm<'rce ,1.nd In
dustry), Torgoda i promy.�hlcnnost Ycrrop,·11skloy Rossiyi 1w rayonaml
(Comm,,r,·e and Industry of Europem1 Russia by Districts), St. Peters
burg, 1912, VIII-XII, pp. vii-17.l
a., lbid., pp. x-16.l
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.-\s we can see from the above, all industrial enterprises with
the exception of the first four categories produced such insig
nific,Lut amounts and participated in such small fractions of pcr
cent:igcs th:t ont° should rather speak of their absence than pres
ence. The one indisputable fact is that the sugar refining indus
try of Ukraine was highly developed, but its growth did not
comP abont wi�hout many obstacles created by the nature of
�com1mk Plati1,rcs with Hussia.

The Sugar Industry
The concen�ration of the sugar-refining indush)' in Ukraine
wa� caL.scd primariJ;, by factors of an objective nature, the
main one being that the transportation of sugar-beets over Jong
disbnccs is �conomically unprofitable. This industry is in the
category of focalized indush·ies where the raw material is pro
cessed a'. the place of its production. The geographic line of
sugar-beet cnlhvation almost coincides with the Northern bor
der of Ukraine, encompassing Southern parts of Russia's Voron
izh and Kursk gu.bernias. Farther north, the beet loses its per
centage of sugar, In Ukraine, one d.esiatyna under beet cultiva
tion gave. 971.-1 pounds of sugar, against 657.2 pounds from
neighboring regions of Russia. One berkovets of beets, between
356 and 396 pounds, yielded 13.72 pounds of sugar in Ukraine,
and 10.29 pounds in Russia.
I� would seem that such favorable natural conditions in
Ukraine should have prccludctl any doubts as to the desirability
of conce'1!Ta.ti1,g 1he sugar refining industry in Ukraine. But
such was not the case and Ukraine had to exert itself to secure
a position of primacy, and still this industry, as opposed to the
textile ind1:strv (lf Russia, experienced severe handkaps. When
the pharmacist Tiindheim originally proposed, in 1800, that a su
gar industry should be organized, the Emperor Paul I favored it
and began to f'!ldow his favorites with land for the purpose.
But the first refinery did not become established until after the
Napolf'c,,.ii(' ,vars, in the 1820's. From that time on, refineries
began lo ,1r1war at a fast pace, but in South Russia, not Ukraine.
The first �11gar refinery in Ukraine was established in the Kiev
region in 1827. By 1840 there were eight of them in the Kiev
regic:n and about forty-five in all of Ukraine, less than one-third
of the number in the whole Russian Empire. Newrtheless, fa
vorable conditions gave Ukraine so much superiority that the
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industry's rate of development always kept ahead of Russia. Hy
ISS2. Uknint.' hu(l 2�9 sugar refineries, half the Empire·s total.
Snb"c'quentlv, bq,;inning with the 1880's, the growth of this in
<lm,tr) in qkrniue took the shape not so much of an increase
in the nunber of e"tablishments as an increase of their produc
tivity. 1n some localities there was even a decline in the number
of relin.•rics. For example, iu Surny counly near Kharkiv, there
were half '.l.S many refineries in 1880 as in 1859, but the produc
tion of !>ug:1r had r.iscn nine-fold. On the eve of \Vorld ·war 1,
compared with 1890, production of sugar increase<l 2.5 times,
and the 'lnmher of plants by only 29%. According to average
productiou figures per refinery, Ukraine occupied first place
among all cour,tric!> of Europe. In Ukraine one refinery pro
duced 16,034,172 pounds; in Austria-Hungary, 11,556,460
pouoris; in Hussia, 9-281.041 pounds; in Poland, 8,883,798
poun<ls; in Germany, 8,739,346 pounds; in Belgium, 6,.'536,453
pounds, and in France, 4,478,012 pounds.""
}_nd although Ukraine ha<l at that time only 62% of all the
rdinc,rics of the Empire, 75.8% of sugar beet cultivation an<l
68.4% of the industry's employees, Ukraine produce<l seven
time� as much sugar as Hnssia, together with H,nssia's part of Po
land (the Kingcfom of Poland). According to the amount of
sugar pro,luced, Ukraine occupied, in 1910-1911, second place
among all the capitalist countries of the world: ( in millions of
pounds). For CT:,ta, see Table LIII.

Cauntry
Gennany

Ul..rnim,

Au�tri,1 Il,mgury

France
U.S.A.

Belgium

Poland

!Iollam\

Switzerland

Spain.

It,1lr

..

Dcnmar!.,

Russia.

TABLE LIII
1900-01
.3,9 L4.649
1,487,8:5:5
2,148.723
2.[81,22.."j
32,5,017
63-"i,,588
249,179
-143.907
227,.512
l0l.l l6

25,279

'6 S. Ostapenko, op. cit., p. HJ7.

-" Ibid., p. J 99.

JU05-06

4,74.5,248
l ,,5fi:l,696.
2,964,877.
2,134.278.
624,75.5
6,50,0'34
332,239
408,077
24l.9,'i7
180,.56,5
162,501)
l.1:'!,6l8
2.5,278

1910-11
4,037,4:17
3,690,748
2,470,[29
1,592,,583
1.000,,330
491,137
444,190
356.409
24D,17!1
234,7:!4
166.120
130,006
86,671
"7
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During 1914-15 Ukraine had 241 sugar refineries, 731 thou
sand desiatynas of land under sugar beet cultivation and pro
duced 3,900,lE million pounds of sugar.
We h:ive considered the development of the Ukrainian sugar
refining iw}u�try at considerable length in order to cmphasi1:e
the great opportunities which Ukraine had for an all-round
growth of this industry. The opportunities were far from realiza
tion because "it can be stated with certainty that with the devel
opment or electric power near the Dnipro rapids, at least half
of thf' agricultural activities could be turned to the sugar industry."a,,
N•:dher em W(' underestimate the tremendous importance of
this imlnstry a.,; one of the most important labor markets for the
Ukrainiau peasants, who always felt a need for employment.
Nor can '•'.'f' lose sight of the fact that sugar beet cultivation
contributed to significant changes in the agriculhiral economy
of the villa1P�. The industrial cultivation of sugar beets necessi
tated a brC'rrk wi_._h the conservative and backward three-field
sy�1:em, gre3tly increased the amount of labor per unit of land
and thns the income from Tand, aided in the claeaning of fiC'lds
of we,:cls, contributing to its fertility, and finally it created a
fodder brtfis fo!' the development of productive animal hus
bandry.
These circumstances make it obvious that the Ukrainian
interf'sts Jnmandecl the widest possible develaopment of oppor
tunities and �pPC;aJ considerations. But Russia's approach to
the maltf'!' wa<: r-ntirely different.
When the idrn of centralizing this industry in Russian re
gions encountered defeat because of the unsurpassed nahiral
condition<; in Ukraine, and when it became quite clear that in
this branch prinity would have to be conceded to Ukraine,
Russ;a transformed this industry into a source of her enrichment
and put it in the service of her interests. First of all, Russia put
sugar, an :uticlc •::if universal consumption, into the category of
goods subject to excise taxes, like spirits, tobacco, t>tc. "The Mos
c,o
• w Cnvernml'nt held a really heavy hand on this deparhnent.
In 1881 tPe excise tax on sugar was established at ,"iO kopecks
per 1 poc� (3fU13 pounds); in 1884, 60 kopecks; in 1885, 75
kopecks; in 1890, 1 ruble and in 1895, 1 ruble, 75 kopecks. Dur
ing the fo('al vear 1911-12, the Moscow Government collected
&i

Ibid., p. 195.

L'krainfrm Industry

127

131.8 million rubles in excise taxes on sugar, plus seven million
in thP for111 of a direct, so-called industrial tax."'"'
The C'1Pise ta:>.. was over ,10% of the sale price. But the prob
lem rnnn0t be confined merely to this burden. It had far-reach
ing "'Conrnuic consCl\uenccs; the high price of sugar, by reason
of the tax burden, narrowed the internal consumer market con
siderably, and in this manner sugar was artificially compelled
to b2come an export article. The Government was interested
in tPis ph:i.,;c, desiring a favorable foreign trade balance. Al
though !he popt,Jation of Ukraine increased its consumption of
sugar somf-'what, Ukraine remained in second place in produc
tion and in last plal·e in consumption. Producing over 3.5 bil
lion pounds of sugar, the Ukrainian peasants were deprived
of an opporhmity of consuming it The average annual consump
tion of sug'.'r pt>i capita in Ukraine in 1850 \vas 2.2 pounds; in
1887, 7.5 pounds, and in 1914, 17.7 pounds, v..!1ile figures for
the {'t'rrespon<ling vears for other countries were: England,
100 pot1nch, U.S.A., 97 pounds; Denmark, 89 pounds; Germany,
50 pLuuds, Rk. "If that excise tax were taken off, then the price
of Ukrainian sugar at home would be 6 to 7 kopecks per pound,
that is, it would be sold , , . at the same price at which Ukrain
ian sugar was sold abroad,"•0
Pursuant to a 1O-year Russo-German trade agreement of
1904, condnd,-,d during the Russo-Japanese war, Ukrainian
sugar was xportcd lo Germany at 5 kopecks per pound, and
Germany, the largest producer of sugar in Europe, considered
it profitable to import that sugar as feed for hogs!
But the exci.�e tax was not the end of the subjection of the
Ukrainiaa sn�ar refining industry to the interests of Russia. A
customs policy also f'xerted its influcJJcc, aimed at favoring an
artificially creatf'cl refining industry in Petersburg, and partially
Mos(:OW.
It has been noted before that Moscow, and in a larger meas
ure Pctcr.0hurg, without possessing any natural requirements
for it, developed a sugar refining industry. Moscow received
the necessary raw material, semi-refined sugar, mainly from
Ukraine, especially after the construction of the Kursk-Kiev
railroad which connected Moscow with mass producing sugar
regions of Ukraine. Petersburg's refining industry was basnd on
colmdal white and yellow cane sugar mainly imp orted from
0

31• Ibid., p. 197.

,o Ibid., p. 198.
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England. This situation determined the position of lhe Govern
ment \\·ith resp�ct to imposing a duty on imported sugar. The
Petersburg refineries were interested in getting the imported
raw material dnty-free, and exerted pressure upon the Govern
ment. It ,Jpenly admitted that otherwise it would not be able
to c,)mpt t� with Ukraine. The Moscow refining im.lustry was
abo interested, although it ran in the main on semi-refined
Ukrain:atl sug1.r, because it created a convenient position under
whicb it could depress prices, bringing out the threat of com
petir,g prices of English sugar which came in through Baltic
port�.
The Ukrainian sugar refining industry suffered from the fact
that the •�mtoms policy favored the interests of these Russian
refineries by cutting off the path of Ukrainian sugar northward
and pladn� Ukraine in an awkward position in exports of sugar.
Ir. 1849, the importation of raw sugar was permitted under
a duty of 3.80 mbles, while refined sugar was under a prohibi
tive tariff. \Vhen the Committee of Customs Tariffs spoke in
favor of permitting the importation of refined sugar, arguing that
refinnics ".'ere conocentrated exclusively in Petersburg and that
the p0pulation was �uffering because of high prices for sugar,
the !\Hnist.rv of the Treasury cxpressf'd itself against the propo
sition, and defended the interests of the Petersburg refiners. It
stated that "the refining industry aids many branches of indus
try connected with it."11
The prnblem ol customs duties came under discussion many
times, always with the object of a further reduction in order to
aid Petersburg refineries. The motive was not only to permit
them to cnntinuc taking profits, but also to facilitate their com
petition with the Ukrainian industry and no secret was made of
it. "Ht·re the coDtra<lictory interests of Southern owners of sugar
refi:nnies and Northern refiners clashed."'"
The Cm·ernment wished to hinder rapid development of the
Ukr:1iuia.n �ugar industry. In 1854 the !\.Hoister of Finance intro
duced in �he State Council a project of reducing the duty on
raw mgr.r ... "The arguments for such a reduction ran thus: 1)
A noticeable decline in imports of raw sugar; 2) An excessive
growth of the sugar industry in Russia ( what was meant was
Ukraine-Author); 3) The extraordinary growth of the sugar beet
indu.,trv r:.111ses an apprehension that imports of foreign sugar
11

.\I. Sobolev, op. cit., p. 2\J.

42

;\f. Sobokv, op. cit .. p. !J8.
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will fail o(f further, and might stop entirely." The :\'linister of
Finance ly0•lieYe<l that the existing high import duty on colonial
(imported) raw �ug:ir was entirely unnecessary for the protec
tion of the Russian (i.e. Ukrainian-Author) sugar industry," he
caust: "under the existing duty the refiners of the Northern
gubernias pay 7.55 mhlcs for sugar (per pood or 36.113 pounds)
and refm::d sugar is !>old locally for 9 rubles per pood. There
fore the refiners get for their cost of refining, labor and interest
on cL1pitat only 1.45 rubles per pood. At the same time South
ern refiner-; who Plake the end product from their own material,
which costs them, including the excise tax 3.30 rubles, therefore
sellin; the refined product locally at 8 rubles leaves them 4.70
rubles. Under such circumstances the northern refiners will
not be ahle to !>-taud up ag:ainst the southern." Therefore, they
argu:'d "by making the colonial (imported) raw sugar cheaper,
the ,�xces�lve development of the sng:ar beet industry could be
haltc<l."4l
Tliis makf's it clear how different the tariff policy in relation
to the Russian textile industry was from that policy in relation
to the Ukrainian sugar industry. In order to benefit the artificial
ly created and economically unprofitable refining plants of the
North, the order of t he day was, hy application of a customs
policy, to hinder the further development of the Ukrainian in
dustry, and to prevent Ukrainian sugar from capturing the in
ternal market. "Thanks to it ( customs policy), northern refiners
will be in a position to compete at least partially with those of
the South in marketing sugar in the central gubemias."H
The �Iinister of Finance. set nn accomplishing this did not
hesitate to violate the basic principle of the Russian customs
policy, i.e. its fiscal nature. Out nl a total income from customs
duties in 1852, 48.2 million rubles, the duty on sugar amounted
to 7 million and was the largest single item among all others.
After the tariff was reduced. this item fell to 2.7 million for 1856.
Such policy quite understandably produced an appropriate
reaction on the part of Ukrainian industrialists. At the request
of 23 owners of refining plants, the Kiev Governor Prince Vas
ilchikov sent a protest, demanding a change of attitude toward
the interests of Ukrainian industrr. He wrote: "The sugar in
dustry requires much capital, proper knowlt•dgc and labor; in
addition it provides work for thf' rnral population, and the cul,, .\I. Soholl'v, op. cit., pp. 86-87.
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tivation of sugar beets, which aids new industries, is extraordi
narily profitable to the land." Polish sugar refiners also wrote
that the tariff support of Petersburg refiners who run their
plants on imported raw sugar is without merit, inasmuch as
such plants "cannot hope to prosper because of the fact that the
home industry has advance<l so much that competition with it
cannot succeed."''
The figures of the Minister of Finance were also proved
wrong: refined sugar sold in Petersburg iu 1856 not for 9 rubles,
but for 12.80, and the manufacturers' cost of sugar in Ukraine
was not 3.30 rubles, only 4.71 rubles and the refined product
sold for 8 rubles. But the protests were of no avail: the duty on
foreign raw sugar was reduced many times. Even at a time when
the tariff policy of the Government in the 'seventies and 'nineties
embarked upon a path of a general increase of duties, raw sugar,
like other industrial raw materials, was affected only in a re
duced proportion.
If Ukrainian sugar was finally able to win, and largely
pushed foreign sugar off the market, it was only because of high
profitability. But even then, at the cost of special railroad rates,
the Petersburg and Moscow refineries were kept alive. Ukraine
sugar was hauled almost 1200 miles, in order to return to inter
nal Hussian markets and, partially, to Ukraine.
The fight for the subjection of the Ukrainian sugar industry
to the interests of the metropolis did not end with this. As has
been noted, this industry became a source of considerable in
come to the treasury by way of huge excise taxes collected on
sugar, and it contributed to foreign exchange balances through
exports. Subsequently, as we shall indicate, the Ukrainian sugar
industry itself was taken over by Russia through banking car
tels.
\Ve thought i t worth-while to dwell on this phase of Ukrain
ian industry a little longer and dispcll many impressions such
as: the large amount of "processed food products," 503 million
rnbles, of which sugar constituted the major part, are proof that
industrial development went on in accordance with the true in
terests of Ukraine, and in this matter no colonial dependence of
Ukraine is noticeable. As we have seen, even in this branch of
industry, given Ukraine by nature ibclf, there was no freedom
from Russian subjugation.
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To study other branches of this industrial group wou!<l be to
repeat the same story: oppres.�ive excise taxes; Ukraine's inter
ests ignored in tariff policies; obstacles on the internal market,
etc. Thus, for example, the well developed distilling industry
was much hindered by the law O piteynom shore ( Alcoholic
Beverage Tax). As a result of this law, the number of distilleries
in Northern Ukraine declined between 1863 and 1883 from
180 to 52.'� In the regions of Kiev, Poltava and Katerynoslav
there were 887 d istilleries in 1863 with a production of 4.2 mil
lion barrels of spirits; in 1864, only 678 distilleries v,rith a produc
tion of 3.4 million barrels; and in 1866, 499 distilleries with 2.7
million barrels. 't7
The only reason this industry did not fail, and by means
of increasing production per plant still gave a considerable out
put, was that the price of potatoe,; and grain was extremely low
locally, and processing them into alcohol was still profitable.
Dut here too, the main profit went into the treasury as excise
tax. In 1913 Ukraine paid into the state treasury 182.7 million
mhles in excise taxes on spirits.•-�
Low duties on wines, imported from Hungary and Greece
hindered the development of Ukrainian viniculture, and the
treasury <lid not wish to part with the income from this source
in order to favor the Ukrainian economy. The same can be
said of tobacco of which Ukraine was a major raw-stage sup
plier though processing was done in Petersburg.

The Coal Industry
DiHere,at ccnditiom developed in the coal-mining, metallur
gical and metal working industries. The factors contributing to
the situation were many, but the most decisive of them were:
1)t Huge natural deposits of coal and iron ore, easily and con
veniently extractable. [Coal deposits of the Donhas are estimatedt
at over 6.5 billion tons suitable for coking. lron ore deposits oft
Kryvyi Rih are estimated at 56 million tons (recently revised tot
1.5 billion tons) of 50% to 62% iron content, and of Kcrch at 175t
million tons of :351 to 45% iron content. Deposits of maugaueset
ore in the Nikopol region are estimated at 500 million tons of at
35% to 48:Z manganese content. J-9 2.) The fact that these larget
_\f. Slabchenko, op. cit., p. mt. .., '.\!. Ya�n,ipol�ky, op. cit., II, 74,
S. Ostapenko, op. cit., p. 19:3.
•� Bo&haya Sodetskaya Ent#k/opediqa (Grnat Societ Enl.'yclopedio), Vol.
55, 1947. Title: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Also Feshchenko
Chopivsk y, op . dt., and P. Fomin, op. cit.
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iron ore deposits in Ukraine were discovered at a late date. 3)
Russia's protracted lack of interest in Ukrainian coal due to a
complete lack of rail communications, the isolation of the coal
fields from the sea and a narrowly limited market for coal. 4) A
sudden change of this attitude toward both coal and iron when
Russian began large railroad construction. 5) Tariff policies of
the Hussian Government aimed at protecting the Hussian metal
lurgical and metal working induslries. 6) The Ukrainian popu
lation's acute nee<l for employment, and the consequential cheap
labor and acquiescence of the workers to the most primitive
standard of living.
During the last decades of the 19th century, as a result
of tl'esP. influences, Russian and Ukrainian capital, active in
the de\Tlopment of the Ukrainian coal industry, was joined
by a tlmd force, foreign caapital which contributed to a special
system of economic conditions in this branch of industry. But
notwithstanding the stormy growth of industry since that pe
riod, Ukraine did not come out of colonialism, and now the con
solidah..d and organically related Hussiau-foreign factor became
the proponent of colonial exploitation. By its influence it pene
trate-1 into other branches of industry, as well as into transpor
tation, admfnistration of municipalities, etc.
Although coal deposits were known to ex_ist in the Donets
basin early in the 18th century, yet until the late 19th century,
the extradion of coal was in the nature of a semi-trade. Even
in 1840 thB amount of coal mined equalled only 4,000 tons. By
1855 it wa� 72,000 tons, and in 1860, 96,000 tons. After 1870
coal mining rleveloped very rapidly, and along with it the parti
cipat'on of Ukraine in the total amount of coal mined in the
Hus�1an Empire.
The dymmics of that incrcase are shmvn in Table LIV.
The great jump in coal mining made in the l870's ( from 240
thousand tons to 1,376 thousand tons per year within ten
years) was connected with the possibility of the coal mining
indush-y supplying the Black Sea shipping with coal. For that
reason tl1e atnount of anthracite, which was the grade preferred
by �teamsl-iips, accounted for more than 50% of all the coal
mined. Ilnt within '.'l. few years prospects of supplying shipping
dwindled because of British competition. An important factor
in this connection was the fact tha t prohibitive tariffs caused
exports horn Black Sea ports to be miich higher than imports

TABLE LIV
The figurus, stated in original sources in millions of poods, ha vr been converted into tons at the rate 11f 1,000,000 )JOods
= 16.000 tons. The figures are in thousands of tons.
Poland
Percent
\Ve#
East
Dombrot:a
Moscow
Siberia
Ukraine
Yem
Caucasus Turkestan
Ukraine
hasin
Ural
region
Siberia
Total
38.4
6.4
8J)
174.4
4,158.4
44.l.
.'3.Z
1885
l,8.'38.4
1,748.8
340.8
2.9.'31.2
208.8
9.6
·1.8
19.2
14.4
5,842.2
HmO
2,412.0
242.2
,50.0
8,0
l9.2
5.3.7
17.6
8.710.6
189.5
4,601.8
3,5!J6.8
281.6
IG3.2
22.4
moo
!:l.fi
1'.l7.6
lSOA
62. 4
10,749.2
4,028.8
363,2.
281.6
V'i,i82.S
68.2
190,5
1,001.6
12,564.8
3,483.2
209.6
38.4
428.8
18,236.8
69.l.
481.6
28.8
222.4
48.0
54.4
.'lO.'l.6
1,076.8
24,.347.2
ti7.l
1910
16,300.8
5,4.'51.2
688.0
68.6.
29,'J4.5.6
1912
1,289.{J
20,347.2
691.2
9G.()
68.8
220.8
6,312.0
920.0
HJI3

1914
191.'i
1916

'"

2.4,700.8
26,940.8
26,02-5.6
27,816.0

6,820.8
3.697.6

1,176.0
1,347.2
1,2ci9.2
1,268.8

W2.6
320,0
433,6
(i76,8

70.4
6S.6
60.8
.'57.6

I.'34.4

1,50.4
164.8
196.S.

857.8
968.0
1,251.2
1,257.6

1,147.2
1,320.0
1,294.4

35.200.0
34,809.6
30,48\1.6

so D. Shary (ed.}, Statistid,cwkiu Ye:r.hegodnik na 1914 god ( Statistical Yeorbnok for 1914), St. Petersburg, p. 147..
"M. Colman, "Russkiy lmpcryalizm" ( "Russian Imperialism"), Pribou ( The Surf), Leningrad, 1926, p. 444..

70.3
77.-1
85,4

"
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into them, and for that reason foreign ships arrived empty at
these ports with l:Oal fo r ballast. Ukrainian coal at that time,
was depriv,_,.d entfrely of rail lines, had very sparse connection
with the seabond, and suffered high railroad tariffs. Under
such circumstances, Ukraine could obviously not successfully
compete. The hrgest shipping concern in the Black Sea "Russ
koye Ob�hC'hestvo Parokhodstva i Torgovli" (ROPIT) used
55,344 ton., of British coal and only 10,656 tons of Ukrainian
coal in li378, and the corresponding figures for 1880 were:
51,492 tons and 22,768 tons.
Under conoditions of very limited home consumption of coal,
there being then no Ukrainian metallurgical industry, and weak
ly developed rail communications ( the railroads would not only
aid in widening the market, but would themselves become a
large consumer), the Ukrainian hard coal mining industry was
faced with a serious crisis in the late 1870's. There was a catas
trophic decline of prices, and coal fell from 7.32 rubles per ton
to 1.22 rubles. Large stocks piled up at the mineheads with no
customers in prospect. In seeking a way out of this impasse, the
Ukrair,1.an coal industrialists faced two basic problems: either
to lowet railroad tariffs within Ukraine and in the direction of
the seaports,· or, in view of the light demand for coal on the
part of Ukrainian industry, to push coal into the industrial cen
ters of R1mia. H11t the latter way out faced the obstacle of im
ports from abroad. In 1876 a special railroad tariff rate appli
cable to coal wns introduced which was openly contrary to
the interests of Ukrainian industry. "The coal industrialists
urged lowering railroad rates within the state. The railroad
tariff was set up in the interests of Russian plants. Analyz
ing the tariff of 1876 one can easily see that for example in the
Southern sector of the Kozlov-Voronizh-Rostov railroad, from
Shakhty to Rostov ( in the direction of the Oziv Sea) the charge
per pood-verst was one-thoirty-sixth of 1 kopeck, while in the
Northern �ector of the same railroad ( in the direction of Mos
cow) the pood-verst charge was only one-sixty-first of 1 kopeck.
.. Even if we take the rate to be one-fortieth to one-sixtyieth
kopeck, still the coal industrialists would have to lose against
English coal which went to Moscow and the Moscow industrial
region at the freight rate of one-seventh of 1 kopeck per pood
verst."""
52 M. Slabchonko, op. cit., p. 216.
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Only those conditions, imposed upon Ukraine prevented her
from successfully competing against British coal, at least on
the Hlack and Oziv Seacoast, because otherwise both the quali
ty and the location would work in favor of Ukrainian coal. In
O<lessa imported coal was sold at 10.37 to 10.98 rubles per ton,
and Ukrainian coal, under such high freight rates at 10.93 to
11.51 rubles per ton. Even Odessa, one of the largest consumer�
of coal ( annually 320,000 tons) which also derived benefits
from the importation of coal ( that is why the people of Odessa
were against in�roducing an import duty on coal) maintained
that "Donets coal could pu:,h out foreign coal, if only freight
were cheaper an<l a sufficient number of coastal ships were
availahle."·"
Tl e fight against duty-free importation of coal began ac
the vi'rv mitset of the crisis. The problem of imposing a duty
on coal was raised at the Second Congress of Mining Industrial
ists of "South Russia" in 1877. Even earlier Ukrainian business
men trie<l to convince Moscow of the advantages of converting
her industries from wood to coal, and the coal coming from
Ukraine. "In l'etersburg, a ton of foreign coal costs 9.76 rubles; in
Riga, 17.08 rubles and in Moscow between 18.91 and 21.-'35 rub
les. At the same time a ton of Donets anthracite equals one cubic
sazh('n ( eight cubic metres) of wood, and even at a price of
2.40 ruhles per ton ( as we have noted, the price at that time
fell to 1.22 rubles per ton-Author) coal would cost locally 2.40
per ton while wood at Ivanov ( near Moscow) cost 20 rubles
per sa:du:n.'·,.,a
The Sixth Congress of Mining Industrialists of Ukraine
again raised the question of duty-free importation and ap
proached the Ministry of Finance with a request: "in order to
provide a market for Donets coal in the Northwestern and Mos
cow regions, a duty on coal should be introduced in the follow
ing amounts: coal coming into Baltic ports, 1 kopeck per pood
( about 60 kopecks per ton); coal in transit to points inside Russia
-2.5 kopecks per pood ( 1.50 rubles per ton); coal coming througha
inland points on the Austrian and Prussian bonier 3 kopecksa
(I.SO rubles per ton) and through Black Sea ports 3.5 kopecksa
(2.10 rubles per ton)." But the Minister of Finance, althougha
inter<·�ted in raising revenues from duties, stood, as umal, pri.,' �1. So\ml,·v. ll]>. cit., p. 524.
'' N. Yasnopolsky, op. cit. , p. 95. (R,•ferences to poods in the ori ginal have
h� ... n conv«rtrd to tnns.)
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marily in defense of Hussian industry, whose interests were al
ways above those of the tariff policy of the Empire. He wrote:
"HevPmw trom duties will in no event compensate for the dam
age done to our industry and the national economy through an
increase in the cost of fuel, particularly in the North of Russia
where manv hunches of shop and manufacturing industries,
comnming muC'h. fuel, would not he able to operate under the
smallest duty burden imposed on coal."·•�
rnsistent demands of Polish coal industrialists were partially
satisfied, and a duty of l kopeck per paod of coal was introduced
on the western border of Poland. The Seventh, and in 1883 the
Eighth Congress of Ukrainian Mining Industrialists brought up
the matter. TI1cv indicated that 3:3% of the coal consumed in the
Empire wn� forf'igu at a time wl1en, in 1883 in the Donets basin
2,112 thousand tons of coal were mined, of which 240 thousand
tons were used locally, 960 thousand tons were sold, and 912
thousand tons rf'mained unsold. "0
The manager of the Kharkh• Commercial Bank, Alchevsky,
told the Eighth Congress; "Defending the interests of Moscow
manufacturers, the interests of our land should also be consid
ered; if ther� were no favorable tariff policy in relation to goods
which our land receives from Moscow, then many branches of
MosC'r,w's manufacturing industries would not reach that stage
of high development which lhC'y now enjoy.""
Thus, as we can see, the other basic Ukrainian industry
coal, just like the sugar industry, cannot boast of a famrable
attitude of the Imperial Government. On the contrary, every
thing possible was done to serve Russian industry at its expense.
The Government quite openly tried to hold the price of Ukrain•
ian coal at the lowest possible level lJy putting it into a position
of having to fight hmvy competition.
Only in 1881 was a law intrnduced which imposed a duty
of 2 kopecks per pood on coal_. coke and peat in the ports of
the Black and Oziv Sea; 1.5 kopecks on inland border points in
the West, and 1.5 kopecks in ports of the Baltic Sea. In 1887 the
duty was rai�ed to 3 kopecks in mack Sea ports, and to 1 kopeck
in Baltic p(irts.�"
But it would be a mistake to think that this denoted anv
change in the Government's attitude toward the Ukrainian coal
indu.,trv. H was mused by a complete change which took place
r;c, M. Snl,ukv, up. ril,, p. -13fi. "'' !\{ So!mkv, op. cit., p. 514.
lhid., p. 512. ''' Ihi<I., p ..'i29.

07

137

{.'krainian Industry

in Ukrair1c at the time, the rapid development of a Ukrainian
metallurgical industry which became a large consumer of fuel,
as well as the construction of railroads. also creating a demand
for c_ial. This C'ontnhnted to an immense increase of the local
market. �tr-:-ngthcned the position of tlie coal industry, drew for
eign c.ipital inv1�st,nc11ts in it, aud facilitated organized market
ing of coal. Subsequently, a syndicate for the marketing of coal
"l'roduhol;· was cstc1hlished, which almost monopolized the mar
ket, bt1t b:v that time Ukrainian capital had already been
sq11et-zt'd out of the coal industry. This high prosperity of the
coal market permitted the �-tinistry of Finance to ntili7e the
opportunity of increasiug revenues from this item, and that is
why au import duty was introduced on coal, 1.mt privileges
were nevertheless reserved for the Petersburg industry.
Later, ht>h-veen 1901 and 1906, when the production of coal
was ah�io�t stabilized, the prices always rising and the industrial
centers of Hns�ia !eeling a dependence on Ukraine, the duty ou
coal was r2duced. In 1913, it was abolished entirely.'·� From
HJOK the annu;,J import of coal was 400 thousand tons. 'l11c
kadiug position of Ukraine in the coal industry of the Empire
hro11ght atlont a cornlition where Ukraine's place was becoming
more ::mJ more important in the Empire's fnel balance. Al
though most of the coal w.is consumed in Ukraine, "a tendency
became nolicc:i.hle in the direction of caphiring distant mar
kets: transportation of Doncts fuel increases faster than cost of
froi£;ht to th(' Southern market, closer to its source:·
Hcgions of destination of coal hanled by railroads ( in thou
sands of tons) arc shown in Tahle LV.
TAB! .E !.\'

/M-1
Sm1tlH·rn rc,:i"n ( r,1 ilrnarls within 1:krainc) 7.81-1
Ccr,tr,,l Hussi.1 :ind \'olg:1 n•gl,m
8!8
Otlwr n•gions
(flj

I<Jl.'J
J.'l87:!
s,�76
.
J,,"i(J-t

'; of
irirrul.'N'
77

:J-i.'l
J:ll

c.o

,\,.ll(l yet, in �pile of a growing consumption of Donets coal
beyo,1d the borders of Ukraine, the internal market grew even
more. t,1kiof over 50% of the total production. The nwtallnrgica!
in<lmtn· bcwm·· a reliable customer, contrihutill_!!: in large meas•
''" \f. Colrn 111. ''/J. rit., Jl. .3.5'3
''" l' Fornin, "Ek"nomiehna kh<1rakter} ,tyk,-1. l"kraiu; ," p. 09.
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ure bJ �'.1e inderendent action of the Donets basin. In addition,
the kudin½ position of the Ukrainian coal industry in the Em
pire fuel b,1!ance changed the nature of the consumption of its
prodt,d bcvond the borders of Ukraine. Not only did the rail
roads become organically dependent on it, but many other
branches of the Empire's industry also. This added to the im
port.nee of the Ukrainian coal industry. In 1912 the fuel balance
of the whole Empire, railroads excepted, was characterized by
the figures in Table LVI ( in thousands of tons).
With the exception of Poland and the Urals which had their
own coal +posits, only the Northwestern region ( the industries
of Petersburg), under the protection of an official tariff policy,
relied on foreign coal. In all other regions Ukraine gained a
dominant position in the supply. The Donets basin played an
even greatFr role in supplying the railroads. The railroads' coal
consumpti0n re,iched 4,123.2 thousand tons in 1913, of which
2,4lfl t!10us:md tons were used by the railroads of Ukroaine. At
that time the production potential of the Ukrainian coal indus
try was already much greater. Beginning with 1005 the "Pro
duhol'' coal syndicate, in order to keep p rices up, stabilized the
extraction of coal at an annual level of 24,000 to 24,600 thousand
tons. In yiew af that the Government, favoring the industries
of Petersburg, reduced and later abolished the duty on foreign
coal. Thus, during the period of the last few· years before the
outbreak of \V0rld \Var I, a situation arose under which the
coal indnstry h<1d made a great sweep and had grown strong
econ'1,nic:illy, yet was restricted in the utilization of its full po
tential. Many factors which contributed to this sihmtion will be
discussed later. The railroad rates, determined by the Govern
ment, played no small part in this. For example, a distance of
only KOO kilom•_•t;-es ( 500 miles) would double the cost of coal,
in SJJite of the fact that the rates were lower than North-South
rates. The excessively high freight rates toward Black Sea ports
as well a.<, high ocean freight rates, and a limited freight fleet,
excluded the possibility of extending the Ukrainian coal export
market t:'l !::mds of the Near East where British coal reigned un
diallnigcd. Wh,�1' is significant, is the fact seen from the above
table, that Ukraine ( to be exact, the ships of the Black Sea)
consumed 152 th,il1sand tons of foreign coal. Exports of Ukrain
ian coal amounted to: 1911, 28.8 thousand tons; 1912, 16 thou•
sand tons, and 1913, nothing.

Rcgim1s of
Cmisumption
Baltic aud Northwestern gubemias .
Poland
Ceutr.11 Ru�.�ia and Volga region ..
l'rnh
Ukrnirn::, and Don
Cauu,sus
TOTAL',
'·1

P. Fmnin, up. cit., p. 73.

Donets

coal
272.0
56.0
2.268.8
30-4.
8.963.2
248.0
11,838.4

TABLE LVI
Categories of Fuel
Polish
Coal of other
regions
coal
64.0
4.8
3,934.4
75.2
,10.4
393.4
3.2
142.4
32,0
513.6
4,171.2

Foreign
coal
3,72.1.2
1 ,688.6
30.4
8.0
1.52.0
5, 602.2

Petroleum
176.0
24.0
3,112.0
72.0
192.0
480.0
4,0?)G.O

Wood
1,001.6
161.6
7,05\),2
2 ,148.8
480.0
19.2
10, 870.4

Peat
81.6
240.0
731.2
152.0
22.4
1,227.2

"
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It must be admitted, however, that the Ukrainian coal in�
<lustry o,·crcamf' in large measure all the difficulties which had
stood in its way and, within a comparatively short time reached
a po.;ition d cof'.Sitlerable importance. It grew into a basic source
of fuel, contribnting 77.4% of all the coal of the Empire before
the 01,tLre�k of Wnrld War I.
The ce,al industry also grew strong as an organized holly. A
dose network of railroads was developed in the Donets basin,
whos;e dl'rnity i•1 that area exceeded that of Germany. The coal
industry acted .;s a nuit in its approach to matters of marketing
and a fairlv livdy process of combining the coal and metallur
gical industries in �usts was begun.
The essential fact is, however, that the more successful the
Ukrainian coal industry became, the less Ukrainian it became.
It Wc''.: dominated completely by Franco�Belgian capital which
was tied with R11ssian banks. The influence of this foreign capi
tal playc,l a maJor role in the very development of this industry.
\\"here;,:; in the bcgim1iug the position of the coal iudustiry
was dett'r�1i11erl by the colonial depemlt'nce of Ukraine upon
Hu�sia, subsequent changes did not touch the system of colonial
rnanagr·m:'nt. The changes merely introduce-cl more modern
forms, approprir•tc to the new nature of exploitation. The only
diffeTei)ce was that during that period and in that branch of
indust•-y, TTkrainto wa� no longer an objec t of exploitatimi b)
Hussi;. alone, but also of foreign capital.
The mitter of complete domination of Ukrainian i11dustry
not only in coal. but elsewhere will be discussed later.

The Metallurgical Industry
We h·we al�c-a<l�· rioted that Ukraine is a land rich ill hip;h
qualit�· iron ore deposits. According to latest research and esti
mates by the Soviet authorities iron orC' reserves of Kryvyi Hih
are 1'�thnatf'd :i.t 1.5 billion tons with an iron content between
50% to 62%. The Kcrch reserves. are even larger. In addition,
Kryvyi Rih and other regions have huge deposits of iron q11artz
itcs (over 21 billion tons). Magnetic anomaliC's northC'ast of
Kryvyi Rih also indicate the presence of iron. There arc also
magnetic anomalies around Kremenchuk, Chortomlyts'ko-Vcrk
hotsevsk, Orikhovo-Ilyanivs·ka (near the Donets basin), Kon
kins!.a. \,,,Jhvnh, arnl Western Ukraine.
The unit1 iron ore base of Khyvyi Hih is locate<l close to the
Dmwts co11 ha:h which has 6.6 billion tons of coal suitable for
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coking. It is also close to the Nikopil region of mangane,e ore,
orn, of the dchest in the world with depmib of over,)()() million
tons. The:,e regLm,·, tied organically to each other in the mctal
lurgicril industry, forrn a tight triangle \\·hose lo11gest side is only
about 300 rniks lo11g.
11.oi, not siupri�ing that �uch conditions contributed to theo
fact that, shortly after the beginning of iron smelting in Ukrai11e,
it OC"!ipied first place in the production of pig iron iii the Em
pire, ai1d bccanw the rnai,1 ce11ter of the iron-ore industry.
But all !hi� hap 1)c11cd only in the last decades of the 19tho
cenh•ry. lt happcmxi OT1ly as the result of a stubborn struggle,
and �cq-:.1ired peculiar features, as with other hranches of
Ukrctinian industry. How odd that the Ccnnai1 traveler Kohl
should w1 itc about this land in 1841: "ln all of the South of
Rus�ia !h1:rr is cot one place where one could find any metal.
This huge area of Europe i� deprived of metals; not enough
iron can i:ie found to make a �ingk nail."""
Actually, the smelting o± Kryvyi Hih ore did not start until
1871. Pri'lr to that time, the iron industry of Ukraine depended
upon the im:?ortation of Russia,1 pig iron. The Luhansky \Vorks,
which �eFrxi primarily the military, used Vkrainian coal, but
pig in,n fnm the Urals.
The hbtory of mining iron ore, and the increase of the part
which Uknine played in the Empire is shown bv the figures in
Tahic l,V!l (in thousands of ton,·).

Year
1870
1880
18\)0
1\)00
HllO
HJJ:l

'

Fkrainu

()uanlity

20.8
2.G
1.3
13.2
3GG.4 2!),9

:i,:mo.o
•1. Hlll.O
fl.'120.0

,SfJ.0

7.3.'l

72,2

TABLE LVll
Poland

()uanWy

:r

105.G
lH.O
212.8
471.0
Hll.fi
:m2.-1

13.G
14.1
12.l
7.\l
2.9
.'3.2

['ra/s

OuanWy

45G.O
Gll.8
Ll8D.2
l.Gl\l.2
1,171.2
1,747.8

'

58.5
Gl.5
51.1
27.2
20.G
18.9

}lnscnu; Region
()wmlity

i,

134.2
140.8
185.2
377.G
123.2
,513.l

!HJ

14.1
ILi

G.3
2.2
5.5

"

\Vithi,1 twenty-three years the amount of ore rnined in
Vkumt• i1,crt'a�tcl almost twenty times, while the increase in
the nhl H11�sian ore center of the Urals merely doubled. Ukraine
became the rnaiJJ .�011rce of iron ore, coJJtributing dose to 75% of
"' 0. Oliloblyn, uµ. cit., 11. 171

,.,, S. (hlapenko, Inc. cit.
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the Empire's total. Dnring the same period, Ukraine surpassed
Austlia-Ilnngary, although Ukraine was still far behind coun
tries with a highly developed metallurgical industry. In 1913,
the production of iron ore in thousands of tons was: Austria
Hungar.v, 4,800; Sweden, 8,608; Great Britain, 15,872; France,
21,600; Germany, 35,200, and USA, 54,848.
ThP- gr0wth of Ukraine's participation in the Empire's pro
ducti0n of pig i�on was equally stormy. Production of pig iron
is shown in Table LVlll (in thousands of tons).
Production of iron and steel ( in thousands of tons) is shown
in Table LIX.
We Ine>St n0t be led to believe that such fast growth of
Ukramian metallurgy and the accession to a leading position in
the Empire is explained merely by the presence of rich
iron ore d ep osits. It is true that the quality of the ore and its
geographic loC'ation in Ukraine surpassed all other regions of
the Empire, but ::i.s to the quantity of deposits, the position of
Ukraine in the Empire is nothing exceptional. According to
data of Professor Bohdanovych, iron ore reserves and the
amom,t of iron in them are characterized by the figures in
Table LX ( in thousands of tons).
It was therefore not the presence of rich iron ore deposits
alone then which determined the leading position of Ukraine
in the iron ore and metallurgical industries. Many factors conTABLE LVIII
Empire total Ukraine (Quantity) Ukraine i
313.6
0
398.4
14.4
3.6
883.2
214.4
24.3
2,828.8
1,464.0
51.8
2,872.8
2,020.8
68.l
2,97\l,2
4,22,5.6
70.6

Year
1860
Hl7.''i
1890
HJOO
1910
1914

Year
1860
1870
1880
1890

moo
1914
''4

Empire total
197.9
232.0
s'}Wi.9
2,149.7
2JJ47.2
3,835.2

TABLE LIX
Ukraine
Urals
161.7
148.1
211.0
25.9
477.6
95:3.7
I •.582.4
592.0
2,302.4
649.6

P. Fomin, np. cit., pp. 89, 90,

Ukraine 'JI-4..5
44.4
5:3.6
60.0

Urals%
81.9
63.9
37.0
22.2
20.1
16.8

u
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·i .\Bl.I-: L'\
llkr.iinc
Urals
Ce>ntr.:il Russia
Poland
Caucasus ..

I ro" in tlie ore
O,·c
227,800
523,13(:l
275,100
1:12.400
:307,400
771,360
117,120
288,000
8,096
13,600
G5

trihuted to this, a major one oI them heing the high technical
prodl!dk,n kwl. The plant<; of Ckraine were estahlishcd from
the heginnini; \\·ith all the technical improvements. They were
estahlished on the pattern of concentrated enterprises of \Vestern
Europe. The production capacity of the plants of Ck.mine, com
pared with phmts in other regions of the Empire shows the
Table LXI figures of pig iron prndudion in 1891 and 1900 ( in
thousands of tnrs per annum, plant capacity is also indicated
in thous,·m,!s of tons per annum):
Therefore, Ukraine surpassed all other metallurgical regions
as far a� concentration of production was concern('d. Tn 1900,
in Ukraine-. 66..55'. of all pig iron production came from plants
with a capacity of 80 to 160 thousand tons, and over 160 thou
sand tons per annum, while in the rest of the Empire outside of
Ckraine 54.6'.f was pro<lucod iu plant� of a capacity helow 16.000
tc,us. Hv t�t' 20th c._•ntury Ckraine was approaching such a b.nd
of highly developed metallurgy as Gcnnany. The average plant
of Uhain,� would havt> an average of 2 on•ns, 345 workers and
,votild W',1rk 74.8 thousand tons of ore per oven, the correspond
ing fi).!ur;:��· for Gt'rm:my are: 2.5 ovens. 322 workers and 86.1
tlmu!:aml ton�. The technical and productive superiority of
Ukrainian metallurgy is even more ohvious when we compare it
,vith thnt nt the l'.rals, the most developed region in Russia. This
supcrinrity mu�t be emphaSized because of the role it played in
the r0btmmhip hetween Ukraine and Hussia in this field. i_ See
Table T.XTT.)
Snch incompar,ihly higher prod11dio11 indices were the re
sult d a lT'Ort' p1Tfeet techllique and orga11izati011 of pro<ludio11:
hot hlast furnaces, use of milleral fuel. .\-lartin ovellS, Bessemer
:md Tl1oin:1s conv(•rters. etc. Thus, from the very beginning, the
Ukrainia11 metallurgical iudustry dl'velopecl as an imlustry of
hi�h capi• .11 im"",tmr·nt. For this. a sonrcc of suppl? of capital
,,·as necessary, as well as conditions favoring the influx of such
· \' . .Fomin, l!/1. cit., p. fl'.)_

TABLE LXI

Y<"ar

1891
1900

Total pig
iron

9!53.8
2,828.8

On:r 160
Ukrninc

474.3

Rest of
Empi.c

Plants with a woduction capacity of:
4R to RO
16 to 4R

RO to UiO
Rc�t uf
LTkmine Ernpir.80.7

496.3

94.8

Ukraine
151.6
,'l'i3.7

.-,o :--r. Vanag, "Finansoviy bpita! v Rossiyi nakanunc mirovoy vuyny"
('"Finance Capital in Russia on the Eve of the World War"), Proletariy,
( Tho Proleturian ), Moscow, l!J30, p. 17.

Rest of
Empire
50.8
lll.2n

Ukraine
111.0

Rest of
Empire
127.0
441.2

Under 16
Rl"5t of
Ukraine
Empire
,543.7
746.6
es
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TABLE LXlT

1890

Ukrniuc

}',oduction of pig
iron per plant
23.8
( in thou�ands of tom l .
Power of plant iu HP ....... • 1.530.0
Number of workers per pfant.. 1,505.0
Production per ov,-.n
15.3
(in thousands of ton�).
Production per worker
15.8
(in tom) . . . .... ... - ...
Or•:" mined per worker
171.2
(in thousands of tons).

l/r(lls

4.0
135.0
1,281.0

1900

Ukroinc

Urals
6.9
244.0

51.l
6,159.0
1,841.0

1,496.0

32.5

-"i. 4

3.1

27.4

4.7

38.4

.'308.8

52.8

"

capit�l, such as good market conditions and a high margin of
profit.
The sonrce of these investments was foreign capital, in or
ganic relationship with the already existing financial oligarchy
of R11s•:ian bank�, Ct'ntered mainly in Petersburg. In an unequal
struggle ap;ain�t this strong Government-backed faction, local
capi\ai wa<; t-'ither ruined, or completely snbjecte<l. 111is hap
pened not only in the metallurgical, but in all other important
industries 0f Ukraille, coal, sugar, etc.
Foxor::ihle market conditions for the metallurgical in<lnstry
were created primarily by a great <lemand for metals, caused
by t�e ma!'s C0'1struction of railroads. But this did not happen
suddenly The initial "skeptical attitude l'oward the ore wealth
of Kryvyi Rih dominated both Government au<l scientific circles
almost until 1880," in other words, we have here to deal with
another aspect c.f R11ssia's desire to hold on to an industrial
monopoly. "This historical conflict of the region of Kryvyi Rih
and the Urals was resolved by the interference of foreign capi
tal, .:·entrn,v to the interests of national Russian capital." 66
Until that time, even the dC'veloping railroads' acutely felt
hungrr for metals was powerless against the negative attitude
toward the development of industry in Ukraine. A solution was
being sought in facilitating the importation of metals from abroad,
but in such degree only, as not to hurt the interests of the
Urak D,1ring rliscussions of the proposed tariff act of 1857,
the ,,\l"ll lc1own economist Tengoborskiy, who was chief speak"'I. Glivits, Zhdez()dclatelnaya promyshlennos( Rossiyi ( The ]ro,1."\'\"nrki11g
Industry of Russia), \foseow, 1911, p. 114.

''" M. \Volf. ())I.

cit.,

p, 42.
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er, smtl: "The prohibition of the importation of iron and pig
iron �hould be repealed, and the duty on these essential metals
should be lowered tn 2.0 kopecks from 1.03 rubles for pig iron,
and to 60 kopecks for iron coming by sea and 40 kopecks for
iron eomiP.g: by land from 1.38 rubles." The need for such reduc
tions was argued as follows: 1) Iron is one of the most essential
products for all brarn·hes of industry, aud all are interested in
getlir-g it cheap. But the existing tariff does not permit it to
become ci1�ap hcc,wse its importation by sea is prohibited, and
importation by land is prohibitively high. Transportation of
mehl frorn th<' UrRls to industrial centers costs more than the
metals themselves; 2) The amount of iron manufactured in Rus
sia is at a standstill, regardless of the growing demand for it;
3)nCompetition behveen Russian and foreign iron is quite pos
sible thanks to the high cost of freight from the seaboard ton
inland points.''e9
The Strte Council went even further. They repealed the im
portation by sea ( with the exception of Black am! Oziv Sea
ports, Odessa excluded) and set up a rate of duty: pig iron15 kopecks, bulk iron-50 kopeck�. sheet iron-60 kopecks etc.
This brought a radical change in the extent of imports: "the
anmd imrort figure of pig iron and iron increased from 3,168
tons b€twcen 1><51 and 1856 to 311,000 tons between 1867 and
1871, and to 470,400 tons between 1877 and 1881.
" , .. Even for the construction of railroads in the Urals, the
center of black metnallurgy, not only locomotives and rails were
imporh:d, !mt '.l!so various small metalware like screws, bolts,
etc.""�
"The tot:>! ya]ue of imported iron goods and iron for the
constrnction and servicing of railroads during the ten-year pe
riod betw�"'n 1870 and 1880 reached one billion rubles.'""
Such a solution of the iron supply problem obviously went
against the interests of Ukraine, whose productive capacity was
thus automrltically ignored.
"The Kbarkiv Committee of Commerce and Manufacturing,
reprc�enting thP interests of the Donets region, pointed to the
exist�ncc nf hu�e rleposits of iron ore in this region." This Com"� \l. Sobolcv, np. eit.. pp. 33-34.

70 B. Brant, Inostra,miye ka/Jitaly ( Fnrcign Capital), St. Pdersburg. 1899,

III. SO.
'' P. Lnshchenko, Istoriyu nurodnnlw khn;:ya!J,fm SSSR ( History of the
Nuti,mal Economy of the USSR). L,·uiu gr.1d, l'.Y,:'., ll, 110.
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mitkL' tl1 .1\g:ht it wise to solve the problem of the supply of
iron iu tllC' dc,,.c·lopnl('nt of Ukrainian mf'tallurgy which "has
been lultcd. in its clevclopmcut, and duties should bf' kept iu
fore(• in order t" aid it. The growth of the mining industry in
the Don<'ts land will provide a large amount of wages for the
pea�;i.n1.�, heretofore restricted to a siJJgle agricultural pursuit.""'
These just aud understandable claims of Ukraine did not
meet ,vith '.l positive response. On the contrary, two years later
came a1;0ther prnposition to lower the duty on pig iron to 5
kopecks ( from 15 kopecks) and for assorted iron to 45 kopecks.
It was carried into effect. :,\foreover, on motion of the Minister
of FiI,ance, duty-lree importation of iron and pig iron on special
requ<'st of individual plants was allowed. This duty-free impor
tation was considerably high even in the 1870's, and constituted
a lar�.e pcrc-mtrge of the total. Table LXIIT shows these figures
in thousands of tons. Thus, the economic policy of Russia regard-

Tear
1875

Pig iron

lSifi

56.I
47.4

1877
1879

181.1

51.6

TABLE LXlll
Of that,
duty-free
44.3

Sheet and
a:,wrted ir,m
85.6

Of that,
dv.ty-free
42.6

38.8
47.4

80., ',

50.5

30.6

96..''.i

30.8

122.5

28.4
, .,

ing me�als was not determined by the interests of the Ukrain
ian eco1 ,,mv, no-:- ul the development of the metallurgical in
dustry nf Ukrnine ,vhich, as has been noted abo\"e, was soon
to rise to a leading position. Russia ignored those interests en
tirely. Russia's colonial policy toward Ukraine required a con
tiuu-uicc� d it !:IS an agricultural economy. But the extremely
favornblt' ,n:irkf't conditions and the growing demand for metals
created an interest on the part of foreign capital, in investing
in Ul.:n.ini:111 indu,,try. The opportunity to balance foreign trade
ccmpr-•i!,:,d Russfo to �nbstitute for the antiquated colonial system
a mo..e trn><lern o!"le, which offered much higher returns not only
to the metropolis as such, but also to this metropolis' still shaky
fina:,ce capital
In 1;-;;1 an Euglishmau, Hughes, built and put into opcra
hm '•vo nieta!lurgical plants in Ukraine. He was not achmlly
·, ;\]. '>0!10'<:'v, op. cit., p. 567.
,. l/,id, p. l !JI-I.
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an independent entrepreneur. He had the backing of English fi
nanchl cirdes ,1ml of some high-ranking Petersburg personages.
Following Hughes, the :\foscow industrialist Pash1khov became
active in the black metal industry of Ukraine. The development
of the metallurgical industry assumed wide proportiom in the
1880's, when t"be large-scale influx of foreign capital came le
gallv.
As has been noted, initially Ukrainian industry relied
mainly on the railroads' demand for iron. Even at that time
the railroads required annually between 800 and 1,000 engines,
20,000 to 2,'5,000 freight cars, between 320,000 and 368,000 tom
of rails, etc. Converted to terms of pig iron, this required an
nually 640,000 tons a year. "If we take into consideration the
fact that in 1890 the entire metallurgical industry produced only
960,000 tons of rig iron, and in 1895, 1,388,800 tons, and its pro
duction reaehed 2,H28,800 tons only in 1900, it becomes clear
to what extent the great demand for metals by the railroads
was decisive for the metallurgical industry.""
On the average, the railroads' demands for metal reached
68.8% 0f the tot'.ll production figure. Some plants (Pruzhkovsky,
Novorossiysky) worked for the railroads 87% to 100% of produc
tion time ..
Thi� was t1'P decisive factor in the development of the
Ukrni!lian met<iU,�rgy (See Table LXIV).
We ca!l �ee from the above that Ukraine was the supplier
of goods in great demand: rails, beams, telegraph wire, etc. But
in the production of goods in mass demand for mass consump·
tion, such as roofing steel, hardware and universal iron goods
Ukr1ine was behind other regions. This is clear if we take into
consxleration the amount of these goods produced in proportion
to the total amount of metal goods manufactured. Even such a
branch of metal manufacturing as nails which would appear to
be ck,sely tied with the manufacture of wire, was underdevel
oped when com!lared with other regions.
This one-sided aspect of the metallurgical industry imposed
upon Ukraine wa� dictated by the desire to conserve the wide
consumption market for the Urals. It was the cause of Ukrain
ian industry's conti!lned dependence on railroad construction
which, ns we shctll see later, facilitated its domination by foreign
and Rns.-:ian finance capital. And to the extent that railroad con71

P. La,hchcnko, op. cit., p. 12.'5.

rears

Pnufoct:
Be.ims and h.irs ...

1903

1912

TABLE LXIV
Rolli11g•mill products (in paceutagos);
Ukraine
Urals
Central
Industrial
Region

81

Hails

1903

88
82

Wir('

1903
l912

56

1912
1903

Hoof irnn
Light shed .....
He.ivy �hcct .............
As.-.orted

..........

Univt'rs;a\

1912
HJ03
1912
HJ03
1912
1903
HH2
1903
1912

79
24

12

24

36

41
.54
63

35
47

39

46

Volga

8
5

18
21
15

.,
80

61

.Jl

16
6

7
19

13

0..5

J
J.4.

16
6

.,

.J

0,5

8

.,

g

I

6

7

.5
0.5

Tnud rnllin g-mill production (in thousands of tom-):
1903
LJ(\2.4
496.0
212.W.
1912
2,051.2
630.4
320,0.°
1903
,5().8
20.9
10.0 °
HJ12
."6.4
17.3
8.9•
"These fi gur<:s w·rtain jointly tu the Central Industrial and Volga regions.
'·' l\f. Colman , op. cit., p. 436.

76 Jbid.• p. 43.3.
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12
8
9
8
3
5

North

( l'der.jburg)

'

[.(j

21
18
2

l
l

4.!5

10

7
9

8

8

Poland

8

4

21

!.5
2

2

2.5.

29

JO
6

23

rn

13

8

41

126.4
244.8

273.6
393.6

6.7

10.7

5.8

"

12.,5

'"
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struction was mainly, and particularly during the 19th century,
undertaken at Government cost, the size of that construction de
pended upon budget means of some fiscal year. The length of
newly opened rail lines in the Russian Empire is shown in
Table LXV, for five-year periods between 1861 and 1915, the
last item being for a ten-year period (in miles)." In addiTABLE LXV
Years
1861-186.5
1866-1870

1871-1875

Miles
1,295
4,349
4,922

Years

Miles

1881-1885

2,340
2,038

1886-1890

1,899

1876-1880

Years

Miles

1896-1900
1901-1905

4.324

1891-1895
1900-1\JIS

·1,294

5,289

18,932

tion to these circumstances which determined the market for the
prodwt� of Ukrainian metallurgy to a large extent, imports also
played an important part in this respect. These also were sub
ject to the will of the Imperial Government, primarily to its
tarift p,,\k-y.
This provides a clue as to why exports and imports of metals
never :::ichicved an equilibrium. One, or the other showed marked
fluctuations, and there was no lack of such instances where
imports, thanks to lower customs tariffs increased, with a con
current increase in exports, although the latter, because of the
high railroad freight rates could never be as profitable as selling
at prices prevailing on the markets of the Empire. Profits of the
Rus\ian industry on cheap imported metals went hand in hand
with losses of the Ukrainian industry on exports, from which
Russia drew the c•xchange to pay for imports. These conditions
prevailed, as we shall indicate later, until the time whell, Russo
Frcnc '1 syndical cs were set up for the Ukrainian coal and metal
lurgir:,J illdmtry. This subjected the home market to a monopoly,
and the Imperial economic policy conformed with the interests
of that monopoly, even to the extent of making the tariff policy
follow its needs. The process did not get into its full stride until
after 1905.
Until that period of monopoly the imports of metals and
metal goods into Ukraine were as shown in Table LXVI ( in
thousauds of tons)."
" P. LnshC'henko. op. cit., p. 123.
'� P. Fomin, op. cit., p. 69.
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TABLE LXVI
Iron arni
Years
1860-G\-J
[870-79
tXM)-8:,)
18\-J0-99
1900-09

Pig iron
9.4:,
66 . .57
HW.76
113.75
16,64

Pig iron
11rod1wts

CJ.7-1

ltJ.27

CJ.24

6.97
.5.28

/ro:n ,md
sled
78.!'iS

270.88

12 I.G2
23"9.8�)

67.8

steel

TooL1 and

products

machinerr,

4.5.68
25.81
32.82
46.35

3.07
42.10
3..\.38
89.63
138.47

21.0."i

Tbns, along with a gradual and systematic increase in the
impc·rt:1tion of tools an<l machinery, we are able to note sharp
fluctuations in the importation of pig iron and iron. An<l this
was at a time of simultaueous and rapid increase of the produc
tion of these goods in Ukraine which even resulted in a surplus
after demands oi t·he home market had been met. Thus, the
cxter.t of imports was not determined hy the home market bal
ance of metals, only by Hussian industrialists' conjectures in the
matter of commcn:ial profits. For example, the sharp increase
of im;:iorts of pig iron during the 1880 to 1889 period was the
direct result of the 1880 repeal of duty on this item, And al
though a major part of the imports was not absorbed by the
economy of Ukraine going merely in transit to Hnssia, neverthe
less the existen(P of such considerable imports with simultan
eous , _•xports of thr same kind of goods from Ukraine is indica
tive of the subjection of the industrial interests of Ukraine to
the interests of Hn.,sian industrial centers.
T:1!� one-sided n'ipect of the Ukrainian metallurgical indus
trv and its <lepmdcncc on the demand by the railroads which
were nndcr the co<1trol of thc Government ( the factor deter
minir,f, the legal rf'gulations in the ar€a of economic policy) was
the m:iin reason for the fad that this industry, in Spite of an
t1cute shortage of metal goods in the land and a great demand
for them, neverthd1:ss had to go through a hard marketing cri
sis in the lfi90's. and an even harder one in 1904-05. As a result
of th1-'se crises and the artificial decline of the price of stock
of this industry on foreign exchanges which followed the crises,
Ukr,1inian capital WflS almost entirely forced out of this indus
try. and it came under the domination of Russo-French capital.
T1tis \Vas the cm'i<' of the varions fluctuations in the exporta
tion of pig iron and iron, alongside an almost unchangeable level
of exports of manufactured metal goods.
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Table LXVII illustrates the export sihiation in metals during
the 190:2-191:2 period. Even after the crisis of 1904 Ukraine conTABLE L\YJT
(The figures arc in thou�ancb of ton�. ).79

Year

1902

1903
1904

H)(I,',

1906
1907
1908
1909
1!.llU
Hll I

Hll2

Pig

iron
,53.61
.3.5
.RO
.94
20.38
72.78
10.38
1.l,5.
2.00.
1.07.

.3>

1nm and
stcd

6.40
8.75
6.16
13.87
3!.63
167.63
l(l�J.80
162.16
WJ.47
77.."i,J
28.43

J'ig iron

lror1 and
steel

1.07
1.16
1.00

4 . .'il

prmlu,:11·

un
.91

110

1.1()

./-Ji:.)

.80
1.15

Tools am/

,irodurts

r,,r1thi11Cr!J

5.+i

2 88
1.63
1.36
3.36
2.20
1.71
1.84
1.66
2.,51
3.10

,Hl2
!UJH.
6.14.
6.33.
7.36.
U.79.
6.76.
12.32.

tinued to export rails in considerable qnantities because the
home market was restricted in order to k<'ep prices up. Exports
of rails amounted to: 1905, 7,184 tons; 1906, 8,480 tons; 1907,
89,:280 tonS; 190S, 86,232 tons; 1909, 140,320 tons, and in Hll0,
66,880 tons. 80
Obviously, nIJder such circumstances the producti\·c capacity
of the Ukrainian metallurgy always exceeded actual production,
and because of that, mined ore was exported in large annual
<tuaritilies abro.'!d, in spite of the fact that there was an acute
need for indmtri.;1\ t>mployment among the local population.
This is typical in a colonial land. The amounts of ore exported
are shown for lhe period between 1901 and 1912 in Table
LXVJII (in thous:a1ds of tons):"'
HJOl
19f:2
1903
1904
1905
HJC6

TABLE LXVllI
3.5:2
H)07.
3K4J
1908.
'.'.8::i.GJ
1909.
2,16.70
l\HO.
211.15
1911.
460.24
1912.

878.48
Jfrl.43
,50,'>.58

H27.44

865.39
647.77

n G. Kus perovich, Zhelc:wdcl,,telrui!Ja prom�hlcnnm·t v Rossi!}i :'..fl 190313 g. g. (The Irnn-Working Indu#ry in Ru:,,sia during the Years 19031913), �foscow. 1914 , p. 41. In his table, the author indudes mils m the
"Iron �nJ steel"' column.
so P. Fumin. op. cit.. p. 72. ;, Ibid., p. 70..
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T!•e main consurncrs of this export itf'm were Germany,
Great Britain and Hollaml, countries which were siumltaneousl:·
c"porters of pig iwn and iron ±or the Pdcrsb11rg ind11stry,
Ub.rai11ian ore wer,t through the Black Sea porls to E11gla11d and
Cennany, and later in the form of pig iron and prod.nets it
wen'. through B.t\tic por!s lo nourish the metalworking plants of
l'dershurg. In 1913 Germany alone took 400,000 tons of Ukrain
ian ,JrC, ()'{ of tht• total mined.
\foch light is shed 011 the position of the Vkrai11ia11 metal"
!urgiml industrv by daia on !he home consumption of mc!als.n
S!atis:ics of c-arlor,dings provide a real insight. If we group then
stati(,11s of loadin!_'" metals ,md �tations of destination of the en
tire Empire, then \\'e will get the following picture for then
year l!-HL Out of a total of 1,660.6 lhonsand tons of pig ironn
;ml semi-m,mnfactured melal goods, Ukraine accounle�\ forn
�)73.R thousdnd tons, or .ss.n.. But of the latter amounl, onlyn
,HH.3 lhousand tons, or 46%, of Ukrainian carloadiugs were forn
internal Ukrainian destination. The remainder went beyondn
Fkra;ne. lt wa� the same wi!h iron and steel. Out of a Iola\ ofn
l,ml7.l thousand tons of carloadings, Vkraine accounted forn
1,1.'lJ.6 tlwusawl tons. or 56.7'0, of which 463 thousand tons, orn
4lf went for internal Ukrni11ia11 consumption. The followingn
t able shows us to what regions of the Empire the metals wcrl'n
destined. Carlo:,dings in 1911 arc shown in Table LXTX ( in
thmts·.rnds of tons).s"n
According to Lhese fignrt's Ukraine ddiwre<l to the cenh·,t!
Moscow regions ,':ii% of their pig iron and 49.4% of their iron and
sleel. Similarly to the Petersburg (Baltic) region went .r;.2:; of
its pig imn and -1t3_-l'i! of its irou and steel. And to European Hus
sia in �encral, Ukraine delivercrl -1,1.4'.-h of the pig iron and 46.8'.i
of the iron and steel. The fact tha! Ukraine alone was consnm
ing 0•1ly 4f)'; of the pig iron prod11ccd, and only 41% of inm aml
steel does 1101 !1y :my means prtwe that the Ukrainian markci's
needs were folly -�•ttisfie<l. On the contrary, Ukraine, satisfying
mon· than 30'.T of Hussia's metal consumption, imported over
:32,000 to11s of irrm from the Urals. The Ukr,tinian population
was supplied with iron and its products on a starYation level;
9SC; of the pc:is,1.nts' homes were straw-thatched, all ntcnsils
Wl'H' earthenware not only in the Yillages, but also to a large
8� P, Fomin, "P- cit., p. Ti,
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TABLE LXIX

Regions oi

Pig iron and semi•riumufactures
Regions of lm1ding
Empire
Ukraine Urals
total

Iron and steel
Empire
total

109.40

49.30
0.32

227.10

115.60

3.JH

Urals
0.25
41.20
4.78

112.83

25.90

196.90

153,40

46.00

319.10

89.80

3.82

97.40

47.07

25.28

79.60

54.14
Chemozem
Poland
111.88

0.99
0.21
14.99

279.88

57.02

106.27
62.40
465.02
7.50
1.39

17.14
3.13

313.40

101.95
0.67

65.82

5.54

71.41

5.39

63.98

1,628.1)2

1,093.13

1.73
283.01

66.00
1,909.65

destination

Northern . .
Baltic
Central Asia
l\loscow
Central . .
Central
Volga

Central

...

Ukrairu,

Urals

Southeastern.

461.37
3.95

271.28

0.32

486.37
276.25

North

Caucasus ..
South
Caucasus.

2.29

2.W0

5.39

951.05

366.81

Ukraine

1.,5

35.34

5.53

266.80
7.!Jfl

142.35

,52'>.70

109.68

2.10

extent in the cities, carts had wooden axles, gates and doors were
hung on wooden hinges, All this speaks eloquently as to whether
or not the peopl�s needs in metal were satisfied, True enough,
the insignificant consumption of iron can he explained to a
large extent hy the low purchasing power of the population,
impo,·erished hy colonial exploitation. But a large part was also
played hy the nature of the Ukrainian metallurgical industry,
whose efforts, as has heen pointed out, were concentrated on
the manufacture of such products as rails, heams, hars, etc. with
a very limitell production of universal consumption articles. Thl'
entire in<lmtry was looking not toward the satisfaction of the
needs of the national economy, only toward satisfying Russia's
needs for products of black metals and of supplying Russian
metalworkin?: industries with raw materials and semi-manufac
tured products. The very nature of manufacturing thus compels
us to delegate Ukr::i.inian metallurgy to the category of a colon
ial imlnstry.
Ukraine did not possess any metahvorking industry with
the e,:ception of fann machinery manufacturing and a railroad
equipment ind1•stry. Any other metalworking did not go heyond
the stage of crafts on a level of hlack and lock-smithing.
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On the eve of \Vorld \Var I Ukraine had 17 smelting plant,
aml 6 mills, of which half \Vere rolling mills, and one served
the ,;hipbuild.ing imlmtry belonging to the :\[ykolaiv Shipbuild
ing CGmpany.
\Vt have been cnmidcring three basic branche� of L'krain
ian i11dmtry: sugar refining, coal mining and metallurgy. \\'e
have been making only cursory remarks about others because
it is not within the scope of this work to draw a �tafotical and.
economic characteristic of the the pre-revolutionary po�ition and.
development of indnstry of Ckraine. Our task is to di�cover
the n-al nature of 1hosc social-economic conditions in Ukraine,
and in Rm�ia, which were decisive in the development and d.i
rcctiOl! of that indmtry, and which formed. the essence of econ
omic procc�,e� in L'kraine. \Ve have deliberately paused. to cor1sid.e· :hese branches, \vhich were the ba�i� of Ukrainian indus
try and in whose development L'kraine met \Vith considerable
�ucce,s. achieving a leading position in the whole Empire in
these branches. :\Pother reason for consideri11g them in detail
was lhat they an· hll based. on natural wealth and by rea�on of
thi� fad possessed a �olid foundation for further development.
Tt would. seem that thi� nah1ral wealth gave Ukraine the right to
expee t favorable c<:mditions for rounded. development of these
Lranc.-he� of industry. But, as we have scc,1, even here Hussia\
attitude wa� characteristic. It treated. L'kraine's economy as that
of a cclony.
Tl.c central pnrpose of Rm�ian economic policy all along,
was to keep Ukraiuc in a position of a supplier of raw material
produced. Ly :1<;ric11lturc, and. a market for Hussian i11d.u�triaI
products. C:011hrrning to this plan, Ckraine should have re
mained in a sta)!e o± merely rudimentary ind.u�trial development.
Thi� wa� the ob\ect of the early ruination of L'kraine's industry,
and ib tran�fer to, and concentration in Russia. As we have
noted, in manv branches of indu�try, particularly in the produc
tion of goods :,f ;11ass consumption, the scheme succeeded al
most 100%.
Thr first stages of dcvelopmcot of the three industries here
in analyzed. were met with a desire to apply the same principle
to tl.nn; to pron:nt their coming into cxistc11cc Ly �etting up
agai1,�t them appropriate branches of Hussian indmtry. \Ve have
�ecn that such wa� the ca�e with sugar refineries which were
beint! estaLlishc·d ir Russia; such was the case with coal, where
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other mining regio11s, wood as fuel and imported coal were
nsed :cs means of pn:veuting the emergence of a Ukrainian in
dustr:,,·, and such wai: the <:ase in metallurgy, i11 the struggle of
the Urals against Kryvyi Hih.
\Vhen, howe\"er, economic conditions appeared to be stronger
than rnch d<'sire�, H.ussia would hegin putting obstacles iu the
way of the growth endeavoring to make them adjnncts of and
suhjc·ct to Hussia!J industries.
Arni final[h:,,, when Hussia ,,·as faced with tlw prospect of an
irresistible superiority of these branches of Ukrainian industry
over the respective branches of Hnssian industry, and when their
growth was <lict2trx1 by the economic needs of all of Russia,
there began thf' conquest of thes" industries with the aid of for
eign capital. Then came the illtroduction of a modern system
of colonial exploitation, peculiar to the so-called "European" lype
of colonies.
But here we encounter a very special process of financial ex
pansion into the economy of a colony. The process is special not
ouly by reason of the fact that foreign capital was drawn into
partir-ipation, and not only because Russia <lid not have too
much c,,pitaL The peculiarity of the sihiation lies in the fact
that ccpnomic �truggle docs not suit Hussian colonial imperial
ism. Hussian expansion was always based on armed force; on
brutal compulsion, ,rnd on cementing her political rule hy com
pletely cleprivi.·1g ,·uhjccteJ people of all rights. The clear<:st
illustration is provided hy imperialist expansiou conducted by
Hussi:i. during the very same period in lands of the Middle and
Far East, whither Russia wanted to extend her colonial holdings,
lu 1896, Hussian fiuanciers of the "Discount-Loan Bank" gave
Persia (lran) a loan in the amount of 1 million pounds ster!iug.
At the same time the Government imposed a treaty upou Persia,
accarding to which Persia was ohlige<l to 1wgotiate all further
loans only thr1Jt1gJ, Russian banks. There ,vas a new loan in
1800, and in 1902 a treaty granting llussia profitahle conces
sions and trade facilities. In 1907 there was a treaty with Great
Brita;!i conc('rnin7 the division of spheres of iuterest in Per�ia,
and finally in 1908 military occupation of Northnn Persia. There
was an analogous situation in Afghanistan. The same thing in
China: in 189.5-96 a loan for the payment of China's reparations
to Japan; and in return, the right to construct the Eastern Chi
nese Railroad through Manchuria, and huge concessions in
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P.Janchuria. In 1901 military occupation, the lease of Port Arthur
and Dalny, and a complete conquest of the oil, sugar and grain
market through the Hussian-Chinese Bank and the Siberian
Bank. In 1803, hugt' lumber concessions in Korea followed the
establishment of military basl's, an<l this finally kd to the Husso
Japanese War of 19Q.1-1905.�·,
Always aud everywhere, Russian colonial imperialist expan
sion ,vas in the n,1ture of compulsion by force of arms and of
political subjnvtion.
Russia's policy of the so-called "financial imperialism" was
c.omb.1cte<l by dcvions ways. It was not a policy of financial in
vestment in the Ukrainian economy, nor a development of indus
trial enterprises of the metropolis in the territory of the colony.l
The heart of the process was that Russia, in cooperation withl
foreign capital, by means of various "reorganizations» and ofl
dire,:'. pressme, appropriated Ukrainian industry, and in 1917,l
following the Bolshevik upheaval, extended the expropriationl
also te, foreigr1 capital invested in that industry.l
This proces� of appropriating Ukrainia11 industry and of thus
conqu('ring the entire Ukrainian economy disdosed the system
of colonial exploitation of Ukraine most clearly.
We shall now proceed to illustrate that process.

'1 Ac;cording to matnial in \t. Colman\ "Russkiy Impcryalizm," pp. 347 ff.

CIIAl'TER 4

FINANCE CAPITAL IN UKRAINIAN
INDUSTRY

,vestern European Capital
THAT PERIOD IN UKRAI'.'IIAN economic history
which hrought a mass influx of foreign capital into industry,
evokes in ptcople unacquainted with the real nature of thl!Se
processes a distorted picture of the Ukrainian economy at the
time. There are also some, who deliberately utilize the situation
in order to distort the true picture. Some, like M. Wolf, K. Paz
hih10v and others, perceive in it a colonial dependence of
Ukraine not upon Hussia but upon foreign capital. Others, like M.
Bal«banov, M. Hurevych, and partially Peshekhonov, making
their point of departme the leading position of Ukrainian metal
lurgy and coal mining as main branches of industry which de
termined the e•1tir,e industrial level, and par.ticularly from the
fact of a monopolistic domination of the imperial markets by
syndkates estahli�hed in thest_' branches, attempt to treat the
matter in such manner that they allege that Ukraine was not
the object of colonir:l exploitation, but on the contrary, the
whoie Empire \VHS economically dependent upon, and subject
to Ukrainian industry. The most prevailing attitude is, hov...ever,
to ignore the specific nature of foreign capita! im-estments in
the Ukrainian economy, and to dwell upon the semi-colonial <le
pemL·nce of the whole Empire upon \Vestern Enrope, and upon
the reparation and localization of labor within the entire Im
penal economic body.
Such distortion o{ the real nature of affairs, along with the
true impact of foreign capital upon the directiou and nature of
the devdopmc:Jt of industry in Ukraine requires a separate an
alysis. This is :1ll 1:he more necessary, inasmuch as industrial
com1itions created In that time played a definite, and no small
part. in the subsefpte11t economic relations hehveen Ukraine and
Hussia during Sovint times.
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\\'r shall begin with the characteristics of foreign (Western
Enrupean) cap!tal i11 Ukrainian industry, its origin, specific
gravit�1, and dominant role in places of its highest sahiration.
There is no complete summary of foreign investments in
Ukramc because av;:ilahle figures refer mainly to industrial cor
pon::-icns. Neitlwr ;!re there accurate figures available as to the
terrilorial rPpariition of foreign capital in commerce, transpor
tation, or municipc1l enterprises. Xor is there any summary of
other forms uf capital accumulation, except corporate. And most
irnpf'r�ant. then' cannot be a determination made of that part
of capital which flowed into Ukraine through Russian banks.
Direct investments of ·western European capital in industry
are a nhenomenon of only the last decades of the 19th and of the
begir,;iing of tlw 2.0th ·centuries. In addition, foreign capital
pJa:v�,tl an import·-mt part in the inU11strial development of Hus
sia, hut rnostly in the form of GovernmC'nt borrowing. Even
dnri n,'c; the time ot Finance 1linister Vishncgradsky, there was
a conversion of internal loans, placing them abroad, which gave
the �;overnment almost 1.5 billion rnbles, used almost exclusive
Iv for the construction of state railroads in Russia. Later, for
:ign loans were of tremendous importance in the so-called "ex
traonli11ary budget" which made it possible, as we shall indi
cate Jr.ter, to arpropriate large sums of money for the Minis
tries flf Comm11nications and of Finance, of which Russian rail
roads and indnstry took good advantage.
The participation of ·western European capital in industrial
corporations of the whole Empire totalled, in the year 1870, only
26.5 million rnhler. Bv lSSO the amount had increased to 97.7
million rnhles, Juring the next ten years to :314.7 million mbles,
and hy 1900 it had reached 911 mi]lio11 rnbles.'
Thf' inflnx (>f for<'ign capital i11creased its tempo even more
from that time on . .-\t the time of World \Var I the nominal value
of st()t·k owned by foreign capital equalled 1,532 million rubles.
plus 300 million ruhles worth of bonds.
In 1917 ou-'.: of a total of 3,185 million rubles representing
stock and bond c:ipital of industrial corporations in the Empire,
1.595 million rnbks, or 50.19'. were the property of foreign capi
tal, :nd out of -171) million rubles worth of stock in hanking cor
porations, 2:37 millirm or ,19.9'.{, were foreign held. The total of
-'l65.S :11illion rubles in the two groups was about evenly divided
1

P. L�shehenko, Istorir,a uarndnoho kl,o:rr,ar,,·tca SSSJI,
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bdw(-en foreig:1 and domestic capital, the latter owning 1,8.32
million rubles, or slightly ovn ,'30%.0
Th1. percent.:ge (,f foreign capital in corporations was stead
ily increasing, and surpassed the rate of increase of capital ac•
cumulated from domestic sources. In 1901, foreign capital held
onh· ,'39,5'.I of the stock in industrial COJl_)Orations ( 608 million
ont of 1,548 million) and in banking corporations only 6'f
( 1 lA million oul of 188.4 !fli!Hon). But prior to the Outbrt'ak
of the revolution this percentage had grown to 50%. This docs
not mean that all corporations in the Empire \Vere under an
abwlnte domination of foreign capital, because its distribution
among the various branches of industry and among the t erri
tories was V('r.\· uneven. "This is very clear from a comparison
of the South with the Urals. Foreign capital displayed no desire
to go iuto the Urals, where remnants of conditions of serfdom
still existed, and frr this reason domestic capital reigned tlwre.
The enterprises wne on a small scale with a low technical level
of production and, besides the rC'gion did not possess its O\VIl
hard coal. Later, during the pniod of Imperialism, the predomi
nance of foreigr1 enterprises which entered into monopolistic as
sociations o� combines with the largest Hussian enterprises, made
a very marked appearance."·'
"In the light ( manufacturing) and in the fa:od industries, par
ticularly in cotton," milling, oil, !C'ath('r, woodworking etc, Rus
sian national capital wa.� in the majority, and in some regions
and hrandws ( the central regions and in textiles) it reigned
supreme. Separate from this group of light industry enterprises
stood the sugar and the tobacco industry. Becaus0 of the
nature of its manufacturing (particularly refineries), the sugar
industry folt an acute need of production and turnover credits,
and for this rca�on it was the first to fall under the control of
banks, at first of special local banks ( Ukrainian-Author) and
later banking monopolies of Petersburg banks."•
Thus, with tl":e exception of railro�ds and banks, the bulk
of forC'ign capit'.11a vas concentrated in Ukraine, and the two main
brar.ches of light irnlustry, sugar and tobacco, \vere, in contrast
to t�ic Russiau, also captured by foreign capital. Th('fefore the
stakmeut that Rmsia herself was a semi-colon y of \Vestern
1

2 M. Colman, "Russkiy Imperyalizm," p. 330,
3 P. L:ishchei,ko, op. r:it., p. J.'ll.
4 I'. Lashchenko, n/J. rit., Jlp. J76-.177.
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EurLpean capit'.1.1, does not conform to reality. Uhaine, and
Azerbaijan with it� oil were almost exclusively with object of
this kind of exploitation, with the possible exception of gold
mining in Sibvria. It is true that Hussia proper cousumed a
]argt' dite of foreign capital in the form of state loans, but, as
we �hall see later, tfw payment of these loans fell in large meas
ure npon Ukraine.
'foking all co1;_,orations in the Empire, foreign capital wa�
invested in the'l1, 'llTOnling to the various branches of industry,
duri:ig the ten-; car period 1S90 to 1900, in the amounts shown
in Table LXX ( in millions of rubles).� Thus, the participation of
1

Industn1
Co.ii mining

;\ktal

Clwmieal

Ceramic

Te-.;til<'
Food

All branches
of im\11stry.

T·\HLE L:XX
11390
Total corpo- Of this
rate capital foreign
85.i
70.l

'

81.6
50.4

27.8

14.0

6.7
l'cl7.5
87.6

0.2-

2tU)

7.0

,1,0-n.2
8.7

580.l

186.2

."32.l

15.6

fi.-1

,t \.(l

1900

Total corpo- Of this
rate capital foreign

,

492.2
:2.'i7.:3

437.9
145.8

59.0
:37.3.7
153.1

26.8
71.4
11.4

89.0
.56.5
31.2
44.7
19.1
7.5

1,742.8

911.0

52.2

03.fl

2�1.:3

European mpital in the most highly developed branches of in
dustry in Rus�i:i. W'.lS relatively low, in any event such that could
not gain a dominating position. And if we consider that the
majr,rity of enterprises in these branches of industry were not
corpc.rate in form, it is quite futile to spt'ak of any domination
over Hussian indnstry. Domination of foreii-,rn capital applies
then only lo non-Rmsian territoriPs and primarily to Ukraine.
Ont of a cor!_lorate capital, the property of foreign investors,
acconling to the status in 191:3 of 1,,'3-43.5 million rubles was:
invC'stmcnts in Ukrainian industry, 46)5.7 million; in Polish indm
try, 126.9 million; in Latvian, 4.5.4 mllion; Lithuanian, 5 million,
and in Estonian 25 million. flenC'e the amount remaining for the
rest nf the F.rnpire is 70,'3 million. Hut of this, 200 million was
invested in Azerbaijan oil and 250 million in banks which, in
their him, own•·d stol·k in industrial corporations of non-Russian
5

Ibid., p. 157.
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territories. Finally, 100 million was invested in railroads serving
both Russia proper and non-Russian terrain. Thus, the direct
partkipation of foreign capital in corporations of Russian indus
trial enterprises did not exceed 10% to 15lt of the total amount of
suer.. ;nvestments.�
The best illustration is provided by the repartition of French
capital in two such industries taken over by it, as coal mining
and metals. Ont of 102 million rubles of such capital in the coal
industry in 1903, 81.9 million was invested in the Donets basin,
18.8 millio11 in the Domhrowa basin (Poland), am.I only 2.3
million in the Kuznetsk and Moscow regions (Russia). The same
appliPs to metals: out of 158.4 million rubles, 111.8 million were
invested in Ukraine; 10.4 million in Poland, and 16,9 million in
Russia.'
The most important role in the investment of capital in
Ukminian indu-.try was played by Franco-Belgian banking syn
dicates, first place being held by three French banks; Banque
de l'Union Parisienne, Banque <les Pays Bas and Societe Gener
ale. Participants were also; Credit Lyonnais, Comptoir National
d'Escompte, and others. Worth�· of mention is the Belgian So
ciete Helge du Credit Industrial et Commercial German. ( !vlen
delsohn, Discon to Gescllschaft, etc.) an<l British banks played
only a secondary role in foreign capital investment in Ukraine, al
though Germany nccupied first place in Ukraine's foreign trade.
Among the foreign financial .industrial enterprises there were
aboet 20 which were governed by French and Belgian by-laws,
and one (Spilka chornoyi metalurgiyi: Black 1[etallurgy Com
pany) had German by-laws. Many of them conducted their busi
ness records in French. Thus, even as to form, these were com
pletely alien businesses located on Ukrainian territory.
J,.ceording to data publbhed at the time in such periodicals
as "Yt•zhego<lnik Finansov," "Torgovo-Promish!enna Gazeta" and
"Vestnik Finansov," the distribution of foreign (;apital in tluee
industrial groups of Ukraine was, in the year 1911, as is shown in
Table LXXI (in thousand., of rubles).
The 16,367 thnn,:md rubles under the title of unknown capi
tal could certain!:, be included in the Franco-Belgian capital
gronp. because the majority of the associations in this group
consisted of e,1terpriscs governed by foreign by-laws. Thus,
'' l' Fomin, '"Ehmornichna kk1ratcrystyka Ukrainy," p. 93.
'lhid., p. 92.

TABLE LXXI
Ind118triul groups

Total foreign
capital
Unknown

I.. \ktallur gical smelting ( 16 industrial.
associations).
percentages · · · · · · · · · ·""" ' '
2.. Pig iron and metal working.
( 8 as,ociations).
pncenta ges . . . . . . . . .
3 Iron-ore ( 4 associations l
pen..--entagcs
Total of 3 groups
Percentages

170,546
83.4

204,, 523
LOO

20, 492

100

14,492
70.1
1,875

100

16,367
7

.5,437
LOO
230,452

Out of thl� ca,,ital total
FrancoFrancoBritish
German
Belgian

65A

Gemum

11,352
.5.6

1.5,100

7,225

11, 3.}2
5.3

1:5,400
7.2

7,225

7.,5

3.:,

6,()(10

29 ..1

.1,562
34.6
180.108
84.1

8 N. Vanag, "Finansovi y kapital v Rossiyi nakanunc mirovoy voyny," 1930, p. 213.
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about 90'.{ of all forei�n capital iuwstcd in Ukrainian metallurg�'
was rroYided by French and Belgian hanks.
This proportio>: (lid not uml('rgo any change until the time
of tht• revolution. And it must be further emphasized that al
that t!nw France also occupied first place among the Russian
Government creditors, because these two circumstances arc, as
we shall later indicate, to a certain cxtcllt related to each othn.
Frn1ch capit,tl aho occupied first place in financing of the
coal mining industry. Ont of 1,39 million rubles foreign capital
inve�ted in thi5 industry, in tlw branch which was controlled
by rnet::dl11rgical ,,�sociations: 106 millio11 (/.5.5'.f) viaS Franco
Belgian capital; 5 million (3.6:f), German; 5 million (0.4:l:,),
Hritis!1, and 2G.3 million, unknown.''
The rok of foreign L:apital, and, h) the sanw token, of the
Frauco-Bd�iau part in it will become even more dear, if we
co nsidL'r uot the -'>Hrn of inYestments, lmt the pro<lnction totals
of t!1c cutcrpri�t's \\·hich were under complete control of this
capital_, and of t!1l' Hussian banks connected with it.
P10J11etio11 of �meltin g eorporntio11s of Ukraiue in HJ13 ( in
tho,,sands of tons)"' i� shown in Tal,le LXXII.
TAHLF: LXXlJ
"

Total

3,025.6

Fil'. lron Smelting

/ir1mco
Bdgilm
2,320.4

British

35.8

,'5.9

270.4

Gemum
I(iOJJ

In percentage reLition to total irnp1crfal prodnction,

66.8

111 percentage relation tu
m.1.B

In

5,070.4

per(·<'nt,tge relation to

.'54.-t

total

llkrninian prodndion,

83.2
8.9
b. Iron Ore "1iniu gn
4.806.•1
214.4
total imperial production:
51.6
2..1

In percenlclge reLttion to total Ukrainian prodnction:
3.2
71 .."i
7,'5.4

6,248.0

In percentag<c rel,11ion to

17.7
In pnc,·nt,ige relation
25.00
"lbid., p, zog_

c.n Coal Miningn
1,377.6
4.B70A
total irnnpnial production:
13.S
-3.9

to total Ukrainian prodnction:
Hl.5
5.5

"'lbid., p. 2lfl.

Franco
German
68.8

.1.6

I..5

5.3

2.2

0.5
0.7
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Tbc figures referring to coal do not give a complete picturP,
becaw-.e the table contains only <lata of such mines as belonged
to rnl'tallurglml corporations. Another :36% should be added to
account for the production of mines not owned by smelters, but
which were also under control of foreign capital.
Thus, almo.;t the entire metallurgical industry, three-fourths
the
iron ore mininp; industry. and more than half the coal in
of
dust1Y can be c:11lcd Ukrainian only in the sense that they were
locate:! in Ukraine and were based on its natural wealth.
Even the part of these industries that was not under foreign
capital control did not b(']ong to Ukrailw. It was in the hands
of Russian hank� which also played a large part in enterpris('S
rnntro!lc><l by European capital.
Ti1e last fact·or i� of essential significancP. Tt rr-fntcs thP state
ment that from the time of a mass influx of foreign capital into
Ukrainian industry, Ukraine C<>ased being a Russian colony, and
became th(' object of colonial ('x:ploitation by Franco-Belgian
capital, and includc<l in the colonial system of the \Vest. Snch
a condusi011 is the obviou5 OIH' to arrive at, consickring the prc
ponc:erance of foreign i11vestmenls in the basic industries of
Ukraine. Even M. Volobuyev, who paiIJted the most clear pie
hire of th<' cohnial position of UkrainP in the Rus'>'ian Empire,
wrote: "lts ( foreign capital's) influx into Ukraine made sharp
char,ges in the economic-geographic map of Ukraine, favoring
a rapid development of productiw forces in th(' region of mining
and industry. Fordg:n c:..pital was not directly concerned v1.rith
centralistic, great-1mwer desires of Russian capitalism. It was
as tli,mgh it had relegated Hussian capital to second place, in
cluding the Ukrainian economic territory within its system of
exploitation."'
11.t Yavorsky went even further, sayiHg: "In this mamiert
Ukndn(' becam,·, thanks to the great demand for her pig iron,
the first-ranking rroducer of it, delivering its products to all
corners of Russia regardless of distance, pointing in no dubious
language to the futnre centrali1.ation of supply. which the Rus
sian economists bC'o-an
" to fear so much."'"
A1: impression is being created that foreign capital, gaining
control of indi1strv in Ukrai11e, cancelled the latter's colonial
ties with Russia, broke the centralistic system, and assumed
M. Volol,uyf'v, "Do problemy Ukrninskoyi C'conorniky."
12 \f . Y11vorsk y, Ukraina L' <'pokhu kapitalismu, III, �7.
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the plac:e of Russia iu continued colonial exploitation of Ukraine.
It would seem fror,1 the words of Yavorsky that from that time
Ukraine betamf' a separate body whkh threatened Russia with
centralization and with domination of Russia's metallurgy. \Ve
have here, undoubtedly, a confusion of terms and ideas, of
whic!i many scholars were guilty, some of whom were able to
clearlv see the triw nature of lhe relations betwecr1 Ukraine
and Hussia. In spite of themselves tht·y mechanically inter
chan;,;t· the socic1l-ef'onomic category with the territorial.
F,�reign capita! not only did not break the Russian eentralis
tic ivstem in ecouomic life, but, relying 011 that system and
strengthening it, joined in the colonial exploitation of Ukraine.
This nevi exploitation did not force out the ol<l Russian, but
facilitated its increase. And what on first glance appeared to be
a struggle of the "L'krainian metallurgical and coal industry with
the Hussian, w;1s nothing more than a struggle within Russian
capirnlisl industry. It was a fight between the modem and more
protit:1ble segmPnt which was located in Ukraine, and which
took advantap;e of Ukraine's colonial statm, and the remnants
of the antiquated, semi-feudal system in Russia proper. This
struggle, which contributed lo the rehabilitation of Russian in
dush,;· which had bf'en halted in its development by the privi
leges extended to it by government policy, resulted again in
large losses to Ukrainian national economy.
The whole matter becomes quite clear when we analyze the
prof·c�·s of penetration of Western European capital into
Ukraine's ernwnny and the part played in this process by Rus
siau hanking monopolies,
A ·ymw becoming acquain1ed with the econornic history of
Ukraine in that period quite naturally rniscs the question: why
did not Ukraine, with all tht> economic advantages, embark
upoll the dear path of creating a national capital? The main role
in tbJ.0 respect wa� without doubt played by the fact that any
prOlluction surplus, the basis on which capital is created, was
exclu,led from tlte Ukrainian economy because of Ukraine's
colonial position. Nevertheless, why did not at least some part of
the c:1.pital Slir!Jlu� become invested into Ukrainian industry,
which offered �uch tempting opportunities? Why was it that
the hrge amounh s,,ve<l by the peasants for lan<l acquisition,
wen· not depo·;iteL1 in banks, a.nd then become utilized for in
dnstrial investmeut? Why did not Ukraine produce more of such
1
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types of businessmen like Kharytonenko an<l Tereshchenko, and
why <lid not the management of Ukrainian industry find ih. way
into their hands? These are all very proper questions an<l require
an answer. And the ouly answer complying with the real truth
is tbat there were external forces which prevented all these
thing,· from beio� done.

Ruination of National Capital
All processes of creating capital, although slow because of the
posi.tion of Ukraine, were present and discernible. Foreign capi•
ta! did not come into a vacuum. The Russian Minister of Fiuance,
Kokovtsev, wrote n letter to the chairman of the Paris Bourse,
Verneuil. [Vcrneuil had proposed to set up «with the aid of
friend� a fii1ancially strong group which would be ready to
study commercial and industrial enterprises existing in Russia
( i.e. ill Ukraine-Author) that could be developed with the ai<l
of French capital."] I-le wrote: "I am very happy that you are
uot i.">tablishing a 1-:cw enterprise, but have in mind helping to
dewlop those '�"'istiJ.Jg ones which, healthy by nature, suffer from
a lad, of capital.·,,.,
In the 1870's lo 1890's the process of capital creation in
Ukrnine was already un<ler way within the national boundaries
and '.vithin the aspeds of Ukrainian interests. Hence the heavy
influx of forei�n capital was preceded by a period of ruthless
stru�gle against th(', as yet, weak Ukrainian industry, resulting
in its ruin.
The ruiuation of Ukraiuiau capital iu industry took place
agai,1st the background of the crisis of the 1890's. In comment
ing upou that crisi�, we have already noted that it came about
as tb· result of ah:10rmal conditions of industrial development
i.mpn�ed upon Ukraine: the m1ilateral direction of the metallur
gical industry; its complete depeudence upon railroad construc
tion; 3rlificial restraints of the market for Ukrainiau coal, etc.e
The crisis of iuveutorv accumulation was simultaneous with aue
acute desire for iron among the wide masses of the populatiou.e
The crisis hit the, as vet financially weak structure of the younge
indndry ver�· pal:1fnlly. Iii addition, there came a catastrophice
decH1w of prin's of �tocks representing Ukrainiall imlustrird en
terprises on foreign exchanges.e
13

r-..•. Vm,ag. op. cit.. p. 129.
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E:,;:change 'i.1lues of stocks of Ukrainian industrial corpora
tions, quote<l on th:; Paris and Brussels Bourse ( in thousa11<ls of
francs) were as show11 in Tal,le LXXIII.
TABLE LXXlll
50 metallurgical cnrporntiuns
18 coal mining corporations
6 glass corporations .....

Oct. 1.5, 18,Y 9

868JH0
:l47,148
17,987

Oct. 15, 1901
298,06U
HVi,957
3,632

% of
ded/r,e
6.'>
,10
79

The crisis deepened by accelerated preparations for the
currency reform of 1897. They not only iucreased the tight fi
nancial situation of industry, hut had even more detrime11tal re
percnssions up0n the whole Ukrainian economy. This, in turn,
had an effect 011 the position of iudustry: a setback in railroad
construction had an effect upon the purchasing power of the
population; losses on exports uf grain fell upon its basic pro
ducers, the peasants; bank deposits did not grow at the expected
rate, and the like.
Prior to the cnrrcncy reform of 1897 there were hvo types
of curtrency.in the Empire: silver and treasury notes called assig
nats, and the ex<'hmge of the latter for silver was suspended
following the Crimean \Var. The continued issuance of notes
( from 71,'3.5 million rubles in 1862 to 1,12L'l million rubles on
the eve of the currency reform )t1" without regard to the decline
of the price of oilver on world markets, brought about a contin
ual df'cline of the value of the assignat ruble in relation to sil
ver. Only in the ]880's did the Finance �'1inistry begin to take
measures in order to curtail the excessive issuance of paper
money. In the mid-1890's the rate was pegged at l assignat
ruble or .37 kopecks silver. Ne\'ertheless the internal value of sil
ver in the Imperial currency system was higher than its value as
a commodity. During that period the value of silver per ounce
on the London market \\,.as: 187:3, .59.2 pence; 1881, 51.7 pence;
1890, 47.75 p ence, an<l 189.5, 29.8 pence.16
I'. A. Khromov. Ek,momidu,skm1c rrJZvitiye Rossiyi v XIX-XX t'.V.
( Economic Development of Rn�sia in the J 9th and 20th Ce11fories1),
I 950, p. 309.
1 s M. Koshkarev, Denezlmoye obra�hcheniye v R<wriyi ( Money Circulation
iii Russia), Moscow, 18')5. I, 72-73
1o N.t Ratzig, Finausornya pulitika Rossiyi s 1887 goda (R11ssia'1,· Financialt
Polir11 sinre MFJ7), St. Pcterslmrg, 190.1, p. 47.t
1'
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For this reason the determination of silver and gold by
wei;:)1l producrd an agio. In 1877 this agio amounted to 48%.
And to the exteIJt that the Russian Covernment in order to ac
cum11late gold for the currency re-form and for thP liquidation
of foreign halanct'S, decided in 1876 to collect customs tariffs
in i;(,ld, to that exh:::nt this agio ineYitably produced a decline of
the price of export goods. In order to compensate- himself for
the gold ruble th" exporter wanted to get a greater quantity of
goods that he purchased for exportation. Thus the determination
of internal pric<:s iP paper currency falsely altered the currenc;v's
real value. "During a period of over 30 years, agio for gold in
Russia fluctuated to such an extent that exporters who were
selling grain abroad had to get exchange rate insurance. This
guarantC'c cost money and lowered our grain prices.""
The basic export commodity was grain. and its chief producer
Ukrn'ne. Therefore the losses on currency exchange rates fell
in tlw largest degree upon Ukraine, and had repercussions on
Ukrainian industry which, under pressure of the crisis had to em
bark upon the cxportatio11 of its products. In a memorandum
on cnrren<'y reforn,, Minister Witte wrote: UFollowing the fluc
tuafrms of the exchange rate (of money), our grain prices fell
when they rose or. the world markets, and vice versa, i.e. these
fluchiations falsified grain prices an<l gave a mistaken direction
to our exports, increasing and lowering them in a direction
contrary to the proper course which should have been taken,
and drawing us into suffering double damages: nudging us
tow.1rds export; whf'n prices on world markets were detrimen
tal, a11d curtailing our exports when prices were advantageous.
From this the agriculh1ral economy suffers most" ( i.e. primarily
Ukraine-Author) .1"
:Rut Witte fails to mention that in order to get favorable
balant·e of exports over imports, the Government used all avail�
able means, primarily through its agrarian policy, to compel
the Ukrainian peasants to sell as much of their grain as possible.
All these currency conditions, we repeat, became the most griev
ous during the first years of the crisis and deepened it.
B;mk credits could not save Ukrainian industry during that
period not only because the crisis impeded the banks themselves,
"lbid., p. 52.
1'A. Bukovdsky, (Ed.). I\fateryaly rw dcne:hnoy reforme 1895-97 g.
(Jfoteri1il.s on the Currency Rtjomi of 113.9-5-91), Mnstow, 1903, p. 19.
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but mainly bce�.use Hussian banks, clearing the path to Ukraine
for their own and foreign capital, led a determined attack
ap;ai1Jst those Ukrainian banks which were still independent of
them.
fn this respC'ct the history of the Kharkiv Commercial l3ank
is most illuminating. Jt was established by a millionaire Ukrain
ian husinessma11 Akhcvsky, who was at the same time a director
of the Kharkiv Land Bank and organizer of the Oleksiev Min
ing Industry A�sociation in 1879. Alchevsky made determined
demands that Ukrainian industry should be permitted to develop
independently. He used all sorts of business methods to ac
cumnlate millions of rubles for the establishment and aid of
mining-industry enterprises, which he foresaw a.� bdng able to
yield "a pot of gold." He estimated the opportunities of Ukrain
ian industry very highly and used all his power to aid it in surviv
ing the crisis. Nevertheless, he was unable to withstand the com
mon Russo-French financial front. His bank failed and Akhevsky
himself committed suicide. "What is the significance of this death
in a capitalist community?" asks Professor P. Khromov. He
answers: "It means that weaker capitalists, capitalists of 'the
second grade· are pushed out by stronger millionaires. The Mos
lOW millionaire, R)·abushinsky, took the place of the Kharkiv
millionaire, Alchevsky."19
The failure of the Kharkiv bank hit the connected industrial
enterprises very h,1rd, among them one of the largest, the Don
ets-Yurievsky Associ:ltion. After this, Ukrainian industry was
helpless to wanl off the appetite of Russo-French financial con
cerns.
A similar fate befelI the Oleksiev r-.Hning Industry Associa
tion founded by Alchevsky. It fought for its independence for
some time, although «during the crisis it came under some de
gree of c:ontrol of Hussian banks, the Volga-Kama Bank becom
ing oue of its larger stockholders in 1900. Nevertheless until
1905 if_ did not lose its national character."'0 When foreign capi
tal established the syndicate "Produhol" in 1004, this Oleksiev
Association was its chief stumbling block, since at that time it
held first place in production with 780.8 thousand tons. In 1908
the Franco-Belgian banking syndicate purchased the stock in
this association from the Volga-Kama Bank and brought it under
its culltrol."
19P. Khromov. u/'· cit .. p. 308,

"" N. V,u1,1g, o/J. cit., p. 121.

"Loe. cit.
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Similar occurre:1ces took place in Kiev, in connection with
the second-largest hank, the Kiev Commercial Bank which
worked with capital of Ukrainian sugar refineries. The Azov-Don
Bank in Petersburg, using French capital, begau extending cred
its t,i 1hc sugar reiim'ug industry on easier terms, and bought up
shares in the Kiev Commercial Bank from sugar refineries. "\Vith
the aid of FreHch baHks, by 1913 the Azov-Don Bank had bought
up a majority of :1tock in the Kiev bank, and had become one
of the principal monopolists in financing the sugar industry."'"
St,di warfare ?.gainst national-territorial banks \Vent on not
only ;n Ukraine, but in Russia's other colonies as well. Thus, in
1908 for exam!)lC, the French baaking syndicate underwrote
a new issue of stock of the above mentioned Azov-Don Bank for
the ;pecific purpose of buying up of the stock of the Minsk
( Belornssian) Commercial Bank. Thus, there was a flow of
foreign capital in\o wore than Ukrainian industry. At the same
tinw, against the background of the economically inexplicable
crisis, a process of destroying the national financial credit sys
tem and of bohtering the financial monopoly of Hussian banks,
primarily of Pcter.'iburg, went on, This too was in the .interest
of fol'(;-ign capital.
The matter did not end in complete control of banks. There
was a simultabneous attack against indushy itself. After wreck
ing the financial basis of an enterprise, ( depreciating its stock
capitnl, favoring its creditors, etc.) and thoroughly ruining it,
it ,vould revive with a new complement of shareholdbers-foreign
and Hussian bank-">. Under the term "financial reorganization,"
s11cl-_ alterations were so widely applied to Ukrainian industrial
enterprises that they hecame routine, In all justice, this period
in the hi<.tory of Ukrainian industry should be called a period
of rna-">s au<l deli1)erately organized financial bankruptcy which
had no justification either in production conditious of the in
dustP: itself, or in objective market conditions. In this period
the few remaining enterprises whose national designation was
Ukrainian, peric,hed. Since then Ukrainian industry in its main
branches ceased to exist as such, and became the industry of
the nwtropolis in colonial territories,
How very far real conditions of manufacturing and sales
were from c:i.nsin� !lny crisis and decline o f Ukrainian industry
is atl('Stecl lo by the evaluation of conditions by French capital
'" 1.,,,. cit.
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itself, the sam,� which took an active part in organizing the
bankruptcies of these enterprises. In 1907, the French periodical,
Le l•inancier International, said: "France has nevC'r considC'rcd
that hy underwriting Russian loans it was th11s engaging in auy
charitable work. Frnnce considered, and still considers. Russian
securities a very convenient, safe and wonderful location of cap
italh. f\.ussia reprt'sents a most reliable and remarkably convenient
debtor. Suffice it to recall the uncounted natural wealth of Rus
sia (here they had in mind Ukraine-Author), the profitable ex
ploitation of which cannot be doubted. France should never
wisl: to lose in the future the convenient position in the exploi
tation of these immense riches which she is now occupying."'"
It is dear fror.i these words that the principle underlying
these "financial reorganizations·· was not any attempt to cure
an existing evil by providing capital which was lacking, hut
rather the conquest of such "very convenient positions" which
had to Le captured from Ukrainian national capital by destruc
tive means. This had its repercussions on the nature of such
"reo1�anizatious." The reorganizations ''consisted of writing off
a part of the initial capital ( depreciation of .�tock-Author), satis
fying the main creditors, banks ( and depreciating loans of other
creditors.,.--Attthor), and financing enterprises by issuing new
stock w hich was purchased by such bank or a banking syndi
cate \vhich comlucterl this credit operation.""
A good ex:imple of such "reor ganization" is that of the
Donets-Yurievsl..-y Metallurgical Association carried out in 1907.
The Banking House of Telman & Co. delivered the following
ultimatum to the association in the name of French banking in
terests: "l) Tt is proposed that the association reduce ( re-evalu
ate-Author) its present capital from 8 million mbles to 3.2 mil
lion; 2) The association will then undertake a new issue of
shares in the amount of 12 million rubles; !) ) If these proposi
tions are accepted by the shareholders meeting, then after 4 days
Telman & Co. will advise whether it will purchase from the
Donets-Yurievsky Association all such stock of the new issue
which will remain undistributed amoug the present share
holdP,rs."2"
"' N. \'anag, op. cit .. p. 23.
21 N. \'anag, "Finansoviy kapital v tyazh,·loy imlustriyi" ("Finance Capital
in Heavy Industry"), Proletariy (The Proletarian), 1930, p. 19.
,., Ibid., p. 23.
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French banks went into negotiations \Vith all the creditors
of the J)onets-Yuricvsky Associatio11 and guaranteed payment
of these debts. For this they got 6.1.S million rubles worth of
prefrued stock ot the new issue at 7'%. Casl1 from the sale of
the- remaining shares the association undertook tu use for the
acquisition of coal lands of the O!eksiev Mining Industry As
sociation ( the same whi('h resisted the "Produhol" syndicate
for a long time, fighting for its independent existence).
Almost all "reorganizations" were carried out according to
this pattern: in 1906, the South-Dniprovske Metallurgical Com
pany; in 1905, the Tahanrih 1fotallurgical Company; in 1908,
the Nikopil-1lariupi l Metallurgical Company etc. "Reorganiza
tions" often brought along, besides, changes in the financial
structure, as wt >ll as administrative changes. A Df'W number of
directors would be e�tablishe<l, such directorships being given
mainlv to officers of Hussian banks. Thus, new directors Bala
banm:, Pfeiffer, Burchardt ar,d Mikhailov, of the Hussian Inter
natinual Bank, Wt'H· appointed to the Nikopil-Mariupil Com
pany.
T11e mo�t e-"osc;ntial characteristics of the financial expansion
of \Vestern European capital in Ukraine were its two goals: join
in the exploitation of the national economy of Ukraine, and
strengthen the colonial dependence of Ukraine upon Russia. It
was riot satisfied with the high profits derived from the develop
ment and financial strength �ning of industry. It further aimed
at eradicating all remnants of any signs of a national character
of the Ukrainian industry by introducing Russian management.
This is the real cause of the terrible ruin inflicted upon Ukrain
ian industrial enterprises during the process of influx of foreign
capi�al.
By its nahm:', this capital invested in Ukraine should be fully
described as colonial, hut there is still no basis for maintaining
that �ince that time Ukraine became a colony of Western Eu
rope. European capital made it possible for a handful of Russian
banks to monopolize Ukrainian industry and to increase tre
mendously Ukmine's colonial exp loitation, making larger profits
avail.tble to both_ Without realizing this we could n ot understand
the true role play:;<l by Russian banks in that time and in that
conne<..'tion.
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Russian Banks
I: is not hard to guess why Western European capital chose
the path it did. The decisive factor was that colonial capitalist
expansion was carried out in a territory without any political
ties with ·western Europe. Jn such situations, capital always de
sires to take out imurance i n the form of legal guarantees, or,
to put it more precisely, to cloak its activities with legality. A
partn.•rship with Ukrainian banks could not give foreign capital
adequate protef!tiou, because these banks worked within a sys
tem of econ01nic dependence on Russia. Moreover, foreign capi
tal c0uld foresee that in spite of a temporary compleacency, the
Ukrainian banks would inevitably oppose any excessive colon
ial e;:ploitation. S11ch a partner would always defend the inter
ests of the laml and would strive to shake free of any foreign
dommation.
P.nssian banks presented a different picture. Their interests
were parallel to those of Western European capital. Any
differences that wonld arise would only be on the plane of a di
vision of profit,;. Foreign capital then sought satisfactory oppor
tunities of expansion in territories politically independent of its
contwl. This capital could not have ignored tl1e prospect that
even under a compkte subjugation of the Ukrainian economy,
poli1.kal prerogative�. without which it co�ld not continue, will
still be in the hand� of the Russian Government. Hence the de
cisior: to form ties with the Russian political system. The symbi
osis with Russi:in banks provided a way out of the impasse, be
cause in their Ukrninian acti\'ities, the Russian banks had not
only fhe opportunit�, to rely on a favorable policy of the Gov
ernm�·nt, but wen• dso an (Hganic: part of the official system.
"Commercial banking corporations had strong ties with the
state apparatus. Russian ministers of finance nominated direc
tors of banks (frequently from among their ow,1 officials)
t hrough the credit bureau, authorized payment of millions of
subsidies to banh, f'tc. Such subsidies reached as high as 800
to 1.000 million rubles."e26
The Russian Government took an active part in the realiza
tion of this symbiosis of Western European capital with Russian
banks for the purpo�e of gaining control over the industries of
colo;,ies, because in this manner it facilitated the floating of
2,, P. Khromov, np. cit., p, 370_
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state loans abroad. ". . Interested in the success of state loans,
the Government opened the doors wide for the influx of foreign
capital into the Russian banking system and industry ... The
'.\,linister of Finance delivered the controlling portfolio of stock
in the Russian-Azov Bank to French banks in order to interest
F
.a
rench capital in Far-Eastern enterprises of the Tsarist Govern1ncnt."n
The participation of Hussian banks in capital stock of Ukrain
ian industrial corporations, and even more their role of middle
men in the financiug of these enterprises by foreiagn capital, were,
for the most part, the result of a deliberate policy, dictated by
the motives dis,;us�ed above.
Eloquent testimony on the artificiality of the participation
of Russian banks in financial activities of foreign capital is pro
vided by the following excerpt from a letter by Minister Ko
kovtsev to his deputy Ya. Utin who was at that time, conduct
ing m'gotiations with French banks: "These ( claims of Russian
banks to participate) mean that eith�r the profits of the French
capit'il will have to be cut, or the treasury's expenses to compen
sate the banks (Ru�sian) will have to be increased, the latter
haviJ:,g joined a matter in which they have no real participa
tion."""
Similarly the participation of foreign capital in capital stock
of Russian banks was in large measure organically connected
with the role which they played in the common cause of exploi
ting colonial territories. In this manner the community of their
interests and the interests of foreign banks became more solidi
fied . The latter, quite naturally perceived a strong guarantee
of sa1eguarding their common interests. Syndicates of foreign
bank� frequently aided Russian banks in the issuance of new
stock which they subscribed, on wndition that the Russian banks
wouhl use the capital thus raised for the ac(JUisition of shares
in Ukrainian industrial enterprises. This was the manner in
which the Russian Internatiaonal Bank acquired shares of the
Nikopil-Mariupil Company, the Azov-Don Bank, the shares of
the Tahanrih Company etc, "What reason compelled Parisian
bank�rs to take an i11tcrest in Russian banks?" This is explained
in no uncertain terms by M, Davidov, director of the Petersburg
Chastny (private) Bank, Infonning the shareholders that the
"synr1icate" gu'iranteed a new issue of stock, he said that "Pari"P. Lashc;henko, np. cit., p. :3fi).

as '.'\ Vanag, or,. cit., p. 128.
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sian banks have in mind hy this operation to facilitate Hussian
credit institutions hemming intermediaries between industrial
enterprises and Ei,rnpean markets."',
r,�1t there is no basis from all this for concluding that in the
matt�'r of colonial exploitation the Hussian hanks were only
playing a minor part, or that they were merely in the service
of foreign capital.
T!ie way the Hnssian ha1iks themselves understood their
role is best illustrated by the Moscow bmiking tycoou, Hyabu�h
illsky iu his own words spokell at a commercial congress ill
�Ioscow. Speaking of the penetration of foreign capital, he said
"vi.th emphasis: "This does uot mean that ".'e shonld reject for
eign (·apital, but it is necessary that this capital should not feel
like a conquerer. It is necessary that we pit our own capital
again�t it, and for this purpose it is necessary to create- condi
tions under which it can accumulate and develop."·'0
T;1e conditions were by no means unfavorable, as far as
the support given these banks by the Government is eouccrned.
It is true that t!w general picture of the Russian money market
ot the period :·ann01- he termed as blooming. This market dc
pclldcd npon the low sahHation point of the marht for rnanu
factv.red goods, determiued primarily by the peasants, the basis
ot tllP -po£}11latio11. For this reason, capital sources outside indus
try c•mld not take the appropriate part in industrial investments.
Peoples' savings, ·which would accumulate in a banking system
and nourish ind11�try were, in a semi-natural economy, very
insii:;11ificant. In Ukrai11e, as we have indicated above, almost
the entire cash part of the peasants' budget was swallowed up
by e.xcessivc taxes, excises mH.1 leases of bnd. Aml wherever
there was an e•:ce�s of ir1come ahove consurnption in a house
hold, it would go mainly towanl the acquisition of land. There
fore the greater part of the surplus pr()(lnction created by !he
rural econorny accomulatcd in the hands of the lar1<llords and
was �pcut by them on uou-productive consumption. most often
abroad. The low level of the popu!atiou·s purchasing power, the
uarrow market for goods and the restricted possibilities of non
industrial capital ac-ct1rnnlation were responsible for that perpe
tual {'<!Sh starvation in the Empire. which was felt all the time
and 'Yhich contributed to the attraction of foreign capital. The
rornlition was nn,.'\c more acute because the Tinssian Empire,
,:, i\. \'.mug, up. cit., p. 139.

"'' Ibid .• p. 113.
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indu·:trially backward, desired to go through historical cycles of
devekpment at an accelerated pace.
£ut for all th.it, in evaluatiug the banks' role in the industrial
ec01nmy, ·we cannot underPstimatf' the resources of inl('rnal
monev accumvl.iticns, and must determine the role of banks
men{\· by their own part of stock capital. As Lashchenko cor
rectlv staks: '"Although in the leading banking corporations up
to 42% of tlwir stock capital was in the hands of foreign share
holdc-rs, yet from this it is still a far cry to the same degree of
depPndence of Hw;.�ian banks and of the entire Hussian bank
ing �;-,stem upon forei!:,'ll capital. Stock capital comprises only
betwC'cn one-third and one-fourth of the credits with which
banks operate, and in the concentration of such credits banks
dep<>'.lded upon c0uditions of the Hussian money market ... n
Oue might ar�11P that on the contrary, in this case we should
speak rather of the domination by foreign capital, of i11ternal
capitrd accumulatiom in the Empire hy exercising a lea<ling role
in th'· banks, because such a leading role does not necessarily
require possession of a controling .":ii% bloc of stock because
there are always some passive shareholders. This is tnw. Bnt
in this imtance it could not be so, because behind the :flussian
banks, in addition to their stock capital, stood also the power
of tile state whirh determined the legal norms of economic
proc,:·sses and tlrns greatly strengthened the role of Hussian
capital. This is all the more important, because in the process
of bolstering the Russian banking system, the relative import
ance of foreign capital was gradually diminishing: new issu('s
of sh,ires always bd a smaller percentage comi11g into foreign
banks. For instance, in the Azov-Don Bank, French banks had
,10,0110 shares in 1911 equal to 46% of all stock capital; of tlw
.1912 issue thcv got 30%, and of the 191a issue, onlv 251.
In spite or' the foct that the financial market of the Empire
was underdeveloped in relation to the number of population
and 11ah1ral opportnnities, ne\·ertheless the process of accumu
lation of money in the banking system v,:ent on at an increasing
rate. particularlv <luring the period of the industrial advance
in the 1900's. For this reason any conception of the true role of
Russian banks cannot by auy means be narrowed down to the
accentuation of the important role pl ayed in them by capital of
forei;m banks. l-11;�e amounts of internal accumulation went
"'' P. L1shi:henko, op. cit .. p. 36 ,'5 .
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through the turnover channels of the Hussian banking system,
which were many times larger than stock capital, and their man
agem�·nt determined the power of their influence on industry,
commerce, etc. "In spite of the impressive participation of for
eign capital, Russian banks managed to keep the controlling in
iluence in their own hands."·'"
''A group of n!nc to twelve Petersburg banks, concentrating
up to 50% of banking stock capital and up to 65% of all bank
dep,l:,;ts, was actually that banking monopoly in Russian finan
cial L·apitalism. Combining with industrial monopolies, and
aided hy foreign capital, it held in its hands the financing of
the entire industry.""'
"This process of strengthening the position of the financial
oligarchy was accelerated, because in Russia, finance capital
cemented its ties with the state apparatus and made large prof
its on so-called state enterprises, utilizing for that purpose the
government's credit, special state loans to industry, etc."'·'
W€ can get an illea of the amounts handled by the hanking
syste,n from Tah/e LXXIV, savings, deposits, and current ac
counts of instih1tious of credit and savings banks ( in millions
of n,bles).
\\'t, sec. from this that huge amounts, for that time, were at
the d isJJosal of corporate banks, and we must bear in mind that
in re2.Hty the data apply only to about nine gigantic banks of
Petersburg and �lo�cow. Outside of these all others constituted
a nC'gligible quantity, without any role in financing industry,
and whose octivitics were restricted merely to crediting local
commercial transactions.
"The total h:ctlarice of corporate hanks as of Jan. 1, 1910
was 2,611 millhm rubles, of which ten Petersburg banks ac
cow1t'-'<l for 1,845 million; four �oscow banks for 379 million,
and all other seventeen hanks for 357 million rubles."·•� The
nine i?igantic hanks were: Hussian Bank for Foreign Trade;
Petersburg Intemational Bank; Azov-Don Hank; Russian-Asian
Bank; United (Soycdinennyi) Bank; Petersburg Private Bank
of Commerce; Russian Commercial-Industrial Bank; Petersburg
"Uchetno-Ssudnyi" Bank, and Siberian Bank. In some respects
we should add: :\foscow Commercial Bank, \Varsaw Commer
cial Bank and Riga Bank.
"2
34

P. L,shehenko, DJ>. cit., p. 374. c3 Ibid .. p. 365.
M. Colman, op. cit., p. 311.
Js P. Laslwhenl::o, op. cit., p, 357.
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The transformation of these banks into a financial monopoly
came as a result of the centralization of the banking system,
This was carried out with the very active support of the Gov
ernment, and national banks of non-Russian areas were simul
taneously desb'0yed. The United (Soyedinennyi) Bank was
forml'>{l from the merger of the Moscow International, Orlov
the South Russian Banks; the Azov-Don Bank from the Peters
burg-Azov which got control of the Minsk Commercial and
Kiev Commcr,_<al, the Russian-Asian mngt>d with the North
ern, de.
Pc•sonal cor:.nection played perhaps an even more important
part in the form:ttion of a banking: monopoly. The Petersburg
finan-�·ial and indvstrial magnate, Putilov, was chairman of the
board of directors of the largest bank, the Russian-Asian; di
rector of the Rt'5Si?.n-Chinese Bank; one of the directors of the
metc1llurgical s_vndicate "Prodamet" based mainly on Ukrainian
indmJry; chief shareholders of many metallurgical enterprises
whi< Ji were meP1bers of "Prodamct," also of the Pntilov, Sonnov,
Bry:,nsk, Koloml'n and other plants, and of the :\Jcva Shipbuild
ing Y�inls. Simil:cr1y, the chief operator of the coal industry of
Ukrai,1e, AvdakO\-, was connected with a whole series of indus
trial enterprises and with influential Russian and foreign banks.
The �ame a·pplies to Utin aml Plotnikov, directors of the Peters
burg "Uchetno•Ssudnyi" Bank; Kaminka, chi�f director of the
Azov-Don Bank and others."
Both banking houses \\-'ere in Petersburg, and their directors,
chiet shareholders of Ukrainian industrial enterprises, were like
wise financial magnates of Petersburg.
It is \Vithout fonndatiou to maintain, in the light of what
was said above, that Ukraine as a result of the influx of Euro
pean capital into her industries, becanw a colonial dependency
of Fnml'e or Bdgit1m, who had pushed Hussia to the side. For
eign capital hohtcred the Hussian financial oligarchy, facilitated
a df'eper penetration into the Ukrainian economy and, leaving
the management and exploitation of industrial enterprises in the
hand� of that 0ligarehy, restricted itself to a participation in
profits. The extent of profits was dctenn ined not only bv con
venient conditions of the advance of the industries of Ukraine,
but .1lso by a favorable policy nf the Government, directed at
increasing the fraT;tcwork ot colonial exploitation. �•fot to men'" P. L;shdwnko, op. cit., p. 364.
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tion Uie legal st.1tm, in economic matters Ukraine c:ontinued, as
before, in the role of R11ssia's colony, for whom foreign capital
was cmothcr means of increasing tbc opportunities ol exploita
tion.
'The participation ot Hnssiar1 capital iu Ukrainian imlustry
was _,mailer thcrn of Western European capital. But political in
fluem:es of H.ussia npou Ukraine were much greater. The policy
of tlw Hussian Empire in Uhainc in the 20th century mani
fested itself in the forms of an unconcc,tled econornic-political
and mitional-culturnl oppression, and curtailment of all and any
rights of Ukraini:w nationality and c-ulture."'<>
A convincing argument showing the dominant position of
Hussbn banks in Ukrainian industry is provided by a roster of
shareholders of l1krainian industrial corporations. A few are
cited as an enmple. Ont of 44,0-"!8 outstanding shares of the
Taha1trih Consolidated :'\frta!lurgy in 1914, 10,000 were in the
hamls of the Azov-Don Uank, 4,761 i11 the hands of the Rnssian
:\sian l!ank, and 1,700 in the ha[l(ls of ll. Kamiuka, director of
the Azov-Don Bank. The total is .'li.,3'.t'.. Nine ,vestern European
Banh held 12,441 �hares of this cori:,oratiou, 28.2%.
Out of 46.Cl.'36 shares of the Nikopil-�fariupil Company.
10,000 belong;,c'd to the P('tersburg International Hank. and
l.'3,6,'l3 to its directors, Zolin. Grauman and others, The total is
51'.t. Out of 2-'5J.'12 shares of the Auerbach Mercury Mining
Company, 11,500 belonged to the Azov-Don Bank, 2,500 to its
dirertor Karninb, and 2,000 to a member of its board of directors
Khe;·i1,. The tobl is 64%."''
TIK same can be said of many other industrial corporatiom
in U'Haine. Ev-·n tC'ward the end of the Hlth century when the
tlow of foreign capital had not yet reached its peak, securities
ot i1•dustrial eT1t<>rprisPs cnnstih1ted an irnpressive percentage m
the portfolios of banks in the repartition of their own stock capi
tal.
li::lustrial �e':'urities in the portfolios of the then chiet banks
of Petersburg ( in percentages of their stock capital) were as
shown in TalJlc LXXV.
Foreign capital occu pied the positions in these banks shown
i11 Tohlc LXXVI ( in millions of rubles).
:<s 0. Ohlohlyn, I'eredknpitatlistuchna fahrtJka, p. 177.
·,,, i\ \"anag. np. cit., p. 1 L9.a
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l'. Lasl1d,t·nko, op. cit., p. 372.
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Obviously, we cannot underestimate the importance of such
a high percentage of foreign capital in Hussian banks. It is
cqu.1lly obvious that it must have played a large part in the
activities of industrial enterprises which it financed, hut all this
does not alter the basic fact: because uf foreign capital, Hussian
hanks became th,, controlling centers of Ukrainian industry and
its real managers. They became simultaneously reservoirs of
the accumulation at money from the whole Empire, and utilized
their position to strengthen the economy of Russia proper. It is
true that in their actiYities they safeguarded the interests of for
eign capital. The reason for this, however, was not subsen·icnce.
Their interests were identical.
The Petersburg banks cbncentrated in their hands a monopo
h· OYt.'f disposal ol all re;,oun.:es of internal accumulation. over
r�pre�t'nting the intcresh of foreign capital and over administer
ing it. The�' also cornmanded the huge amounts which the Gov
ernment collected annually in its budget from the entire
popnlation of �be Empire and directed to the aid of enterprises
of Hussian territory proper. \Ve have already indicated that
state capitalism in�titutions were to be seen in Russia long be
fore the Bolsheviks: state railroads; .state factories; estates and
lam:s of the treasury; state concessions, etc. All these constituted
rarts of a large state industry, located almost exclusively on the
territory of Russia proper. To finance these, large sums were
spent out of the budget, the latter being contributed by the
entirt' populatiou of the Empire. The means of financing these
indnsiries wcr� mainly concentrated in the hands of the same
banking monopolies, large smns, indeed large. "In the expemli
tmes part of the ,,rdinary state budget which in 1913 reached
3,09-t million ruhlts, a basic part of expenditures, -182 million
rubles went into the budget of the :Vlinistry of Finance, with
the inclusion of repayable state credits, 906 million rubles; to
the i'vfinistry of Roads, 640 million rubles; to the Ministry of
the Army and �avy, out of the ordinary budget. went 826 mil
lion nibles.''<8
"These expendih'res were largely spent by the Government
in large part on state subsidies, all sorts of premiums to indus
trial and railroad capitalist�, for the purchase of private enter
prise� by the tr<>a�11ry, etc.""
'' l'. Kbrnmov, or,. eit., p. 3i2.

· Ibid., p. 3i5.
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Dw.ining the fu,ancial resoun·es ot the coloaies, in this man
ucr, placing tlw111 on her own territory concentrating all com
merce in her hands and hence also the accumulation of all com
mercial capital. Rus�ia financially exhausted non-Russian terri
tories, arnl pn�ventcd their organizing any normal financial
economy. All initial attempts to create a banking system of
thc-ir own, as has been indicated by examples gin'll of tbe ex
pPrier:ce of the Kharkiv an<l Kiev Commercial hanks, were
ruthlessly suppressed in the name of that self-same monopolistic,
unchallenged rule over the economic life of these territories.
These occnrrences are not exclusively applicable to the pre
revolutionary period of the a(kancf' of finance capitalism. but
to thE entire hi�tory of Hussia's colonial policy. In a work from
which we have aln:u<ly quoted. N. Yasnopo!:;ky ,vrotc: ";\.ccord
ing tn Schletzer, even at the beginning of this century (19th)
the i!lterest ch<trge<l ou capital )oane<l ,vas 6% in the Northwest
ern gubcrnias, 10.% in 1Ioscow, an<l at thC' same timC' in Tauria
(Ukraine) 25% ... In Odessa. up to the time of the cstablisb111mt of a hauk in HHS, they charged 3% p<"r month, and ahC'r
the bank was L'Stahlislwd the intcrPst rate was rcdnced to 2%
and l;l' per month. Even now (the reference is to the 1870's)
capital in Odessa is not much cheaper: they pay one, one and a
half. and up to t\',O percent per month, and only against abso
lutely safe collateral, .10'.l. Acc()rding to 1-foscow manufacturers
thl'V have credit available at 6'.l' per annum." Yasnopolsky con
tinu('s and gives the underlying reason at this phl'uomcnnn on
the basis of r<'ports of the state bank: ''Operations of the State
Bani.: and its branches are conducted prepon<lerantly in the
North. In 1866- the:- State Dank, its hrauchC's and counters dis
co1rnted drafts and other time-paper for 96,104 thousand rubles.
Out of this arn,unt, Petersburg. Higa and Archangelsk partici
pated in 60,181 thousand rubles, or 62.5% ... and this lack of
cre<lit institution� produced Vl"'ry bad results for the industry of
thl"' South.""
This is hO\v it was all the time. The conquest o!- Ukrainian
inclmtry ( and oaf other activities) hy foreign and Hussian capital
came about as thE" result of continually depriving Ukraine of
capital hy draining cash internally accumulated. It is there
fore not surprisiJJg that Russian industry which was nmch more
advanced, could lean on Russian capital. while Ukraine, from
"N. Ya.snopolskr, "Ekunomid1cskaya bududmost ...," lf, /.3.
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the H'ry heginning ut' a wider industrial devdopmcnl, went into
c,tpliv1t;,· of alic,1 c,1pital.
In his sh1dy of the characteri�tics of geographic regions of the
Empire accontng to the degree of industrial rkvclop,nent, P.
Lashdwnko pnts the Moscow industrial region in first place, "a
regi(J;t of prep:m(ln::rn!ly li11ssia11 nation,11 industrial capital all([
with a large relative pcrccutage of the commercial." lle gives
�t•rnnd place to the Petersburg aml Baltic regions, "regions of
a mi"cd cornpm:iti011 of ill(lustrial capital, Russian and foreign,
maiuk German" ( the latter was conc-entratcd mosllv in non
ll 11 s�i:Ln areas along tlw Baltic). Tu third place is the· region of
l'olaw_l_ ··a region ,,J1uust c0111plctcly under the rn,wagernent of
Ct�rnuu. Polish and Je\\·ish capital." The fourth place is held
by the Southern h,1nlcoal aud black orc region. i.e. the T,eft
Ban]- Ckrafnc, a re_gion '"of a couh-olling positiou of foreign capi
tal ·11Hl Hussia11 capital in subsidiary control." Finally, in fitth
place C"omcs the Right \hmk Ukraine, the region of the sug,ir
jll(\i,slry ..with Hns�ian, Ukrainian, Jcwi.'>h an<l Polish capital.""'
Ii, rcganl !o tbe last-named reg10n. or to he more accnrate,
iu n g�ml to the sn�ar inrlustry, it would he more ctppropriatc
tn src;1k ol its c,lmplete cunqnest l1_v Hussian capital, in particu
lar ;![rer the csrablishmcn! of the .-\zov-Don Bank which swal
lowed np the Kie\· Commercial lhnk ol- the sugar refiners. The
situation in the sugar refining industry W<l-'> accurately sum
mari;,cd by the Jvlinister of Fiuauce KokovtscY, who said; "From
the e-'.change of idc.'as on the participation of banks in the
sugar imlustry it has become clear that an influence of hanks
upon the industry cannot be dt'nicd, that the influc>nce extemls
he:-.-wl grantin.� of ('rcdits. and that the p,nticipation of lrnnks
iu c(•rpor.1tc and compan:· enterprises appears to he controlling.
Some l1anks take: ,t vcr:· actin' part in the �ugar industry, and
tliis p0:rt consi,t� not only of extending credits, hut also of tak
ing part in the (•nt.21vrises themseh-es and in trading in sug,n."",

Almsc of the Ukrainian Eco110111y
It i� eviden! th,1t in and of itself the fact of tlw devdopmeut
of industry in Ukraine, even trndcr forcign control. cannot he
n·gard('d as n11 item on the debit side from the viewpoiut (lf
tht' tTkr,1luian ('conom\·, �:[crch· the fact that because of this dc
\·clopmcut there was 'an upsu;ge of th<' employment of Ukrain,-. J J Li,lt(il<'nkn, OJ). cil., p. 428.

": l'. Khrnrnov, op. r:it., p. ;_16.J
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ian workers, ,..·as of great importance. But in this evaluation we
must not overlook that along with the iucrease of the Ukrainian
national income, there was even a greater increase of that part
of the income wbich was exr:lu<le<l horn the Ukrainian economy
in favor of Russia Q.m} of Western Europe in the form of in<lus•
trial and comn.ercid profits. These profits were very large.
The pre-revolutionary Hussian Empire ( thanks to a very
low wage scale tor labor, a favorable tariff policy of the gov
ernment and a relatively low "absolute" land rent) was a land
of high industrial profits. The average percentage of industrial
profit in relation to invested capital was, in the whole Hussian
Empire, as shown in Table LXXVll ( in millions of rubles).
TABLE LXX\'!l

Year
1900
1901
1902
1903
19fl4

HJ0,5

1906
1407
1908
1Y09

l910
rn11
1912
Hlt3

Invested

capital
2,032
2,1.%1
2,260
2,.3.';7
2.367
2.369
2,319

Profit
284.9
26.5.0

23().,1
2.'i7.fl

277.2
256.l
279.0

2,l'i.:'l0

2Y2.6

2,726
2,833
2.789
3,083

292.4
321.8
TJ6.4
396.3
460.2
509.8

,'3,486
3,!JOO

\[ of invested

capital
14.2
12.3
10.2
10,9
II.7

10.8
12.l
11.1
10.8
11.4
12,7
12.8
13.2
13.l

"

As we can ,cc, the percentage of profit was very high, es
peeh•lly when cornparC'd to the yield of capital invt->stc<l in
\Vestern European industry, ,vhere "the usual profit was behvecn
4% and 5% and lf'ss."'"
But these awrages for the Empire seem quite small when
c:omp·1red with in<lnstrial profits in Ukraine. The awrage an
nual 11rofit of the large metallurgical associations \\�as, in rela
tion to invested capital in 1912-1914, as shown in Table LXXVIII.
It was then hvo and one-half times higher than the average
for the whole Empire, But in order to dctenninc the degree of
colonial abuse, t�c repartition of these profits is of even greater
'"�L Colman, op. cit., p. 202.

H, Ibid., p, 298.
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T.-\BLI:: LX.\:\"111
Sm1tl1-Hu1.,i.rn Dm;,ro ,\.1soci,1l.011
H,,,.,i,,:1 T11\J<• .-\,socic(l!On
1{ 1 ,.,. ,ian-lh·lgun .-\s,oc1 c<lion
Kr,u,,atorsk . ·\s,ociation
Sulin \\'ml..s
K,m,;t;intim,· \\"orl..,
;\l<,an .-\vcr:ivc

.)/, ,]:
, )3.0%
28.1%
2b.O'.f,
21.8%

2:un

:l4 l'.f,

impntance. Ac,"·on.ling to .\-1. Colman, out of that "34.1% profit
in relation to ir'.vt'sted capital, from 20 to 25'.'£ went toward tht'
pa; rnent of div:rlcml,, and tlw remaining 9i to J.1;f went toward
capifa] accumuhlion, i.e. towards a wider re-investment of cap
ital."·'"
During thr: period between 1891 and 1914 the total of the
incrt':1se of inc111,trial capital. of profits rect"ivt"d and of dividenrh
paid out, reached throughout the Empire the figures shown in
Table LXXfX.
I ABU. L\.XJX
Jrwrerisc of invc,stc,d irnln,trial ,·apital , ..
Jmlnstn,!l prnf-its n":.·iv"d
Dindcnd, pai,l

2,310.0 millirn, ruhl<'s
-1,·119.8 million ruhk.1
2,0bfJ.7 million ruhk1,
!d

During the same period the amount that \Vestem Europt"an
capital haU inve�ted in industry, wa� 1,142.2 million rnbles.
lit'nce, industrial capital accumulation achit'ved intt'rnally was
1,188 million rubles, (2,3..'30-1,112). lf we make a proportio11 of
profits and dividends to the5e arnounts, then internal imperial in
dustrial r:apital had 2,3-19.7 million ruble profits and out of that
1,063.8 million rubles in diviUemh.
\\'c must strc's� the relativity of this summarY, because, a5
ha, bt·r:n noted above, the pt'rcentagc of industrial profits was
two and one-half times smaller in Hussia than in Ukraine, where
rnos1 r,f tht' fon,ign capital flm�wl. Therefore the total of profit�
anU diYidt"nds of European and Hussian capital invested in
lJkr;;int' shou!U be higher than their proportion to capital. But
even if we assume ,nch a smallt'r calculation. then "subtracting
''' \". Ziv, Inostr,mnyi kapital t,' Ih,.1skoy clwrm1-1m;od;k,01.1 promysh/ cnm,sti
rforr'iµn C,,pit"l in the Ih,s1ian 13/ack-,\!i:lr,/ Iw/,io"tr!/), l'ctrograd, lDli,
P;). 18-JD.
r,,, .\!. Cohn ,n, up r:it., ;). 30.'.i.
Ihirl., ;,. :;08.
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from the total amount of 2,089.i million rubles in dividends,
1,06:J.8 local diyidcnds, there remains the sum of 1,()2;5 million
rubles which must absolutely be considered as taken out and
excluded from the process of local accumulation, and charged
to the profit or foreign shareholders."'"
Fer the year 1913 the export of industrial profits was esti
mated at 721 million rubles. ''Foreign capital excluded from our
land ( reference is made to the J<'.rnpire) during only 20 years
( 1891-1910) without any erp1ivalent, \Yas almost 2,760 million
rubles in gold. Russia was compelled to pay such high charges to
foreign capital, and lowards this went an impressive part of the
national income of the land."''"
\Vhat land a.re they talking about here? To what Pxtent were
these the losses of Rusosia? We have already indicated by sta
tistics of the rep"1rtition of foreign capital that in Russian indus
try foreign capital was practically non-existent. It was being
inve�ted in non-Hussian territories, in colonies, and to the ex
tent 0f 75%, in Ukrainian industry. Thus, these huge amounts ex
clud<·d from the national income apply primarily to Ukraine.
Ilut tnat is not all. As shown above, an amount of �,760 million
rubles acr:rl)Cd to "local" capital. llut this was not local Ukrain
ian c:.ipital. It w:1s also alien capital which belonged to Russian
banks, although part of it was pumped out Qf Ukraine. There
fore we can estimate \Vithout error that the amount which was
usuriously drawn from Ukrainian industry during the twenty
five year period of accelerated industrial development reached
apprcximately 5 billion rubles, an amount much in excess of
the total of capital invested in the entire Ukrainian industry.
This fact cannot be overlooked under anv circumstances if
we wish to recognize the real position of industry in Ukraine
and the nature of its development which allcgcclly contradicts
the colonial status of Ukraine.

Syndicates
Syndicates were tremcudously important in the process of
gaining control Jf Ukrainian industry by Russo-European capi
tal :md in it snbsequent exploitation. They were established in
the beginning of the 20th century in metallurgy ("Prodamct")
in coal mining ("Pro<luhol"), in sugar refining and in rail1

,. \I (;olnrnn,

()JJ

,:ii .. p. :lO\J.

''" S. Stnnnilin, Pwh/emy prom11sh/,m11ngo ko,,ituki p SSSR ( Prnblem of
Imlw.trial Capital in t/ie USSH), :\1oscow, Ul2:i, p. 11.
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road equipment ("Proch\·agon.. ). The svmlic,1tcs f:onncJ •tn
crpu1;c unit wi�h the entire systC'm of impro\'iug colonial cx
plolb;tion.
\\'ithin a .i�harl· timt', such syndicates as "Prodamcf" andi
'"Pro1!t1hor' became real dictators n ot onk in the area of markl't
ing, \Jut also in iarge def--,'Tt'e ill the area of prorluct io11 itself.
Their dictators!i.ip \Vas not n·strictcd to tllt' st>dms i,1 which
!lwy were established, but cxte11ded to the entire indnstrial life,i
inasn1:1ch as those two sectors of industry (metallmgy a11di
coal) nonrish man:,,· others.i
�yc,dicates in manufacturing were also being established b:,
H11sai,lTI industries. and ('\'Cn i11 the same brnnc-lws as iu Ukrniue.
as for example. "Krovla" (Hoof) in Ural metallurgy. Hut not one
of !hem sncceelll'd in attaining- as dominant a position as the
g-iants of Ukrair,('. S(>me even fell at the wayside i11 thi'ir attc111pti
to cmnpek wit'.: the gianb.i
A]!_ 11ough 11cither svndkatcs, ··rrodamcf' Hor "Produhol" con
fined itself to the borders of lJkrai11e in selection of mem1Jer
ship ('"l'rodam,,.�" iJ1duded four!·ecr1 Ukrainian plants, niI1<' l'o
li,h. three Bahe and one Central Hussian), nevertheless most
irnpm tant were their l"krni11ian plants which accounted for
rwarh· three-fourths of tl1e total production of tlw Empire.
This was tlH' .:·,wsc of the syrnlkah's being ldcntifo·d with
Ukr:cirllan industrv, and hence tht' myth of the colltrolling p11si
tion of the bttr·r in all i11dustries of the Empire. People who
were either unahle or unwilling lo make a deeper analysis of
the silua!ion. dr,-w from this conclusim1s that it \VllS not Ukrai11i:m industry tlwt was subject to color1ial exploitation, hut. on
the contrary, !he whole :industry of the E111pire \Yas its \'assal.
There is 110 greater l'fror lforn sllch cmwcpt of the nah1re of
S\Tldicates.
.. -\11 thme svmli1.•atcs werc established i,1 the form of commm1
+radi11,r corporatlon�. under 'commission agrccrnents· for tlH.' salei
of the produi't'i of their members. l 11 reality the�· were sh·ictlyi
monopolistic org;mintions which hdd in the hamls of a smalli
group of monopnlists the entire industry a]J(l llictated all marketi
condi�ion� for tlie prolluct,; of industry so important to the na
tional r·co11om\·.'·.,-,i
\\'ho constituted this "small group of monopolists"? ln 190:?:.
"Prodarncf' was est<1hlished. ""The shan�s of 'Prodanwf \H'!'t'
"I'. Kl,wrno\'. ,,,,_ c:it., p . .368.
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grank<l by law the right to be traded on exchanges and to be
sold freely to 0nlside persons," They were completely concen
trated in the h,mds of owners of plants who were members of
the s::ndicate, ::rnJ those owners, as has already been indicated,
were Hmsian bcmks and European capital, acting through those
hank:,. Therefore tht' manufacturing profits of' Ukrainian indus
try, as well as commercial profits frorn the marketing of their
production, were in the same hands: Russo-European finance
capital, Thls fact alone e,duJes the possibility of any separa
tion of the syndicates from the general system of control of
Ukrainian industry by foreig11 capital. It also excludes, what has
unjustifiably be"n attributed to these syndicates, Le, that they
were the orgar,izers of a national production in the internsts of
developing a national economy. But in reality lhey were not
even ,1ccunrnlators ot commercial profits, neither were they crea
tors of commercial capital. Their only and direct task was the in
crease of the industrial profits of their member-manufacturers.
The most convincing proof of this that "frequently there were no
dividends declared at all, because the entire profit from opera
tions of the syndicate to its members was not determined by divi
dend per share, only by an increase of monopolistic prices for
goods sold:''0·' The managerial centers of these syndicates were lo
cated in Petersburg. They were headed by persons who occupied
leading positions in banks (the chairman of �'Prodamet" was P.
Daren, the real executive of «Produhol" was Gruencl, both rep
resentatives of French banh). The syndicates themselves were
nothing but an integral part of the financial structure of the
Husrn-European bloc for the exploitation of colonies. The mon
opolirntion of the market by syndieates was the cause of the
industrial proHt of metallurgical enterprises reaching the un
preu•::lented level of 3•1.1% in relation to inYested capital. Thois
profit as has b�en stated above, which was being excluded from
the national eCfmomy in fayor of Russian and European finance
capital, was the measure of the colonial exploitation of the
Ukr'.linian industrv.
Undeniably these monopolistic prices injured all consumers,
not o_,1ly the Ukrai11ian. Purchasers of Ukrainian metals in Rus
sia were also co1.1tributing to these high profits. Bnt the essence
ot the matter is that profits made in Russia stayed there in the
national economy, just as did profits from monopolistic prices
"" P. Lashc:henko, op. cit., p. 2fJ7.
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of the Russian textile industry. Jn Ukraine they were excluded
from :lie natimul f'cmiomy. �-forcover, for the purpose of corn~
petini with Husshn metallurgy which was outside the symli•
cate,, prices in Russia were lower thm1 in Ukraine."At a confer
ence of participc,_!tts of 'Prodamet' in 1912, prices for assorted and
roofit1g iron were hxed for Ekaterinburg aml Nizhni Novgorod
(Russia) at 1.15 rubles per 36 pounds, while for Katerynoslav,
Kiev, Odessa and Kharkiv they were 1.48 rubles. Thus prices in
the main iron producing area were 30% to 3.5% higher than 'war'
prices in the Um! region."5B
Hegarding competition with the Urals, there is no basis for
trcati1,g it as a fight between Ukrainian ,md Hussian imlustry.
It was nothing more than an internal struggle of various finan
cial groups for supremacy. There was even a struggle within "Pro
damct," where !wo groups were contending, one headed by a
majority of French capital (South Hussian Dnipro Association),
and the other '1y mixed capital, in large part of Hussian banks
such as the Jutc-rnational. Azov•Don, and Hank for Foreign
Trade (the Don-Yurievsky Association). The second 1-,rroup won.
Al5o opposing "Prodamef' was the grm1p of enterprises of
Hughes ( controlled by British capital), but ln 1905 it knuckled
m1dPr. Thus, even in this respect the actiYities of the syndicate
cam·ot by any meflns be considere<l a display of Ukrainian na
tional-economic rnrsuit. The main thing to bear in mind in
order to understand the true nature of the syndicates is the fact
that !he Hussian Imperial Government was backing them. They
were in the vanguard of the Government's course of policy in
non-Hussian areas. "Prodamet" was already tightly fused, legally
and !llcgally, with the governmental apparatus which favored
its [-,,,'.icy.'·:,,
,vhcn, in HJOR, under pressure of the State Duma, a confer
ence was callrcJ to consider cur�ailmcnt of the monopolistic
trend of the syndicate "a large part of the members of the con
ference consist<"d of representatives of those industrialists and of
bureaucrats from the 1.finistry of Industry and of Finance. And
the c,mference llid not think it wise to undertake prohibitive
measures against the syndicates, being of the opinion that the
Government should only fight corruption ... Assured by the
sn1111ort of official circles, the syndicates continued their policv.""�
"'' P. L:a.-,heh,•nko, np. cit., p, :JU.

"P. La�l1dwnk,). nrJ. cit., p. 326.

:,, !hid., p. 327.
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Therefore, �lie symlicatcs not only di<l not promote the in
tl-rc.,·ts of the Pkr.-1inian 1:co1mrny, hut they acted to its detri
ment and were an addi1ional, more perfected loo! of tolonial
exploitation. Aud the damag{· \Vils not restricted to the mere
,iphc,ning off of h11q: amounts of the national income of Ckraine.
Industry itself ,;xp,·rienct'(\ terrible ahnse. "I'rodamet" took 11n
dcr crmtrol 74S of the !o!al pig iron production of the Empire.
At thf• base of its monopolistic policy "lay thC' aim to restrict pro
duction, as a mea11s ot increasing prices aml super-profits of
the leading enterprises .... In reality the policy of 'Prodamet,'
dirccte!l towarrl restricting production and incrcrising prices was
supported by tlw Govcrmncnt itsclf."'·11
Kr>t a single new plant was established dnriug all this time.
Umkr the protection of the tariff policy \Yhich nndcrweut a
sharp change thl' momeJJt Ckrainian (•nterprises c;;me under the
control of Hussian banks. "Prodam{'f' brought the whole Empire
by HHl to a stal;(c of an acute shortage of pig iron. 1t held pro
dm:tion of rails at 201 below the 1904 le\·el. With the aim of
a fmther curtaihrwnt of production it shut dowll two rolling
milk Starachowice and Nikopil-1lariupil. This caused an im
mediate 40\". ri,;e in the price of rails.
Every pl-aut was given a strict prmluction quota by the syn
clkatt:. Its viola!ion brought f'ittt·s of 10,000 rubles plns 1 ruhle
for '"\'('fY 36 ponnds of on•r-qnota prodnctiori. And converse!?
a ph:ut would get a premimn for producing less than c111ota.
Prn<lndio11 for foreign markets was ontside of the quota. but in
time this was '-·11 ·.mgt'd. too. \Vhen. for examplt', in 1912 the
Druzhkov plan� chked "'Prodamet'" for permission to increase its
productiou for expmts to the .\Iiddle Fast. it was denit>ll.
"In the pmslrit of t!test' aims 'Prodamef did not take any
needs of the national cco11or1w into consideration. It reduc('\1
the c0lunlrY lo a condition of mdal slai-Yation and chronie u11dcrprotl11d itm of nwtals. This ha<l a (ictrimcntal effect O!l tbe (k
vdo11rnent of �1:d1 imporblllt sectors, as the production of agri
( nltural machinerv ( a S\'ctor fairly w<"ll developed in Ukraine
and whose pr(lf_lutts were acutely needed in tht> South of
l'kraim'-.Author), construction of railroads, commercial ship
ping. ctc.""0

''' Ibid., pp ..'31.>,

3:W.

'"' P. L1sl1d1,•nko, np. cit., n. :316.
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\�,mventions o± rnanufacturers of agricultural machinerv in
CkralPc requesli:d lower metal prices on two occasirms, in 1910
and hi HHS, and tlKir requests were denied both times.
Even when the Minister of Commerce, Timashev, feding the
pind1 of a metal shortage, proposed the erection of uew pla11ts
to t,1.kc care of the re11uirerncnts of the \Var :\Iinistry, he met with
an vrganiLed opposition and had to withdraw.
There is no point in digressing into the characteristics of the
secrnHi syndicate, ··rroduhol" which was established iu 190-4,
because what was said above applies in full measure to all syn
dicatl·� in Ukr,1inian industry. This syndicate also controlled
751 o! all coal mining in Ukraine. As with "'Prodamct,'· each
mi1H' had to a<lhcn:· to a strict quota of coal sold, and members
of ti;,, syndica�e did not receive dividends. only premiums in
the form of a difference between the b,isic price and the s,1le
price. Between 190� and HJ08 mines were paid this premium in
the amount of 2 kopecks per 3fi pounds where their wst price
was 4.5 to 5 kopecks i.e. 40% to :)0'.{ per cost price, over and
above normal profit.
'Trodnho!" abo "used all means to curtail the production of
coal of enterprises controlled by it .... In other words, the 'Pro
duhol' monopoly had as its open aim the stifling of the hard
coal milling indn�tr� .""1e
Ju 1906, the Oleksicv Association which had been working
with Ckrninian capital for a long time ( until the failure of
Alche\sky's KbukiY Commercial Bank) and had preserved
its independence, was ordered to curtail its production consi<l
crahh- as a prerequisite to being admitted to the syndicate. And,
it was forced to comply. The Zh�·lov Company was ordered to
switch to proUucing bri{piettes an<l to "close the mine. . . The
mine had been produeill)-'; 480,000 tons oF coal annually and em
ployed over ,'3,000 workers."•;�
Ql1ota violations were punished by a fine of 10 kopecks per
3fi pounds, or double their cost price. Aml conversely, "for rej ect
ing the assigned quota for the home market, the contracting
part�, may. with the assent of the syndicate, receive a separate
rew:1rd."6'
T11is kind of activity of "Produhol" went beyond the bounds
of kg:ility, and in 1811 it was hauled into comt. "HoweYer, fiP.eL1shch,·11J..o, n11. cit., 11..117.e
,., J.:.m·'"!li Arkl1i1;, (Herl A.rd,i, nl, X\'111, p. 13!).
'•- l'_ L,_i,]wlwuku, op. !'it.. p. 1,1'5
,.i
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11anci;1l pressure wa� exerted on the part of French banks and
Hus�ian im!mtrial cirdes, and the French GovenmH-'Bt even
made a diplomatic intervention. The case was not prosecuted.""'
i\ few more wcrds about the symlicate in the third basic in
dmtry of Ukraine, sngar refining. It came into being as early
as l/,;87 on the h:>sis of a private agreement, uniting 106 out of
the 226 plants then in existence. As has already been noted, the
Ukrainian sugar industry, following the capture of the Kiev
Commercial Bank by the Petersburg-Azov Bank subsequently
ehanged into the Azov-Don Bank, came under complete con
trol pf Hussian finance capital, and exports of sugar were mon
opolized by three Petersburg banks. We have also noteJ, how the
banks' role in the sugar industry was characterized by the �:Jinis
ter oi Commerce and Industry. But even this was not enough:
in 189� the Russian Government look over the regulatio11 of
production of e-ad1 refinery for the home market, aud thereby
gavt 1he syndicate a compulsory status. Thus, by ruthlee.sly cur
tailing the home consumption of sugar (400,000 tons in 1895-96)
and levying a hi?:h (�xcise tax on sugar ( l.75 rubles per ,'36 pounds
when the cost prict• wa� 3.25 rubles), the Govcnnncnt used all
possible means to favor the exportation of sugar abroad, exempt•
ing 1":porter banks from the excise tax and p:tyi11g export pre
mium of 80 kopecks per 36 poun<ls. 'Tnder such circumstances,
at the expense of incr{'asing prices on the home market, there
arose a possibility of shipping sugar abroad at prices which
were below cost. The price of l1krainian sugar in London was
almost three times lowc-r thau in Kiev," thc- center of the sugar
refining industry."''
It is possible that some of this sugar came back lo Petersburg
again in the form of grain raw materials for further processing
into crystal by Petersburg refineries. Thi.� is the tme nature of
syndicates whieh existed in the industries of Ukraine. They were
the tools by which ,rn increased colonial exploiL1!1on was carried
ont, industrial development thwarted and sonwtimtes ruined. In
addition to the exploitation conducted by Russia by means of
centralizing industry on her own territory, by means of excluding
a larl_\'c part of th,· national income from Ukraine in the form
of cnmmcrdal profit, there was yet ,motlwr means. the system
of fi1 1;mcial cxploi!:1liou of Ukrainian industry. True enough,
c,

!hid., p. 3:3'3.

,,,, P Khmmov, op . cit.. p. 256.
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forei_:::n capital nov: joined in, but this did not alleviate the ex
ploitation.
The Holslwvik Odober upheaval of 1917 freed Hussia from
this partnnship in the exploitation of her colonies. Hussia cou
fiscatt>d foreign capital and became absolute ruler of the large
Ukrainian industry.
"Ju the course of the hi.�tory of colonial expansion of Russia
during the perir1J of Tsarism, her political, social and economic
relati,;ns with conquered people brought Yiviclly to the fore
these characteristic feature� of a general economic and historical
development which made Russia 'thi' prison of nations' ....
Tht' problem of tht' multi-national system of Hussian capitalism,
and of its colonial-national policy, is one of the most important
for the understanding of the entire social-economic and national
ecor<nmic development of Russia."60

ca P. La,hd1enko, op. cit., pp. 421 et seq.

CHAPTEl\ 5

RELATl01'S BETWEEN UKRA!l\E Al\D l\CSSIA
IN OTHER ECOKO�l!C S'cCTORS

Transportati01i
W1:. HAVE ILLVSHL-1.TED the relations between
Ukrair1e and R1��sia which existed during the period of the de
velopment of c<tpitr,lism in the provinces of land, industrial
capital and finac1ce capital. \Ve have shown that at the base lay
the colonial position and colonial exploitation of Ukraine. \Ve
could now comider our subject exhausted, at least as lo that
part \d1ich deals with the times hefore the revolution. As wc had
irnlic:tted at th<: beginning, it was 1iot our task to provide a
charaderistic �Jf the development of the national economy of
Ukraine. \Ve wPrc to show that the entire development, by its
direction, reach and economic consequences was determined
by 1hc existence of a colonial dependence of Ukraine upon
Hussia. More(wcr ,\c wished to sho,,· that the object of creating
there the kind of agrarian conditions and industrial development
v,,hicL were created was the extraction of the entire surnlus of
the production 0f Ukraine for the henefit of Hussia. Lt;ter, of
course, \Vestern European capital was drawn into the picture by
Hnssi.t. to tak<' part m this colonial exploitation.
Cconomic l"On<li1ions in the three sectors aualyzcd above
gi\'P ;, complch• rictnrc of the real nature of the whole economy,
bccan�c they arc thP same for the whole. The conditions which
were created here and cemented by it-gal norms of state econo
mic policy, ine,·itably had to spread to all economic processes
and all aspects of economic life, It made Ukraine, instead of be
ing part of a solid national-state ('C:Onomic body, a restricted ml
tional area called upon to serve the atiYancement of the state-me
tropolis. Ukraine, like other national areas comp1cred by Russia,
was not a "borderland," hnt a colony, which TT]adc possible Rus
sia's growth into a colonial empire.'. "Hussia's colonial policy of
the 17th and 18th centmies consisted of the same form of plum!-

Other Economic Rclatiom

197

ering the borderland colonies, although not on such a vast scale,
vet the plundering of Ukrainian localities, particularly during
ihc period ot the Muscovite state, was considcrahk. Therdore
jt would be erroneous to rnai..ntaiu that colonial sources were not
utili:t.ed both in the primary, as well as in the subsequent period
of capital accumulation."•
"le venture the opinion that the trnth of this thesis hecornes
i□-csbtible iu the light of the facts here cited which charactt·r
i:t.e the economic relations betwt'en Hussia ,md Ukraine. Capital
accumulation and economic development in Russia occurred
in Luge measurl' at tht· expense of h('r colonies, primari]�, of
tTkraine as the largest of them. It thwarted the e<:onomic growth
of Ukraine. Conditions in agriculture, industry and tinauce
irrefutablv attest to this.
\Ve will JKlll�l' for a short time Oil other sectors of economic
relations in order to find that they \Vl're also subject to colonial
exploitation.
\Ve will start with railroad ,·onstruction as a most important
brand, of e<:onomic activity, Of itself. it constitntcs a large in
dustr_v, and, without exception, determines the development of
all other aspects of the economy.
The attitude of Hnssia toward the bui\cling of railroads in
t:h:ti1w c:m he dividetL like industry, into two periods. .-\t frst
Hussia halted thl' Jeveloprnent of railro,td construction in
Ukrnine, just as she h,i.d halted the development of industry,
wishing to keep llkraint' on thl' level of supplier of rav., material
of agricultural production and consumer of H\lssia's industrial
production. Subsequent!�', when the natural wealth of l:kraine
opened \vide opportunities for industrial exploitation and con
tributnl to the den'lonnwnt of a large indu�try in Ukraine hy
Husso-Enropl'an capital, the attitude toward railroad construc
tion changed. Under the new conditions railroads he<"ame an
indispensable mc·ans toward the realizatio11 of industrial exploi
tation. The pace of the spreading of railroad co1incc-tions made
possible by the i11flnx of foreign capital began to outdist111ce
all other areas of the Empire, and finally placed Ckraine first
among all areas in length of rnil lines. Bnt even then the direc
tion of rail lines w:1s not determined hy the interests of llkrai11e,
only hy th!' ne('tls of capital t'xploiting her.
1

P. L1shc-lwnko, lsturiy" namd,mhr1 klio:::r,,iy�trn SSSR. II, 12.
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The first railroad between Petersburg and Tsarsko�·c Selo,
2.i kilometres in length, \Vas begun in 18:)i, Lt'. not much later
th-1n the hcginni11gs of railroads iu \\"estl'rn Europe. Almo�t
simultaneously the \\'2.rsaw-Vilna line was started, .322 kilo
metres long, and was completed in 184S. In 1851 work was
begun on the :\"ikolaevsky road bctwE"l'Il Petersburg and Mos
cow, G50 kilometres iu length. The latter cost the trcas11ry the
tlwn stagµ,ering amount of Ul million rubles. or 217,000 rub]f's
per kilometre, as against 2.3.000 ruhk� tor the \Varsaw-Vilna
line.
ln 1SS7, on th(' initiative of the Government, and with its
aid. the corporation "Glavno;,-·e Obshchestvo Hossiyskikh Zhelt>z
nyk!t dorog" ( Central Assoeiation of Hussian Hailroads) was
founded. It was to concentrate in its hands all further railroad
construction. Its capital \Vas set at 275 million rubles_ hut only
112 million rubles were subscribed, and within a few years it
was indebted to the treasury for S9 million rubles.
The principle of faying rml lines by this c011Joratio11 was
determined in the following onler: l) from Petersburg to \Var
saw and the German border, 2) from Moscow to Nizhni-Nov
gorod, 3) from \lo�rnw via Kmsk and Kharkiv to Theodosia in
the Crin:wa, a11d 4) from Kursk or Orel via Dinahurg to Libau.
Thus, one of these lines was to bisect Ukraine, connecting her
with Mmcow. But along with the construction of these frnnk
lines, feverish construction of railroads connecting �foscow
with producing regions went on. \Vithin hventy years from
the beginning of planned railroad constrnction in 1848, a net
work of lines was open connecting i\loscow with the following
rcgim,s: the Moscow"Kursk \inc brought to Moscow the pro
duce of the central chernozem rcµ:ion, the Moscow-Kozlovo
Vor011izh line brought grain from tlw Southeast, the Moscow
i\'izhni-NoYgorod connected it with the whole Volga and Kama
region, the Moscow-Petersburg line opened delivmies of grain
from the South to Petersburg, and all these lines together opened
distant markets to products of the :\Ioscow imlustrial region.
Ukraine was then being take.n into consideration when plans
were drawn laying out railroads, but only to the extent to which
it served the interests of Moscow. "The Imperial Government
was priimuily concerned with the construction of Russian lines,
in order to (t)mwct the ccn1ral manufacturing region with Baltic
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ports,": through ,,vhich came most of the imported raw material
for the t('xtile industry.
()11 Jy after !\\'enty years of railroad construction in Hussia
was the first lille in Ukraine built, beh"""n Balta and Odes.�a.
In 1862. when Russia already had 4,030 kilometres of railroads,
Ukraine had none. In the entire Sonth there was, at that time,
onlv a 73 kilometrc line hehveen the Volga and Don rivers. Hut
eY�ll after railroads had already been started in Ukraine, the
rate of construction lagged far behind Russia. (See Table

LXXX).

Year
1869
1871
Ib7'6
1879

TABLE LXXX
Length of Railroads ( in kilometres)
Ukraine
R11ssia
366
1,211
434
12,278
-587
17,652
l,(l.57
20.034

% t'krai,w
5.t)

3.5
3.3
. 5.3

•

Such a miserable percentage applied to Ukraine not onlv
with respect to railroads, but to roads in general: "In 1864. out
of a total of hard-surface roads of 7,664 kilometres, Ukraine
had only 942 kilometres, and even out of this the Kiev-Beresta
highway goes almost along the northern border nf South Russia
(Ukraine), the Kharkiv-Moscow and Kiev-Petersburg highways
h'.lrdlv penetrate Ukraine from the North, and the Simferopil
Scvastopil are insignificant in length."1
:--;eedless to say, this deeply affected the Ukrainian economy
with its \arg{' amount of commercial grain, cattle, sugar and by
thc11 al.�o coal. The cost of transporting one chelvcrt ( 360
pounds) of wheat a distance of 100 kilometres cost up to 2 rubles,
er almo�t 30% of the ya]ue of the wheat itself. We also must bear
in miud the specific conditions existing in Ukraine as to animal
dra\\'n transportation. First of all, autumnal rains and spring
thaws preclude all transportation in the black soil regions. Fur
ther. the winter ( in Russia this is the main season of transpor
tation, when a horse can pull three times as mnch on a sled) in
Ukraine is short and uncertain. The main thing is. however,
that in Ukraine most of the hauling was done by oxen and not
'lhid., p. :ll4,
"\I. SlahchenJ..o, Materia/ 11 ..., p..'312.
'N'. Yasnopolsky, "Ekonomichcskaya h1duchnost . . .," II, 77.

200

L'kraine und Russia

by horse:;. and d1.iring the winter no hauling by O.\("n was possible
becamt' the:, were used to grazing on the roach (200 feet wi<ll'_).
During th(• summer heat tlw:,· would not budgc, eitht·r. Thus,
the transportation perio<l was n•stride<l to .\pril-June and Ang
ust-October. a period of the greatest activity in the farm fields.
T n addition the pace of transportation by oxen was e.\tremely
slow. 10 to J.5 kilomdres per day, and, with the great distances
from seaports. the c1wnwks ( oxen teamsters) umld mauage to
make one ,uumal round trip, to the coast with grain, and hack
with fish or salt.
Under such cireumstanccs transport•ttion of goods required
a lot of manpower and other means. Tt is estimated that in the
Poltava region alone there wen• about 210,000 teamsters in the
1860\. Two-thirds of all c,u�oes taken i11 the ports of tbe ll\ack
and Oziv Sea were dclivt'red by chunw.ks. Altho11gh this pro
vided the peas:wts with some additional income, the time was
not free from labor in the fields, and thus was costlv. lt was
otherwisf' in the North. In addition, the financial loal of trans
portation costs fell upon thf' priee of grain, the basic product
of the peasants. The cost of h,mlinp; prodm.'c to l1krainiau mar
kets alnnf' amounted to 100 million rubles every vear.--·
The above cited is sufficient evidence for us to understand
how acut�ly Ukraine felt the need of an early development of
railroad C(•mmunications, and why the landlords of Uhainc
made such persistent demands upon 1\-Joscnw in this regard.
B11t "the matter was slowed down by l\,[oscmv patriots who,
!hrough t!wir mr,uthpiccc Moskm;.�ki Vcdomosti (an organ ofh
official cirdes) said that it is not so neccssar�· to cormect Ukrain
ian points witb Ukrainian export ccntt"rs, as to connect Russiah
with Ukraine, 11oscow with Kiev and Odessa, so that ties withh
T\Joscow 'the collector of Russian lands' shouhl not be weak
ened."'•h
The di\·crgent intc·rr·sts of Ukrairic and Russia were prob
ably wider in the matter of railroad b1ii\ding than in any otber
field. niis applied to thC' amo11nt of coustruction of lines, as
well as their direction. "ThC' internsts of the Ukrainian economy
<lema1;�kd that railroads shonld first be built from Ukrainian
cC'ntC'rs to Ukrainian Black Sea ports, and also to the \Vt'stern
borders of the Empire, i.e. the Austrian and Prussian (through
Poland), The hnpt>rial Government, under prC'ssure of t11C' Rnss Ihid., p, 78.

"\I. Slahcheriko, op, cit., p. 289.
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sian bourffe!eOisic_ cleci<led upon other directions of the first
Fkrainiall railroads ( in the first place .\foscow-KharkiY-Theodo
sia). This dirl'dion, as a hasic one, was inconYcnicn1 to tlw
Ukrainian economy. All<l if we t:onsidn that it put the brakes
on other projects of railroad cone>trnction in Ukraine, it is dear
tl iat it was detrimental to l1krain(:'. The problem of directions
of railroads caused all animated discussion. Even an official
Hu'>sian publication ( Central Statisticc1l Committee of t!H' i\fin
istrv of Internal 1\ffairs) stated in IS64 in a paper O napraden
i!Ji -zhcleznikh dorog ti Yugo-Zapacbwy llossiyi (011 the dire:·
tion of ntilroads in Southwestern Russia J that "after the termin
ation of the Crimean \Var all efforts of the state were concen
trated on the construction of railroads in the North, whereas the
S011th. the most productive part of l{nssia, remained neglected.
Soutlwrn Hussia is feeling more and more con\'inc(•d that her
interests are. in the eyes of the CovcrnnK'nt, in second place,
and that the income of the entire state i� being directed toward
tlw benefit and convenieuce of its northern part. lf such con
yictirm t akes root it can bring about a complete dis1mity of the
int<'rests of the :\forth and of the Sonth."•
By means of this policy of railroad construction the H.nssian
Government of the timf' (up to the 1880's) desired to accom
plish two ends: first of all to secure the economic dependence
of Ukraine npon t he metropolis, and in the second place to pro
mote more actiYit� in the Baltic ports which were of much
more interest to the Petersburg and 1·foscow industrial areas
than Black Sea ports. This caused an artificial routing of Ukrain
iau grain over great distances, and as a result there was a high
differential land rent on the realization of the products of the
L1krainian agricultural economy, in the form of a difference of
transportation costs. In the balance of goods aecmmting, the
profitability of a unit of land in Hussia increawd thereby.
"Ukraine suffered from thi� n:ry much, being obliged to
ship grain too far. The relationship between exports through
Baltic and Black Sea ports was, in the form of a percentage Of
the Empire's total exports, as shown in TaTJle LXXXT. Thus, com
JJ1t'ns11rate with the increase of the railroad network the partici
pation of the Baltic- increases at tlw expense of the participation
of the Black Sea, adjat:ent to whose shores were directly localed
the exporting regions of Ukraine, J..:nban and the Don Cossack
1

7

0.rOhlobl)'n, Peredkapitalistychna fabryka, p. 172.r
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TABLE LXX.\l

1872
1873
f

lf7-I

Ha/tic
�:'.i
::Ooh,
lYi
,J/'.,-

187.J
187(3

Hlu,:k Seu
r,9:;:
;JT!
61'.f
.31'>
t3<;
37'.f

region. Only after railroad construction ( in the South) was in
creased considerably did a process in the reverse of the one
indicated above begin taking place."8
The amount of the surplus profit which fell to the seller of
1-l.ussiau �rain urn..ler these circumstances can he pretty accurate
ly imagined from the comparison in Table LXXXII, of prices of
whc-at and rye in Odessa and Petersburg in 1874 (per unit of
one cheti:ert-160 pounds).

Wheat
Ryt'

TABLE LXX.\JI
Petersburg
12 to 16 mbl1:.s
7.8 to 8 n,hJe<;

Odessa
8 to 14 rubles
, J.7 to 7 mbles

•

Tt would seem that the needs of the Ukrainian economy for
railroad couuectiom hctween its producing regions and the
Black Sea. and the general need of railroads in Ukraine were
quite obvious. But, as we ha\'e already 11oted, until the end of
the 1870.s, Ukraine was in reality outsidt> of the plans of rail
road construction. At the same time in Russia, np to 1877 private
capital amounting to 878 million rubles and 1.833 million in state
railroad loans had alrea<ly been spent on railroads. r-.fon,over,
even iater_ when \Vcstern European C'apital i11tNw·m:d in the
matter of railroads in Pkrainc, the proposition of a large-scale
rnnnectio11 with ports of the Black Sea encountered a deter
mined opposition of Hussian commer('ial and in<lustri,tl circles,
"which \.Vere stubborn in trying to prove by all possible means
that it would be a useless loss of money, n.b. not their own,
but foreip:n British, French .and German lo build railroads to
thC' l3laf'k Sea. They maintained that freight from Black Sea
� ?\-1. Slabchenko, op. rit _ p. 278

"//,id., p. 27-t
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ports to :\farseilles or London is too high compared with the
closer naltic network of ports, aml the amount of goo<ls too
small. Furthermore, they saitl, many loads of grain come to the
ports of the Black Sea by water of the Dnipro, Don and Buh, or
ll\· O.\Cll froin nearer regions. Only a SJllal! part can he hauled
by rail. Therefore, railroads in Ukraine will never become an
importmit mean� of trnnsportating grain a11d they will be unable
to compete with the dieap chumak. " 10
Basic change> in the matter of railroad construction took
place in Ukraine in the 1880's un<ler the pressure of new condi
tions in the Ukrainian coal mining and metallurµ;ical industries,
in whose conquest Hussian and ,vestern European finance cap
ital were verv much interested.
The already then impressiYe network of railroads in Russia,
amJ its further increase, represented a great demand for coal
and metals. Satisfying those needs a� heretofore, by imports, be
c,11ne difficult because of the lack oJ forei�n exchange. ln addi
tior1. hand in hand with the C'ompwst of Ukrainian industry by
Husso-F.uropcan capital, the official policy of the state, as has
been noted ahove, changed also. fn the order of 1857 entitled
Polo:::.heniyc ob osnornikh 11slodyakh dla ustroystva zheleznikh
dorog i; Rossiyi ( Order concerning !Jasic conditions of railroad
co11struction in Russia), section 18 permitted duty-free importa
tion of all material used in railro.id construction (rails, cars,
engines, steel, etc). Hut already during the rnnstruction of the
Kursk-Kharkiv line the Government required that "rails, cars,
l'tc. m:e<led for the construction of the line must be purchased in
Hmsia i11 such quantities as Hm�ian factories are able to sup
ply."'' Only the amount which could not be supplied by domcs
fr- factories rnuld be imported without duty. Subsequently,
the rt'strir·tions became more stringvnl.
A <lut�· was also imposc<l 011 coal. and it was being increased
all the time. The proprietors of the Ukrainian coal and metal
industry, TTmsian and French banks, desirous of monopolizing
the market, did everything ·within their power to isolate the
market from foreign lands. This helped increase the importance
of UkraiIJian industry in the economy of the railroads, and simul
tan('ously in the entire economy of the Empire. Under these
circ11m.�tancr>s. railroad c-onstruction in Ukraine became an acute
70

\I. Yavorsky, Ukraina v ernku kartitalism, II, 78.
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rn:ct'ssity, flowing from tht' needs of fimmce capital. Tht: \f-iiiistcr
of Finance. KokO\tse\· gavt' a dear pictnrc of the situation in
his letter to the French banker, Verncuil. Although the letter
rdns to a rnbseqnent pniod ( 1908 in connection with tlw con
struction of �he North-Donets railroad), nevertheless it charac
terizes completely the motives of foreign capital in the develop
meut of railroads in Ukraine, it reads: "This matter interests
the Hussian Covcrrnneut, which admits the whole importance of
railroad constr11dion in H.ussia, but it intnests equally Frcuch
capitalists who investe(\ their capital in coal aud metallurgical
enterprises of the Donets basin. I am even convinced that thcs(·
enterprise� will not be- able to exist, build up and grow other
wise tliu11 with the aid of the !\"orth-Donets railroad. \Vithout
this railroad coal enterprises will 11ot bf' able to transport all
their prodnction, and metallurgical plants will not have orders
of which they are acutely in need.""
Th(• Katerynska railroad was started in 1879 which conm:t:ted
the iron on· region of Kryvyi Hih with the Donets coal basin.
From that lime on, railroad construction went at a fast pal'l',
f
declining during the pniod of l'rises in the late 189f s and pi<:k
iug up again after l!J07 Hailroad construction was partienlarly
intt'nsin· in_the Donbas itself. ln 1891, there were ouly 118 kilo
metres o'f railroads there; in 1893, they grew to 1.091 kilometres;
in 1896, to 2,272 kilomC'tres, and in 1898 to 2,865 kilonlt'tres. At
the outbreak of the rcvolntion in 1917 Ckrainr posscsse,i the
railroads shown in Table LXXXIII. Of this, 14,770 kilometres
TABLE LXXXlll
Name
Donds
Sontlwm
K aterynska-�loscow-Kiev-\" onmi7h
S,mthw,-.stern
Odessa
Total

l.1'ri1dh i11 kilometres.
:1.so.1.8.
:l,270.0.

-t.B:12.6
:1.-110.8

1.12,'J.0
16,(103.S kilomdres

were within the borders of l)kraine, out of the total of 70,:100 in
the whole Empire or 21;1:_,.,
From a land almost without railroads, Ukraine soon bt"camc,
in regard to rai\ro:uls, the best equipped territory of the Empire.
l� :>J. \':maµ, "Finansoviy k�pital ,. Rossiyi nakunne mirnniv ,·ovn,·." p. 111.
"" P. );\imin, for. cit. , and Rolshaya Sodctskaya Er1tsikfopcdi,1; \'ol. 5.5 ,.
['SSR. p. 374.
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For each 1,000 square kilometres of .area Ukraine had 23.7 kilo
nwtn·s of railroads, as ag,1iust 22.3 kilometres in the ccntrnl
black ,oil :1rea; 17.9 kilometres in the central industrial, a11d
17.) kilometres in the \\'c�tern area. ln the Urals there were
,it that t:rnc only 2.2 kilomctr<'s of rnilrna<ls p('f 1,000 sqnarl'
kilonwtres, in Siberia, l kilometre, and iu the Far East only
5 kilometres.''
Fit1ancial sources out of which railroad construction was
undertaken \H'rG the state budget an-d state loans, floated in the
main aLroaU, and private capital. mostly foreign as far as
Ukraine is mucerned.
Initially, as has been statetl above, the Imperial Government
started building railroads out of the state budget, Lut subse
qm•ntly the so-called "conression s;-·:stem" was applied. fts ob
jectiYC \\·a:,, widc-sprc-ad attraction of foreign capi!al. It existed
11 util _!.',JD, that is prior to widespread cmistruction in Ukraine.
The Covernment looked with great favor on associations which
took conC(!osions for railroad c011stri1ctio11, and gave thC'm vcr�
conYt'11ient terms. Fir:,,t of all the Co\"ernmcnt guaranteed iutcr
est and profit on honds, as well as payment of homls. These
guarantees were issued not to the associations, bnt to each bond
holder. The same principle was later applied to shares. Jn ad
dition, the Government knowingly permitted inflated cost esti
mates, thus facilitatiug the issue of more bonds. The stock cap
it.11 was supposed to constitute hchvcen one-thinl and one-fifth
of the cost estimate, but in reality it was ouly one-ninth, one
twC'lfth_ and lat<"r even one-nineteenth. The fact of the matter
is that frequently the s.11bs.cription of capita[ was cntirc!y ficti
tious. The sale of govcniment-guarantced bonds was t:omplete
[y free of control and the foundn� would subscribe lo certain
blocks of bonds at low prices, sell part of them at a higher price
and eukr !he differC'ncc as the payment of their own subscrip
tion price.
l t w::,s a process of artificial euriehmcut of Hussiau entrf'
prenenrs at the expense of the state budget, and this gaye them
the initiatin: to build more railroads. Eveu the railroads which
\ nTe built <lirecth· out of the budget were, when finished,
h1rned oyer to these corporations. Hy 1881, all railroads, with the
1

'·

'' f'. h.hr(l]11ov_ Ekm,umiclu:skmw m;c[itil}t Ro.1·.,ir1i
... p. ,'337.
,.-, K. Zagurskiy, 1-:kmwmiku /ra�,.�rwr/fl ( Ecow"";I f!i 'J'nmsporlflti,m), i\l"sum, l\-l,10, p. 270.
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..
25,676
28,890
3:),050
54,374
. 61,49,'3
67,253
70,525

577
.'510
193
120
134
137
130

C,ipiLt11

in lwll(!.,

2,259
2,602
3,249
4,006
4,35.'5
4,515
4,705

Ctipit(ll

Tntat

TABLE LXXXIV

1 ,682
2Jt02
3,036
3,886
4,221
4,378
4,,575

l'krainc and Hm�ia

im -c,1 m1?nt

31-14
43!:J4
4084
l'>H-.14
1,599
2,361
2,97K

,, tlditimwl

H

2,-573
3J)41
3,662
4,825
."i,954
,
6,876
7,683

t'X('eption of one narrow-gauge liue, were in pri\'ate hands.'"
Beginning in I f-:iSO, after the abandonmPnt of thl' concession
sy�tem, the state took over railroad constrnction. and soon be
gan to purchase private railroads, amullg; them also those which
had previously been state-owned.
On these operations of transferring railroads to private cor
porations and thC'n buying them back and on the guarantees
of bonds and shares, the Government suffered considerablt'
losses.
Capital invested in railroad construction is shown in Tab/C'
LXXXIV ( in millions of gold rnbles). This total of 7.7 billion

�

]t
1885
1890
1895
1900
1905
1910
1!:113

;n.1haws

JG Ho/,<;l/1/ya Sodetska ya Entsil.lopcdiya, Vol. 24, p. j6()_
17 Ibid., Vol. 24, p. 762. See also, L Glh·its, Zhelezndelatclnaua promysh
lennost' Rossiyi, p. 114, is I/Jid.

rubles consisted of 4.7 billion rnbles of state and private corpor
ation loans and 3 billion rublt's out of the state budget."
Out of the 4.7 billion rubles borrowed, 2.7 billion can be
apportioned to state loans and 2 billion to loans of private cor
porations. R1tt evi:11 in the latfrr 2 hillion there is a certain share
of the treasury, and prior to the purchase of private railroads
by the state, the state had contributed up to 90% of the capital
of these private enterprises. Table LXXXV indicates, at ten-year
intervals. the accumnlation of pri\"ate capital in railroad construc
tion, and the part of the treasury in it ( in milliom of rubles).
Thus, even nut of 1.990 mi1lion rubles which were, on the
eve of \Vork1 \Var l, in the hamls of private capital, one-fourth

Lrmlc(lh of
railrMd
( kil<m1ct w~)
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TABLE LXXXV
Shares
Bonds
Total

1873
f,3f,

J,l.'55

1,791

Treasur y ill above
8-1.5.
Shares . .
7,'i4.l.
Bond,,
Treasury g uarantee
and other
,3(),'5.1
Total · · · · · . . . . . . . 1,143.7
In percellta ges of total
6.3.8
amount of capital.

1883

67.'5

1 ,SOO

2,11:,

/903

1893

406

1:31
l,J51
1,682

1,744

2, l.';0

W13

130

1,8/-HJ
1,990

12.7
891-4.

851

26!J..5

265.7

869.7
1,873,8

876

1.727

106,7
376.2

217.6
483.3

22.3

24.,3

90.2

80.4

"

belonged to lhc treasury. VVc may therefore figure that out of
7.683 million rubles capital in the railro.ads, 6,173 million rubles,
or 80.5%, belonged to the treasury, and only 1,507 million rubles,
or 19.5'0, to private capitaL It is therefore permissible to consider
the railroads in the Hussian Empire as nationalized. This is of
prime significance for the determination of the role played by the
railroads as an arm of the state economic policy and in regard
to colonial exploitation. In this regard we can come to full agree
ment with the conclusions of Soviet Russian economist�. Albeit
the conclusion was not a(klressed to themselves, nevertheless it
is to the greatest extent applicable to Hussia: "Colonial railroads
were, in the hands of capitalist countries, siphons for dra,ving
from the colonies raw material, a means of colonial exploitation
of the col01lics in all forms, and finally, a mt'ans of their political
cnslavenwnt. The policy of state acquisition of railroads of the
colouies was in this respect in accord with this objective, and
profitable to foreign finance capital which, on the one hand,
bleeds the colonies, drawing off local capital and preventing its
entry into industry, and, on the other hand, strengthens its
strategic positions in the national economy." 00
This is corret:t because by this means the state takes into its
hands such a very important economic factor, as railroad tariffs.
Utilizing this factor, the state has au opportunity to exert a basic
inflnencc upon the entire et:onomy of the land. "Tariff 1mmage
ment, instih1ting these, or other tariff payment has as its object
the inflm•nce 11pou the course and de,·elopmcn! of <'conomi<;
life of the land in thos,• <lircdinns which, in the opi11ion of the
'" Dnfalwya Sovict,1ka11a Entsiklo pcdiya. loc. r-it.

"" Ibid. , Vol, 2,1, p. 738.
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Government, represent at the given time, what is desirable from
the general-state viewpoint," aml "to solve such problems, as
to which areas arc to enµ;agc in agriculture, which ill animal
husbandry, which in cxJ-raC'ling or manufacturing industries, and
which arc not to do �o, what roads and directions appear to be
the m,Jst attractive for commercial rclatiom, etc." By means of
raising and lowering railroad tariffs, the Government has the best
oppnrhmit� to realize its economic policy in the direction "of
the best (from the standpoint of the Govcmmenfs interest
Authot) repartition of C'apital and prodnctive forces of the land
among the various forrns of in<lustry and commerce, among the
various producing regions and commercial-industrial centers.""'
Such was the significance ascrihcd to railroad tariffs in the
c·crnmmic policy of the state, hy one of the grcate.\t Hussian ex
perts in this matter, Professor K. Zagorskiy. And we must state
that the Hussian Government made full use of lhis economic
fulcrum in its colonial policy. A State Tariff Commission \vas
established in 1889, aud it was givcn the po\vcr to ciraw up
tariffs both for state, as well as for private railroads. It worked
out a very complicalc<l system of tariffs, depending upon the
nahire of tht• freight and the distance in the form of so-called
differential t_ariffs, i.e. progressive lowering of the freight rate
per pood-kilomctrc ( 36 pounds per two-thirds mile) on long
hauls,
Gkrainc \vas plat:c<l in a much \\-'orse position thau Hussia
in all rcspeds, he it in the matter of tariffs according to the
1tomc1wlatmc of goods, or tariffs according to distance of haul
age. :\loreover, different freight taritts applied to identical loads
on Hnssian and Gkrninian railroads. Thns. the frC'ight tariff 011
grain in Ukrninc was one-thirty-second kopecks per pood-kilo
mctrc. whilt' in Russia it was one-fortieth to one-fiftkth ko
pcl'ks." "The losses of grain producers at the place of produc
tion, because of high tariffs and disorder on railroads amounted
to no less than 15 kopC'cks per pood, or between 6 and 7..5 rubles
per dcsiatyna of land, dcpcmling upon the har\'cst.''"'
It is fit to recall here that the gross profit form 1 dcsiafyna
of land i11 !he steppe area of t:krainc amounted to 4.5 to ,5 rubles.
The ('.\CCssivc tariff load on Ukraine can be jud ged from such
''" '.\!. Sbhd1cn1rn, ,,p. di.. p. ,]:::!].
K. Zagornkiy, op. cit., p. 17D.
"" �. R,lt.<ig, /<'iw1t1s0t·aya po/itika Rossi!)i ,1· 1887 g. (Russia's Financial
l'oliq1 Since 1887), St. Petersburg, 1903, p. 39.

�1
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fa('ts. For example, in 1900 the freight on 36 pounds of grain
from Chicago to New York cost 11.2 kopecks for a distance of
1,378 kilometres, and for the same distance between Kherson
and i\loscow it was 22.!56 kopecks, which was the e(tt1ivalcnt
of 35c; to 4(Yk of the value of the grain at the place of its origin.
The same applies to other products. ,ve have noted already
that the tariff on coal from Shakhtna in the southerly direction
of the Oziv Sea was higher then in the northerly, or :\foscow
direction. Coal mining industrialists attempted to prove that "in
connection with high tariffs we have such misunderstandings
that a pood of coal costs 23 to 25 kopecks, in Kharkiv ( the cost
pric� at the mine being 45 to 5 kopecks) while wood, a more
expensive fuel, costs ill the same city of Kharkiv 15 to 17 ko
pecks per pood."""
Hussian industrialists stood firmly behind this tariff policy
of the Government. It was so favorable to them that iI1 1896, when
tariffs on grain were being revised, they <lemamled "protec
tion of Central Russia from the competition of 'borderlands,'
basing their demands upon the historical merits of the center in
the matter of the establishment of the Russian state."25
Ou this occasion the tariff struggle agaiJJst the central man
ufacturing region was renewed. That region had for a long
time considered itself the exclusive supplier of manufach1red
good� to Ukrn.ine. At the commerce and indu�try meeting in
Odessa, \Veislein, the mill-owner, said: "For a distance such as
that between 1foscow and Odessa, the freight on textile in inland
transportation ( within Ukraine) costs 1 rnble, 15.9 kopecks per
pood, and in through transportation (into UkraiI1e), 41.0S ko
pecks, i.e. on goods coming out of Moscow the tariff is lowered
by 6,5% .... A representative of the stock-exchange committee,
Pctakoros, showed that the railroad tariff policy caused a reced
ing of freights from such regions hordering directly on Odessa,
as Bessarabia, to Koenigsberg and Danzig. The system of differ
ential tariffs had a considerable influence upon the loss of grain
loadings by the port of Ode�sa particularly because the only
railroad leading to the port goes in a very crooked line."2n
\Ve need not pause to consider the particular tariff items
as to each form of goods. It is sufficient to cite in general that
"the total income of Ukrainian railroads in 191:3 was 31S.206
"' !II. Slabchenko, op. cit., p. ,125.
"" \I. Sbbclwnko, np. cit., p. -319.

"'Ibid., p. -321
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thousand rnbles, which is the equivalent of 16,400 rubles per
kilometre (,.;erst). If we comrare the net profit of Ukrainian
railroads ( property of the Russian Go\·ernment) with the net
profit of railroads in all other lands, it appears that the profit of
the Ukrainian railroads was the highest in the world.''27
\\'hen we recall that the Government guaranteed railroad
shares and bonds as to fixed income, then the annual payments
of the (;overnment lo the operators of Russian railroads were
"11ofoinµ; else bu� a system of money grants and premiums. paid
out not directly from the treasury. but through the intermediary
of railroad ticket offices," grar1ts really going to Hussian industry
an<l commerce."'
But this is not the end of the matter. A� we shall see later
the load of interest payments and capital retirement of state
loans incurred for the eonstrnction of railroads, fell in greatest
measure upon Ukraine, though the railroads wen� built all over
Russia.
"'.'Jot only the tariffs, opeuly protective of Russia hurt the
economy of Ukraine, hut it suffered no less from the
direction of railroad connections. Just a look at a map of Ukraine
convinces one that the m,iiu objective of railroad construction
in Ukraine was uot the safeguarding of the economic iuterests
of the area. The trunk lines go only in one dirf'ction, North
South. The North is connected with all the main producing
areas of Ukraine, agricultural, sugar, metallurgical and coal min
ing, while withill Ukraine there are no tnmk lines hetween
tlwsc are,1s. From \Vest to East Ukraine has in rnality only one
direct rail line, Kovel-Sdrny-Kiev-Poltava-Donbas. All the otlwrs
are indirect and, considering the high tariff, contribute great
ly to the incre,1se of costs nf trausportatiou in likrai11e. The
whole South of Gkraine hclow Katervnoslav has 110 west-east
lines at all. Such localities, as e.g. the triangle between K:hc-rson,
Niknpol and \fp]itopol, which hy arc-a is almost as large as all
of Hdginrn and produces huge quantities of commercial grain,
have no feeder line at all. Many villages are located between 30
and ,50 kilometres from the uearest railroad station, in a land
where, during the trackles;, spring and fall seasons, even a
distance of 10 kilometres is insurmountable. \Vith a lack of hard
snrfacPd roads, transporting goods by horse even a short dis"' S. O�t.qwnko, "Kapitali7m r1a Ukraini," p. 201.
L Z,1gnrsl..iy. "T'· cit., p. 184.
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tance frequently doubled the cost of the load. It must be noted
that the products of the Ukrainian economy are goods of great
bulk and weight and are priced low per unit of weight. Costs
of transportation reflect heaviiy on priee.
.\'either must we forget that Ukraine had very poor connec
tions with seaports, in no way commensurate with the real in
terests of the Ukrainian economy. Ukraine's largest port, Odessa
has only two tnmk lines, and one of them, Odessa-Petersburg
(Leningrad) goes along the fonncr frontier, and is of importance
only to the sugar refining industry. The other, O<lessa-Bakhmach,
does not connect the sea with either the metallurgical, or the
coal region. Other ports, such as rviykolaiv and Kherson, have
only one trunk line. lt is also without direct connection to indus
trial regions, and the latter Kherson-�Ierda (Kharkiv) which
was only completed after World \Var J, is used principally for
hauling grain and other agricuHura.l products to .\Ioscov,'. T11c
coal producing region is only connected with the port of .\fariu
pil, and the metallurgical region with au undeveloped port of
Berdyansk. Both ports are on the unimportant Sea of Oziv. One
other line leads from the Donhas to Taghanrog, also on the Sea
of Oziv, but it is beyond Ukraine.
'With the North, however, all industrial regions are connected
by many direct trunk lines. To the two previous lines between
the Donbas and 1foscow, another one has recentlv been added,
via Starobilsk Luhanske ( Voroshilovgrad).
As a result of such specific layout of railroad directions,
freight loads, in the absence of direct and short conl!ections with
Ukrainian ports, went to the great trnnk lines connecting Ukraine
with the North. Therefore "The Kursk-Kharkiv-Oziv railroad
hauled the same grain both north and south
The Kiev-Be
resh:a railroad south and towards the \vestern border.""r
Lt is not surprising therefore, that the "most overloaded li11es
were those which cmmected the Donbas and Kryvyi Hih with
the center ( l\Io�cow ), Leningrad and the Volga region. Over
them were hauled the main loads of coal. iron ore, metals, lum
ber, grain, mineral building material, both within Ukraine, as
well as beyond Ukraine·s borders:·""
The development of railroads in Ukraine ,\·as thus sub
servient to the general goal: tying the Ukrainiau economy with
"� D. Chnprov, Zheleznodoro:dmoye khoz[[aysti.:o (Railroad "Jlanagnnent),
�lnscow. 1897, H. pp. 6D-70.r
so Bolsh.
Sot>ietsli. Entsikl., Vol. 55, p. 728.
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the metropolis and making it dq,endent upon it. Western Euro
pean t·apital, ,vhich played such an important part in the devel
opment of these railroads, was likewise interested in this layout.
That tapital, in partnership with Hussian finance capital, thus
automatically assured itself a monopolistic repartition of the
products of Ukrainian industry on the markets of Russia.
llence, the nature of the Ukrainian raillroad economy was
incomp:i.tihle with the total interests of Ukraine. This reflected
her colo11ial position and not the re(111irements of internal com
men:ial-imlustrial exchange of goods, nor foreign tics dictated
by natural conditions. This explains the disproportion between
external and internal railroad operations in Ukraine, as compared
with Hussian regions like the central-agricultural, or the Volga,
not to mention the central industrial regions. Table LXXXVI
indicates the percentage relationship behveen external ( through)
and internal (home) railroad connections.
TABLE LXXXYI
Regwn

Centr,d ngriculturnl
Yolg.i rc,gion
Southern Ukrniile
Southwestern Ukraine

Extern.al connection Internal connection

42.1%
47.0%
75.4%
72.8%

57.19%
53.0�,
24.6'.f
27,2�
31

Beside the harm from the tariff policy and the railroad lines,
the routing of the external trade of Ukraine to its natural sea
ports was in great measure stymied by the condition of the ports
and freighter fleet. The Hussian Government, interested in in
n·easing operations on the Baltic, and directing traffic to Baltic
ports by tHPans of its tariff policy, deliberately neglected the
development of harbors and shipping in the Black and Oziv
Sea. The Ukrainian coast of the n...·o seas has eight ports, of
which the three Crimean (Evpatoria, Sevastopol and Yalta)
are of uo commercial importance. To the remaining five, we
must add .Mykolaiv am! Kherson, situated on the est11aries of
the rivers Bob and Dnipro. These seven ports are numerous and
well enough located to take care of all the needs of Ukrainian
commerce, but in reality were far from fulfilling their destiny.
31

P. Lil.slichcnko , op. cit., p. 365.
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The finest and largest of all Ukrainian harbors, is Odessa,
followed in size and importance by Mariupil, the harbor serving
the Donbas and Kryvyi Rih. But even these two principal ports
were very poorly equipped. "Berths, for example, were very
small. Foreign ships sometimes had to wait for a month an<l a
half for their turn to unload. Docks were awkwardly located. In
Odessa the location of the ooal harbor was such that ships could
uot be berthed lengtlm-isc."''"
General i11:1der1uacy, and in some localities a complete lack
of river shipping, also had its detrimental influene:c upon
Ukrainian overseas commerce. Specific layout of railroads and
expensive and difficult r ail deliveries of goods to seaports
created a real need for cheap and easy river trahnsportation,
which was not forthcoming. Ukraine possesses rivers that are
conveniently loe:ated for commercial purposes. Three great riv
ers flow through Ukraine from north to south, the Dnister,
Southern Boh and Dnipro. The big bend of the latter around
Katerynoslav-Zaporozhe encompasses the metallurgical region
and comes very close to the Donbas. Donbas in turn, is bisected
by the river Donets, the largest tributary of the Don. It, in turn
connects the coal region with the Sea of Oziv. All those rivers
have tributaries from \Vest and East, covering all Ukraine with
a fairly deuse network
The Dnister, 1371 kilometres long, has nine important tribu
taries, which arc hardl�· used for shipping at all. The river itself
is used for shipping along only about 800 kilometres although
it is navigable mu<'ll farther Nurth than this. !vfatters arc much
worse with the Boh, 750 kilometres long, where steamers go only
between Vozncsensk and :\lykolaiv, a distance of 100 kilometres.
The principal river, Dnipro, 2,150 kilometres long, of which
IAOO is in Ukraine, is utilized for navigation along almost its
entire length, with the exception of 80 kilometres of rapids ( at
present flooded and locked, following the construction of the
Dnipro Electric Power Station). Its tributaries, Pr�·piat and
Desna, are also navig:.i.ble, But hardly any of the other nine
large tributaries, as well as the tributaries of the Prypiat and
Dcsua, arc navigable, because of a complete neglect of the regu
lation of their flows. Similarly on 1hc river Doncts, in the part
\Yfoch flows through Ukraine, there is no navigation.
:<2 ;\I. Sl.,hdwnko, op. cit., p. 291.
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The large watPT arPas with an annual water (leficit which
are so badly needed by the Ukrainian economy are not properly
utilized because this would aid the economic consolidation of
the Ukrainian 1iational territory contrary to Hussian interests.
"!liver navigation in the South does not aid the economic de
vdopmcnt of the land. For each inhabitant there is only 25
poun<ls of river fn·ight for a charge of 73 kopecks, while in Hus
sia, in the North it is 300 pounds ±or 3.5 rubles. If, for the better
ment of South Russian communications, both by water and by
land, thus far as much had been <lone as in the North, the re
sults would be greater for all of llussia than herf'toforc, because
the immense natural wealth makes the land of the South more
suitable for wider development than the North."""
All these circumstances, point to a situation where the
Ukrainian seas were far from carrying out the task commensur
ate with natural con<litions.
The privileged position of the Baltic ports, uphelrl by the
Government, and the niggardly equipment of the Black Sea in
tonnage of home registry, influenced existing comHtions.
In their competition with Baltic ports, lower shipping rates
were as necessary as favorable railroad connections and pro
tective railroail tariffs. The freight 011 36 pounds of grain from
Odessa to London \Vas in the late 1890-s 24 kopecks, while from
Baltic ports it was only 13 kopecks. "H is not surprising, there
fore that the latter have such prc-cmi11ence over Southern
ports."3·1
Freight cost was in large measure also heavily influenced by
the la,·k of balance between ocean imports and exports. Steam
ships had to go empty to Ukraine. In 1912, in the main ports of
the Black and Oziv Sea 3,718.4 thousand tons \Vere loaded for
overseas shipment, while only 41G thousand tons were un
loaded.·'·'
During the s:une period 75% of tlw ships arriving at the ports
of the Baltic Sea came fully loa(led.
\Ve kn-e a different picture in coastwise shipping, i.e. basic
ally an iutra-Ukraiuiau sea trade. Against 1,766.4 thousand tons
of lmdi11�;�. Wl' have 2,l.'39.2 thousand Ions of unloadings. These
figures would have bee!l much higher if the ports had not been
workillµ: 1111der lmndicaps described above, because, in spite of
-,_, \I Y."""l"'l.sk;-. 011. l'it., TT, 71'. "' \I. l":11,no pnl,ky, "/). cit .. I. 2:·Vi.
:,,, T. Fc,,h('h('ukn-Cl1opivsky, Fkonomic"lma hcohrnjiya U ·rain y, p. SI.
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all difficulties. the advantages of shipping via the Black Sea
,n"rf' indi\pntahlc, The 1rright cost of ;3fj ponn<ls of oil products
from Batum via O<lessa to Kharkiv ,vas 38.2 kopcch, and to Kiev
:13J:i kopecks in �pite of the high railroad tariff in Uhaint'. At
the same timt', t!"ansporting the same quantity and prodnd by
rail via Tsaritsin (Stalingrad), l'Wn at the low railroad tariff
on Hussian railroa(ls cost respPctivcly 42.2 kopecks and 46.9
kopt>cks.
This comparison is all the more applicablt• to transportation
exclusively by water. Thirty-sLx poun<ls of freight from Odessa
to Vladivostok in the Far East cost 51 kopecks and never more
than 1 ruble, 12 kopecks. Transportation over the same distance
via Siberian railroad cost 12 rubles.
But in �pitc of everything, in spite of the obvious aclvautagt's
of 11ti!izin_g southern sea rontcs, and in spiir' of the undeniable
need to connect the commerce of Ukraine with her geographical
position. the polic:y nf the Russian Government remained un
changed. Grain deliveries to ports t>f the Black Sea, at a tinw
when exports of grain wen: on the ilwrease frequently declined
011 a large scale. Grain dclivcriPS tn Black SPa ports ,verc ( in
tho1isands of tons j as shown in Table LXXXVII.
TABLE LXXX \Tl

JfW.'i
IS9G.
18\17,.

Z,823.(;
2,5!:J8A
l ,8S!J.fin

urns.
1.89D.
moo.

S.SfH.On
l.870.8n
1,704.0n

"

At the same time we can obser-..c such a phl'nomcnon in
dissonance with natural conditiorn, as an increase of overland
exports. Thcrf' was such a paradoxical situation: exports df'
elincd ,vhcn tlw French Govcrnrn(•nt reduced duties to a miui
mulTl, anJ increased whf'n, in consequence of large imports
from abroad, the Frcnch tariff wa� i11creased by 287'. "The fact
that foreign countrie�· demand declined, released the brakes
upon dom(•stic trade.".--.,
13rakes upon dome�tic trade experienced by L'kraine ,vere
more effective than a boom on fureil'.Q-1 markets. Things ca111e
to such a sht_e:e that the Sonthwestern Hailroad attempted to
escape the rnlt' of the �Iinistrks of Transportation an<l of FiJt

M.nSlabchenko, op. dt.. p. 2D4. "' lhid., p. :!\:16.n

:Zlt:i
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nancc and "to condude a separatC' agrcPrnC'nt with German
rnilrrnHls to combat Hussian protl'diouism hy lowering tlic
tariH 011 irnportPrl good, and exported sug;ir."...Tliis dearlv shO\vs why so little attention was bcillg paid to
the problem of rebuilding a home commercial fleet on the
soutl,cm seas, which had been nearly destroved i11 the Crimean
\\.ar
T('ll ports of the llkrainlau coast, irwluding Sevastopol h:id,
at the outbreak of \Vorld \Var I, a lutal of ,'310 ships with a 11d
of 20U.0fJO 1ous, and 657 eoastwisc ships weighing 25.:3()0 tons.
Tht> an•rage weight of one seagoing vessf'l \Vas mm tons. and of
a coastwise vessel ,'38 tons. Both the numbers, as well as the ton
nage of ships, JHOYide dear evident:t' of the absolutf' dispropor
tion between the 1ttcans of water transportation and commercial
tonnage of Ukrnirw. At that we must bear in mind that !5,S'{ of
all ocean-going and 62% of all coastal shipping was handled
by Odessa. Tht> rcmaindc•r has to he apportioned among the
other nine ports. of which e.g., Skadcwsk, a good harbor close
to a \Yl's1lthy region. had only one ve��el of 7 tons.
l1 nder such circumstances the role of a honw commercial
fleet in water transportation was ,er;: iusignihcant. \\'hereas
the partidpition of domestic ships in transporti11g goods of the
European part of the Empire was equal to l 1.8%, in the Black
and Oziv Seas in 1912 it was only ,'5.8%. British ships handled
47.!)'.l.', Greek lo.l'.Y, Austrian-Hungarian 101, and others lesser
amo11nts..89
The situation in river trarn;:portation was no better. On the
entire Dnipro river with all its trihutarit>s there \\-'ere only ] 87
freight-passengl'r steamers, total tonnagP, J.:3,500 tons, arid 177
barges. On the Dniskr there were 14 steamers a11d 7 barges,
and so on. As of 1900 the e11tire import and export trade of tht>
Empire by waler is rcprt>sf'ntcd by the figures ( in percentages)
in Tahle LXXXVIIT.
TARlE LX:\XVIII

Baltic S,,,1
Black and Oziv
WhitrCi�1,ian

Imports

7fl.4
.S
ti.8

Expol'ts
-43.6.
50.5.
3.0.
2.D

,., Ibid. :m P. Fomin, "Ekrm.omieh1rn kharnktcrystyki Ukrainy," p. 47.
P .f,.Jiromn\ up. <"it.. [). 2.5].
1"
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Jgnoring the interests of Ukraine in laying out railroads,
neglecting rin�r tramport.1tio11. iuade(111a1c hi�hway\. these
were what kept the duJrwslic trade frorn assnn1ing its proper
proportions. This also explains the disproportionate importance
of fairs iu Ukraine. The ten largest foirs h;1JJdkd almost half of
tlw domf'�tic trade in goods in Ukraine. It is aho characteristic
that out of the kn fair�. eight W!'rc located in close proximity
to the Ilmsian border: four in Khar ki\', hrn in Kiev an<l two
in Polt.1va. At these fair5 the bulk of goods produced by Russian
industry was sold. This system of trade, peculiar to ancient
times, is a vivid indication of the \Veakness of domestic com
munications. It is understandable whr, in the middle ot the 19th
century "all goods sold at fairs were valued per one inhabitant
of Kharkiv region at J.':i rubles, Poltava at 12 rubles, Katerynos
la\· at 6 rnbks, whereas in Petersburg proyincc at 35 kopecks,
\Iosco\\' at 27 kopecks, Tula at :?::3 kopel'ks and Hyazan 20 ko
pecks. ·11

J.1arket
lu the chapter which studied the characteristic of rdalions
hetwee11 Ukraine and Russia in illdustry, we have already anal
yzed the extent of track: [n three hasic branches of industry,
coaL ml't,1l1urgy and sugar. Tlwsc three branches were the lead
ing ones of Ukrainian industry, and conditions existing thert'
charaderized the entire system of economic relations with Hns
sia. Xcvcrtheless, for a more mmplek picture of the colonial
nature of the L1krainian economy, we sliall pause to corn,ider the
position of the Ukrainian market This is more important since
we ha\'<' not clarified the situation i11 the grain trade which was
ot tremendous irnportn11ce t() the Ukrainian economy,
Herc again, the center of our attelltion will not he the par
ticular branch of commc1Tt' alone, h11t the relatiollship bctwc<:n
Ukraine and Russia in this scdor.
We shall consider first the problem of the gencml exchange
of goods in Ukraine as they were subject to official statistics
of tlie GoYernment, the trade of those enterprises which were
licensed to do business. For this purpose we arc makin?; use
of dab on commerce and indnstry tu the regions of European
Hus�ia. as published by the lvfinistry of Commerce and Indnstry
in HJOS. \Ve arc unfortunafrly compelled to adhere to regional
11 ;\/.

Ya,nupol�ly, op. cit., 11, FIL
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boundaries nsed iu the official report. They do not correspond
to the boundaries of Ukraine. One ot the regious cited, the re
gion of grain commerce, includes a small part of the South
of the Dun Laml. But for our purpose snch slight variation in
the figure� of thlC region is not too important am! can have no
scriom effect upon the genero.l conclusions.
The J\linistrv of Commerce and Industry divided Ukraiuc
into three rt'1,,;ions: 1) g-rain commercial (Nnmber VIII)
which inclmkd the Oziv SeahoanL tlw Crimea, the Dnipro-Hoh
strip and lkssarabia; 2) black-industry (iron and coal), (!'\um
ber IX) including the Donbas, Katcr::noslav and Kryvyi Hih
regions; and 3) the Southwestern, ( Number X) which took in the
regions of Kharkiv, Poltava, Kit>\\ Chnnihiv, Volhynia and
Podilla. The gross business fignres of commerce and irillustry
of these three regions, are (in thousands of rubles) as seen in
Table LXXXIX.
TARLE LXXXIX

Rehm,
\'Ill
!Xn

'

Tut.,]

Gr<Jss Comm<'l'I"<'
580,620
152.614
317,983
J,2:'il..'.:17

Gro.�s fo,l11Mru
177,54:2
:231.4[9
·101, 1,'52n
8,'33.1!3

Total
758,162
407,033
\Jl\),13."i
:2 084,330

According to groups of goods, the gross commcrcl' figurei
were ( in thousands of rubll's) as shown in Tahle XC.
According to gronps of goods, the gross figures of industry
were (in thousand rnhles) ,1s shown in Tahlr XCI.
Befo1·,:, we begin an analysi.� of the above figures we inust pin
point two basically important sets of figures, those of the food
industry and iron and coal industry which, tO)!dher, constitute
:SW! of the entire gross figure for indnst:ry.

Agrini/tur,i/
Jfrgimi

vm

lX
X
Tot.,\

llcgi,m

vm

IX
X
Total
42

J1r,,rluct1·

HJ7,-ll.3
2 ,5,. 17U
71;,37,'5

.3:i}.2b!)

Fu:1d
80,147

23,163
J:2.(JA(),"j

138-71,).

A,,aimal
,,,.o,Juct.�
28,0-18

6,.Sl-1
3J,D.S2.
(JD,0-1-1

N,m-edibf,,
animal

TABLI:: :\C
Miueruls
T,um/1('r
and mdul
18,(JOJ
.';7./i2S
12,93,f
H-I0.5
:W.228
,J,',f:i.12
117,06::'
,51,763

CJ7Ji(i8
36.3!.J.1
12--12..1'5

2.)8.2!17

prmluct.,·
10,'."i\]4

I.umber.

:\tini11g

Tnti/e.�

8.J!J(J

.}J.1<)2

3,Pi-t

2.,8"i 1

2.15. tl :5

.',,:1')7

8,0:'. ,)

>9.D\Jfl

:WJ

j(j,.l()(J

Ret:l'ragn
.S2,976
2.5,llDS

S3A3CJ

lfil,.'ilO

,\'ot
.11wcificd
127.8.':i')
31,7D3
1J2,0,J2
2\Jl.771

Tutal
SM0,720

152.,614
.)17,083
l,2."il,31!:l

"

TABLE XCI

Hl,179

:30(;Jl06

\li,,i,h'r 'l"orgnvli i Promy�l,knuo<,ti (J\fini,tn of Conn,wrt ·e aud ln
du,try), Toriz,ot:la i pwmy.1h/c,.11c1.1·t Yr·,·ropcysk,1y Rvs,·iy i pv my,iwnn,
l'J08, VIII-4, IX-.5, X-."i.

·"· //,;,/,, Vlll-. ), IX-6, X-6.

'/'('ctile.,

123

-l.702.
8,00(J

Cl,(·mirals
10,208

.17-H

O,."i\J1

20,5,H

Not
. �1w,.ifinl
7,U17

S,771

7,072
2.3,760

Tntal
177,.'5.12
�S.t:JHJ
-!01,] ,';2
8."3:J, 113
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The gross figure of the food industry is broken down into
the groups shown ir1 Table XC:Il (in thousands of rubll's).
T.\BLE \:CJl
Grnup.1·
�lillin;,,
Sng,u n·finin:� .
\Vines arnl
_,pirits
rohaeco
\'t·twL1l,!<• oil
Conkct\o>rnr�-.
Grits
llakin·!
.\l,·,1t
F,,Ji
Bn·,1·iE1_l!
Otlwrs
Total

\'//I
'.J.'l.2,50
Hi,WJ\J

Regions
I.\
lj_271l

H,.1:;.1
12.'-J/-;;)

11',liSS
11.,2H
2}M4,
L.714

:3.70:,

2_:-,n:1
1,D91
2.8('2
D,5,'l
l . .'l/.'3
:?.,.1'.'4
".-H.>
88,138

X
-1";",(ijf),
2.1 -;-.121,

!Ti-!,
i-12
:,_1,0:;
21.Hn,

·1.2).'3,
-127,414,

In pcrcnd11g,'
r,,/.r,tiw, to
Tut1,I
the total
\lk.2/l, )
22. .1
:'iH.l
2.=; !,020
2,"i,181
:!-t,,18
H,fl rn
, ..117
1,991
,I_ 5.)f;
l.6'1(1,
1 ••171
2.-121
12,.'il/l
-!18,71.5

5.7
,'5,6
l..'i

I:::

n.-l
1.(J
.1

'

.-'.i

Q

20

\00.0

"

0'Jlw gronp ""tlwr ,;" in the ,,ffi('rnl rt·p01t also i1tdml,·s some ikm� from,
umnu)! �pecificd group� whil'h Jrr• in ,rnall ,rnwm1\s.

41

l/1id., VIIJ-1.'3, IX-16, X-15.
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Table XCIII is a similar breakdo,vn of figun's of the iron and
coal industry (in thousands of rubles).
TAlH .E ,\CJJ I

\'lll

GnJUJM

R r' g i" n .,

.\ktalluri:r and
metal-working 32,731
Coal am! clay
extraction
1,897
Iron ore
529
Agril'ultunil too�
aml machinery
3,,5S6

....

Hiieks and

lrt pcrccrtlll/!,i'
relation t11

X

Tot,1/

l lH,66,3

16,832

WJ,228

.5:'i.2

60,680
l J,!l6.5

1,148
II

72.71<5
1'.L568

24.2
4.0

2.31!)

8,94:'i

14,820

4.!J

IX

/()/{!/

pottery

2,48.'i

4,J::'8

,5,:234

11,8,57

3.!:\

nwlah\arc
\,.Jt mining
�l,·rc11r)'J

2,0fJO
1,823

64

l,D14

4,668
3,800

l..'i

1,877
1.417

1,417

.4

·r in

.,rnl

,t>i11inl;

�fa1tgarn·s,·
miulng

Repair•�hops
Cement, chalk,

alabaster
Gla,s am\

foirn('C
Zinc
Carriagern,iking
E!edrorn,·chanical.
Otlwr�
Total

7,'5!)

1.2

·"

J,705

208

l }l68

75!.l
3,871

1.3

l.615

1.308

l)il4

4.498

1.4

1,438

1,.'501

2})39
284

.I

,588

167

676

],432

.4

.1,',--1
700

�70

3!':i6

3,54
1,38B
306J l06

.I

284

51,12\l

215,4Fi

:rn,9rnl

,!,)

"'

100.0

,.,,

lt is not worthwhile to spl'nd time on the textile industry,
in spite of its basic impmtmce, because of its very insignficant
fignre (8 million rubles), and also for the reason that this group
includes rnostJ�, goods of secondary use such as twine, bags,
de. Thus we actually find in two main branches of industrial
production, only two 1-iroups in each which have a preponderance
over all othl'rs, constituting 80% of the total. In the first it is
milling and sugar"refining. and in the second, metallurg�· and
coal. The gross figures of all other groups arc so insignificant
that their per capita repartition will gin: no more than a few
"//Ji,/ __ YI\l 17, IX-7. X-11.

Ukraille mid H.ussia
kopech per pcrsou. Thus, in analyzing tl1<· Ukmi11ia11 ('Cm10111y
from tlw standpoi11t of the market, we find agai11 the same situ
atio11 that we ban' alr<'ady ohst·n·r·c\ in thP r('ahn of industry:
the niam1facturing process h imhspntahly one-sided, v,;hid1
is a characteristic- ot colonial countries,
Even rnor<' telling iu this respect is a comparison of the gn)S\
indw,trial aud commercial fi_gun:s. The sales of textiles reached
:?/58,297 tho11sand rnble�. and this is doubtless an incomplete
figure, sine<' many textile articles ar<' inclmlcd in the "not -�pcci
fied"" group. Ukrai11c·s ow11 pro<luction of k;,.tik� rcach<'d only
8 million rubles, of secondary use. A similar picture is revealed
in the comparison of production of wines and spirits (2.5 million
rubles) witl1 sales in this group ( Hil 1nilion ruble�)- From the
comparison ot just these two groups we mu L'Sti111ak the huge
amonnts of foreign production consumed by l'kraine, i.e. what
gredt part of the- national iueume Wt>llt out of tbc Ukrainian
economy in the forrn of commercial profits.
O,w might reply to such argmnent that there \Ve-re othc-r
industries iu UkrainP at the tiuH· prnducin.(!; more than was re•
rp1irc<l for home comumption (sugar, metals, etc.), an<l tlwt
these imlnstri_es produced goods which went iIJto foreign econ
omks creating t omnwn.·ial profits in favor of the l'krainian
economy. This \Vould be an apt ohs('n·ation, provided th(' indus
trial and commercial capital cnµ:ageJ in tlwso adivitics had Leen
Ukraiuian capital, a11d that the pro!ih from tlll'rn accrued to
Ukraine. But, as ha.\ been amply illustrated ahcJYe, nmw of the
capital \Vas Ukrainian, and thus the Joss of surplus production
was not comp('nsatcd for by these rl'turn proe('Sses.
In support of this, we cite below some data on the distribu
tion of good;, in the Ukrainiau market accor<ling to production
clas,�ification groups. It is to lw borne in miml that, in addition
to commercial distribution as accounted for by the :\-Iinistry of
Commerce and Industry for lke11.sed enterprises, there was also
a distrihntion !hrou�h local bazaar;,, where the vendors were
not subject to licenses. This indndes .�ueh enterprises as peasants
oflering tli<'ir wares. and local mong\�rs..\.ccording to Ostap<'n
ko. this distribution. mostly in agricultural product;,_ addetl np
to the rnlue of i.':il millimi rubles in 191:3.
According to the same scholar, the l'kraiuian market handled
<n1 the eve of \Vorld \Var f, the annual quantitiC"s ot its own
products (in thrmsands of tons) as shm�u in Table XCIV.
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Coal
Cnk,•
Iron me
\iamgant·>•· on·
:i,dt
l'i" irnn
trOu ,,nd ste.:l
.\1"d1innv and tools
T,·�til,·s ·..
L,·.tlh<cr
Leather gm,,ls
Peiper
Book�
Cl1c,,,ical,
Toh,1eco
Oils ( r:dihk 1

TABLE
:31,(){J0,0()()
·t81l0,(100.
ti,7'::().()(I().
2,3fi,0(){)
800.()00
(il(J,mlO
2, 1()(),1)()()
2.:24.000
-'J{i,0()1)
lti0,00(1
14..J,OOO
40.000
J(iJ1{)(1
-18.00()
,'56,0(10
43,:200.

.\Cl\'
H,GOOJI()()
Cr,;in
S,\Jfil),O()O
Sugar b,·l'l�
Sug,ir
l,2),j0,000
Crits
1,600,0{)0
JGS,000
Spit its
l't>talot\s
3,8 J(),000
\'c!getnhles
... 352,000
Corn ( 11Hli2C I
·180.000
llnrs,·s
26-3,000 Jw,1d
St,:,-1, .ind ,·nws
Hl,5,0llO head
C1lves ,rnd heifer.,. 1,025,000hcad
Hugs
U-50,000 !wad
3,;;oo,ooo lll'.id
:ihe<'p
1,U00,000 tlm11s. piec-"�
Eg(' :S
l'nu\tr ,;
35,300 tliuus. pJ!'eo:s
, . , •.••. J,180,(J()(l IOJL\
;,,,Jilk

In addition to the above home prod11ction figmes, Ukraine
imported. during the Year 1913 the r111,rntities of goods ( iu
t!iousand tu11s) :.hn\\·11 in Talilc XC\'.

LumlJ('r ..
i\ladtiaer\' and
metal !,(oods
T,•,111,·s
'.'../UtJ<HIS
fkrrings
Otlwr fish
Ricr•

TABLE .\C\'
l,24fiJl1io
T{•,,
(;_,snlin, ,tml l<,·rus.-11e
320.(1()0 Fc-1tiliz,·r
80,000 Ce,,l<'nt
C;IOO \\-'rn.11
l l:?.,000. l.<>,1tlwr gr><•<ls
80,000. Fn,ils
J {iJ){)I).

J,800
.:18{1,()l)ll
H0.800
J:l7.li00
1 li,000
-18,000.
8,000.

"

.\t the same time , goods cxporkd from Ukraiue are shmYn in

Tah!e XCVI ( in thousand tons).
Coal
c;1ai11
Su,1!:ar
Ore
Pi;.'. iron
lrou am! st,•,-1
Salt
Grits
Crits (fine)
Mi,\dling.,
Br,111
Sunflnwer seed
;1nd J,emp sc>cd

TABLE
0,000_!1()0
7,20(),/1()()
(J(j(),(H)O
l.fiOO;OO()
-18fl,0()()
J_.H/1. ll()()
384.000
'13.'2.0(1()
2- 5,(iOO
2:l:?.JJO(:
96,UOO.
91,200

4" \l. 0,taq),•uho, "I'· ril., p. 21\-1.

.\CVJ
Clnl'er s<·t·d

\(l,1)(1()
,)\J.20(7
160,000
l'r,ts
l l'.:,00(1
Com
Pot,1tn'.;
CJ(iJ)f)()
rn,0(10 t,ms
J.,·1llll'r
Akohulic bcver,>)!'.l'S 37 million litn-�
Agri, ultnr.d 11 1:ii·hlno:rr --1--!,iillO tons
100,000 ]wc,d
Ilorws
:J8'.,,I)()() J.,,ad
Hcmwd eattk
Iln«,
13SJ)OO lwad
Hl,200,000 piece,
J-'ot;ltry
70, :!()() tons
F.g_r:;s.
flt•,m.,

"Ibid., p. 203.

49 Ibid., p. I Ll..
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The total export figure of all goods shipped from Ukraine
m HH:3 wa;, L022,780 thousand ruhh·s, arnl import. 647,9B0
thonsand ruhles. '"
Thus. Ukrai11e\ expnrb were in e:-.cess nf imports lH' the
amount of 374,820 thousand rubles.
This relation�hip between exports and imports was not a
matter of ch:rnce, 11or <lid it apply only to the year 191:3. :\L
\"o]obuycv in<lica{('S that Ukraine's active foreign trade balance
in 1900 amounted to 367 mil!io11 ruhlcs; in HJ0L to 7 IO million
rubles; iu HJ02, to 468 million rubles; in 1904, to 287 million
rubles, and in 190.S, to 301 million rubles.''"
The annual excess of exports over import� is estimated by
M.t Shrah for the vcars 1909 to 1911 at 319 million rubles. Outt
of this 202 rnillinu applies to foreign trade and 57 million to tradet
with Russia."'t
Ostapcnko estimates the excess figme for 1912 at 200.4 mil
lion rubles. There were obvious variations from year to year,
hut exports always exc('cded imports. In this instance we are
not so much iutercsted iu the amo1111t of that cxu'.�s as i11 the
fact of its existc11ce, because it is indicative of thl:' eco11omic rf'
lations bctwc>cn Ukraine and Rus�ia. The Empire as a whole
also had an aetivc foreign trade balance, and we have to inquire
bv what meaus this was achieved. Professor P. Fornin cites
(TabTe XCVll) the abbreviated trade balance sheet of Ukraiuc's
foreign trade for the year 1912, compiled hy Professor llalytsky
(in millions of rnbles):
TABLE X C\'II
Fond products
Animal produc·t�

Raw m:tt<'ri,il .md y•rni-

nianufadur,·d goods
:\lannfactornl goods
Total for Ckrnim'
Active babnce

Execs,

Et ports

Exr wrts
660.S.
2·1.i.

In17)()1/s

3i.l
.I

(;20.1

fll . .5
\J,'5
iSS.fJ

(-;4,8
1.'58.8
260.8

'26.7

ln11,or/>

l'i.6

(j7i_..j

$:?.S.l

1.19,,3
].tv.3

'� Ibid.. p. 114. 00 �f. Yolobuy<'v, "Do problcmy L'krainsko yi ckonomik,-·."
"' !\I. Shrah. ''Zornislmya torhivl� VSSR ta yi yi hl:,-sh,·hi p cn. pcktyvy"
("Forei gn Trade of the l'krainian SSR am! its lmmedi.1tc Prns prcl'ts"},
C/icri:rm11 Shlakh (Red Pat/i ), Kharkiv , No. G, ICJ24 , p, l li.
'•2 P.. Fornin, op. cit., p. l l ').
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At the same time, the Empire as a whole exportc<l goo<ls
abroad of the total Yalue of: 1,276.9 million rubles, and imported
goods ,·ahwd at 841.9 million rubles which giYcS an active trade
balance of 4:1.'5 million rubles. This hahmce. as we can sec. is
93 million rublvs lower than the balance of Ukraine. This means
that the Empirt', without Ukraiue. imported goods from ahroa<l
for almo�t 100 millio11 ruble.� more than it exported. H we con
sider that the Empire also included such non-Hussian territories
as the Kuha11. ,\zerhaijmi. ck., then Wt' must come to thC' cou
clnsion that Hussia proper imported nrnch more than she ex
ported. This ,,·as done :it the expense of the colouics. \Vc ha,·c
alrcad�, indicated that in commNcc with Ukraiuc, Russia re
ceived 100 million rubles worth more than she ga\'e to Vkraine.
Out of tht' total Ukrainian export figure, the amounts sliippt:d
to Russia W<'re as shown in Table XCVIII.

C-:r.1in aml cere11ls
Iron and pig iron
Sugar
See,!

Ores and salts

TABLE
720,000 tons
1.024.000 tons
720,000 tous
14-1,000 tous.
7(;0,000 tons.

XCVlll
Coal over
Catt!t, over
Hogs ..... .
:!\leal
Cl<1y, linw, ete.

8,000,000 tons
'.?.(10.0()0 lw,ul
90,000 hc,ul
rn 000 tons
80,000 tons

Snch was the nature of Ukrafllian f'Xports to Russia, chieflv
agricultural pro<luct�, ra"· materials an<l scrni-munnfactured
goods, exports peculiar tu colouies. This situation is even more
marked iu l:kraiHian exports going outside the borders of the
Empire. During the period 1909 to 1911 agricultural products
eonstihitcd 85% of the entire value of expmts from the Empire.
Thu;,, in spite of the relatin:ly high le\·el of imlustrial develop
ment. in vxport:-; to foreign comitries L'krainc appeared in the
role of a t_vpical rolony supplying industrial countrie\ with food
products. To .H.ussia, h(nYen'r. Ukraine shipped industrial rm-\·
makriab an<l semi-manufactured goods, playing the role of a
raw material market for Russia's indush'y. "Economic relations
hrtwcc11 Pkraine and Hmsla were based on industrie., to the
extent of 7G'.f, and not on agriculhire.".-,.,
The extent to \Yhich Ukraine· participated in the t'xportation
of agriculh1ral products of the whole Empire can be determined
I..Ft·shd,cnko-Chopivsk�-, op. cit., p kl.

s-1 \I. Slirnh, op. rit .. p. ll7.
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from thc- fact that out of a total of 7,107,200 tons of grain ex•
portt>d by the Empire in 1900, L1kraint> forriislwd .SS52,0ll0 tons,
or 8-t:. The aver<tge participation of Ukraine during- the period
moo to 191:3 was about 75'./".. At the sarne time Fkrai,w harvt>stf'd
2.--t2'."{ of the four principal graiu nops which made up the ex
port figure. (The total Empirt' figure being 70,70--1,000 tons; and
Ukraine, 17,136,000 tons.;·•"
"This rc-gion of hugl' cultivation awl extcmi\'(: grain tanning
( Ukraine) was hw1sformed iJJto H n"gion of l'apitalist-eommer
ciul ag;ricultnrc. engaged partially in .'>hipmcnts to home prov
inces, hut mostly for export. The region was becoming a typical
colony which dt->livercd its grain products to the metropolis am\
to foreign markets, and imported manufactured goods from the
nwtn1polis ...''"
\Ve lmYe deliberately cmphasizt-'d the fact that Ukraine had
an ac-tiv(: tradti balance with H.ussia. This was not meant to im
ply that this is, of itself. detrimental to thC' cconom�' of a C'Ollll·
try. 11uch depends upon the mnditions under which this phe
nomenon m,1kcs its appe,mmcc, and upon the proprietary rights
to the trade balance surplns. Under ordinary ciffumstances a
cmmtry appropriately organizes its connnf'n'e and can a1h·iscd
ly create reserves for a definite cconomi<.: objective, wch as
strcngtlwuiH� its currency. etc. This in grncral is ow• of the
1m.,,ms of a<.Tumulating aational capital. Tlwrefore. in our em
phasis upon this position of the external trade of Ukraine, it
was not our intention to evaluate ii as an economic ill ia itself.
But under the C''l.isting rdatioushirs beh.vccn Ukraine a11d Hus
s:ia, this cxs:css of exports over imports was yet auother form
of colonial exploitation.
The surplus de1frcd from Ukraine's external trade did not
roin the re.�ervcs of Ukrainian c<1pita] accumulation. lt weut
into the bands of those who controlled UkrniniaTJ exports. Hus
sian .:.:nmrncr('ial ,rnd finan.:.:e ('apital was that controlliug factor.
\Ve han' had ocr.:asion to remark that exports of sugar were ex
clusively r.:oncc11trated in the hands of two Petersburg banks. the
"Petersbur� lHternational" ,md the "Hussiau Bank for Forcign
Niuety 1wr cent of sugar exports w1:11t through their
Trade. .
harnls.'"-"
-,-, B. IJ/.ink,·ncl,. Pmd11ktsi111i kli/i/)(J i; l..'kraini (Gra/J, Prorfoction ill
L'krni11e), Kharkiv, 192.'3, No. I, p. 23, and P. Khrumov, op, cit.• p. 253.
P. L-,�hch,,,.l,.o, 1;p cit .. p. 487.
s� :\J, Gohnan , "Ru;�ki" l111pniali;sm," p. 354.
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The second most important export item, grain, was also
handled by R\ls�ian t'xporters, primarily by the state bank.
·111e surplus did not return to Ukrai11c in tlw form of capitalt
accnrnnlation, but was consumed in Russia. H11ssia proper, as
we have stated, exporte(l less than she imported, and the differ
ence was cover<'d by the surplus of Ukraine. Russia not only
shipped more goods to Ukraine than she took from Ukraine,
hut aho received more from abroad than she �ave at thP cx
pp11sc of Ukrai11e.
Hnssia �1ccountcd for her fillancial loan opcratirms with for
eign countries, floated for the dc\·elopmcllt of her economy, in
the same mallller.
"Ukraine, which had been up t{J the time of the war illeg,1lly
part of the former H11��ian Empire, in spite of being one of
the wealthiest parts making up the property of thl' autocrats, in
spite of being one of the basic conhibutors to tht> achievement
of Hussia's adivt:> foreign trade balance, not onl�· dicl not partki
pate in the organization of forci,!{n trade. not only did not ap
pear 011 foreign m::irkets as <lll economic mtit_ but in general
had very littlf' advantage from the Hussiall active trade opera
tio!ls ,,·ith foreigu lands. The profits were l15f'd to pay off Rus
sia's foreign debts, or to the Imperial Tre,1sury, or to the pockets
of private dealers, who reaped tremendous profits by taking ad
vantage of the producers, the peasants and workers of Ukraine
,.,-h o wcrt' the supplier� of cheap raw material."''
\Ve must also hear in mind that thanks to the monopoly en
jo�'ed by tlw exportf'rs. profits v,·ere in large measure determined
by their price policy, aimed at b,vering prices paid to Ukrainian
product-'rs in spite of constantly rising taxes, excises. and. most
important. a stormy increase of the land rent in the shape of
th(' prit:e of land a11d rentak Export prices for basit: proclucts
of the agricultun' of Ukraine declined in the manner shown in
Tahlc XCIX [the figures arc in kopecks per 36 pounds (.1
pood)].
TABLE XCIX
Y,•(IT,\'

1871-7.5
1876-flO
1 <'18 ]-/�,;

Hl86-80
lb!.ll-100n
'" '.\f. Shrnh. ep. di., p. 101-\.

\Vht',it

Ry/"

Barley

,'i.5.1

('n.1
G,'U

;){l_[

DO.!

7(i,7
6·Ul

.5,).fi

fi.S.7

•12,, 5

46.6

.-,s P. Khr-omov. op. di .• p. 2-5•1.

60.6

.52.n

37.6
.1.5.9

"
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For a Uettcr understanding of the rc1wrcussions upon the
gt>m'rul profitability of Ukrainian agril:11lt11rc, Wl' must bc,n
in 1nind that the dedinc in graiu prices between :30'Z and -H.l1 was
accompanied by an increase in prorluctivity of only 19'{. This
meam that the Ukrainian peasants, burJcncd by taxes, rents and
prices, were continually forc0d to sell more aml more of their
produce, aud thus consume less . .?\Jo�t Pkrainia11 peasants were
short of food. This went on in a land \Yhid1 was callerl ·'tltc
hrrndhaskct of Europe" and aboiil \\hi,,_.h tltt! p(wt :\. Tolstoy
wrote: '"Know you the land where all things breathe alnm
dancc('
S11l'h is the fate of all lanck richly endowed by Gotl, that are
llladc into colonies. India, the pearl of !hP British <TOWll, ,,as frc
quC'ntly visited by famine which r;l.\agt'd millions nf the popub
tion. The fellahin of wealthy Egypt lin:d iu utter ..,qualor. So abo.
most of the peasante> ,md workers of Ukraine. who \\'('re torced
to gin· np a large part of their labor's fruits to Russia, liwd in
misery and the entire Ukrainian population was deprived of
the opport11nit_v of de,;eloping its national 1.x:on01ny.
It becomes (JUi!e apparent, thl'n, why those diseases that
\ ividly indicate Ilic existence of a low material level of life were
widespread in Ukraine, Typhoid is often called "hungry typhus."
not without reason. This cannot be charged to the ncgligeucc
of the lTkrainiam. On the contrary, all ,·isitors from foreign lands
ha,·c alwa�·s remarked tha! in this respect tlw Ukrninians arc
far ahead of the Hussians. The qu,1intness and dt"anlirn1ss of the
Ukrainian 1,wasanfs home ha� become his national pride which
be bas carried with him wherever fate would compel him to go.
Under these circumstances the prevalence of some diseases
traceable to malnutrition is yet another illustration of tlw social
and economic position of Ukraini'.
From 1910 to 1914, the incidenc(� of (\isc,tsi· prevailed per
10,000 of the populati.on,"" as .�hm,·n in Table C.
TABLE C
Tt1r1h,,/rl

Ukrainr
Europ,,,rn
RH.ISL,

-IJ.�

2.:"\. 1

T11plws
10.fJ

SA

Rec1irre11/ 1yril111i !)1111•,a/('l'r,
Di71hl/i(·ria
·

,1.S

:2.1,f;

.J,i,\J

2.-S

22.6

20.-1

,,,, RoM1. Sm i--lsk. Ent.<ikl, \"nl. .).5, Vkr. SSR.
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It could not be otherwise: acute- nee<l of cmplovment created
by ,1grari,1u conditio11s :1.11d a ri'strickd n1arld for labor in in
dustry con1pd!ed the work1"rs to accept low "·at;es and hard
cond itious of work. ··The condition of the workers w:ls awful.
just like that of slaves on plantations . . lu the uutl�rgrouml
stone quarries of Odessa, workers die\ not come out iuto the air
for W(-->eks nt a time. thf'y slr�pt on bundles of straw 011 which
they poured \\·ater. so they wo11ld steam aml keep their bodies
warm. \\"ithout question first place in crimi11al riegligencc and
u11fit1wss of dwellings for human habitation goes to the cutn
prise� of Hughes. The lahorcrs have to shift for thermcfrcs.
They make dirt hut�, about 60 square feet for two people, ,vith
nut an; wi)J(lows, damp, musty, sonwthing like animal de11s,
\\"here it is r,ot only 111orally revolting to eutcr. but frigliteu
ing."',7
\Ye han· rna,le this hrid digression from the main subjt'd
of nuu-kd conditions i11 order to cmphasi,-:e the significant influ
ence of the policy of colonial exploitation upon the .standard of
living of thf-> labor classes, aml in onl!·r to \tre�s the falschoo(l
of statements undf' about the alleged flowering of Ukraine. S11eh
flowf'ring is impossihle nndcr conditio11s of pcrpehial and exces
sive diversion of a large part of the national incomf' in favor of
the metropolis. In respel"t to market eonditions Ckraiue was abo
the ob_iect of coloHial exploitatiou. Bussia concentrated in her
hawls the manufacture of goods of u11innsal cou�umptio11, de
rivl�d large profits from the distribution of the�e goods iu
Ukraine, and a,;suring lwrself of tlw eoutrol of Ukraine's ties
with foreign markets, siphoned l:krainc's fa,·ornble trade balance
to servict" her own foreigi1 debts.

The Budget
\\'e havt' uoted above that colonial exploitation consists in
the cxclusi,m from a natiou·s Cl'tmornic hodv in f,n-or of the me
tropolb of a part of th,; national incomc-"the surplus produc
tion" iu the shnp,, of land rent, ind11 strial and commercial profits,
as \n•ll as of bmlg-et surpluses. Tlw-rdore, in order to provide a
('Ornplefr pic-tur�· of the nahm• of thf:' econom:, of Ukraine prim
to tl1e revolution of 1917, we must consider, if oulY
· brieflv.
, thei
budget relationship of Ukraine and Hussia.
,a S. Ost:1p,·11ko, np. cit.. p. 21D.
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It must lw home in mind, for a better understanding of state
fi11a11ces of the Hussian Empire, that the Hussian Covennn('11!,
unlike governments of other large European countries. al
ways took a larl,!;e and actiYe part in the economic life of the land
as proprietor of many enterprises. EYen <luring the period of
serfdom and before industrial capitalisrn, the state owned huge
tracts of land inhahite<l h;· millions of state serfs. Duriug the
reform of lSfll the state kept a large nurnhcr of land estates,
which continued 1111der a forn1 of state feudal °'"'11ership. The
state cnga\;ed not only in a�riculture and lumbering. EYen dur
ing th{· reign of Peter I state industries were established, particu
larly in iron and coal in tf1c Urals. Subsequently the industrial
developrneut ot the Empire frequently took the shape of state
enterprises '>nch as state railroads, state dislillcrie, and distrilm
tion of alcoholic hevemgcs, state banks eJ1gagcd in the opera
tions of grain exports, state land banks engaged in tmding 011
the exchauges and in underwriting mortgages and stak owner
ship of stock in corporations.
A !I these economic unckrtakings \vcrc ob\'iously of a diffcr
<.'llt firiaJ1cia\ natnrc thall the ordinary state bmlget and for
that reason the budget itself had many peculiarities. The appor
tionment of state income and f'xpewlitures based on eolledion
of all sorts of taxes from the population was supplemented by
the .�o-ealled "'extraordinary hndget" which providl'd a close
link betw('ell the hu<lget and credit financing, banking and
finance capital, Part of the budget covered the area of finance
capit.11, and \'ice \'ersa. The latter contributed to the maintenance
nf state enterprises with the result that the butlget included
items of t'It'dit "peratious.
Between lSSi and 1901 a total of 1-600 million rubles was
cxclucll'd frnm tbe state brnlget in the form o! an exet'ss of or
dinarv inc,ome over ordinary expenditures, and this amount was
used for so-called "extraordin.u�· expenditures,'' for enterprises of
a fisl'al-c'conomic 1wtvr.:·.""
By l\)(J.3 these "extraordinary expenditures" reached 1 ruble,
4i kopech per capita of the Empire's population and continnecl
to increas('- from year to year. Exp(·nditures lor t'lhH'ation weH"
onl :,-· 28 kopecks per capita. This nature of the state c conom:,-· of
the Hussian Empire was the cause of a pcculiarit),' of Hussia's
credit operation� with foreign countries. Russia did not seek for0

,c c K. RatLig, np. cit., p. 40.
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cign loans to supplement budget deficits caused by unusual oc
currellccs such as war, but to finanC'e state commcn:ial and imlus
trial enterprises. This mnst be strC'sscd since the Hussian State
Government. in servicing thC'sc obligations, exercised its sover
eign prerogatives and was a direct participant in colonial ex
ploitation. The economic policy was t}ms adapted to the regula
tion of industrial and commercial relations, to customs, and thus
the budget itself was drainiug surplus profits. The im1cbtednc.�s
vf the Hussian Imperial Government at the C'nd of the 19th cen
tury exceeded 5 billion gold rubles, or the equivalent of a three
year bmlget of that period.
Subsequently the national debt increased at a slower pace,
but the iucrease still was considerable. See TaUe Cl (in millions
of gold rnbk·s),
TABLE CI

Yc,1r
1901
1900
1!!08
H)(Jg
Hill
HJJ3

P('rccrit relation
011tstnnding Annual p11yml'llf� of p1111mcnt
rm debts
to state lmdget
deht
l,'U
6,3<J2
277
3.'57
8,62{1
J.'i,7
]fj_.')
8,8-�2
398
9Jl.).)
:J'::)5
lf:U
8,958
399
1-'i.7
13.5
42-1
8,824

l'J

These slate lu;ms were floated partly within the Empire but
in large measure abroad.
As we have already stated, in addition to state loam, shares
of private and state corporate enterprises were also floated in
the financial markets of foreign lands.
The total amouut of Hus;.i:m securities, according to group
origim and \ocati011 markets, can be properly e\'alunted acconl
ing to data for the period l90S to 1912, a period of the peak of
operations of this sort. See Table CII (in millions of rubles).6'
The bul"k of the St'Ctuities is located, as we can see, in mort
gages which almost wholly constitute laud bau"k obligations.
They were a s11i ge,wris uature, basically like curreut a("counts
and only withiu the last fow ye,1rs precPding World \Var I did
foreign exchanges begin !o quote them. They came into exist
ence as a result of the sale of laud to the peasants by landlords,
"" �I. Colman, O/J. cit., p. 12.

q :'-i. Vanag, op. cit., p. 261.
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TABLE CII

.state Bonds
'-lnrtga!c!CS

....

Securities of credit

institutinns
Rai\ru,id bonds
Industri:11 s!neks
Tot;1l

Total

:2.72

278
11

l ,JG
]8:]

900

1908

Jll/ssirm Fnrcign Total
2111
(i\-)
:?.n<.J

272

278
JO

1

1:'JS

l(jf)

(j4{j

234

'j!-Jlj

1:17

4(;

/'.)/0

SL,te Bonds . .
i\1ortg,igt·s
Srcmitic\ nf cn;dit

mstitution� . . . .
Railroad bond�

lndu�trial stoeks
Tot�\

State }fonds

Sec·urilies of cTP<lit
1n;tit11timi\
R,ilro;Hl hornb
ln,l,,stria,l slod,,,

Total

20S

18

5

70

98

40
146

8:1

4, 30
1911

4(;:l

:12

4/i:1

·12

r..tal
(l3.J

G3,l

17

11

83

r,2

3:J

l \,!,

9,3

21

16D
\121

107

226

\,),5

74

120

, )7

41

71,)

C

,'54,'j

171

lfi7

272

l,:350

20(1

Stale Bond�
�lortgages
Sec:uritic'S of acrlit institution,.
Rni\ro,1d hond�
I11dml!ial �tot:!..,

28

78
381
U.:16

1912
Ri,Hirm Fort'ign Total

6-15,
;!O.';

7q
62

l}':l6

T<>tal

I

•I 14,

J,50

179

898

4:5:2

[1'

�(;(;llfitif's

H.3

4,1, 1,

Ul

14.0

:21.7

lO/J.O

728
1,128
,5,203

;2,'j()

Ru1wiun Fnrl'igu

2.Jf;
2,Hl:1

(i-10

63

].5

2)\l;l

,', ,)

:26

15S

H11.1sian l'ordgn

100

'C ,,f /nta/

Total

12:1

7
272

Tri/al Rus. ,im1 For,•i;:.u,

Total
i\lortga;:;1•s

2:1

18

1,909

Ru�-�ian Fnreign

.17 -">
JO()

04

5.')8
417

170

711

:3,fi80

1,514

% nf foreign
f/n,it,;,l sccuriti,'s

:1s.n

4.4
L'Ll
76.8

36.7
29.2

the peasants making: their pu rchasl'S with 11w aid of credit l'X·
t<'uded by the Land Bank. These securities were used lo pay off
the maiu part of the purd1J.se price Jue to the land!onls for
land sold throu�h the Hank. The latter (landlords) paid off their
mortgages by these securities. The laudlords owed huge
amounts of mortgage monies to banks at that time. m,1inly to the
Dvoryanskv P07:emelny Bank. Thns the real meaning of the
banking operations could he reduced to the following: by settle•
mcnt of accouuts between two banks, the Dvon·,rnsky ( '.\lohility)
and Selyansky ( .Peasants') with the aid of bonds, the mortgagp
indebtednes� of the lamllord;,: w,1s transferred to the peasants.
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These operations re'.lched their peak in Ukraine, particularly
following the Stoltypin reform.
If we exclude from the total amount of securities issued
such mortgage bonds theu the percentage of securities floated
abroad reaehes 48.6% of the total. Part of this indebtedness fall
ing upon the state cannot merely be rletermine(l by the appro
priate amount in the cited table, for, as wc have noted, the rail
roads were almost all the property of the state. Hence the location
of their boHds on foreigll markets was also an indebtedness of
the state. In addition, -,.vith sornc securities thc state had assumed
a gmrantce of payment of both dividends and capital. \Ve have
had occasion to quote the total amounts payable by the state
on ere<lit operations with foreign lands. This provides an answer
to the disproportionately high amom1t of debt service payments
as tompared with the indebtedness c,f other natiom. The amount
of interest was ot some significance in this respect, as Russia
generally had to pay more interest than other nations. Among
the sewn largest eountries in the ...vorkL the Hussian issue of
securities during the ten-�·ear period of 1903 to 1912 amounted
to 10.41. '-Vhik am1ual service payments amounted to 25% in
th<: year 1910."''
It is therefore not surprising that the servicing of loans con�
stituted such a large part of the budget ( between 13..'5% and 16.5%
as indicated by a preceding table). Some economists ( especially
Colman) estimate loan servicing at 2,5.21 of the budget. From
the tables cited it is easy to imagine what a heavy load foreign
loan servicing put upon the currency balance of Russia's for
eign trade. Thus e:,,_-ports beeame the main source of covering in
vestments in Russian industry which were undertaken with the
aid of borrowed capital.
Although the balance sheet of payments of the Russian Em
pire compiled by N. Ole is c·onditioual and statistically imper
fect, yet it pro\·icles a fairly accurate characteristic of currency
account settlements with foreign lands. For this reason we arc
utilizing it in Table Cll l. all the more so, a� our task is an analy
sis of the nature of economic phenomena, and not so much their
quantitative expres�ion:
Balance of PaymC'nls of Russio ( in millions of rubles):
or, Vrrestnik 1-"inonsoi: Prnm11,,h/ennosli i TrJTgodi (Flflancial, Industrial, ond
CommcrcWI News), St. l'l'krsburg, HH2. No. 37, p. ,547.

TABLE Cll
18818,J.lO

18f)8191.1
13,31'.3

2,900

t:i,000

18.97

!'aynwnts fur imports
Foreign paynw11t,; of interest
and dividends
Horn! rdircrnent:
a)t of banks ...t
h)t of railroadst
Spent br Ru,siam abnwl.
Other expenditun·s
Inere,1s(, of foreign currency
reserves
Totals:
.,., I'. Laslwhcnko, op. ,•it., pp. 385, 386.

100
:?.87

400
2,000
41,5

27:3
12,700

772
21,900

1,000

181>1-

1897

lRDH-

!JJcornc from cxpr,rtst
Fon·ign cnpit,il investments:t
a) in indnstry .......... .
b)t in railroadst
c)t in ercdit institutionst
d)t ,n munictpalitit'.st
C:ovNmn<'nt loans
Other income . ,

10,77'1

191,1
17,4,1:?.

200

:s.�o

1,300

l,0.50
12,5

2.000

Totals: .. . ....... ..... . . ..... ... .

12,700

21,897

,130
37.'3
240

""
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\Ve can see from the ahove the extent to which exports con
tributed to the balance of foreign payments. A place of high
est importance was held by grain exporb., 75% of which was
contributed by Ukraine, and of equal importance was sugar, al
most all of which came from Ukraine. "The Tsarist Government
used all available means to holster exports of grain at the ex
pense of malnutrition of the workers. '\Ve are not going to eat
as much as we need, but we shall export' was the cynical re
mark made by the .\linister of Finance Vishnegradsky.""'
11ost of the grain came from Ukraine. "The Tsarist Govern
ment aimed at increasing exports by all means, hecause the
Government's balance of payments could as a rule he only cov 
ered by having an active trade balance. Industrial development
required the importation of metals, machines, etc.; it was neces
sary to make annual payments of large amounts of interest on
bonds of the Tsarist Government, as well as on loans of private
railroad companies and interest on other credit amounts. All
these payments contributed heavily to the passive side of the
payments balance and were covered in the main by bolstering
exports, primarily of grain and raw materials, inasmuch as Russia
did not possess any other worthwhile sources of income ( from
freights etc.)."""
It is now clear to what degree the results of Ukraine's com
merce influenced the Imperial budget. Russia not only withdrew
from Ukraine more value than she <lelivered, but also balanced
her foreign payments at the expense of exports of Ukrainian
grain, sugar, cattle and ores. These foreign payments of Russia
were for loans negotiated for military purposes and for the de
velopment of Russia's own industry. "Hence, one can now state
openly that a large part of what constituted the difference be
tween the exports and imports of Ukraine was being taken
away, as capitalist robbery, to pay for debts."sn
It was not only through the medium of the "extraordinary
budget," hut also through the ordinary budget that Ukraine was
a source of Russia's enrichment. In contributions to the state,
such as taxes and others, Ukraine paid more than the Empire
spent on Ukraine. Table CIV is the income side of the Imperial
budget for 1885 to 1913 ( in millions of rubles).
''' P. KhnJmov, fl/J. rit .. p. 2.5,1. '" Ibid., p. 23'2.
,;o S. 0.1hpenko, O/J. cit., p. 207.

TABLE CI\'

lKli'i

18,JO
JKY.'i

l fl()(l
l!JO.''i
](-)09

1911
Hll2
191-3

Direct
130.1
90.7
1(),'5,7

l:Jl.7
120.7
1H8.H
223.9
243.2

2-HJ.8

•" \I. Colnmn, op. di., p. ,176.

Tux,·� und co/leeti01Js
lmlirl'ct
Other
360.1
49.3
'.5\l.8
474.6
.'58(}.]
71.8
87.3
657.2
99.7
408.3
L'51.4
,)2fl.7
193.4
029.7
(j.'i0.4
198.2
671.0
218.2

Total
539..'5
fl25.l
7(i3.6
876.2
(i:34.7
879.7
1047.0
1,092.8
l.l3RO.

Total
gros.1
Stutc rwmopolies,
Payment.I' f ur
enterprise:,
land purchased budgd of
estates
by peasants , 1861 Empire
47.:l
705.0
80.,'5
fJ0.,'5
H.'i2,0
144.8
1,2,';.'5.8
:,10.4
HI 1.2
1, 704.1
6.'ill.4
im.o
,'5,'i.3
LZ.19.l
2,024.4
L'i2'.'U
.7
2526.:3
2,9.'52.0
.8
1,778.2
l )382.4.
.8
3,l0<'5JJ
1,U66.2.
.9
3.24(),(j

'"
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The column of income from monopolies, C'ntcrpriscs ,.u1d
estates is very interesting. Tt provided 10.5% of the hml)?;d iu 188.5
and increased to fj{).7% of tht' hudgd within 28 years. The chief
item ot this i11<:orne figure is trom the sale of alcoholic lwveragcs
(nt:arly one billion rubles). It is not surprising that the Hussiau
budget of that period was called ··the drunken budget." ln ?l'n
eraL this column provides a good illustration of the extent of
lhe spread of state capitalism in Hnssia hy that time. Hence the
present total nationaliz:1tion of the entire Pconom�' had its bl'
ginnings before 1917. Equall�· notcworth�, arc also im:omes de
rived from indirt:ct taxes. They more than double direct taxes
and those coupled with income from the sale of spirits, again
provid<· a close parallel between the budget of that period and
thost' of the prescut day, under which indirect taxes, or so
called receipts taxes, constitute almost 80% of the entire budget.
\\'c can sec that even then a characteristic of the state econ
omy was that a dedsin' role in the budget was pla� ed b)· <:om
mercial and industrial profits from state enterprises. These were
based on the appropriation by the- statf' of certain f'nterprises
and a mouopoh· in certain economic processes, in place of fi
nancial obligations to the state of the population and business.
And to the extent that the same state authority was at the same
time suhject to the law, to that extent the regulation of economi<:
processes was in a large measure determined by law enforce
ment ,\·hich ahva�·s stoocl on guard for the interests of the domi
mmt Hussian e(;onomic svstem.
The significance of this moment (;annot he 11ndcrestir11atcd,
inasmuch as it determined Ukraine's losing battle \Yith Russia
in the realm of economics. \Ve ha,·e emphasized on seYeral oc
<:asious the part played by statutory regulation and official gov
ernment polil'Y in agricult1ire, industry, transportation, aud
!.'.Ommerce. This fonnd its rcpercw,sious in the slrncture of the
budget. Let us lake, for example, just the irnlirect taxes. Excise
collections are their backbone. In 1900, the total of 658 million
rubles indirect taxes consisted of: excise tax on spirits, ,'317 mil
lion; on tobacco, 41 million; on sugar, 63 million; on kerosene.
25 million; OJJ matches, 7 million, and <:0llection of duties, 2.04
million. As we <:an see, excise taxes were imposed on goods
chiefly of non-Hussian origin: spirits, toba<:co an<l sugar from
Ukraine. kerosene from the Caucasus, m,1tches from Finl:md
and Relorussia. Yasnopohky is correct when he says: "the present
1
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excise taxes on grain, spirits and salt ( there was an excise tax
on salt at that time-Author) imposes a douhle hurden on the
agricultural part of Russia, both on the producers, and the con
sumNs. And that excess ot income over cxp(•nscs which is
created in the aizricnltural part of Ilussia, is diverted Xorthward
in impressive amounts for the state treasnry."71
Excise taxes thwarted the development of the Ukrainian dis
tilling indm;try, and the tax paid on sngar was lost to the· Ukrain
ian manufacturers when it weut into the hands of the tv.-o Peters
burg sngar ('xporting banks. All this indicates that relations be
tween Ckraine and Russia in the realm of the budget were, sim
ilarly of a colonial nature. The budget was another tool of colo11ial exploitation.
Yasnopolsky, in his basic text on the geographic repartition
of state income and expenditures, states that <luring the 13-year
period "since 1868, the ninr t:krainian gr11Jernias gave thC' Rus
sian state an income of 2,899.2 million rubles and received from
the state, 1,749 million rubles.""
The Ckrainian national et·onomy lost, hy means of the hmlg
et, l,l.50.2 milliou rnhles. This is nothing but colonial exploita
tion.
Jn the same text Yasnopolsky also cites statistics compiled by
t-.L Parsh. According lo these: ''The Russian state had from
Ukraine ( during the period of 15 years at the" encl of the 19th
and beginning of the 2(}th centuries) an income of ;'3,289.6 million
rubles, and expenditures of 2,60S.2 million ruhles."'j
ThC" following tablC" of hudgetary income and expenditures
for tlw y1�ar 1912 is found in the work of Professor Fcshchenko
Chopivsky:''

Empire total
Ckrairn'

Ta\Jle CV
(In Millions of Rub],,,)
Income
:3,1()1
683

Ex1wnditim;g
:3,171
:377

Here ag:lin is a siphoning nf 306 million rnbles from l.Tkraine.
We might allow that all these statistics are not absolutely ac" X. Ya�nopol,ky, op. cit .. II, l lfi
"" '\!. Yasnnpolsky, 0 /!."O gmfic/wgknm ras preddc11i11i gosrulurstncm,ik/i dok
lwdor i ra>khor/ov ( Geograpl1ic Distributiou of Stat<- ln,:,onw :wcl Ex p<'!J
rlih1n-s}. Kiev, l8\J3, p. 6\J.
7 .1 llf. Yavorsky, op, cit.. 11, 123,
'' I. F,,.•hchcnko-Cl1opivsky, op. cit .. p. 161
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curate an<l that tht' amonnl a<:tualk tal-e11 ont of Ukraine varies
Ollt' wav or tht' other. There is room for error iu view of the ab
c,ence of a proper snbdivision and locali/.ation of cntain catC'
gories of expenditures iu the offici;"tl sources, although Yasno
polsJ...y's calculations ha\'e \)t'en made \Vith the utmost regard for
scrnpulous vemcity. For the purpose of our research any possible
inaccuracies may properly lw disregarded, inasmuch as onr task
is not to ddcrniinc the exte11t of colonial {'xploitation, bnt rather
to find its presr11ce. To prove in other words that economic re
lations lwtweeu Ukn1ine ami Hnssfrt were based on principles
of colonial dependence. Hence, it is of no great import how much
the state hu<l g:et succeeded in pumping out ot the UJ...raiuian
t'cOmHny in ta\·or of Hussia, be it 300 million rubles annually. or
l,·ss. The g,:ist of the matter is that rneh pnmping existed, that
Ukraine always paid more than she received, and that this was
the consequence of her colonial position. "The Tsarist regime
of tlw second half of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th
eentnries imposed upon l!kr:iinc a greater financial burden than
dming the old times ot the Jktmanatc.'·,.,
;\ similar strndure of the lrnpcrial hmlgct on the e:-.penditures
\ide vividh· illnstrates the diversion of funds of the colonies in
favor of the metropolis. Table CVI is <l summan· statement of
budget expenditures in percentage grouping�.
TABLE CVI
\lilit.u; cstal>lishnwnb
Debts
State aclmiuistrn"lion
E(l11rnt1nn
A !:rit·Lrltnrv
h,dn.1try

Total

rnw
30.6'>'.
2rl.6'.\'.

'

26.0%

')';

3.5%

ci.'J'>JOO<;:

1-'Jll

31.7%

2-"i.2%

25.7%

H.3·;

3.H%

,e;_:-n

100'.b

'"

\\'c l1anc ,dread�· ampl�· illustrated the part of Ukraine in
thP repartition of debts. The debts of the Empire were lJeing
p:1id off h,· Ukrainian grain, th!: proceeds of tho'.>c loans ha\'lng
heen usc�J b) Hns,ia. Concerni11g expenditures fur the rni!itar\,
c�tahlishment. their preponderance in the budget mirroVi th·c
impniabt nature of R.1��ia and her coutirrnous military expanc.-, \L Yavorsk :, l'/1. cit .. H, 12·1.

-,,. i\f . Golrn:m, 01,. cil .. p. J"i7.
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sion, something which had nothing in commo11 with the interests
of Ukraine. Even a proportionate participation of Ukraine in pro
viding funds for state needs is not justified to the extent that
the maintenance of part of the state apparalus was not the resnlt
of the needs of the population but merely an assurance of polit
ical domination of subjected nations. Only the last three cate
gories of cxpcndit11rcs, together totaling 17'.? to 18'0 of the Imper
ial budget can be cousidC'fc--d as giving Ukraine .1 proportionate
share. In all others, Ukraine gave more than she rcccivt'd. thus
making it clear that in the state budget branch of the economy,
part of Ukraine's national income was diverted in favor of met
ropolitan Russia.
To repeat our former statements on the nature of colonial
ism in the sphere of economic relations: its PSSC!lC(' is that the
surplus production of one national economy is appropriated by
another national economy hy military and political sHperiority.
This appropriation goes on by siphoning of land rents, indus
trial and commercial profits and tax budget burdens out of pro
portion to expenditures. In order to insure continued exploita
tiou, the econom:· of the colony is developed in a certain direc
tion which precludes the creation of a harmonious and unified
economic body on tlw national territory ot the l'Olon;-· aml for
this pnrposc legal norms arc promulgated, regulating economic
processes in the direction desired hy the metropolis.
We have analyzed all primary branches of the Ukrainian
economy during the period between the abolition of serfdom
anrl the rcvolntion of Hll7, i.C'. during tht' period which h just
ly catlcd thl' pt'riod of imlnstrial-capitalist <levt'loprnellt of the
Hussian Empire. \Ve have illustrated the natme of the rnain
and dPcisive economic processe� in their historical dcvclopmt•nt
during that timt'. arnl we havc invariably conw facC" to facc
with the fact of the existence of characleristi('S peculiar to colon
ies.
This ondcniably justifies to state that duri n_g this period
Ukraine was a 1T1lony of Russia, and that thr: industrial a11d
eco11omic grn1cth of Russia u;as to a great extent basr'd upmi a
colonial ex{1luitatinn of Ukraine.
Unless this i� properly recognizer!. there cm1 be no correct
evaluation mad(' either of th,.- real nat1tre of the economic den�l
opment of Hussi,1, or of those peculiar ecol!ornic proces�es which
took p!acc in Ukraine.
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This problem kl5. nnfortunately, not been sufficie1ttly clar
ifil'd to thi� day. Very many people percl'ive in the economic
centralhm of Hnssia, pccnliar to colonial t'mpircs. a sign of
ecouomic unity. This le,,ds them to regard the Hon-Russian co
lonial 11ational territories as provim.·es of Hussia and as compo
nent parts of a single economic organism.
For obvious rcasom, this matter has thm far not been given
sufficient atte11tion either iu the literature of economics, or his
tory. It is llOt in tht· interest of Rnssia. with her deeply rnotcd
Imperialism. to have this matter clarified.
As justly stated by Lashchcnko: "The development of capi
talism 'in depth' ,md 'in breadth', i.e. the spreading of capitali;,m
to new terrains
. appt'ared with great force and continued
to spread in Russia following the reform ( of 1861-Aril/wr).
This most important problem has thus far not been solved
either by the economists or the historiarn. No sC'paratc- work on
the development of Hnssian capitalism on national territories,
nor 011 such new cconmnic conditions which appeared against
this background. has as yet been ,vritten." During this period
"the development of capitalism 'in breadth' meant primarily the
colonial subjugation of national territories .... The Russian state
be�an to transform into a centralized. multi-nation state in the
16th and 17th centuries with many nations economically and po
litically subject forming its composition .... In the t>eonomic re
spect, the national terrains of Russia were to thl' mctropol is for
tlw most part colonies or semi-colonies, suppliers of all sorts of
raw material."''
This in no way contradicts another undeniable fact: the de•
sire of Russia to assimilate Ukraine completely by destroying
lwr unique national character. Oppressing all manifestations of
the Ukrainian national spirit, Russia never showed any intt>ntion
of obliterating the bouncbry in social aml economic relations by
placing the economy of Ukraine in a position of ('quality ,vith
the econnmv of Hussia. A Ukraine russificd wonld continue as
a colom· of Russia and a source of Russia's enrichment. Econ
omic centralization was b0ing 0arrit'd ont .1):!:ainst the hack1-,rr01111d of imperialism.
Suf'h contradictor\' nature of two lines of Hussia's Ukrainian
policy obviously acted to stre11gthcn the resilience of the
Ukrainian peopl(:'. Russianization unified Ukraine spiritually and
;; P. L:a�l,chenkn, op. cit., pp. 418-421.
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economic exploitation physically in opposition to the Russian
steamroller.
The icl('a of Ukrainian sPparation was, undC'r these circum
stances, the result of logical thinking in terms of reality.
:M. Volobuyev is therefore perfr-ctly right in his conclusions
made after an analvsis of the so-callC'd unitv of the Russian
Empire's economy: :'Those who speak of the 'unity of the pre
revolutionary economy of Hussia or UkraiuC', have only i11 miud
the first teudC'ncy ( towards centralism-Author) and forget
about the second. the centrifugal, or rather the desire to join
in the world system directly. not through the intnrncdiary of
the Russian economy. The process of concentration on a capital
ist basis goes on counter to the forms of autarchic tendencies,
therefore we should not deceive ourselves by the fact of conN•n
tra! ing tendencies in tlw Hussian pre-re\·olntionary economy. Bt�
hind such tendencies wC' must perceive separatist forces of the
Ukrainian economy. Hence. the question of whether there was
a single H.ussiau pre-revolutionary economy should be answered
as follows: it was a single economy on an antagonistic, imperial
ist basis, but from the viewpoint of centrifugal forces of the
colonies oppressed by her, it was a complex of national ccon
omic-s .... The Ukrainian economy was not an ordinary province
of Czarist Russia, but a land which was placed in a colonial
position."''
This ends the analysis of social and economic processes in
Ukraine prior to the 1917 revolution. ,ve end by stating that it
is a proven fac.:t that UkrainP was transformed into a colon:,·. ex
ploited by Russia for the development of her owu economy. A
natural question arises. how did this position of Ukraine influ
ence the thinking; of her population and what were its repercus
sions upon tlw social trends in Ukrainf'? This question cannot
\)(' answered by the scope, nor significance of the social-economic
processr:s herein analyzed. This is quite understandable. \Vhen
we sp('ak of the history of one or another enslaved nation. the de
cisive matter is not its subjected position, but rather the realiza
tion ot the position by the people themselves, and a crystalliza
tion of the peoples' will around the idea of national and politkal
liberation. The fador of liberation i5 in no ,vay determined by
the extent of oppression, but by the strength ot the nation's ,vill
which comes into existence when the nation realizes its op,, I\L Volobuy<>v, Inc cit.
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pressed condition. In the light of the above it would be essen
tial to provi.<le an analysis of psychological processes in the
Ukrainian community and of the social movements. But to do
this, it would be necessary to write a history of social an<l politi
cal developments in Ukraine, and this goes far beyond the scope
of this undertaking.
Tt is also necessary to postpone an analysis of this problelm
for the further reason that thus far we have concerned our
selves with economic couditions to the time of the revolution of
1917. Almcst forty years have gone by since, forty years of
weighty events, in all spheres, including economics. ·without any
change of their inner nature, the processes continued under an
entirely different set of circumstances. The social structure
underwent a basic change, likewise the nahuc of social trends.
To speak of a society's desires as of a factor which determines
the hi�torical pathways of a nation, the expression of such de
sires in a single historical moment will not suffice, the general
trend must be known.
Our task has been to show that social and economic relations
behveen Ukraine and Russia prior to the revolution were based
upon principles of national oppression. This is the kind of soil
in which the i<lea of nationalism takes root. Therefore, wishing
to discuss contemporary Ukraine, \Ve must find out whether any
changes have taken place in this respect, and if so in what direc
tion. Tt is necessary to illuminate the nature of s11hsequent so
cial and economic processes. This is the task of our undertaking
in the second volume of this work.
There we hope to characterize the awareness of the commun
ity, its desires and social movements in the entire historical pro
cess to this day. This might gi\'C us an insight into the future of
such continued processes.
\Vithout pausing at the present moment to consider the de
velopment of a national awareness in the Ukrainian people, or
the content and course of social movements in Ukraine before
the revolution of 1917, we wish to quote an historical fact which
provides a summary of all those so-cial processes an<l constitutes
their clearly visible peak.
\Ve speak of the revolution of 1917 in Ukraine.
'
From the very first days of the revolution, the problem of reshaping the social structure was inextricably connected with
the national problem.
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The social-political revolution imrnl'diatclty bl'camc a national
Ukrainian renJlntion.
A new social order was lwing introduced into the frammvork
of a sep:trate natioual-statt' organism.
ThPre was nothing- smprising about this. It came as the logi
cal conclnsion to mauy centuries of the Ukrainian uation's ex
istence, as a fact of hi�torical necessit y.
Ttlat it had to be thus was dear to all v>'ho were aware of
the real situation in Ukraine. The best testimony to the existence
of this sihiation is in the words of the most prominent statesman
in the Tiussian G(H'ernnwnt of the 20th t·entury, Prime :\linistcr
P.tStolypin, who said as early as 1906:" ... the mtional all(\ po
litical aims are so closely intertwined in the Ukrainian move
ment that it is absolutely impossible to separate them."'�t
Neither will thf'y he separated in the future.

7"

S. Shdrngokv, Sm,r,:,mrrmoye L-'krair1.1tvo, yego proiskhozhrle.niye i u1dachi
:'C:mitempornr:; Ckrainiarmm, its Origin and J\im.1), Kic•v, Hll3, p. 37.
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Translator's Postscript
READERS WIIL NOTICE from the method of tran
scription of certain ·words, especially of geographic designations
and names of persons, that then• is a discrepancy between this
method an<l generally accepted transliteration standards for Soviet
(Russian) names. This discrepancy stems from the fact that the
ovcnvhelming majority of geographic designations and names of
persons refer to Ukraine, thus diffNing from their Russian counter
parts.
A few examples will illustrate the problem: t hroughout this
book Kryi;y Rih has been used instead of Krfooy Rog, Tahanrih
instead of Taganrog, Mykolaio instead of Nikolayrv; also HryJwry
am! not Grit:orii, Myklwilu and not Mikhail. The rPason for this
is that the names are Ukrainian, and hence the author, as well the
translator, believe that they should be emphasized as such in order
not to confuse them with somewhat similar Russian names anrl
terms, or \vith names deliberately chaugcd by Russians as part
of the so-called process of Rus.�illcation. An illustration from a
different area will bring out the point with even more clarity:
during their occupation of Poland at the time of World War II,
the Nazis changed the name of the Polish city of Lodz to Litz
ma.nnstadt; the city, however, never lost its right to its original
name, and after the German withdrawal it became Lodz again as
a matter of course. So it is \vith Kryvy Rih, Mykolaiv and otht>rs;
uo amount of change hy fiat of Moscow could change their
original Ukrainian names.
In this connection, it might be added, according to all Soviet
official declarations, that the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Rcpublic
is a soverign nation ( although the veracity of this statement with
in its \Vestcm meaning is disputed), and as such it has its O\Vn
geographical terminnology, obligatory within its political bound
aries, \\foch is officially recognized by the other Soviet Jh•publics.
Once such names and term.� arc used in offic-ial Ukrainian gov
ernmental designations, they also deserve application outside
Ukraine.
Finally, we wish to refer again to the factor of Russification
or Russianization. For a cOI1siderable length of time, the Russian
conquerors of Ukraine (particularly since the time of Peter I,
following Mazepa's and Charles' XU defeat at PoltaYa in 1709),
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haw: attempted to transfor111 Ukraine to their own image. anJ
following this policy, they began to impose Russian place names
in substitution of the original Ukrai11ia11 nanws. Inasmuch as the
Ukrainians have offered political resistance to these plans of con
quest and colonization. it is on1y fair that a concession to the
fig,;htiug Ukrainians shouh.l he made in the realm of terminology.
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